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ABSTRACT
It is almost exactly one hundred years since the popular and not merely academic 
dissemination of Buddhism in the West began. During this time a dialogue has 
grown up between Buddhism and the Western discipline of psychotherapy. It is 
the contention of this work that Buddhist philosophy and praxis have much to 
offer a contemporary psychotherapy. Firstly, in general, for its long history of 
the experiential exploration of mind and for the practices of cultivation based 
thereon, and secondly, more specifically, for the relevance and resonance of 
specific Buddhist doctrines to contemporary problematics. Thus, this work 
attempts, on the basis of a three-way conversation between Buddhism, 
psychotherapy and various themes from contemporary discourse, to suggest a 
psychotherapy that may be helpful and relevant to the current horizons of thought 
and contemporary psychopathologies which are substantially different from those 
prevalent at the time of psychotherapy's early years. It is set out according to the 
traditional Tibetan Buddhist plan of Ground, Path and Fruition. "Ground" 
presents first a brief consideration of Western psychotherapies, followed by an 
introduction to Buddhist views with particular reference to those doctrines 
considered of most relevance to psychotherapy. This is followed by consideration 
of ideas of the subject or self in Buddhism and in contemporary discourse. "Path" 
reviews the two major branches of the Buddhist way, ethics and meditation, in the 
context of psychotherapy. "Fruition" compares and contrasts the goals of 
Buddhism and psychotherapy, suggesting that they may be similar in quality, the 
quality being that of liberation, but different in the quantity or extent of the 
liberation desired. Subsequently this section explores the implications of the 
Buddhist view in the light of contemporary discourse, and in the context of 
experience. Again according to a traditional pattern this is presented in terms of 
the dimensions of Body, Speech and Mind. Finally in the light of the foregoing 
some suggestions are made as to the possible general features of a contemporary 
Buddhist inspired psychotherapy. An appendix describes the individual details of 
two existing Buddhist based trainings for psychotherapists.
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"Our life is a faint tracing on the surface o f  mystery.
BUDDHISM AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
One hundred years ago in 1893 the World's Parliament of Religions was held . 
during the Exposition in Chicago. This was, perhaps, the starting point for the 
popular and not merely scholastic dissemination of Buddhism and Hinduism in 
the West. Following this conference a disciple of the Rinzai Zen Buddhist 
representative Shaku Soen came to America to work as an assistant to the scholar 
and publisher Paul Carus. This disciple was D.T. Suzuki, whose work was not 
only influential in introducing Zen to the West, but who may be said to have 
forged the first of many strong links between Buddhism and psychology by his 
interest in and openness to this then new field.2 Since that time, not only Zen, but 
many different forms of Buddhism have, at some stage in their reception in the 
West, been associated with aspects of psychology. "Many different forms of 
Buddhism" associated with "aspects of psychology"; thus the first step in this 
work needs to be definition. For there are, indeed, many forms of psychology, 
more of psychotherapy, and also many "Buddhisms". Overall my emphasis is 
general rather than specific. According to the Oxford Dictionary, psychology is 
"(a) the science of the nature, function, and phenomenon of the human soul or 
mind; (b) A treatise on, or system of psychology." Psychotherapeutic is "of or
1 A. Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, p. 131.
2 In particular the works o f William James who was a friend o f Carus.
pertaining to the treatment of mental or psychic disease." In this study I shall 
generally use psychology to denote the theory of mind, and psychotherapy, praxis 
relating to healing of disease or to healthful expansion of the potential of the mind 
of the individual. However, I am aware that at times there is some overlap. 
When speaking of Buddhism, I am attempting, as far as possible, to give an 
overall view, explicating those doctrines which are central to Buddhism in 
general, rather than restricted to any particular school. Views from specific 
schools and outlooks will be credited as such. However, I acknowledge that the 
balance is weighted towards the views of Mahayana in general and Tibetan 
Buddhism in particular. I would also agree with David Loy, one of the most 
interesting participants in the dialogue between Buddhism and contemporary 
thought, in his suggestion that we should distinguish between Buddhism as a path 
of liberation and Buddhism as an institution. My concern is pre-eminently with 
the former. While I hope to show that the philosophy and praxis of Buddhism as 
a path of liberation may be interpreted as almost uncannily in tune with the 
contemporary horizon of ideas, this is not the interpretation of any of the more 
culturally crystallised forms of institutional Buddhism as religion, though 
partaking of aspects of all of them. Let us now return to history.
In 1923 Mrs. Rhys Davids entitled her translation of one of the books of the 
Theravada Abhidharma, A Buddhist Manual o f  Psychological Ethics, and wrote: 
"Buddhism from a quite early stage of its development set itself to analyse and 
classify mental processes with remarkable insight and sagacity. And on the 
results of that psychological analysis it sought to base the whole rationale of its 
practical doctrine and discipline. From studying the processes of attention, and 
the nature of 'sensation', the range and depth of feeling and the plasticity of the 
will in desire and in control, it organised its system of personal self-culture."3
In the 1930s Carl Jung published psychological commentaries to accompany 
German translations of two major Tibetan works, The Tibetan Book o f  the Dead 
and The Tibetan Book o f  the Great Liberation. In 1939 he also wrote an 
introduction to a German translation of D.T. Suzuki's Introduction to Zen 
Buddhism  and in 1943 he delivered a lecture on The Psychology o f  Eastern 
Meditation. Although Jung was always extremely wary of what he saw as the 
dangers and illusory promises of Eastern texts and ways for Westerners, and felt 
that a direct transplantation of Zen or Tibetan Buddhism was neither possible nor 
commendable, he could not fail to be impressed by the seriousness of their
3 C.A. Rhys Davids, (trs.) Dhamma-Sangani. A  Buddhist Manual o f  Psychological Ethics, 
introduction.
9enterprise and its relevance for therapists, writing of Zen that, "the 
psychotherapist who is seriously concerned with the question of the aim of his 
therapy cannot remain unmoved when he sees the end towards which this Eastern 
method of psychic 'healing' - i.e., 'making whole' - is striving. As we know, this 
question has occupied the most adventurous minds of the East for more than two 
thousand years, and in this respect methods and philosophical doctrines have been 
developed which simply put all Western attempts along those lines into the 
shade."4
In 1957 D.T. Suzuki was the guest of honour at a conference on Psychoanalysis 
and Zen Buddhism at the National University of Mexico, resulting in a 
publication containing works by himself and by Erich Fromm and others.5 In 
1961 Alan Watts, who wrote many works popularising Buddhism and Taoism, 
published Psychotherapy East and West stating: "The main resemblance between 
the Eastern ways of life and Western psychotherapy is in the concern of both with 
bringing about changes of consciousness, changes in our ways of feeling our own 
existence and our relations to human society and the natural world."6 Since the 
1960s the dialogue between Buddhism and psychology has expanded 
exponentially. At that time Watts claimed to have read everything written in the 
field. Today that would hardly be possible, such has been the explosion of texts 
concerned with the subject, particularly after events in 1959 initiated the 
dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism in the West. Nor has the emphasis been 
entirely one way. When some Tibetan centres in the West were founded, certain 
teachers such as Chogyam Trungpa and Tarthang Tulku gave their teachings a 
specifically psychological slant, and directed them towards an audience of 
psychotherapists and healers.7
Why have there been historically and do there continue to be, these strong links 
between Buddhism and the world of psychology? I would argue that there are 
several reasons: some that come from the very nature of Buddhism and of 
psychology, and some that come from the specific relevance of Buddhist ideas 
now to the contemporary scene in the West. Of the former the most important is 
an overwhelming shared concern with experience. This is at the heart of
C.G. Jung, Collected Works, Vol. 11, para. 905.
E. Fromm, D.T. Suzuki & R. DeMartino, Zen Buddhism & Psychoanalysis..
A. Watts, Psychotherapy East &  West. p. 11.
For example the Human Development Training Program, an eight-week intensive 
seminar offered several summers running by Tarthang Tulku at the Nyingma Institute, 
Berkeley, for professionals in the helping professions. See Gay Gaer Luce, "Western 
Psychology Meets Tibetan Buddhism" in Tarthang Tulku (ed.), Crystal MirrorlU.
Buddhism, the very foundation of Buddhist philosophy.8 Indeed Buddhism has, 
from a Western perspective, been described as a psychological religion, for its 
"entire philosophy and the medical system which adjoins it, is based on the 
analysis of mind . . .  the Dharma is not a rigid theology, but a support for the 
search for the real meaning in life, and for the attempt to comprehend oneself, 
one's mind and the nature of one's experience."9 Using terminology more 
frequently found in the realms of psychotherapy and counselling Sue Hamilton 
has recently described Buddhism, perhaps uniquely among the world's major 
religions, as "notably person-centred."10 Although Buddhist teachings are deeply 
rooted in philosophical and cosmological considerations, their principal aim is 
concerned with understanding the human condition. Liberation from the suffering 
of ordinary life is achieved through understanding its nature. In line with this, I 
would agree also with Richard Gombrich's assertion that Buddhism is not pre­
eminently concerned with ontology, with what exists, but is concerned rather with 
how things exist, with existence and our experience of it rather than essence.11
And the method of considering experience is through analysis of the 
Concern with mind is central to Buddhism. As the Dhammapada begins:
We are what we think 
All that we are arises with our thoughts.
With our thoughts we make the world.
Speak or act with an impure mind 
And trouble will follow you 
As the wheel follows the ox that draws the cart.
We are what we think 
All that we are arises with our thoughts.
With our thoughts we make the world.
Speak or act with a pure mind 
And happiness will follow you
"But this doctrine is concerned with things of this life, and is not a matter o f time; it bids 
man to come and behold, it guides him on and away, and should be known by the wise as 
a personal experience." The Book o f  the Kindred Sayings (Samyutta Nikaya), Vol. 1, 
p. 147.
T.Clifford, The Diamond Healing, p.215.
S. Hamilton, "Passionlessness in Buddhism". A paper delivered at Wolfson College,
Oxford, March 1994.
This was expressed in his presentation of the Louis H. Jordan Lectures in Comparative
Religion 1994, "How Buddhism Began: the Conditioned Genesis o f the Early Teachings,"
particularly in the first seminar entitled, "How, not what: kamma as a reaction to
brahminism."
As your shadow, unshakeable.12
Following on from recognition of the importance of mind, Buddhism provides 
over two thousand years of experience of the systematic and phenomenological 
study of the mind, and of methods of cultivation of desirable mental processes 
based on this. Such practices of cultivation of mind arise hand in hand with the 
philosophical theories which underwrite them, something which is quite alien to 
Western philosophy which almost entirely separates itself from questions of 
practice and of embodied experience.13 In the East personal cultivation is an 
integral part of traditional philosophy. Knowledge is not divorced from usage, 
from practical questions of personal salvation, behaviour and ethics to the extent 
that has occurred in the West where philosophy has become increasingly an 
endangered species in the natural world, to be found only in the protected and 
high-walled pastures of the academy. True knowledge according to Buddhism, is 
considered not to be the result of mere theoretical thinking but a realisation that 
involves one's total mind and body. It is learning with the body/mind and not the 
brain alone, as is evident in the Buddhist trilogy of morality, meditation and 
wisdom. Like Buddhism, psychotherapy is a process whereby through the initial 
application of language and analysis, a deeper level of experience is sought, a 
realisation through which change and transformation may occur. Although the 
first psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, was called "the talking cure", to effect lasting 
benefit an affective embodied realisation needs to be experienced. Rational 
analytic understanding alone will not suffice to bring about transformation.
Even etymologically there are links between therapy and Buddhism. Archetypal 
psychologist James Hillman notes "the Greek word therapeia refers also to care, 
the root is dher, which means 'carry, support, hold,' and is related to dharma, the 
Sanskrit meaning 'habit' and 'custom' as 'carrier.' The therapist is one who carries 
and takes care as does a servant (Greek = theraps, therapon)."14 A Tibetan lama 
also points to dharma as the carrier of truth, which can be thought of as an 
antidote, a remedy or cure to promote change and transformation.15 The therapist 
is one who carries and takes care.
12 The Dhammapada (trs.) T. Byrom. London: Wildwood House, 1976, p. 3.
13 "Western philosophy has been more concerned with the rational understanding o f life and 
mind than with the relevance of a pragmatic method for transforming human experience." 
Varela, Thompson & Rosch, The Embodied Mind, p.218.
14 J.Hillman, Blue Fire. p. 73. Dharma is a central term in Buddhism, standing both for 
truth or teaching and for phenomena. It is glossed by Walpola Rahula as "Truth, 
Teaching, doctrine, righteousness, piety, morality, justice, nature, all things and states 
conditioned or unconditioned etc."
15 Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche, The Union ofMahamudra andDzogchen. p. 1..
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Psychotherapy is a practical and purposeful enterprise for relieving suffering and 
expanding potential. Can the thousands of years of Buddhist exploration of this 
field be of assistance to this relatively young Western discourse? This is the 
problematic of this work, and its exploration of this is particularly concerned with 
the contemporary context, the current field of ideas, knowledge and experience 
which we inhabit today, which is already a significantly different context from 
that in which psychology and psychotherapy had their beginnings. i
-  A  ,f
BUDDHISM AND THE CONTEMPORARY HORIZON
Thus, it is the question of the relevance of Buddhism to the contemporai 
situation which may be most compelling and most important. For Western views 
would_seem to be in the process of experiencing a paradigm shift.16 Nietzsche 
proclaimed the death of God; Heidegger' saw the end of metaphysics in 
forgetfulness of Being; Derrida has undertaken the deconstruction of logocentric 
philosophy. The atom has been split unleashing the potential for vast destruction, 
the principle of relativity and the principle of uncertainty have been discovered.
New views coming from philosophy, literature and science seriously unsettle 
ancient beliefs and certainties, even those of earlier science itself. Speaking in 
general terms they show a concern for difference rather than identity, for process 
rather than for substance and for relativity, contingency and specificity rather than 
for absolute overarching and unchanging truths and systems. Such views 
challenge and undermine the traditional dualities of earlier Western philosophies, 
but can, I will suggest, engage in dialogue more easily with ancient Buddhist 
views, particularly those of the Madhyamaka school.17 A Christian, albeit 
radical, theologian Don Cupitt recently suggested that we are getting ourselves 
"into a rather Buddhist cultural condition", and named it "a post Buddhism of the 
sign."18
16 See T. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions.
17 For changing views in Science and their relation to Buddhism see F. Capra, The Tao o f
Physics; J.W. Hayward, Shifting Worlds, Changing Minds; B.A. Wallace, Choosing 
Reality; in philosophy, C.Gudmunson, W ittgenstein & Buddhism ; C.W. 
Huntingdon, The Emptiness o f  Emptiness and ''A non-referential view o f language and 
conceptual thought in the work o f Tsong-kha-pa"; A.P. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy 
and the Philosophy o f  Scholarship; R.Thurman, 'Philosophical nonegocentricism in 
Wittgenstein & Candraklrti."
18 D.Cupitt, The Time Being, p.2.
First it is necessary to attempt some description of the postmodern, a description 
rather than a definition which would surely in itself be a contradiction in terms for 
something open-ended, unbounded and in process of becoming. I use the word 
postmodern with caution, aware of the aura (both of avocation and disagreement) 
which hangs over it, as a useful term to embrace the multifarious array of 
concepts and characteristics of that contemporary discourse which has followed 
the modem.19 The postmodern begins with a sense that the world we inherited, 
upheld by the foundations of philosophic and scientific theories, is crumbling.20 
The main theme of the postmodern is Lyotard’s oft-quoted "incredulity towards 
metanarratives,"21 those unquestioned foundations which give legitimacy to our 
beliefs and actions. The resultant difficulty of legitimation may be the cause for 
the neo-pragmatism that is another of the major aspects of the postmodern.22 If 
legitimation is not to be found in a conceptual abstraction (God or truth or reality) 
outside the system it legitimises, an immanent and pragmatic legitimation in 
action may be sought instead; a legitimation in action occurring in a context of 
embodiment and shared linguistic and cultural practice.
Other major themes are those of difference, decentralisation and new views of self 
in which the earlier modem view of the decontextualised individual is both 
fragmented and re-inserted into the social and cultural context. There is a 
simultaneous loss of naive realism, belief in the objective world; human 
knowledge is no longer considered as representation, a mirror of an externally 
existing reality, but is seen as a construction, a mutual "enaction"23 which arises 
from cognitive and embodied interactions with the world. Through all of these 
themes weaves a most important thread of interaction and interdependence. If 
modem discourse was monologic and closed, postmodern discourse is open and in 
process. If the modem world was a representation of externally existing reality 
which accorded with transcendental rules, the postmodern world is conditioned, 
contingent, outsideless, immanent in itself with no external guarantees, and is a 
function of the meaning with which we imbue it, and is tied to the context of 
society, language and history within which it is embedded. And it is unfinished,
Lyotard used the term "modemH to designate any science that legitimates itself with 
reference to a metadiscourse.
"Postmodernism begins when the nihilism of the modern world is seriously perceived, 
and when the vision of reason that brought this world into being is no longer permitted to 
rule unchallenged." D.M.Levin, The Opening o f  Vision, p.26.
J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiv. This description itself has been 
criticised as legitimising the non-necessity of legitimation.
Neo-pragmatism, to differentiate itself from earlier American pragmatism, incorporates 
distinctly postmodern ideas of foundationlessness and fragmentation.
This term is specifically employed by Varela, Thompson & Rosch, whose views 
expressed in The Embodied Mind will be referred to below.
unfinalizable, in process of becoming. In short, the postmodern world view, like 
the Buddhist one, carries the marks of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and 
selflesness.
BUDDHISM, AS AN INSPIRATION FOR A CONTEMPORARY 
BSY-CHQ.THERAPY
Thus, it is in this postmodern climate that I suggest that Buddhist teachings may 
resonate clearly for us in the West today.24 Firstly the view given by Buddhism 
has always been essentially different from that of the 'modem' West from which 
we too today are forcefully growing estranged.25 Buddhism emphasises process 
rather than substance in a seemingly contemporary manner. At the foundation of 
Buddhist philosophy is a view of interdependent origination of all phenomena 
which is quite distinct from the linear causality espoused by the West. 
Underlying this network of interdependent origination is emptiness, the 
transparency or lack of essential, unchanging essence in all phenomena, including 
persons. These views of the contingency, impermanence and dependence of all 
phenomena including persons, hand in hand with an understanding of the way. 
suffering arises in everyday human life when they are ignored, constitute the 
Buddhist view. The descriptions and models of causality and of the human being 
are undertaken in order to show how things occur rather than what they consist of. 
Through understanding of how the world is, how its processes work and how we 
perceive them, liberation from ignorance and suffering may be gained. Those 
metaphysical questions concerned with ontology are the questions that the 
Buddha refused to answer. The outlook and practices which rest upon such non- 
substantial foundations display a middle path, a centred understanding, free of the 
major dualities which structure our very thought in the West, the hierarchy of 
distinctions of our essentially dualistic mode of thinking. Subjective/objective, 
inner/outer, self/world, mind/body, life/death become interrelated and 
interdependent rather than contradictory, in a logic of complementarity rather than 
of exclusion.26
24 "A world that accepts the multiplicity o f perception, the insubstantiality and contingency 
o f reality, the disturbing, fragmented, elusive, indeterminate nature o f the self, the 
pervasive confusion and anguish of human consciousness would seem to fit Buddhism 
like a glove." S. Batchelor, The Awakening o f  the West. p.273.
25 See above n. 19.
26 The bivalent orientation of Western scientific thinking has quite recently been challenged 
by what is called Fuzzy Logic, a multivalued or ’vague’ logic, based on a continuous
Secondly, I would point to the holistic view presented by Buddhism in which 
philosophy, religion, psychology, morality and even medicine are inextricably 
interlinked. In the history of western psychology, with the striking early 
exception of William James with his works on psychology, philosophy and 
religious experience, all these disciplines have become increasingly independent 
and isolated from one another. As an American psychologist wrote recently; "We 
have lost sight of the deeper roots of our discipline in philosophy, and in turn of 
philosophy in religion."27 Medard Boss, instigator of Daseinsanalyse, an 
existential approach to psychoanalysis based on the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger also regretted this lack of consciousness of interdependence: "Western 
psychology tells us absolutely nothing about the subjectivity of the subject, the 
personality of the person and the consciousness of the mind in a manner that 
would enable us to understand the connection between these, the environment and 
our real selves."28 Such a concern for the nature of the world and the relation 
between man and world is vital, and "its adequacy in regard to the particular way 
of mans' existence will always be of first importance for their practical therapeutic 
actions as well."29
In the West itself, the changes in view mentioned above have led recently to a 
more interactive understanding, and new hybrid disciplines such as Cognitive 
Science and Systems Theory have arisen which partake of many previously 
separate areas of study. It is here that some of the most exciting Western studies 
in the field of Mind are taking place, some of which have themselves given rise to 
comparisons with Buddhist views.30 It has even been suggested that the 
discipline of scientific psychology itself is pre-eminently a child of modernity that 
in the postmodern era is out of touch with contemporary discourse; that indeed the 
terms "psychology" and "postmodemity" may be incompatible, and that the main 
tasks for a postmodern psychology, those of cultural critique and the construction 
of new worlds may be better carried out by anthropology and literary theory.31 
Only some trends in practical psychology are seen as being closer to postmodern
matter of degree rather than exclusivity. A recent book on this subject points out that a 
map of those areas in which research on fuzzy logic is respected and widespread is 
closely comparable to a map of those areas in which Buddhist thought flourishes. Such 
thinking was largely rejected in the West until the results o f its application in 
technological contexts became apparent. B. Kosko, Fuzzy Thinking, p.72.
27 D. Goleman, Mind Science, p. 3.
28 M. Boss, A Psychiatrist Discovers India, p. 10.
29 Ibid. p . m .
30 J.Macy, Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory; F.J.Varela,
E.Thompson, E.Rosch, The Embodied Mind; G. Watson, G. Claxton, & S. Batchelor, 
(eds.), The Fly & The Fly Bottle; L. Olds, Metaphors o f  Interrelatedness, p. 129.
31 S.Kvale, "Postmodern Psychology: A contradiction in terms?" p.31.
conceptions displaying a shift in the focus of theorising away from both the 
interiority of the individual and the metanarratives of natural science towards 
relationship with society and communities of practice. However, here too the 
findings of current research and ideas are only just being acknowledged. Their 
effects upon psychotherapy are hard to find.
Even in western terms, the very word psyche  has suffered a constriction of 
meaning. "Psyche was for the Greeks an unbreakable relationship between men, 
gods and nature which even encompassed death."32 The contemporary western 
view considers mind alone as the exclusive locus of concepts, values and feelings, 
so that it alone is seen as psychic and is separated from body and from world. 
Obviously such a belief narrows the field of psychotherapy. It has been suggested 
that this separation with its accompanying move towards interiority is a 
consequence of progression from an oral to a literary culture, and from the 
participatory view of an "ontic logos", world conceived as a self manifesting 
reality, to a disengaged stance towards a mechanistic universe.33 Such separation 
is a loss, and it is symptomatic of many separations found in the western view. 
The contemporary western individual has, perhaps, become more isolated in his or 
her individuality than at any other time. Links with family, with land, with 
tradition and society are increasingly rarely honoured or studied. In some ways it 
may be argued that psychotherapy itself, both in its theories and its practices, has 
unwittingly contributed to, and exacerbated this isolation, due to its emphasis on 
individuality and interiority, and its exclusion of the cultural and political 
horizons of the individual life.
a Traditionally, as we have seen, western views have been dualistic, and the non- 
dualistic view of Buddhism may offer a new ahd helpful perspective to those in 
the West who are now suffering from alienation and the reactionary narcissism 
which has arisen from our separation of man and world, following in the wake of 
”~fEe~collapse of many traditional religious beliefs. Such a view may helpfully
32 C. Hampden Turner, MapTofthel^Iind7]p /R T B . Bettelheim has mourned the loss in the 
English translation of Freud's work which has replaced psyche with mind, with 
concomitant loss of meaning and value. See Freud & Man's Soul.
33 A.C. Klein, The Great Bliss Queen, p. 185 cites W. Ong as seeing this separation as the 
result o f the change from an oral to a literary culture. In the latter feelings and 
experiences are considered to be the interior property of an individual, and if  projected 
beyond this, will be projected onto other individuals, whereas in oral cultures feelings and 
experienced are more likely to be expressed and located in the wider space outside and 
around individuals in the world. Klein also notes Charles Taylor's view o f this change 
occurring in the progression from a participatory world view to a mechanistic one. In the 
first: "Ideas are ontic, the basis o f reality, for the second they are contents o f  mind." 
C.Taylor, Sources o f  the Self. p .188. This progression may be mapped onto the 
movement from the first to the second Bakhtinian stages, and a prospective reintegration 
to the third. See below p. 17.
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enter into dialogue with those western voices which have attempted to find new 
ways of seeing unconfined by traditional "common-sense" or traditional 
philosophical distinctions.
CONTENTIONS AND INTENTIONS
Thus it is the contention of this work that Buddhism has much to offer Western 
psychotherapy at this time. Firstly because of its long history of familiarity with, 
and exploration of, such views as interdependence and emptiness. Secondly, and 
more importantly, because, unlike the separate intellectual disciplines of the West, 
it is not merely analytical or descriptive, but is a 'way', containing methods of 
practice and cultivation of awareness which may link theory with experience, 
instantiate views in praxis and offer a legitimation and escape from relativism in 
practice and in non-egocentrism. All of which may enable an alternative view of 
psychology which, as Kvale suggests, may enable it to move out of "the 
archaeology of the psyche and into the cultural landscape of the present world, 
entering a postmodern discourse."34
This work sets out from these links between Buddhism and psychotherapy, with a 
desire to place them in the context of contemporary discourse which, questioning 
its own western precursors, is frequently found to resonate with Buddhist 
concepts. From the Buddhist perspective, engaged as I am with the specifically 
human experiential realm of psychotherapy, my concern, as I have stated, is not 
with the specifically transcendental and religious dimensions of Buddhism as an 
institution, but more with those aspects and ideas which provide theoretical 
expositions and concrete methods for the attainment and retention of mentally and 
emotionally healthy living; that is with Buddhism as a path of liberation.. From 
the Western perspective it is influenced by many thinkers whose work has led to, 
or constitutes, the postmodern view with its questioning of the previously 
unquestioned divisions of mind/body and individual/world. Pre-eminent amongst 
these are Europeans such as Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and 
Lacan, also Americans, Rorty, Lakoff and Johnson; and from the realms of 
cognitive science, the work of Francisco Varela and his colleagues. It is much
influenced by the dialogical approach of Mikhail Bakhtin. The principle of
S. Kvale, "Postmodern Psychology: a contradiction in terms?" p. 53.
dialogue is that all meaning is relative, a result of the relation between at least two 
bodies. Every dialogue consists of an utterance, a response and the relation 
between them. It is a model neither of monism nor of dualism but of multiplicity 
or polyphony. No word or self is virgin and isolated, "every word is directed 
towards an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering 
word that it anticipates."35 The fundamental a priori of the dialogical approach is 
"that nothing is in itself. Existence is sobytie sobytiya, the event of co-being; it is 
a vast web of interconnections each and all of which are linked as participants in 
an event whose totality is so immense that no single one of us can ever know it."36
From Bakhtin's history of sociocultural periods anthropologist Stan Mumford has 
extrapolated a model of three layers of temporal identity which I find to be most 
useful.37 The first period which Bakhtin calls the ancient matrix or folkloric 
period is that in which the life of man and nature is fused, time is perceived as 
cyclical, spatial and concrete containing all elements in equal validity. The 
experience of primitive man in this layer was seen as an aspect of life itself, not as 
a function of his abstract thought processes or consciousness. From this ancient 
matrix arises the second layer of the individual life sequence in which the 
embedded realities of the matrix are dissociated from one another, and undergo 
internal splitting and a hierarchical reinterpretation, and become impoverished 
within the boundaries of individual life narratives. In the transition to the third 
layer of historical becoming, the boundaries of individuals and ideologies become 
questioned and doubted, subjected to mockery and irony, and the bounded 
individual is recontextualised, as images of the ancient matrix return in a reflexive 
manner, the result of dialogue between many interpenetrating voices of cultural 
and ideological exchange. This tripartite sequence will be found relevant to many 
processes described throughout this work. It can be found in the evolution of the 
postmodern from the modem and premodem. It may also be used to describe 
aspects of the development of Buddhist philosophy, the development and 
transcendence of the individual self, and aspects of the development of Western 
psychology. Psychotherapy has predominantly considered itself only in terms of 
the middle, individualistic period of this model. Perhaps an almost unconscious 
realisation of the impoverishment of this lies behind an increasing contemporary 
interest in shamanism, myth and folklore.
M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, p.280.
M. Holquist, Dialogism. p. 41.
S. Mumford, Himalayan Dialogue, p.l 6. Mumford takes his model from Bakhtin's work 
on chronotopes, periods distinguished by the manner in which time and space are 
experienced, and by the degree o f dialogic awareness, see M. M.Bakhtin, The Dialogical 
Imagination.
This idea of the relationship and interconnectedness presented by Bakhtin and by 
the Buddhist doctrines of dependent origination and emptiness is most fully 
expressed by the school of Hua Yen Buddhism with its image of the net of Indra. 
This symbol, used to explain the cosmos and the manner in which things exist in 
mutual identity and intercausality, portrays an image of a cosmic web extending 
infinitely in time and space, whose every intersection contains a jewel in whose 
polished surface every other jewel and its reflections are reflected. Furthermore 
each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the others, so 
there is an infinite reflecting process occurring.38 This is the guiding image 
which lies behind the approach of this work, which is an attempt to carry on 
dialogue between several different discourses. It is an attempt to explore 
conversation between Buddhism and contemporary postmodern discourse. For in 
terms of Richard Rorty's distinction between philosophy that is systematic, 
providing grounds for present customs and that whose "aim is to edify - to help 
their readers - or society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and 
attitudes", Buddhism has always presented an "edifying" philosophy, which 
strangely may appear more in tune today than the systematic philosophies of the 
more recent western past.39 It is also an attempt to situate psychotherapy, both in 
the context of this contemporary discourse from philosophy, science and literary 
theory and in the context of the contemporary pathologies with which it is faced, 
some of which may be seen to be resultant from a disability to live with these very 
views.40 It is finally and pre-eminently an attempt to explore and illuminate the 
dialogue between Buddhist views and practices and a psychotherapy for the 
current time, in the hope that similarities of view, and the long Buddhist tradition 
of mind training may give rise to an approach arising from the meeting between 
Buddhism, psychotherapy and contemporary discourse which may be of value in 
the training of therapists.
Thus, it is one aim of this paper to see psychotherapy as part of the postmodern 
world of historical becoming, inserted within a many-voiced dialogue. That there 
are major differences between Buddhism, postmodernism and psychotherapy may 
be not an impasse but a source of possibility for dialogue. For the intention is not 
to weld them together into a new metanarrative or to reach the closure of a
38 A contemporary image might be found in the infinite infolded recurrence o f fractals.
39 R.Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f  Nature, p. 12. & pp. 365-379.
40 "Thus, our cases of psychopathology cannot be understood outside an ontological field of 
interpretation in which we acknowledge our present historical experience of Being, our 
debilitating loss of conviction in the meaningfulness of living, our dreadfiil encounter 
with the possibility of nothingness." D.M. Levin, "Psychopathology in the Epoch of 
Nihilism" p. 26.
coherent totality, but to encourage open-ended dialogue, wherein acceptance of 
difference leads to new insights and continuing conversation. Contemporary 
discourse stresses the "between". It is from the spaces, the relationship, the 
intervals, that new dialogue emerges.41 Furthermore as Rorty suggests: "Edifying 
philosophers want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can 
sometimes cause - wonder that there is something new under the sun, something 
which is not an accurate representation of what was already there, something 
which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained and can barely be 
described."42
The middle way of Buddhism with its reliance on interdependence and emptiness 
exemplifies this attempt to keep dialogue open, the attempt to evade both the 
closure of the monologic and the lack of differentiation of the folkloric. Such a 
middle way mediates between the major Western distinctions of individual and 
world, subject and object, and mind and body. The search for such an approach is 
a recurring theme in contemporary discourse, a search for a "between" that 
escapes the unsatisfactory dualism of subject/object, body/mind and self/world. 
Echoes of such a project are heard in many different fields; in Heidegger's 
"Dase/n", Polanyi's "indwelling", Merleau-Ponty's "flesh", Geoffrey Samuel's 
"multimodal framework" and in Gregory Bateson's "the pattern that connects", 
and his reference to patterns of relatedness as "the ecology of mind". If the image 
of the individualistic modem age was the hierarchical tree, the image for the 
postmodern or the dialogic is surely the aforementioned net of Indra. Another 
image is that of the rhizome, a many-centred, interconnecting underground 
network.43 Each image encompasses many centres, many perspectives, none with 
overriding hierarchical dominance, just as, according to Rorty there is no longer a 
human essence, only a conversation of many voices. A contemporary 
psychotherapy must be in touch with what Samuel calls "the flow of relatedness" 
and imbued with such images.44 If Buddhism is already a philosophy of the 
between - between asceticism and sensuality, between etemalism and nihilism -
S.Gans speaking of Levinas refers to: "the between of human relatedness" in "Levinas & 
Pontalis". p.85. Homi Bhabha speaks of: "the emergence of the interstices - the overlap 
and displacement o f domains o f difference ... and the formation of subjects 'in between', 
or in excess of, the sum o f the 'parts' of difference..." The Location o f  Culture, p.2. He 
points out presciently that if the 'post' in postmodern or poststructural is to bear any 
meaning at all, it must not lie in the merely sequential meaning o f 'post', but in a 
transformation o f the present into: "an expanded or ex-centric site o f  experience and 
empowerment." (p.4). The very limits and fragmentation o f the grand meta-narratives 
become the boundaries from which "something begins its presencing." (p.6.)
R.Rorty, Philosophy & the M inor o f  Nature., p.370.
This comes from G.Deleuze & F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trs. B.Massumi, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1986.
G. Samuel, Mind, Body & Culture, p. 12.
the dialogue we are about to enter is doubly between. It is, I suggest, in the very 
process of this constant betweenness, which refuses to weld itself into an 
objectified totality but remains responsive to shifting, impermanent and 
interdependent processes and boundaries, that its value lies.
In the past three decades, as I have mentioned, a great amount has been written 
about the meeting of Buddhism and psychology or psychotherapy, but such works 
have usually approached this wide topic from a point of comparison between one 
particular school of therapy and one particular school of Buddhism, or have 
focused on a single aspect such as meditation.45 They have also most frequently 
been written by psychotherapists who are Buddhist followers of one or another 
specific tradition.
As shown in the appendices to this work, two Buddhist influenced trainings for 
psychotherapists exist, and a third is contemplated.46 However none of these have 
as yet produced any comprehensive written account covering both their theoretical 
approach and practical training, or explicated the interrelationship between the 
Buddhist and the Western components of the training. They have mostly 
concentrated on the practical aspects of incorporating Buddhist models of mind 
and awareness techniques into Western psychotherapies without fully exploring, 
the theoretical and moral aspects which underlie such models and practices.47 
Thus, it seems timely to step back from close discussion of the manner in which 
specific Buddhist theories or practices compare with or assist specific types of 
psychotherapies, to consider the wider view. To consider what it is in Buddhism, 
in its generally shared theories and practices, which is attractive and valuable to 
the psychotherapeutic project.
For example: R.Moacanin, Jung's Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism; M. West (ed.), The 
Psychology o f  Meditation; and edited collections of essays from various viewpoints e.g. 
J.Welwood (ed.), The Meeting o f  the Ways and Awakening the Heart; N. Katz (ed.), 
Buddhism & Western Psychology; G. Claxton (ed.), Beyond Therapy; J.H. Crook & D. 
Fontana (eds.), Space in Mind.
Under the guidance o f Akong Rinpoche at Samye Ling in Scotland a training for 
psychotherapists is currently beginning. It appears that it will differ from the two 
trainings described in the appendices in its closer adherence to traditional Buddhist 
practice.
In 1963 R.D. Laing considered the need for a firm primary theory for psychotherapy 
which would draw all practices and theories into relation with the central concerns o f all 
forms o f psychotherapy. He suggested that the fundamental requirements o f such a 
theory are "concepts which both indicate the interaction and inter-experience o f two 
persons, and help us to understand the relation between each person's own experience and 
his own behaviour, within the context of the relationship between them. And we must in 
turn be able to conceive o f this relationship within the relevant contextual social systems. 
Most fundamentally a critical theory must be able to place all theories and practices 
within the scope o f a total vision o f the ontological structure o f being human." The 
Politics o f  Experience, p.40.
This study then, is an attempt to provide an overview; an attempt to explicate the 
underlying theories of Buddhism in relation to psychotherapy and to 
contemporary discourse, as well as their instantiation in practice. Coming from 
academic familiarity with the field of Buddhist studies and practical experience as 
a trained psychotherapist, I will attempt to explore issues within Buddhist 
philosophy and praxis which, I argue, may provide inspiration for a good 
contemporary psychotherapy which is aware of its position vis-a-vis other 
contemporary discourse, and the pathologies with which it is faced. I will also try 
to situate those theories, models and practices which a Buddhist-influenced 
psychotherapy might use within the context of the central tenets of Buddhist 
thought. This last issue is addressed in reply to the critique that to take randomly 
from Buddhism only what is useful in another context is not only unjustifiable but 
weakening to Buddhism itself. It arises also from some disquiet concerning the 
lack of consideration given to contextualising those theories and practices taught 
in the context of psychotherapy within the sphere of Buddhist thought. The 
importance of hermeneutic awareness of contextuality is central within this work.
To cover all these areas in detail would obviously require several books. It is my 
intention to delineate the territory, introduce the participants and suggest the 
dialogue. More detailed and carefully selected perspectives have been and will 
continue to be explored, but what has not appeared heretofore is a broadly-based 
discussion on the topic of Buddhist inspiration for a psychotherapy which is 
aware of and responsive to the horizons of contemporary Western thought and 
research. This is a question of Buddhist philosophy and praxis as an inspiration 
for an integrative psychotherapy; it is not advocacy of Buddhism as a therapy.
There will also be more emphasis on the training of therapists than on clinical 
experience. For as Jung wrote, "the attitude of the therapist is infinitely more 
important than the theories and methods of psychotherapy."48 Such observations 
regarding the prime importance of attitudes and personality of therapist and client, 
rather than the centrality of technique or theory have been confirmed in 
subsequent studies.49 The views and practices influenced by Buddhism will
C.G.Jung, Collected Works, Vol. 11, para. 537.
"We find increasing acknowledgement o f the fact that psychotherapeutic results are 
strikingly similar regardless of the theoretical framework followed by each therapist; that 
the personality o f the therapist is more important than his adherence to a particular 
school o f thought." G.Mora, "Recent American Psychiatric Developments", p. 32. Also 
R.Russell, Report on Effective Psychotherapy & Legislative Testimony and J. Norcross, 
(ed.), Handbook o f  Eclectic Psychotherapy. For an overview o f research on 
psychotherapy outcome see Stiles, Shapiro & Elliot, "Are all psychotherapies equal?".
inform the work of the therapist as an approach; to become implicit in the way she 
works rather than to act as an overt offering or theoretical framework for the 
client. Thus there is no necessity for the client to espouse Buddhist ideals and 
beliefs themselves, or even to be made aware of the Buddhist inspiration behind 
the therapeutic practice.50 Nor is it necessary for the therapists to become 
practising and committed Buddhists, though for the therapists a positive attitude 
towards the philosophy of Buddhism and the ideals of mindfulness would be 
necessary.51
Perhaps the ambivalent results of research into the process and results of 
psychotherapy to date are a reflection of how little is really understood about the 
process of therapy itself. As a therapist wrote recently: "Our understanding of the 
human psyche is considerably more solid than is our understanding of 
psychotherapeutic work."52 In 1964 R. D.Laing stated that: "Psychotherapy must 
remain an obstinate attempt of two people to recover the wholeness of being 
human through the relationship between them."53 It may, perhaps, be seen as a 
paradigm of human interaction. What occurs in the therapeutic encounter is a 
meeting of two or more individuals, their energies, relationships and world views; 
body, speech and mind. For the therapist, at least, some explicit understanding of 
their own philosophy is necessary. As the existential psychiatrist Medard Boss 
wrote: "It is not necessary that the patient himself learn to recognize thematically 
the ontological existential structure of human being-in-the-world. His insight 
need not extend beyond the limits of his individual, directly perceptible ontic 
ways of relating to the therapist. But it is the duty of the latter to become 
thoroughly acquainted with, and clearly aware of the ontological nature of being 
together."54 Elsewhere Boss has written: "what our psychotherapy needs above 
all is a change in the psychotherapists. If our science of mental health is to 
become more effective, psychotherapists will have to balance their knowledge of 
psychological concepts and techniques with a contemplative awareness."55 Boss 
wrote this after his foundational attempt to provide an new existential grounding 
for psychoanalysis in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, since he believed that
This is certainly the case regarding both of the psychotherapy trainings described in the 
Appendix.
This is why the two trainings described in the Appendices are integrative  Buddhist 
approaches to psychotherapy, a meeting of Buddhism and Western psychotherapies. The 
Naropa Institute training is entitled Contemplative Psychology.
B.Stevens Sullivan, Psychotherapy Grounded in the Feminine Principle, p. 1.
R.D. Laing, The Politics o f  Experience, p.45.
M. Boss, The Existential Foundations o f  Medicine & Psychiatry, p. 280.
M. Boss, Eastern Wisdom & Western Psychotherapy, p. 191.
the scientific view embraced by Freud was no longer adequate on its own as a 
basis for a contemporary psychotherapy.
It is the contention of this study that a dialogue with Buddhism may provide both 
the philosophical orientation and the pragmatic awareness practices that may 
effect change both in the theory of psychotherapy and in psychotherapists 
themselves, which may bring both more into harmony with current scientific and 
philosophical discourse and with the presenting problems of contemporary clients. 
I am uneasily aware that this attempt holds a double paradox. Not only am I 
attempting to describe theory which can give inspiration and validity to a 
profoundly practical enterprise, but also I am trying to ground this practice in a 
theory which insists it is no-theory, a ground which is no-ground, a view written 
in invisible ink. But I hope to show that this perhaps is indeed suitable for an age 
whose focus of attention has shifted towards difference rather than identity, wave 
rather than particle, where the only certainty is that of change and impermanence.
The structure of my exploration, based upon traditional Tibetan Buddhist method, 
is divided into the three parts of Ground, Path and Fruition. These are presented 
in Western terms as Theoretical Considerations, Methodological Considerations 
and Goals and Implications. Before considering the ground of the views either of 
western Psychotherapies or of Buddhism, I will begin with a preamble, a 
consideration of experience and meaning which underlie and relate to both. 
Experience is the raw material of both Buddhism and psychotherapy and the aim 
of both, I would suggest, is to understand or reveal the meaning of that 
experience. Therefore the section of Ground will start with a brief exploration of 
the ground of the ground, that is, experience and meaning and the relation 
between them. Then I will review Western psychotherapies, grouped under the 
four major schools, the Analytic, Behaviourist, Humanistic and Existential, and 
Transpersonal, with a brief account of the history and outlook of the major 
individual therapies, with their own views of themselves in relation to the 
problems and possibilities they address. Then I will turn to Buddhism, with a 
particular emphasis on those philosophical and psychological views which, I 
contend, peculiarly fit it as a source of meaning and practice for contemporary 
psychotherapy in the light of some current Western discourse. Finally, since both 
Buddhism and psychotherapy are concerned with the liberation from suffering of 
the human being, and as the Dalai Lama has recently pointed out that view refers 
"either to the consciousness that views, or the object that is viewed,"561 will look
56 H.H. Dalai Lama, The Meaning o f  Life from a Buddhist Perspective, p.93.
at concepts of Self in Buddhism and in contemporary thought. This will be the 
longest section, as my orientation is primarily, though not exclusively, theoretical; 
that is, an examination of ideas which could support the practice of an integrative 
Buddhist psychotherapy.
Path will look at the instantiation of the Buddhist view in practice; at those 
aspects of the eightfold Buddhist path of ethics, meditation and wisdom which 
may be of special relevance to the therapeutic journey, again with particular 
reference to the training of therapists. Three factors, those of right speech, right 
action and right livelihood constitute ethics; three factors, right effort, right 
mindfulness and right meditation pertain to meditation; and two factors, right 
thought and right understanding constitute the wisdom aspect of the path which is 
the fourth noble truth for Buddhists. The wisdom aspect, right thought leading to 
its achievement in right understanding will, I hope, have been adequately 
explicated in Part One and in this section I will concentrate on ethics and 
meditation. Ethical considerations are commonly noticeable by their absence 
from any psychotherapeutic discourse, except in terms of the ethics of the 
therapeutic relationship. Discussion of any form of natural ethics as part of a 
healthy, responsive and responsible relationship to others and world has largely 
been ignored, which is perhaps why much of contemporary psychotherapy has 
been considered by outsiders (and some insiders) and by the media as narcissistic. 
As contemporary postmodern trends, as we have mentioned, are concerned with 
increasing contextualisation, dialogue and widening horizons, this section will 
look at morality in terms of responsibility, both from the perspective of Buddhist 
ethics and from that of some recent trends in Cognitive Science and western 
philosophy.
In contrast to Morality, Meditation has been one of the most explored areas within 
the dialogue between Eastern thought and psychotherapy. However, most 
scientific research has been carried out with Transcendental Meditation, and it is 
the different and specifically Buddhist practice of vipassana meditation and 
mindfulness with which this section will be predominantly concerned. Meditation 
and mindfulness will be considered from the perspective of the therapist and their 
training, the experience of the client, and the therapeutic relationship itself.
The first part of "Fruition" will attempt first to compare and contrast the goals of 
both Buddhism and psychotherapy, suggesting a qualitative similarity and vast 
quantitative disparities. Then I will consider some implications of the 
engagement of the Buddhist theories and practices discussed earlier in
psychotherapeutic training; how they can be of value, and how they "fit" with 
contemporary discourse. I shall conduct such an exploration in terms of Body, 
Speech and Mind, the traditional Buddhist divisions of experience which may 
provide a useful framework within which to position the different layers of 
experience, intra, inter and transpersonal. Embodiment will consider our 
embodied experience from the perspective of Buddhism and from the 
contemporary discourse discussed previously. It will consider a revaluing of 
embodiment, not as a poor relation of mind, but as the foundation of our lived 
experience. Speech will encompass a wider frame than that perhaps normally 
considered in terms of speech, including language, imagination and metaphor, and 
will emphasise the embodied prelinguistic foundations of speech. Mind will look 
at the wider horizon of our relationship with world, discussing it particularly in 
relation to the themes of interdependence, non-egocentrism and as a remedy for 
nihilism.
Finally, in the light of all the foregoing I will attempt to bring the discussion to a 
temporary or empty closure, reviewing some earlier arguments and attempting to 
establish if it is possible in their light to delineate any of the particular features for 
an integrated Buddhist psychotherapy. Separately in an Appendix I will present 
two existing psychotherapeutic trainings, one in England, and one in America, 
which are based on Buddhist models and awareness practices. Here I will discuss 
some of the specific models and practices based on Buddhist sources which they 
use in their training programmes for psychotherapists.
This is a somewhat linear exposition of a problematic which, I have suggested, 
may be better presented as a layered network of relationship. Indeed, in Buddhist 
discourse the goal is often described as the instantiation of the view or ground 
through the means of the path. In terms of this thesis, the ground is that Buddhist 
philosophy and practice can be both compatible with, and helpful to, 
contemporary Western discourse, and that much psychotherapy is often out of 
step with such discourse. The path is an exploration of different psychotherapies, 
of some trends in contemporary thought, and of the Buddhist ideas and practices. 
The goal is a model of a integrative psychotherapy inspired by Buddhist theories 







"We had the experience but missed the meaning.
"There is, it seems to us,
A t best, only a limited value
In the knowledge derived from experience,
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation o f all we have been. "2
Psychotherapy has often been considered as a search for meaning. Carl Jung 
believed: "Psychoneurosis must be understood, ultimately, as the suffering of a 
soul which has not discovered its meaning"3 and that: "It is only meaning which 
liberates."4 Victor Frankl, the creator of Logotherapy, also considered that man is 
"primarily motivated by the search for meaning to his existence, by the striving to 
fulfil this meaning and thereby to actualize as many value potentialities as 
possible. In short man is motivated by the will to meaning."5 Those unimpressed 
by the endeavours of artificial intelligence critique its foundation upon a primary 
currency of information rather than meaning. Such meaning, however, is no 
longer an object to be received, but must be created. In earlier times, the great 
Truths of philosophy and religions stood like megaliths in the landscape, clear to
1 T.S.Eliot, The Dry Salvages.
2 T.S.Eliot, East Coker.
3 C.G.Jung, Collected Works. Vol. 11, p.334.
4 Ibid. p. 330.
5 V. Frankl, Psychotherapy & Existentialism, p. 74.
29
sight. Today tremendous changes of view both in science and in philosophy have 
caused these to collapse until only fragments and ruins of the once grand 
structures remain. For the most common problems of those presenting to 
psychotherapy are no longer the common problems which confronted Freud. 
Clients suffering hysterical disorders are now generally outnumbered by those 
complaining of depression, sense of meaninglessness, lack of purpose and loss of 
self esteem. Such complaints are personal to individual histories, but are also 
symptoms of metaphysical malaise, loss of meaning and alienation from 
experience. Many people, today, entering therapy do so bringing issues of 
depression and lack and problems of personal relationships overburdened by 
carrying so much that once belonged elsewhere. When such relationships crack 
under the strain and collapse, they leave apparent the lack and absence they alone 
were expected to cover up.6
Today perhaps more than ever before we are required to create and live our 
meanings. A strong trend within both psychology, philosophy and literary theory 
has turned to narrative rather than to revealed truth to create coherence as a source 
for meaning. But what is the relation between experience and meaning? T.S. 
Eliot wrote: "We had the experience but missed the meaning,"7 and much of 
psychotherapeutic work is indeed concerned with the attempt to make sense of, or 
find the meaning within experience. Yet there is another way of approaching this 
- from the opposite pole. Sometimes it seems we have so many theoretical 
meanings (especially in psychotherapy), which have lost their grounding in 
experience, that we are in danger of losing the experience itself. We may be so 
busy narrating that we forget to experience. As Joseph Campbell said: "We let 
the concept swallow up the percept ... thus defending ourselves from 
experience."8 For what is meaning? According to one perspective, it is a fixed 
relation between objective reality and a representation of it. According to newer 
views which we will discuss below, it is an enactment, a dynamic interactive 
event of understanding, and what we normally consider as fixed meanings are 
merely those most recurrent and stabilised patterns of our understanding. If we 
lose appreciation of the dynamic lived quality of understanding and meaning, we 
become alienated from our experience, living in a secondary world of theory and 
representation.
6 Eric Fromm speaking o f the difference in presenting symptoms from earlier (Freudian) 
times, speaks of "Inner deadness.... The common suffering is the alienation from oneself, 
from one's fellow man and from nature; the awareness that life runs out o f one's hand like 
sand and that one will die without having lived; that one lives in the middle o f plenty and 
yet is joyless.” Psychoanalysis & Zen Buddhism, p. 26.
7 T.S. Eliot, Dry Salvages.
8 J. Campbell, The Flight o f  the Wild Gander, p 186.
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In times of change and threat to received views, when sources of certainty and 
previous meaning are deconstructed, there is a tendency to cling nonetheless to 
the theories and forms as a defence against the felt uncertainty of experience. If 
externally authorised meanings are gone then activities and experience must 
themselves become autotelic; the state that Mihalyi Csikzentmihalyi calls ’’flow" 
which we will discuss in chapter six. This concerns a return to experience for its 
own sake. Earlier this century, the poet Rainer Maria Rilke mourned the loss of 
living connection with experience and with the objects of experience: "just as 
language has no longer anything in common with the things it names, so the 
movements of most of the people who live in cities have lost their connection 
with the earth, they hang, as it were, in the air, hover in all directions, and find no 
place where they can settle."9 Ultimately, as Campbell suggests, what we are 
seeking is not meaning but experience itself: "People say that what we're all 
seeking is a meaning for life. I don't think that's what we're really seeking. I 
think that what we're seeking is an experience of being alive, so that our life 
experiences on the purely physical plane will have resonance within our own 
innermost being and reality, so that we actually feel the rapture of being alive."10 
Perhaps to experience this is to experience openness to being, to experience 
things as they are, in Buddhist terms, tathata. As Chogyam Trungpa described it: 
"Enlightenment is ... an honest relationship with ourselves. That is why it is 
connected with the truth - being true rather than truth as something external you 
are relating to. Just being."11
It is my contention that Buddhism may help to supply views which uphold 
meaning acceptable in the contemporary world and experiential praxes which 
instantiate such views; may, in short unite meaning and experience. And this is 
certainly the field of psychotherapy. I would state of psychotherapy what 
Campbell states of art: "The function ... is to render a sense o f  existence, not an
R.M. Rilke, "Worpswede" p. 89.
J.Campbell, The Power o f  Myth. p. 5.
Chogyam Trungpa, Transcending Madness, p. 180. Cf. "It is not how  things are in the 
world that is mystical, but that it exists." L.Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
6.44. As psychiatrist Robin Skynner writes o f his own experience: ”... I am most alive, 
closest to the source and meaning o f my existence, when I am open to my immediate 
experience, receptive to what it can teach me and vulnerable to its power to change my 
being. In this moment, when I am sure of nothing, I am yet most deeply confident o f the 
possibility o f understanding. . ,  The next instant I have lost this movement, this freedom, 
this life constantly renewed seeking to preserve some experience, like a butterfly gassed 
in a bottle and pinned to a board, losing in the process everything that made me wish to 
capture it in the first place." "Psychotherapy and Spiritual Traditions." p.30.
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assurance o f  some meaning. "12 Exploring both meaning and experience reveals 
their interdependence; how our expectations and conceptual frameworks frame 
and constrain our experience until sometimes the direct and immediate flavour 
and feel of the experience is overwhelmed by the conceptual wrappings of 
memory and expectation. It is the task of psychotherapy to explore mindfully this 
very process. Ron Kurtz the founder of Hakomi Therapy has given a wonderfully 
precise description of this:
"The whole point of therapy is change, change in the meaning we give 
to experience. So we go for meaning in order to discover how we are 
creating it, what we are making out of what is given to us and to gain 
control of that process in order to give new meanings and create new 
experiences from them ... The point is to access and change the 
symbolic world that shapes all experiences. Of course the long range 
goal of this pursuit of meaning is to recover the capacity to have full 
feelings and experiences without interrupting them, even to search for 
meaning. In the long term, the meaning and the experience are one 
and are sensed as such."13
Such a sense of existence as Campbell describes must be one that can find its 
balance within the uncertainties of the contemporary world. For as he says: "The 
circle has been broken - the mandala of truth."14 Our circle today, he likens to 
that whose circumference is nowhere, and whose centre is everywhere, for no 
fixed terms of reference can be drawn. It is the circle of the postmodern which 
may bear comparison with the mandala of the emptiness of Nagaijuna. It holds 
both threat and promise. If we cannot cling to theory, can we find ourselves in 
the lived experience?15 Can we directly contact that experience? What we need 
to connect with is the direct presentation of experience not its representation 
within the frameworks of expectation, differentiation, emotion and language. In 
the context of meditation we will see such projects in Gendlin's "Focusing", 
Czikzentmihalyi's "Flow" and in the context of philosophy, in Heidegger's, 
Derrida's and Levinas' different attempts to evade the egological, the logocentric 
and the theoretical. For over two thousand years in its views and above all in its 
methods of contemplation Buddhism has undertaken this task. In Buddhist terms
12 J. Campbell, The Flight o f  the Wild Gander, p. 188. A psychotherapist writes: "The 
power o f analysis, like the point o f life is the experience itself, not the endpoint." B.S. 
Sullivan, Psychotherapy Grounded in the Feminine Principle, p. 100.
13 R. Kurtz, Body-Centred Psychotherapy, The Hakomi Method, p. 142.
14 J.Campbell. The Flight o f  the Wild Gander, p.l 89.
15 Note "The reality o f man and o f his world proceeds from livingness, not from anything
that mind as a formulatedness of livingness can codify, for objectified knowledge is
always removed from truth." H. Guenther, Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective. 
p.59.
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as we will discuss below, ignorance or nescience is that which takes the thought 
coverings as real, wisdom is that which discovers iunyata , emptiness or 
transparency, that is without conceptual diffusion. Buddhism sets out a path 
whereby one's conceptualisation of reality is discovered, contemplated, and 
ultimately let go of. It has much to offer psychotherapy which is a contemplative 
journey in which one's personal process, the way in which one creates one's own 
conceptualised reality and the meaning of one's experience is discovered, 
reflected upon, and considered in terms of change and alternative, if not of 




"O the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs o f  fall 
Frightful sheer; no-man-fathomed. Hold them cheap 
May who ne'er hung there. "16
"Always there is desire, 
only the shape 
o f  what is desired shifts, 
each love giving way to another, 
from the first sound 
o f heartbeat inconceivably there, 
and on . . .
. . .  and the new love comes, 
i f  the heart
will open enough, will let go enough to make room. "17
For an overview of this large subject, I should first like to take a brief comparative 
view of the subject divided into the four major schools (Behaviourist, Analytic, 
Existential and Humanistic, and Transpersonal) into which psychotherapies are
16 G.Manley Hopkins, "No Worst, there is none." Poems & Prose o f  Gerard Manley 
Hopkins, p. 61.
17 J. Hirshfield, "Lullabye", O f Gravity & Angels, p.69.
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often gathered, in terms of their philosophies, key concepts, goals, therapeutic 
relationship and techniques.18 Then I should like to consider more closely each 
of these schools, noting some of the most important variations from the paradigm, 
both in terms of historical development and also of variations in outlook which 
fall within the larger framework of the school. Finally I would like to present a 
further comparative view according to the Spectrum model set out by Kenneth 
Wilber, which contextualises the different therapies and relates them to the 
different life problems they address.
A BRIEF COMPARATIVE OUTLINE
Behaviourism, as its name implies is concerned with visible behaviour and the 
physical body in its actions. The outlook is deterministic; the belief being that 
humans are shaped by socio-cultural conditions. Behaviour is the result of 
learning and conditioning and stimulus-response mechanisms, and there was 
initially no concern with consciousness, memory and interior processes of mind, 
which are considered invisible and hypothetical.
As behaviour is learned through imitation and reinforcement, abnormal behaviour 
is seen as a result of faulty learning, and therapy is based upon learning theory, 
focusing on overt behaviour, precise goals and treatment plans and objective 
evaluation. The emphasis is on present behaviour, with little concern for past 
history, except where it directly concerns the dysfunctional behaviours. The goals 
of therapy are to eliminate maladaptive behaviour patterns, and to replace them 
with constructive ones. This type of therapy is specifically goal-oriented. Within 
the therapeutic relationship, the therapist is active and directive, functioning as a 
teacher. The personal relationship is not emphasised. The main therapeutic 
techniques are operant conditioning, systematic desensitisation and assertiveness 
training, all of which are based on principles of learning theory, and intended to 
effect behavioural change.
More recently (since 1960s) Behaviourists have allowed a legitimate place to 
thinking with the resultant establishment of cognitive behavioural therapies which
These headings are suggested by those used by G.Corey in his overview o f the field in 
Theory & Practice o f  Counselling & Psychotherapy.
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accept that cognitive factors play a central role in the understanding and treatment 
of behavioural problems.
The classic Psychoanalytic school arises from the work of Sigmund Freud. Its 
basic philosophy is that human beings are driven by sexual and aggressive 
impulses, and that behaviour is largely determined by unconscious motives and 
conflicts. It stresses the importance of early development, suggesting that later 
difficulties arise from repressed conflicts usually occurring in childhood. Normal 
personality development depends on the successful resolution and integration of 
various stages of psychosexual development, faulty personal development results 
from the unsuccessful resolution of one or more of these stages. Key concepts 
include the theory of unconscious motivations, the structural division of the 
personality into id, ego and superego, the arousal of anxiety as the result of 
repression of basic conflicts between impulses and socialisation, and the 
development of ego defences to control this anxiety.
The goals of therapy are to bring the unconscious elements into consciousness, so 
the patient can relive early experiences and work through the repressed conflict.19 
To this end the therapeutic relationship is, in theory at least, relatively distant, the 
analyst’s anonymity permitting the analysand to develop projections of 
relationships from their past history towards the analyst. The focus of the therapy 
is on working through and interpreting these projections, which are termed 
"transference". Therapy is usually frequent and long-term. The main techniques 
are dream analysis, free association, analysis of resistance and of transference, and 
interpretation. Therapy is verbal and rarely concerned with the body.
Humanistic psychologies are based upon a phenomenological approach. They 
are primarily concerned neither with the individual's behaviour nor motivational 
history, but with their subjective perception of events. The prime exemplar of 
this type of theory is Carl Roger’s Person-Centred approach, to which the 
following directly applies. A central belief of this school is the individual's 
natural tendency towards health and self-actualisation, the fulfilment of their 
capacities. It is concerned with what one of its founders, Abraham Maslow 
called "Being needs", the higher needs of value and meaning which arise from the 
sphere of culture and are superimposed upon the basic biological survival needs. 
Maslow argues that these Being needs are intrinsic to human nature and that their
19 Psychoanalysis refers to the analysand as patient. Forms of psychotherapy other than 
analytic often use the term "client".
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fulfilment is essential to full human growth and development. Of central 
importance in this approach are ideas of the self such as self-concept, and the 
ideal self. Normal development results in and from congruence between our 
ongoing experience and our self concept, the self we believe ourselves to be, and 
between self concept and ideal self, the self we would like to be. Faulty 
development will arise in and from discrepancy between them. The emphasis is 
on the present moment and on the experience and expression of feelings. The 
goal of therapy is to provide a safe space for self exploration, so that blocks to 
awareness and growth may be recognised, and aspects of self formerly denied or 
distorted may be experienced. Clients are helped to move towards openness to all 
experience, greater trust in self, greater awareness of ongoing experience and 
increased spontaneity and self direction. The therapeutic relationship is of prime 
importance, and is a real and direct relationship rather than one based on 
transference. The emphasis is on the therapist's warmth, empathy, genuineness 
and congruence and communication of these qualities to the client. Techniques 
are considered less important than the therapist's attitude. Main techniques are 
active listening, reflection back of the clients' process, clarification and presence.
Building on the Humanistic approach, Transpersonal Psychology is the fourth and 
most recent school. Transpersonal psychology believes that impulses towards the 
spiritual are basic for full humanness, and attempts to "integrate spiritual 
experience with a larger understanding of the human psyche ... it is a project that 
attempts a true synthesis of spiritual and psychological approaches to the 
psyche."20 To this end traditional therapeutic approaches and techniques are 
allied to meditation and other awareness exercises often derived from Eastern 
disciplines. What characterises a transpersonal approach is not the content but 
the context. Transpersonal therapy will deal with all the issues brought by the 
client, mundane affairs and existential problems. As one of its leading 
practitioners has written: "What truly defines the transpersonal dimension is a 
model of the human psyche that recognizes the importance of the spiritual or 
cosmic dimension and the potential for consciousness evolution.."21 It is the duty 
of the transpersonal therapist to keep this context in mind. The therapeutic 
relationship is of prime importance, the power structure between therapist and 
client is not highly defined, the therapist is a guide and companion in a joint
M. Washburn, The Ego & The Dynamic Ground, p .l .
S. Grof, Beyond the Brain. There are also, perhaps echoes here with Heidegger's later 
writing o f the "fourfold" of earth, sky, divinities and mortals. (Poetry, Language &  
Thought p. 173). Compare also "Psyche was for the Greeks an unbreakable relationship 
between men, gods and nature which even encompassed death." (C. Hampden-Tumer, 
Maps o f  the Mind, p 14.)
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practice. Techniques are also of less importance than the relationship and the 
presence of the therapist, but awareness practices are important.
After this brief outline, I would like to consider more closely some of the theories 
presented above, and also to review some individual variations within these four 
very broad divisions.
BEHAVIOURISM
Behaviourism with its general outlook taken directly from that of the physical 
sciences, and its refusal to acknowledge introspection and subjective experience 
has been the dominant force in academic psychology. Behavioural therapy 
originated in the 1950s and early 60s as a reaction to the dominant psychoanalytic 
perspective within therapy. More recently however, it has succumbed to the 
cognitive challenge, which contended that intelligence lay, not merely in 
stimulus and response, but in an organism's ability to mentally represent aspects 
of the world, and then to operate on these mental representations rather than on 
the world itself. Thus mind and consciousness were allowed back into 
consideration. In recent years, Cognitive Behaviour Therapies have accepted 
cognitions as explicit behaviours which determine action and can be modified, 
thus effecting behaviour change through taking into account beliefs, expectations 
and interpretations. Cognitive Behaviour therapists first address the distortions in 
the thinking of the client, and then encourage them to formulate alternative ways 
of viewing their situation, before testing the implications in action. Behavioural 
and Cognitive therapies tend to be shorter-term and more goal-specific than those 
of the other schools. From the perspective of other schools of therapy, although 
they concur that cognitive factors are important in changing behaviour, the 
emphasis is too restrictedly focused on behavioural procedures rather than verbal 
ones, and unconscious dynamics or irrational factors, and the intricate relationship 
of a person and the world and past history is insufficiently addressed.
As far as academic psychology is concerned, since the late 1950s Cognitive 
Psychology in the hands of psychologists such as Jerome Bruner has led an all-out 
effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychology. This focus has 
supported experimental work into mental states, intentionality, development, and 
the function of narrative and metaphor in the construction of self concept. From
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Cognitive Psychology has emerged Cultural Psychology,22 based on the 
contention of anthropologist Clifford Geertz that" there is no such thing as human 
nature independent of culture."23 Cultural Psychology believes human actions 
cannot be fully accounted for by intrapsychical factors alone, and sees the 
construction and usage of meanings as cultural processes which must be situated 
within the context of their cultural world. Alongside this trend in academic 
psychology however, the strictly hard-scientific outlook of Behaviourism 
continues, with a focus on artificial intelligence and information processing rather 
than on human meaning. Within Cognitive Science, both these trends may be 
found.
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Psychoanalysis was historically the first significant school of psychotherapy, and 
is the one against which almost all subsequent theories have defined themselves. 
It was founded and is still centred upon the work of Sigmund Freud, who, as 
much as any one man has changed the climate of thought in this century, 
presenting both a theory of the human mind and a curative practice. Freud's was a 
scientific enterprise, an attempt to place psychology within a scientific and 
materialistic framework. He put forward a dynamic theory, which spoke of the 
interplay of forces within the mind, arising from the tensions developing when 
instinctual drives confront external necessity. His theory posited an "economic" 
description of pleasure and pain arising from increasing and decreasing 
disturbance following stimuli received from this interaction of body and external 
world. He also described the mind first topographically, as being divided into 
conscious, preconscious and unconscious, and in a later model structurally, as 
having three distinct agencies; the id, relating to the instinctual drives, particularly 
sex; the ego, which is developed out of this as a mediator between the drives and 
the world; and superego, representing social and parental influences brought to 
bear upon the drives.24 A famous, though later considered erroneous translation
22 See J. Bruner, Acts o f  Meaning, p. 19.
23 C. Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Culture, p. 19.
24 In writing of Freud I am writing from familiarity with the English translation o f his work. 
Bruno Bettelheim in Freud and Man's Soul critiques the English translation, in particular, 
that o f psyche as mind or mental rather than as soul, thus impoverishing the field of  
psyche, and cleansing it o f emotional, spiritual and motivational connotations. Similarly 
he argues that the use o f "ego" rather than "I" is both limiting, and more importantly, 
divorced from direct experience. "I" includes bodily awareness in a way that "ego" does 
not.
39
of one of Freud's aims reads "Where id was, there shall ego be"25 On the whole 
Freud considered life a difficult business, his aim in Psychoanalysis was to enable 
the ego to achieve as stable a conquest as possible over the id, to replace 
uncontrolled neurosis with "ordinary neurosis", a level of accommodation, or 
acceptable repression of the drives.
In Freud's view, neurosis was caused by the inappropriate return of repressed 
wishes in the form of symptoms. The agents of repression are the ego and in 
particular the superego when they are threatened by instinctual demands which 
are unacceptable by the standards of the external world. What he termed the 
repression of the "pleasure principle" by the "reality principle" serves to keep the 
guilt-laden wishes out of consciousness. Psychoanalysis is the process of retrieval 
of repressed material by a skilled analyst and the "talking cure", using the 
techniques of free-association, and dream analysis, which loosen the hold of the 
conscious rational mind which represses buried memories. Through uncovering 
the repressed causes of the neurosis the patient is relieved of the conflict and the 
resultant symptoms are dissolved.
Two important pillars of Freudian theory are the Oedipus Complex and 
Transference. The Oedipus complex describes the developmental path of 
sexuality in the male through specific phases, since for Freud a child's sexual 
identity is achieved, rather than determined; achieved through their relation with 
their parents. For a male, initially, love of the mother is dominant, followed by 
perception of the father as a rival, giving rise to phantasies of the killing of the 
father and possession of the mother. This incestuous desire is abandoned in the 
face of father's perceived threat of castration, (having seen mother as "castrated"). 
A boy then moves from his love for his mother to identification with the father. 
The female path is more complex and reverse, the castration complex precedes the 
Oedipus complex, interpreting the lack of a penis as failure on the part of the 
mother, and turning away from the mother in hostility, towards the father who 
could give her a child. However Freud has been much and increasingly criticised 
for the inadequacy of his view of the feminine.26
Transference is the way in which during analysis the analysand projects onto the 
analyst the psychic conflicts which he suffers. Awareness and use of this 
transference to uncover the hidden is a central tenet of Psychoanalysis. Counter
25 S. Freud, N ew  Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. Standard Edition, Vol. XXII, 
p. 77.
26 See for example, H.Lerman, A Mote in Freud's Eye.
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transference in turn is the analyst's uncontrolled and unconscious response to the 
analysand's transference. Transference within the analytic relationship exposes 
the projections which the analysand habitually imposes on the other participants 
in his life, and in this particular setting allows for them to be interpreted and 
addressed.
Within the field of Psychoanalysis itself historical developments show a similar 
pattern to that we see in the history of the development of the different schools, 
with an increasing widening of the field of interest, from the intrapersonal to the 
interpersonal to the transpersonal. There are two main trends in Freud's work, that 
of the instincts and that of personal development. After Freud the development of 
his ideas turned away from psychobiology to personality theory. Under the title 
of Object Relations in England and Interpersonal Relations Theory in the United 
States, the stages of development were delineated less in terms of biological or 
system ego and of instinctual maturation than in terms of the personal ego's 
experience with objects or relationship. Such relationship with the environment 
has a part to play in development; if the environment does not satisfy needs of 
understanding and supporting, this development will be arrested or distorted. 
Once the proposition of libidinal and aggressive drives regulated by a developing 
ego is supplanted by "the concept of a psychosomatic whole with ego-potential, 
developing primarily libidinally in object relations, but also aggressively if 
thwarted, then the ego is the whole psychic person, the psychic aspect of the basic 
psychosomatic whole being. This person ego has its own energy or life-drive, and 
develops a structural identity and individual characteristics by organising its 
experiences as it goes along."27 This movement from system ego to person-ego 
was carried forward by the work of Karen Homey and Erich Fromm and Melanie 
Klein, and came to fruition with Erik Erikson, W.D. Fairbum, H. Guntrip and 
especially Donald Winnicott and his work in the field of child therapy.
Winnicott is particularly interesting and important for his work on the early 
relationship between mothers and children and for his concept of the "transitional 
object" and "transitional space". In his work as a paediatrician Winnicott drew 
important conclusions about the function of the "good enough mother", her 
"holding" of the child, and facilitation of the emergence of the individual from an 
early state of fusion. Following on the work of Jacques Lacan entitled The Mirror
H. Guntrip, Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy and the Self. p. 133.
41
Stage 28 Winnicott believed "the precursor of the mirror is the mother's face."29 
In the early states of infant development a vital part is played by the environment 
which is not yet separated out from the infant by the infant. This environmental 
function involves "holding", "handling" and "object presenting".30 As 
development progresses the mother separates out as an objectively perceived 
feature of the environment and the child forms a self in response to this reflection 
by the mother. In Winnicott's words:
"When I look I am seen, so I exist,
I can now afford to look and see."31 
In fact Winnicott believed that "psychotherapy is not making clever and apt 
interpretations; by and large it is a long-term giving the patient back what the 
patient brings. It is a complex derivative of the face that reflects what is there to 
be seen."32
He used the terms "transitional object" and "transitional phenomenon" to 
designate an intermediate area of experience, between me and not-me, between 
early fusion experience of thumb sucking and true object relationship. In the life 
of an infant this may be displayed first by a teddy bear or security blanket, being 
the use of objects that are not part of their own body, but which are not yet 
recognised as belonging to external reality. Between the inner reality of the 
individual and the outer reality of the world, Winnicott posits another area " the 
third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, is an 
intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both 
contribute."33 Since no human being is ever free from the tension of relating 
inner and outer, relief from this strain is provided by the intermediate area which 
is analogous to that third area of potential space between mother and baby. It is 
the space of play, of culture and of religion. Winnicott believed that only in play 
can an individual, child or adult, be creative, and that it is only in being creative 
that the individual discovers the self. Whether the infant is able to learn to live 
creatively is a result of the early environment. Playing is the natural way of 
development taking place in that potential space between mother and child, when
28 The first version o f this paper was delivered at the fourteenth International 
Psychoanalytical Congress held at Marienbad in August 1936, an English translation 
appearing in 1937. For a discussion of Lacan's theory, see below, p.44.
29 D. Winnicott, Playing & Reality, p . l l l .
30 As Winnicott explains: "A baby is held and handled satisfactorily, and with this taken for 
granted is presented with an object in such a way that the baby's legitimate experience of 
omnipotence is not violated. The result can be that the baby is able to use the object, and 
to feel as if this object is a subjective object, and created by the baby." D.W. Winnicott, 
Playing & Reality. p. 112.
31 Ibid. p. 114.
32 Ibid. p. 117.
33 Ibid. p. 2.
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a satisfactory relationship of reliability on the mother's side and confidence on the 
infant's has grown up. He suggested that psychoanalysis is a highly specialised 
form of play in the service of communication after the failure of the natural. He 
suggested that "psychotherapy is done in the overlap of the two play areas, that of 
the patient and that of the therapist,"34 for in that transitional space the patient 
may learn to play, to be creative in that unintegrated state of the personality, 
which when reflected back by the therapist, may become part of the organised 
personality, having been seen. Winnicott was adamant that the paradox involved 
in this transitional space between inner and outer, between conception and 
perception is one that must be accepted but not resolved.
In contrast members of the Ego Psychology school which developed the work of 
Freud first in Europe, then in the United States, retained a more scientific 
orientation towards the system ego rather than the personal ego. They based their 
theory and therapy around a reification of the ego, its development, strengthening 
and its adaptation to group norms. However it has been strongly critiqued for its 
lack of hermeneutic awareness that these social norms were themselves social 
constructions.35 Lack of such awareness led to conformation and unquestioning 
acceptance of the status quo.
A further development within the American Analytic school is the Self 
Psychology of Heinz Kohut, which also marks a shift away from a biological 
drive-oriented description of man towards a fuller more humanistic picture 
"centred on the primacy of the ambitions and ideals of the cohesive self',36 to 
which the drives are secondary. Self Psychology is a psychology that "deals with 
the formations and functions of the self, and with its break-up and re­
in tegration ."37 Kohut found that the classical Freudian framework of 
psychoanalysis was suitable to explain the structural neuroses, particularly 
hysteria which presented with great frequency at the turn of the century, but not 
suitable for disorders of the self; malfunctioning arising from damage to central 
structures of personality which he believe required "more broadly based scientific 
objectivity than that of the nineteenth century scientist - an objectivity that 
includes the introspective-em pathetic observation and theoretical 
conceptualization of the participating self."38 Kohut defines the self as an 
abstraction derived from clinical observation and "as a potentially observable
34 Ibid. p. 54.
35 see P.Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America, p. 186.
36 H. Kohut, S elf Psychology and the Humanities, p. 74.
37 H. Kohut, The Restoration o f  the Self. p. 22.
38 Ibid. p. 68.
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content of the mind."39 He describes it in the narrow sense as a specific structure 
in the mental apparatus, and more broadly as the centre of the individual's 
psychological universe. There may be many different selves, conscious, 
unconscious and preconscious, in ego, id and superego, but he believes there is 
one most resistant to change - the nuclear self, which has a particular structure. 
This nuclear self develops from the primary self or initial given and a matrix of 
empathic selfobjects necessary for its development. It is composed of derivatives 
of the grandiose self, the self-assertive goals and ambitions which push it 
forwards, and of derivatives of the idealised parental imago which pull it. A 
functioning self is that in which "ambitions, skills and ideals form an unbroken 
continuum that permits joyful creative activity."40 Narcissism, rather than being a 
pejorative term always relating to incomplete development or regression is 
reinstated in Self Psychology as valuable and important in the development of the 
nuclear self. It is its transformation rather than suppression or outgrowing which 
is necessary for mature fulfilment. Indeed Kohut saw empathy, humour, 
acceptance of impermanence and wisdom as transformations of narcissism 
involving expansion of the self, a cosmic narcissism which has transcended the 
bounds of the individual. Just as the primary empathy of the child with the 
mother is the blueprint for the empathy of the adult, so primary identity with 
mother is also "the precursor of an expansion of the self, late in life, when the 
finiteness of individual existence is acknowledged."41 This approach, together 
with an emphasis on the importance of empathy and introspection, the centrality 
of the observation of inner experience rather than preoccupation with established 
theory, leads to a psychology that is far from the reductionism of Freud, 
particularly in its discussion of the humanities and religion. However a critique of 
Self Psychology has been directed at its reification of the self at the expense of a 
more healthy dynamic view from the perspective of process.42
The spread of psychoanalysis in France occurred later than in other nations. It 
was not until the second half of this century that psychoanalytic discourse 
emerged as an important factor in French cultural life. Since then its influence on 
intellectual life and culture has been enormous. However this is a changed 
psychoanalysis, uniting developments within analysis itself, with influences from 
Marxism and other political theory, surrealism, existentialism and linguistic
39 H. Kohut, S elf Psychology and the Humanities, p. 10
40 H. Kohut, The Restoration o f  the Self. p. 63.
41 H. Kohut, S elf Psychology & the Humanities, p. 119
42 See F.J. Levine & R. Kravis, "Psychoanalytic Theories o f the Self:. Contrasting Clinical 
Approaches to the New Narcissism" in P. Young Eisendrath & J. Hall, (eds.) The Book o f  
the Self..
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theory, far more strongly involved in social philosophical and cultural issues than 
is the case elsewhere.
The key figure in this development was Jacques Lacan, whose writings are 
difficult, intriguing and influential. Lacan recast Freud's theories in symbolic and 
linguistic terms in the light of structuralist and post-structuralist ideas. Objecting 
to the totalising ambition of philosophy and its pretensions to tell the whole truth, 
and to the desire of the American Ego psychologists for adaptation to cultural 
norms, Lacan stressed that above all psychoanalysis is about the unconscious. 
Yet even this concept is rewritten in the light of relationship to language. Perhaps 
his best-known statement is that the unconscious is structured like a language. 
His view of language is close to that of Heidegger - "Man acts as though he were 
the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of 
man"43 Thus although Lacan does not see man as the victim of uncontrollable 
drives, yet with more sociological and linguistic influences, he sees man as 
submitting to processes which transcend him, rather than as being an autonomous 
subject.
Lacan stresses the role of language and of desire. When the child acquires the 
capacity for language, she becomes a subject. However in language we can never 
completely express our meaning, thus language is linked with desire. And for 
Lacan, "Desire is a fundamental lack, a hole in being..."44 It is an effect of 
"primordial absence." Desire is part of a triad of need-demand-desire. Need can 
be defined in basically biological terms of the satisfaction of basic wants, but for 
Lacan a transformation occurs when the child's pleas for satisfaction become 
expressible in language, since the request is now accompanied by a plea for 
recognition as the subject of the need. This he calls demand. Out of this process 
emerges desire: "that which goes beyond demand and conveys the subject's wish 
for totality. It can never be fulfilled"45. Again, "...the drama of the subject in 
language is the experience of its lack in being, and that experience is a movement 
of desire. Desire is a relation of being to lack."46 And from Lacan himself; "I 
always find my desire outside of me because what I desire is always something 
that I lack, that is other to me."47
M. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking." in Poetry, Language, Thought. p. 146.
M. Sarup, Jacques Lacan . p. 13. It is important to note that the term "desire" takes a 
different meaning in Lacanian discourse from that it plays in either Buddhist or Freudian 
contexts. The same term, used by Levinas, will be discussed in chapter four.
Ibid.. p. 36.
Ibid.. p. 94.
Quoted by Sarup, Ibid. p. 68.
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This definition of desire as lack of being arises developmentally. Lacan mapped 
his model of development onto Freud's concept of Oedipal process interpreted 
symbolically and linguistically rather than biologically. From an Imaginary stage 
which is presymbolic identification with the mother the child passes into the 
symbolic world of recognition of the Father's name and law; from a body-based 
material relationship to one based on language, culture and social exchange. The 
turning point is what he called the Mirror Phase, a period at which the infant still 
without mastery of its own body first imagines itself through seeing its image in a 
mirror, as coherent and self governing. At this stage the child sees his own 
reflection, and sees someone else as someone else, recognising its discreet 
separation from an Other. In this way "the Other warrants the existence of the 
child, certifies the difference between self and other. This is the action upon 
which all subjectivity is based, the moment in which the human individual is 
bom."48 Lacan writes of this stage:
"The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is 
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation - and which 
manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic - and lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an 
alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the 
subject's entire mental development."49
The child has obtained an identity which is really an identification, an anticipated 
orthopaedic image rather than the actual fragmented insufficiency. The ego is 
bom from this identity which is already alienating. The infant despite its 
imperfect control of its body, sees a coherent united image in the mirror, thus the 
image in which we first recognise ourselves is a misrecognition. That the subject 
is constituted through an image that alienates it, and thus potentially confronts it, 
explains for Lacan the close relationship which he sees between narcissism and 
aggression. Thus for Lacan, the ego is constituted by an identification with an 
other, a projection, an idealisation. This first alienated relationship of the self to 
its own image constitutes what Lacan calls the domain of the Imaginary. "This is 
the world, the register, of images, conscious or unconscious, perceived or 
imagined. It is the pre-linguistic, pre-Oedipal domain in which the specular 
image traps the subject in an illusory ideal of completeness."50 It is to be
48 Ibid. p. 64.
49 J. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage." in Merits. p. 4.
50 M. Sarup, Jacques Lacan, p. 66.
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understood as both a developmental stage, and a permanent level of the human 
psyche.
The Imaginary is the first of Lacan's three orders or registers. The second is the 
Symbolic, the linguistic universe into which the child is initiated with language, 
thereby in an interpretation of the Oedipal project, taking on the "name-of-the- 
father" , and the phallus which is a metaphor for the privileged signifier. In the 
later works of Lacan the Symbolic becomes an autonomous structure in which the 
lack of being which we have already encountered is intensified in a signifying 
chain which excludes the human subject and offers no ultimate correspondence 
between words and things. The third order the Real is not a successive stage, and 
has little relation to any assumptions about the nature of the world, but refers to 
that which is outside the imaginary and the symbolic, which is inexpressible. 
According to Madan Sarup: "It serves to remind human subjects that their 
Symbolic and Imaginary constructions take place in a world which exceeds 
them."51
The Lacanian development is a study of loss or lack. The first loss occurs before 
birth with the sexual differentiation of the foetus. In terms of the androgynous 
whole, the sexually differentiated subject is lacking as fabled by Aristophanes in 
Plato's Symposium.52 The second occurs after birth, but prior to the acquisition of 
language. This is the loss incurred by the restriction of undifferentiated or 
"global" libido into culturally established channels. Once the subject has entered 
the symbolic order her organic needs pass through the channels of signification 
and further loss occurs as she is subordinated to the symbolic order which will 
determine identity and desire. Finally Lacan sees subjectivity as "entirely 
relational; it only comes into play through the principle of difference, by the 
opposition of the 'other' or the 'you* to the T. In other words subjectivity is not an 
essence but a set of relationships."53
I have taken time and space to attempt to delineate, with the help of Madan 
Sarup's clear exposition, the difficult views of Lacan, since they are of particular 
interest from the point of view of a Buddhist outlook. Alone among 
psychoanalysts, Lacan believed that the function of the ego is a meconnaissance;
Ibid. p. 105.
According to fable, an angry Zeus split the original androgynous four legged creature in 
half, since when the two parts have been struggling to rejoin one another and regain their 
original spherical whole. See also J. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f  Psycho­
analysis. pp. 195/6,205.
M. Sarup, Post-Structuralism & Postmodernism, p. 24.
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that it is constituted by an alienating identification, and that the human search for 
imaginary wholeness and unity is a futile project, as the ego seeks endless 
substitutes for the object of lost desire, the Real which is buried in the 
unconscious and beyond language. Lacan retranslates Freud's famous statement 
" Wo Es war, soli Ich werdeif, usually, as we have seen, approvingly translated 
"Where id was, there shall ego be" as "Where it was, there must I come to be" or 
"Where it was, there ought I to become", and contends in these reformulations 
that the realm of unconscious energy, far from being in need of ever firmer 
control from the ego, is a source of value.
Lacan has been enormously influential in the world of European psychology and 
philosophy. Among the strongest responses to his work have been those from the 
perspective of the feminine. Lacan has made clear the power of gender in the 
creation of identity. In his presentation the "phallus" symbolises both the 
wholeness which we lack, those things the subject has lost during the stages of its 
constitution, and the cultural values which adhere to the symbolic order, which is 
a patriarchy - the "name of the father." Thus "the feminine is erased in the 
assumption of identity achievable only by entering into what Lacan calls the 
realm of the symbolic, the realm of conventional meaning."54 Whether this is 
read as descriptive or prescriptive, from a feminine point of view it would seem 
unsatisfactory. In different ways three French women in particular, have 
addressed this problem.
Julia Kristeva alters the emphasis of the Lacanian framework, perhaps restoring 
the feminine balance, by replacing language at the centre of the edifice with 
affect, going beyond his theory of linguistic representation to give more emphasis 
to "pre and trans-linguistic modalities of psychic inscription which we call, 
'semiotic'",55 the early experience of maternal non-separation, the non-symbolic 
originary experience which may be seen as hostile to ego subjectivity and 
linguistic control. This allows her to classify the heterogeneous nature of 
conscious and non-conscious representations in a manner which still allows for 
meaning in the eclipse of signification, giving three levels of analytic discourse - 
representation of words, representation of things, and semiotic traces of emotions. 
"Signifiance" is made up of the two levels of the symbolic and the semiotic. 
Inherent in discussion of "chora" as she terms the pre-symbolic experience, are a 
mixture of feelings of fear and revulsion which she calls "abjection." Kristeva 
states that the cause of abjection is "what disturbs identity, system order. What
54 D. Cornell, The Philosophy o f  the Limit., p. 172..
55 J. Kristeva, In The Beginning Was Love. p. 4.
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does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
com posite."56 The emptiness of separation from mother, from the chora, 
underlies the formation of the subject - "the representational contrivances that 
cause us to speak, elaborate or believe rest upon emptiness."57 Again: "If 
Narcissism is a defence against the emptiness of separation, then the whole 
contrivance of imagery, representation, identification and projections that 
accompany it on the way towards strengthening the Ego and the Subject is a 
means for exorcising that emptiness."58 With the first understanding both that 
identity with the mother is shattered and that mother too is not complete in 
herself, psychic transfer to the imaginary "father", symbolic of language and 
symbolisation itself, is correlative with the establishment of the mother as 
"abjected."
Kristeva is aware of the paradoxical nature of subjectivity which is only revealed 
in face of the "other" and thus reveals and is revealed by lack. This discovery 
discloses "that I myself, at the deepest level of my wants and desires, am unsure, 
centerless, and divided."59 However understanding provided by analysis can 
show us that we are "subjects in process" and restore a provisional unity in the 
subjects, and "the resumption of transitory ludic illusions. Fantasy returns to our 
psychic life, but no longer as cause for complaint or source of dogma. Now it 
provides the energy for a kind of artifice, for the art of living."60
Helene Cixous and Luce Irigary are also influenced by Lacanian analysis, with 
particular interest in the constitution of subjectivity in relation to gender. Hel&ne 
Cixous is opposed to all forms of dualistic thinking based on hierarchies and 
oppositions such as head/heart, form/matter, speaking/writing, and relates these to 
the opposition man/woman. She argues that in each dualism one term is 
privileged, from which conflict ensues. Within a patriarchal society woman is 
represented as the Other, whose necessity for the constitution and recognition of 
identity we have seen in the work of Lacan and Winnicott. This other is necessary
56 J. Kristeva, Powers o f  Horror, p. 4.
57 J. Kristeva, "Freud and Love: Treatment and its Discontents" in The Kristeva Reader.
p. 258.
58 Ibid. p. 257.
59 J. Kristeva, In the Beginning was Love. p. 8. This lack could, I believe, be correlated in
Buddhist terms with the idea o f lack o f inherent nature. Elsewhere Kristeva speaks again 
in terms which bring to mind Buddhist concepts concerning lack of inherent being within 
dependent origination and our ignorance of this: "From Plato on, Being is already true 
being; esse verum as the scholastics were to put it. The strategy of this formulation 
becomes clearer; the subject of enunciation has foreclosed his real 'natural' dependence as 
well as his symbolic debt to the other." J.Kristeva, "The True-Real." p.219. For 
discussion o f inherent nature and dependent origination see below, chapter three.
60 Ibid. p. 9. This too may, perhaps, be compared to a Buddhist acceptance o f conventional 
or confined truth merely as conventional or confined, see below, chapter three.
but also threatening. Cixous rejects both the Freudian and the Lacanian models of 
sexual difference which she sees as condemning women to inferiority and 
negativity. She argues for the possibility of bisexuality, and the recognition of 
plurality and the simultaneous presence of masculinity and femininity. She 
contends that writing is a privileged space for the exploration of such non- 
hierarchically based plurality, and calls for a specifically feminine practice of 
writing. Such writing rejects the principle of individual subjectivity as united and 
stable, and is concerned with subjectivities that are plural and shifting. She argues 
for an alternative economy of the feminine centred on the concept of the "gift"; a 
concept I would consider more in tune with the Buddhist perfection of giving with 
its lack of essential difference between self and other, than with what she 
considers the masculine western concept of giving in terms of mechanisms of 
exchange.
Luce Irigary too, critiques the psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan in terms of 
gender bias. Her critique underlines the historical determination of 
psychoanalysis, which, she argues, is unacknowledged by psychoanalysis itself. 
Thus its historically determined patriarchal bias is unexamined and taken as 
normative. She suggests that the underlying phantasies of psychoanalysis are also 
unacknowledged and uninterpreted, and argues that representations of the mother 
support male phantasies, but are themselves unrepresented. The result of this is 
that "instead of remaining a different gender, the feminine has become, in our 
languages, the non-masculine, that is to say an abstract nonexistent reality."61 
Other views concerning the feminine in relation both to Buddhism and to 
contemporary discourse will be discussed later.62
One of the more important renegades from early classical Freudian 
psychoanalysis was Carl Jung who enlarged the field of exploration not only into 
the interpersonal field of object relations and the constitution of identity, but into 
the transpersonal realms with his concept of the collective unconscious. For this 
reason I would like to consider his contribution to western psychology under the 
heading of the Transpersonal School.
L. Irigary, Je, tu, nous Toward a Culture o f  Difference, p. 20.
See below p.206.
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EXISTENTIAL AND HUMANISTIC PSYCHOTHERAPIES
Existential and Humanistic Psychotherapies represent perhaps the largest and 
most heterogeneous of all the schools, and thus are difficult to describe in terms 
that both are simple and do justice to the differences of approach. There is a 
great deal of overlap between the Existential and the Humanistic approaches, and 
often the Existential is subsumed within the label of the Humanistic or Third 
Force School. Perhaps the major philosophic difference between this outlook and 
that of the Analytic school is the shift from the medical and scientifically-oriented 
point of view to the phenomenological, from the instincts to individually 
experienced existence. It displays a shift from the intrapsychic to the 
interpersonal, and a holistic understanding of mind and body, and individual and 
world. Previous models and tendencies are seen as too intellectual and 
technological, emphasising the cognitive at the expense of sensation and 
emotion. Therapeutic approaches are designed as corrective experiential 
procedures to remedy this dehumanisation, disembodiment and alienation. 
However it is important to note that all this is a reaction to, and development 
from, the initial formulations of psychoanalysis.
One of the most theoretically thorough approaches is that of Existential 
psychology arising from the philosophy of Existentialism. Ludwig Binswanger 
and Medard Boss are the most important European names connected with the 
inception of this movement. Medard Boss' "Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalyse" 
was an attempt to unite what he felt was of inestimable value in the view and 
practice of Sigmund Freud, with the very different ground of the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger. In this work and in Existential Foundations o f  Medicine and 
Psychiatry, Boss attempted to set out a philosophical foundation for therapy 
springing from a different world view, with a different meaning and values from 
that of Freud and his followers. Although Daseinsanalyse retained the practical 
approach of psychoanalysis, its theoretical base is undoubtedly existential, which 
is why I consider it amongst the later division. As Boss believed that "the finding 
of modem French phenomenologues existentials may fairly be described as a 
halfstep advance from the natural scientific concept o f  the body" 63 towards the 
Daseinsanalytik of Heidegger, so I believe that Boss' Existential foundations may 
be, in turn, a half step advance towards a psychotherapy with Buddhist 
foundations. This would be capable of carrying on from Boss in a similar spirit,
M. Boss, Existential Foundations o f  Medicine & Psychiatry, p. 127.
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but better endowed both with theoretical responses to contemporary problems, 
and specific tools and methods provided from the long history of Buddhist 
practice of mental cultivation, which are not available to Heideggerian, or indeed 
to any Western philosophy. Similarities between Existentialism and such Eastern 
philosophies as Buddhism and Taoism were pointed out in the first major work of 
existential psychology published in the United States. "The likenesses between 
these Eastern philosophies and existentialism go much deeper than the chance 
similarity of words. Both are concerned with ontology, the study of being. Both 
seek a relation to reality which cuts below the cleavage between subject and 
object. Both would insist that the Western absorption in conquering and gaining 
power over nature has resulted not only in the estrangement of man from nature 
but also in the estrangement of man from himself. The basic reason for these 
similarities is that Eastern thought never suffered the radical split between subject 
and object that has characterised Western thought, and this dichotomy is exactly 
what existentialism seeks to overcome."64
Boss' approach was set out with the direct involvement of Heidegger, who 
annually for nearly twenty years taught the Zollikon seminars for Boss' students. 
Interestingly, according to Boss, Heidegger had answered the first letter that Boss 
ever sent to him in 1946, despite the amount of his correspondence and the fact 
the Boss was entirely unknown to him, because "he had hoped that through me - a 
physician and psychotherapist - his thinking would escape the confines of the 
philosopher's study and become of benefit to wide circles, in particular to a large 
number of suffering human beings."65 Boss' desire was to map the Freudian 
discoveries onto the Heideggerian conception of Being-in-the-world, which , he 
felt, provided "an adequately human foundation for medicine." Being-in-the- 
world is a relationship to the world "that is prior to all exact natural scientific 
conceptualisation, prior to all emotional enthusiastic experience, and the 
foundation for both of these. It is the fundamental relatedness of human beings to 
what is, our inherent worldly relationship of being-in-the-world."66 Within this, 
self and world are not two divided entities, like subject and object, but form the 
basic determination of Dasein itself in the unified structure of being-in-the-world. 
This kind of being presupposes a special openness of man's existence, in the light 
of which the traditional situation seen as a mind distinct from objects which it 
observes, and/or acts upon, is considered a deficient mode of being-in-the-world. 
"Being essentially self-interpreting, Dasein has no nature. Yet Dasein always
64 R. May, The Origins & Significance o f  the Existential Movement in Psychology, p. 18.
65 M. Boss, "Martin Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars."
66 M. Boss, Existential Foundations o f  Medicine & Psychiatry, p. 159.
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understands itself as having some specific essential nature, and feels at home in 
belonging to a certain nation or a certain race. Thus Dasein's everyday pre- 
ontological understanding of its own being necessarily involves a pre-ontological 
misunderstanding. Understanding itself thus as an object with a fixed essence 
covers up Dasein's unsettledness and calms the anxiety occasioned by recognising 
that Dasein is interpretation all the way down."67 Forgetfulness of being, lack of 
what Heidegger terms "resoluteness", which in German is also a pun on un­
closedness and is thus openness to Being, leads to the rise of the subject forgetful 
of the actual co-emergence of subject and object, and of the ecologically wilful 
project of fortifying that subject This can sound familiar to Buddhist ears ... "no 
matter how many times I say T there is still no actual psychic agency involved. 
What is involved is my ecstatic being-in-the-world to the extent that I have made 
its potentialities my own. T refers to the most concrete of all beings, the Da-sein 
in its having grown as one with the world. By contrast the psychological ego 
agency is an abstraction par excellence. It is the hypostatic reification of certain 
phenomena of the unobjectifiable Da~sein."68 To approach life from the point of 
view of an ego is a restricted approach, the ego is clung to as a refusal of the task, 
which is to face up to what addresses man, a response to the call of the openness 
of Being. An adequate response is a resoluteness which faces anxiety and death. 
Anxiety is the "disclosure accompanying a Dasein's preontological sense that it 
is not the source of the meanings it uses to understand itself."69
Thus human being is no thing but a perceptive, responsive openness, and any 
illness or mental disturbance encroaches on this openness and is a restriction of it. 
Treatment is treatment of constriction of Dasein and its ontological structures of 
existence. Modes of illness are classified according to the particular impairments 
that affect manifestation of these existential characteristics.70 Authentic living 
requires facing up to and accepting one's position. The prime objects of 
repression for Existential Psychology are anxiety and death.
This existential foundation for medicine and psychiatry was also reflected in a 
different way of being with the patient. The discovery that man's existence is his 
essence, that "man is essentially one in whose meaning-disclosing relationships
67 H. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world. p. 25.
68 M. Boss, Existential Foundations o f  Medicine and Psychiatry, p. 146.
69 H. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world p. 180.
70 These are termed "existentiales" (Dreyfus) or "existentialia" (Boss) and denote the
structure o f  Dasein, the basic aspects o f Dasein - understanding, affectedness, telling and
falling. Detailed discussion o f these lies outside the scope of this work, but affectedness 
(befindlichkeit) has been introduced into the domain o f psychotherapy through the work 
of Gendlin, see below pp. 56 & 154. For discussion of existentiales see Dreyfus, Being- 
in-the-world, chapters 10-13.
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the phenomena of our world make their appearance, develops in the 
Daseinsanalytic therapist a basic respect for the intrinsic value and essential 
content of everything that shines forth and comes into its being in the light of a 
Dasein."11 Everything that appears is to be taken seriously as the truth and reality 
of that patient's existence, rather than as a symbolic account of a drama of 
underlying forces as in a psychodynamic interpretation. The Daseinsanalyst 
rather than being tied to a theoretical interpretation of the patient's life and 
symptoms, is free to look for the limitations imposed by the patient's outlook on 
her own life, and expose and questions these limitations, opening up the 
possibility of a wider, richer existence.
In turn the transference relationship in Existential psychology is seen as a genuine 
interpersonal relationship between analyst and analysand, and the fact that the 
analysand may behave in an infantile manner, and thus misjudge the actual 
situation, is not allowed to detract from acknowledgement of the genuineness of 
their present feelings. This also has the effect of bringing the focus of work into 
the present rather than excavating the past.
All forms of existential psychotherapy, and indeed of Humanistic Psychology in 
general, display this movement away from the earlier theoretical efforts to 
achieve purely scientific respectability towards an understanding of man 
according to his existential reality. As Ludwig Binswanger wrote " Psychology 
and psychotherapy as sciences are admittedly concerned with 'man' but not at all 
primarily with mentally ill man, but with man as such. The new understanding of 
man which we owe to Heidegger's analysis of existence, has its basis in the new 
conception that man is no longer understood in terms of some theory, be it a 
mechanistic, a biologic or a psychological one."72 The shift was towards the 
specifically human, man as existential centre in his dealings with society or 
environment with an emphasis on awareness, self-consciousness and presence. It 
was, as Binswanger's statement shows, a shift towards the exploration of freedom, 
authenticity and integration for all, in which neurosis is seen as a failure of 
personal growth. The influence of Existential Psychology in America was 
profound, its most well-known protagonists being Rollo May, Irving Yalom, and 
James Bugental.
However perhaps the most influential figure connected both with Humanistic 
Psychology and, as we shall see, with the foundation of Transpersonal Psychology
71 M. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis p. 234.
72 L. Binswanger, "Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy", p. 144.
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was Abraham Maslow. Maslow was instrumental in turning Humanistic 
Psychology away from the medical model towards a field of growth and human 
potential. Starting from a position of admiration and gratitude towards 
individuals whom he saw as supremely well-functioning, Maslow set out to see if 
these models could lead him towards any conclusions about the healthy human. 
This led to his theory of the hierarchies of human needs and the process of self 
actualisation and his conclusion that growth itself is a motivating experience, and 
one which will occur naturally and healthily whenever the attractions of growth 
outweigh the perceived dangers. He believed Freud's greatest discovery to be that 
the cause of much psychological illness is the fear of knowledge of oneself.
The first hierarchy of needs are those he called the deficiency needs, concerned 
with basic homeostasis, physical needs and security, followed by those for love 
and esteem. When these are met he felt a further hierarchy of needs came into 
play that he called Being needs, which are concerned with value and meaning. 
He described these needs as instinctoid in nature, claiming them to be necessary 
for avoidance of illness and achievement of full humanness and growth. Indeed 
Maslow finally postulated that spiritual needs are a biological necessity, and with 
this belief he was instrumental in founding a fourth psychology, the 
Transpersonal school,
Another figure of central importance to the development of Humanistic 
Psychology was Carl Rogers, who, with his Person-Centered approach to therapy 
continued the trend away from theory and towards a real meeting with the client. 
Rogers believed that all clients have within themselves the ability to guide their 
lives in a healthy and constructive manner, and it is the job of the therapist to help 
free the troubled individual from the blocks and restrictions which separate them 
from their own inner wisdom. As with the Existentialist foundation, this led to an 
altered view of the therapeutic relationship, and was Roger's most profound 
contribution to psychotherapy. According to him there are three conditions that 
constitute the "person-centered" approach that are growth -promoting. All these 
conditions relate to the presence of the therapist. The first is congruence or 
genuineness. It is incumbent upon the therapist to be real and open in the 
encounter. The second element is what he termed "unconditional positive 
regard", within which the therapist expresses a positive, non-judgmental and 
accepting attitude towards whatever the client presents. The third facilitative 
aspect of the relationship is empathetic understanding. This means that the 
therapist should enter the client's world, sensing accurately the feelings and 
meanings that the client is experiencing, and communicating her acceptant
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understanding back to the client in a clarifying reflection. This is listening of a 
particularly skilful and active kind, and can be of immense value for change. I 
should like to return to these principles later in terms of the manner in which 
Buddhist meditative practices may facilitate them.
The other major component of Humanistic Psychology, and of many therapies 
generally considered under this umbrella is the emphasis on the body, and on 
psychosomatic unity.73 Here, possibly more than in other therapies so far 
mentioned, come changes in techniques and praxis to match those in foundational 
theory and approach. Human health and potential is seen as a matter of and for 
the body and its energies as well as of a disembodied mind or psyche, and 
techniques using bodily exercise, posture, breathing etc. are used to expose, 
release and heal energetic blocks which cause neurosis and hindrance to 
expression, growth and freedom. In the Analytic therapies although psychic 
disturbances are seen to cause somatic trouble, there was yet no appreciation of 
the possibility of the converse situation, that somatic work could release psychic 
and emotional tensions.
The change of emphasis goes along with the fundamental belief of Humanistic 
Psychology that in order for a therapeutic result, thoughts and insights must be 
accompanied by concomitant affect. Although this had been noticed by Freud, 
subsequent psychoanalytic work had concentrated on the verbal and cognitive. 
Indeed Freud had also mentioned the body, writing: "The ego is ultimately 
derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of 
the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the 
body."74 This has profound therapeutic implications which, however, he did not 
follow up. It implied that lack of ego-forming bodily sensations will hinder the 
development of ego, and that bodily experiences which are ego-developing will 
be needed to bring about change and restitution. Freud's student Ferenczi 
continued work in this area, developing "activity techniques" which paid attention 
to muscular activity and bodily expressions. It was Ferenczi's student, Wilhelm 
Reich, however, who brought the body into central focus in psychotherapy. 
Reich's major theoretical contribution was the concept of "muscular amouring"; a 
bodily response to the continual conflict between instinctual demands and those of 
society and culture. Character is seen as a structural formation developed as 
defence against unacceptable instinctual expression. Reich's theory dealt with the 
economy of the libido, which he saw as a measurable physical energy, which he
73 For an excellent review, see E.W.L. Smith, The Body in Psychotherapy.
74 S. Freud, The Ego & the Id. p. 16.
56
termed orgone energy. Muscular armouring, corresponding to psychological 
character structure, binds this energy and interferes with its homeostasis. Various 
practices of breath and movements are utilised to release energy blocks. Somatic 
therapies such as Reichian, Bioenergetics, Biodynamics and Biosynthesis and 
concepts such as muscular armouring and character structures have provided an 
important new area of development for the field of psychotherapy.
In some senses forming a bridge between Heidegger's thought and somatic 
therapies, Eugene Gendlin has interpreted Heidegger’s concept of " befmdlichkeit," 
translated as "mood" or "attunement", the way we sense ourselves within a 
situation75, in the context of the therapeutic encounter, and has produced the very 
important concept of "felt sense." Gendlin's research into the results of 
psychotherapy suggested that some clients benefited far more than others from 
therapy, and that it was possible to predict the successful ones. He found that the 
difference lay not in the therapists' techniques, nor in what clients talk about, but 
in how  they talk; giving outward sign of what is going on inside, gaining access 
to the subtle shifts of internal body movement, those preconscious unverbalised 
infinitely subtle feelings or moods. Gendlin calls this skill "focusing," and has 
written about it and taught it. Focusing is now a most useful tool or technique 
which can be used in conjunction with many different approaches to therapy. 
Basically it is a method for gaining access to the "felt sense". "A felt sense is not 
an emotion. We recognize emotions. We know when we are angry, or sad, or 
glad, A felt sense is something you do not at first recognize - it is vague and 
murky. It feels meaningful, but not known. It is a body-sense of meaning. When 
you learn how to focus, you will discover that the body finding its own way 
provides its own answers to many of your problems."76 Gendlin set out a six step 
method for accessing and listening to this felt sense, for he says that in the 
movement from being implicit to becoming explicit the feeling itself changes, and 
it is in this change that the effectiveness of psychotherapy lies. This is the 
experiential shift that must accompany, or replace, purely rational talk if there is 
to be long-term and deep change, and is a skill which may be learned and 
practised. I will discuss this further in consideration of methods of meditation77.
Dreyfus translates befindlichkeit as "affectedness" in lieu of any more appropriate word 
but explains: "What one needs is an English word that conveys being found in a situation
where things and options already matter.” B eing-in-the-w orld . p. 168. Perhaps 
interestingly from a Buddhist perspective, another translation offered is that o f  
'dispositions', which we will see in the following chapter is the term frequently used to 
translate samskara, one o f the aggregates o f the self according to Buddhism. This is 
suggested by R.J.Dostal, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 155.
E. Gendlin, Focusing, p. 10. 
see below, chapter six.
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These are perhaps some of the most important themes which occur through the 
heterogeneous school of Humanistic Psychology under whose umbrella shelter a 
numerous array of different therapies, techniques and trainings quite impossible to 
do justice to. However one which has escaped previous mention, should be 
noticed here. This is Gestalt therapy, many of whose techniques and approaches 
are used by all kinds of therapists professing different allegiances. In fact, 
ironically, one of its founders, Fritz Peris was wary of techniques. He considered 
Gestalt to be one of the existential therapies with an emphasis on integration 
rather than analysis. Peris was influenced by Freud, by Reich, by the findings of 
German Gestalt psychology that human beings do not perceive things as isolated 
and unrelated, but within the perceptual process organise them into meaningful 
wholes, and by the Eastern philosophies of Taoism and Buddhism. He believed 
"that awareness per se - by and of itself - can be curative."78 Thus the emphasis 
in Gestalt therapy is not on asking "why" questions, but consistently on sensing 
and feeling 'HOW'- how you experience, how things happen. It exemplifies the 
experiential holistic outlook important to Humanistic Psychology.
TRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGY
As we saw earlier it was in the work of Abraham Maslow that the movement 
from Humanistic to Transpersonal Psychology began. Maslow came to believe 
that spiritual needs are a biological necessity, and in 1968 he wrote: "I consider 
Humanistic Third Force Psychology to be transitional, a preparation to a still 
'higher' Fourth Psychology, transpersonal, transhuman, centred in the cosmos 
rather than in human needs and interest, going beyond humanness, identity, self- 
actualisation and the like."79 This was to be Transpersonal Psychology. In the 
words of Frances Vaughan, one of the school's leading writers and practitioners, it 
is "an open-ended endeavour to facilitate human growth and expand awareness 
beyond limits implied by most traditional Western models of mental health ... in 
this the therapist may employ traditional therapeutic techniques as well as 
meditation and other awareness exercises derived from Eastern consciousness 
disciplines."80 A chief objective of transpersonal theory is to integrate spiritual
F. S. Peris, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim. p. 16.
A. Maslow, Towards a Psychology o f  Being, p.iii.
F.Vaughan, "Transpersonal Psychotherapy: Context, Content, and Process." in Walsh & 
Vaughan, (eds.), Beyond Ego. p. 182.
experience within the understanding of the human psyche. It attempts to achieve 
a synthesis of spiritual and psychological approaches to the psyche. Only through 
the belief that human development ultimately points towards spiritual ends and 
that it is only ffom this perspective that human nature can be fully understood, can 
the final integration between man and the cosmos, man and meaning take place.
If Maslow was the actual Founding Father of Transpersonal Psychology, it has 
important godfathers who lived long before the school as such was founded in the 
late 1960s, but whose work in retrospect opened the way towards it. One is Carl 
Jung, who as we have already seen was one of the first psychologists to be deeply 
interested in Eastern religions, alongside the even less-travelled paths of Western 
mysticism and alchemy. He broke away from Freud in opposition to Freud’s 
insistence upon the primacy of the instinctual drives, his biological orientation 
and his emphasis purely on the personal. Jung's psychology describes both the 
importance of the unconscious and a very different conception of it. In his 
clinical work Jung came face to face time and again with recurring images and 
themes which led to his belief in an "authentic religious function in the 
unconscious", and to his formulation of the theory of the collective unconscious. I 
will give his own definitions of his key terms.
"The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche which can be 
negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact 
that it does not, like the latter, owe its existence to personal 
experience and consequently is not a personal acquisition. While 
the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents 
which have at one time been conscious but which have 
disappeared from consciousness through having been forgotten 
or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have 
never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been 
individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to 
heredity. Whereas the personal unconscious consists for the 
most part of c o m p le x e s , the contents of the collective 
unconscious is made up essentially of archetypes."
"The concept of the archetype, which is an indispensable correlate 
of the idea of the collective unconscious, indicates the existence of
59
definite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and 
everywhere. Mythological research called them 'motifs'."81
With this theory Jung opened up exploration of the symbolic world, particularly 
through the practice of dream interpretation and active imagination. His approach 
to symbols however, differs from that of Freud. Whereas for the latter the symbol 
represents another known but repressed object, for Jung the true symbol points 
beyond itself to a something that is truly unknown and unknowable, the archetype 
that cannot be represented more specifically. Thus the psychological endeavour is 
immeasurably extended into that of the inexpressible, the mysterious.
As we noted earlier, Jung came to believe that "psychoneurosis must be 
understood, ultimately, as the suffering of a soul, which has not discovered its 
meaning."82 Such meaning is the realisation of the self and its destiny in what he 
termed the "individuation process." This, his analysand, personal secretary and 
biographer, Aniela Jaffi§ has written: "has to be understood as the realisation of 
the 'divine' in man,"83 a realisation of "how vast is the nexus of life and the goal 
towards which it is striving, no matter whether this be interpreted as sense or 
nonsense, and no matter whether any such interpretation is sought or not."84 The 
process of individuation requires first a ruthless confrontation with the contents of 
the unconscious, an integration of the previously rejected "shadow" side of the 
personality with the accepted "persona," and of all the divergent and dualistic 
tendencies into wholeness. It is a finally unattainable task. As Jung himself 
wrote; "The goal is important only as an idea. The essential thing is the opus
which leads to the goal; that is the goal of a lifetime."85 It is a progressive
realisation of wholeness taking the form of confrontation between conscious and 
unconscious, ego and self.
Further exploration in the symbolic realms of the imagination have followed with 
Archetypal Psychology, an offshoot of Jung's Analytical Psychology. Unlike 
Jung, who radically distinguished between the noumenal archetype and the 
phenomenal archetypal image, the concern of Archetypal Psychology is with the 
archetypal image rather than the archetype per se. The realm of Archetypal 
Psychology is the realm of the imagination. Its strategies involve attention to 
phenomena and to the way in which one sees. It undertakes a deconstruction of
81 C.G. Jung, Collected Works. Vol. 9 part 1, para. 88.
82 C.G. Jung, Collected Works. Vol. 11, para. 497.
83 A. Jaffe, The Myth o f  Meaning. p.79.
84 Ibid. p. 80.
85 C.G. Jung, Collected Works. Vol. 8, para. 400.
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the world by "seeing through" accustomed structures of thought, and a 
reconstruction through attention to the self display of an ensouled cosmos. 
Although Archetypal Psychology is a prime explorer in the transpersonal 
symbolic world of images, it is necessary to point out that holding to the central 
aspiration of its work as "soul-making", it is resistant to spiritual disciplines, 
eastern or western, and techniques of cultivation whether of meditation or operant 
conditioning, all of which it sees as belonging to the "spirit position", "with its 
rhetoric of order, number, knowledge, permanency, and self-defensive logic ... its 
rhetoric of clarity and detached observation ... of unity, ultimacy, identity..."86 
rather than to the soul position. In his most recent book and talks, Hillman has 
strongly criticised psychotherapy for its lack of involvement with the world and 
narcissistic obsession with the individual, referring to a wish to turn from therapy 
as narcissistic mirror to therapy as window.87
Both Jungian and Archetypal Psychology are still based on the word, with their 
origins in the Freudian talking cure. Another of Freud's students Roberto 
Assagioli and his Psychosynthesis unites a transpersonal or spiritual dimension 
with some of the outlook and the diverse techniques of Humanistic Psychology. 
The aim of Psychosynthesis, as its name suggests, is synthesis rather than 
analysis. The synthesis is firstly personal synthesis of parts of the self, the 
subpersonalities, and later, transpersonal synthesis of the self with the Higher Self 
however that may be conceived by the individual. Assagioli presents a 
cartography of the personality containing seven dynamic constituents. The lower 
unconscious contains the elementary psychological activities which direct the life 
of the body, the middle unconscious corresponds roughly to the Freudian 
preconscious containing those elements similar to waking consciousness and 
easily accessible to it, and the superconscious is the house of higher feeling and 
capacities such as intuitions and inspirations. The field of consciousness 
designates the part of the personality of which we are directly aware - the 
changing experience we can observe, analyse and judge. The conscious Self or I 
is the point of pure awareness. It differs from the field of consciousness as the 
difference between a lighted screen and pictures projected upon it. The Higher 
Self is a noumenal, permanent or true self, situated above and unaffected by, the 
consciousness of the mind stream and bodily conditions. All the above are 
enclosed within the collective unconscious. The therapeutic process of 
Psychosynthesis involves four stages; first recognition of the elements of the
86 J. Hillman, Archetypal Psychology, p. 26.
87 J.Hillman & M. Ventura, We've Had a Hundred Years o f  Psychotherapy and the World's 
Getting Worse. See also P.Cushman's critique of psychotherapy for its lack o f historical 
and political contextualisation in Constructing the Self, Constructing America.
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personality, second, disidentification from them and acquisition of control over 
them. This is based on the psychological principle stating: "We are dominated by 
everything with which our self is identified. We can dominate and control 
everything from which we disidentify ourselves."88 The third stage is the 
realisation of one's true self, and the creation or discovery of a unifying centre. 
In terms of the earlier cartographic model, this involves uniting the conscious Self 
with the Higher Self. The final stage is Psychosynthesis itself, the formation or 
reconstruction of the personality around the new centre.
Contemporary Transpersonal Psychotherapy believes in the transpersonal 
perspective and experiences in which the sense of identity or self extends beyond 
the individual and personal to encompass wider aspects of life, psyche and 
cosmos. To this end it holds assumptions of the potential of human development 
beyond common definitions of normality in the context of ancient wisdom 
traditions.89 In a recent article in The Journal o f  Transpersonal Psychology, the 
home of much contemporary discourse in this field, two of the more central 
Transpersonal therapists and writers discuss the elements of transpersonal 
practices that they consider constitute the art of transcendence.90 They enumerate 
six elements ; a foundation in Ethics (1), is the basis for Attentional Training (2),
which assists in Emotional Transformation (3), comprising the reduction of
destructive emotions, the cultivation of positive emotions, and the cultivation of 
equanimity. These practices redirect Motivation (4) and Refine Awareness (5), 
leading to the realisation of Wisdom (6). Such a list betrays a strong Buddhist 
influence with reminders of the Eightfold Path and the six Paramita of the 
Mahayana. The philosophical foundations of such teachings are of equal import 
as their practices, for as Stanislav Grof, another leading contemporary 
Transpersonal Psychologist has written;
"Modem psychotherapy ... faces an interesting paradoxical situation.
Whereas in the earlier stages it tried to bypass intellect and eliminate
it from the process, at present a new intellectual understanding of 
reality is an important catalyst for therapeutic progress. While the 
resistances in more superficial forms of psychotherapy are of an 
emotional and psychosomatic nature, the ultimate obstacle for radical 
therapies is a cognitive and philosophical barrier. Many of the
88 R. Assagioli, Psychosynthesis, p. 22.
89 See various anthologies of articles e.g. J. Welwood (ed.), The Meeting o f  East & West 
and The Awakening o f  the Heart; F. Vaughan & R. Walsh, (eds.), Beyond Ego;
D.Goleman, The Meditative Mind; G. Claxton (ed.), Beyond Therapy.
90 F. Vaughan & R. Walsh, "The Art o f Transcendence: An Introduction to Common 
Elements o f Transpersonal Practices." in Journal o f  Transpersonal Psychology, Vol. 25, 
No. 1,1993. p .l.
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transpersonal experiences that are potentially of great therapeutic value 
involve such a basic challenge to the individual's world view that he or 
she will have serious difficulty in letting them happen unless properly 
intellectually prepared."91
Grofs own explorations into the transpersonal realms are concerned with altered 
states of consciousness, and the experiences of birth. To accommodate his 
findings in these fields, he has had to reappraise the relationship between 
scientific theories and reality, and seek new theoretical frameworks from within 
the findings of the new physics beyond the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm, and 
from ancient non-Westem systems of thought.
One towering figure has been absent from mention within any of the four schools 
or approaches. This is William James, who was present at the very birth of 
Western psychology, and whose breadth, wisdom and prescience are still 
breathtaking when read today. Indeed it is the figure of James to whom I look in 
this enterprise. Alone in Western terms he provides the holistic unity of 
philosophy, psychology and religious meaning which had been lacking in Western 
psychology and therapy for so long. Indeed James' psychology as, perhaps also 
his philosophy, has been eclipsed for much of the past century but is now 
reappearing in many places to surprise, and perhaps still to shock by its freshness 
and genuiness. Perhaps James sits most comfortably within the transpersonal 
approach because of its very lack of boundaries, having written in 1901:
"The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the 
world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds 
of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must 
contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and 
that although in the main their experiences and those of this world 
keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and 
higher energies filter in."92 
Indeed William James is mentioned twice in the article by Vaughan and Walsh 
mentioned above. The authors cite James in support of their contention that one 
of the two most important "breakthroughs" in Western psychology of the 
twentieth century is the rediscovery that, as James put it; "most people live, 
whether physically, intellectually or morally, in a very restricted circle of their 
potential being. They make use of a very small portion of their possible 
consciousness ... We all have reservoirs of life to draw upon, of which we do not
91 S. Grof, Beyond the Brain, p. 341.
92 W. James, The Varieties o f  Religious Experience, p. 519.
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dream."93 James is quoted once again with respect to his comments on attention, 
having written in 1899: "The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering 
attention over and over again is the very root of judgement, character and will. 
No one is compos sui if he have it not. An education which would improve this 
faculty would be the education par excellence."94 Even more pertinent is his 
continuation on the same page that "each of us literally chooses, by his ways of 
attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit."95 
James' views on consciousness which he believed "connotes a kind of external 
relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being,"96 are so non- 
substantialist, so rooted in interrelationship that they often appear strangely 
compatible with a Buddhist view.
So too do his views on the self; distributing it between the material Self, including 
the body, the family and possessions, the social Self; the recognition we receive 
from others, the spiritual Self, the inner or psychic dispositions and the pure Ego, 
and concluding that "the 'self o f  selves' when carefully examined, is found to 
consist mainly o f  the collection o f  these peculiar motions in the head or between 
the head and the throat" 97 Perhaps this compatibility comes with an almost 
ruthless concern with experience itself, not with conceptualisation; a 
determination to take experience as James describes "just as we feel it, and not to 
confuse ourselves with abstract talk about it , involving words that drive us to 
invent secondary conceptions in order to neutralize their suggestions and to make 
our actual experience again seem rationally possible."98 James' psychology 
demonstrates many of the postulates of Transpersonal Psychology; emphasis on 
awareness, the awakening to a greater identity beyond the bounds of the 
conventional self, and the training of attention and intuition.
THE INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
It is important, however, not to overlook the predominance of the integrative 
approach. In practice, many if not most therapeutic approaches today partake of a 
variety of different techniques and concepts. In the 1991 edition of Theory and
93 W. James, Principles o f  Psychology, quoted by Vaughan & Walsh (see note 65.)
94 Ibid p. 401.
95 Ibid.
96 W. James, "Does'Consciousness'Exist?" in Essential Writings, p. 172..
97 W. James, Principles o f  Psychology, p. 290.
98 W. James, Does Consciousness Exist? in The Essential Writings, p. 181.
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Practice o f  Counselling and Psychotherapy, Gerald Corey states that: "There are 
clear indications that since the early 1980s psychotherapy has been characterized 
by a rapidly developing movement towards integration and eclecticism".99 His 
prediction is that this trend will continue, accompanied by an increased emphasis 
on a spiritual perspective. Most of the trainings which would consider themselves 
under the umbrellas of the Humanistic or Transpersonal schools take an eclectic 
approach to psychotherapy. Basic principles of psychoanalysis, the theories of 
Freud, Jung and Object Relations will be known and taught today for aspiring 
therapists in all trainings. Currently the UK Standing Committee for 
Psychotherapy has eight divisions.100
Such eclecticism does, however, require, careful consideration of the underlying 
philosophical foundations of different therapies and techniques, with 
discriminative awareness of their compatibility in terms of outlook, goal and 
therapist function.
IHE_S_PECTRUM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Ken Wilber's model of the Spectrum of Consciousness (Fig. I)101 is a simple and 
comparative model around which to organise the aims and developments of the 
four major schools of western psychology, as long as one bears in mind that it is 
merely a model, and the map is not confused with the territory. For the model is a 
necessarily over-linear and hierarchical presentation of what is in actuality far 
more organically interrelated and overlapping. This model attempts to show not 
only "a synthesis of Eastern and Western approaches to psychology and 
psychotherapy, but also a synthesis and integration o f  the various major Western 
approaches to psychology and psychotherapy."102
The spectrum model can be read two ways, from the perspectives of evolution and 
involution. In terms of evolution the ground or foundation is what he calls Mind
99 G.Corey, Theory & Practice o f  Counselling & Psychotherapy, p.425.
100 The UKCP is the main body which represents psychotherapy in Britain. The divisions
are: Analytical psychotherapy, Psychoanalytic & Psychodynamic psychotherapy, 
Psychoanalytically-based therapy with children, Behavioural & Cognitive psychotherapy, 
Family, Marital & Sexual therapy, Experiential Constructivist therapies, Humanistic & 
Integrative Psychotherapy and Hypnotherapy
101 From No Boundary by Ken Wilber. <g> 1979 by Ken Wilber. Reprinted by arrangement 
with Shambhala Publications Inc., 300 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Ma 02115.
102 K. Wilber, The Spectrum o f  Consciousness, p. 19.
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representing reality, emptiness, God - many names for a timeless ground of non­
dual experience.103 Such a view can be found in many sources, both eastern and 
western. Here are three, two from admittedly somewhat idealistic strands of 
Buddhism and a third from western psychology, again from the experiential 
approach of William James.
"Truth is the self-realization inwardly experienced by the wise 
through their non-dual insight and does not belong to the domain 
of words, duality, or intellect... The world is nothing but Mind ...
All is Mind;"104
"The Mind in terms of the Absolute is the one World of Reality 
(dharmadhatu) and the essence of all phases of existence in their 
totality.
That which is called 'the essential nature of the Mind' is unborn and 
is imperishable. It is only through illusions that all things come to 
be differentiated."105
"Let us take outer perception, the direct sensation which, for 
example, the wall of these rooms give us. Can we say that the 
psychical and the physical are absolutely heterogeneous? On the 
contrary, they are so little heterogeneous that if we adopt the 
common-sense point of view, if we disregard all explanatory 
inventions - molecules and ether waves, for example, which at 
bottom are metaphysical entities - if, in short, we take reality 
naively, as it is given, an immediate; then this sensible reality on 
which our vital interests rest and from which all our actions 
proceed, this sensible reality and the sensation which we have o f  it 
are absolutely identical one with the other at the time the sensation 
occurs. Reality is apperception i ts e l f ... In this instance, the 
content of the physical is none other than the psychical. Subject 
and object confuse, as it were."106
From this unified ground emerges duality. With each duality, there occurs 
repression, projection and identification; repression of the former unity, projection
103 For a most interesting exploration of non-duality see David Loy, Nonduality. A  Study in 
Comparative Philosophy.
104 D.T. Suzuki., Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, p. 243/5.
105 Y.S. Hakeda, The Awakening o f  Faith, p. 32.
106 W. James, The Writings o f  William James, p. 186.
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of this into two distinct parts, accompanied by rejection of one and identification 
with the other. From the base of unity or mind arises the Primary Dualism of self 
versus other, organism versus environment, subject versus object. Immediately 
above the level of Mind are the Transpersonal Bands where man is no longer 
conscious of his identity with Mind, but neither is his identity confined to the 
boundaries of the individual organism. Here is the place of the Jungian 
Archetypes and much mystical experience, where there is a way of looking at 
emotional and ideational complexes without being totally identified with, and thus 
looking through them. The Primary Dualism is followed by the Secondary 
Dualism of existence and non-existence, life and death which brings us onto the 
Existential Level. Here man is identified with his total psycho-physical organism 
as it exists in space and time, and boundaries between self and other, organism 
and environment are firmly drawn. The upper limits of this level contain the 
BioSocial Bands "the internalised matrix of cultural premises, familial 
relationships, and social glosses, as well as the all-pervading social institutions of 
language, logic, ethics and law."107
Driven by the anxiety that flees from death, the life of the organism itself is then 
divided into psyche and soma, the Tertiary Dualism of the Ego Level where the 
unity of the total organism is repressed and projected into the ego or self image, a 
mental representation of his organism with which man identifies in neglect of his 
actual body. Finally, within the mind or self image, on the Shadow Level, the 
Quaternary Dualism is imposed, the division of the many faceted self into those 
aspects with which we identify (the persona), and those we repress or reject (the 
shadow). Each level, thus is constituted by a central dualism, with ensuing 
repression of unity, and projection of the divided parts with accompanying 
identification and rejection.
The schools of psychology and their therapies follow the involution of the 
Spectrum (Fig. 2). Different schools address and attempt to integrate different 
dualities. Broadly speaking, each new historical development has expanded the 
territory, from the intra-personal, to interpersonal to transpersonal dimensions. 
Analytic Psychology is concerned primarily with the intra-personal, divisions 
between id and ego, conscious and unconscious, the identified persona and the 
rejected shadow. Later developments of this school confront the interpersonal 
and the Biosocial Bands more strongly. Humanistic Psychology with its emphasis 
on actualising the full human being is concerned with the total psycho-physical
K. Wilber, "Psychologia Perennis" in Vaughan & Walsh, (eds.), Beyond Ego. p. 76.
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organism in its existentiality, in the interface of self and other, self and 
environment. Here the aim is to reveal the true self rather than the false self, the 
individuated self rather than the persona, the integrated I rather than sub­
personalities, to use the terminologies of different schools. This real self is the 
integrated body/mind of fulfilled personal authenticity, at ease within relationship 
in a world truly experienced. "Psychotherapy consists of the paring away of all 
that stands between us, the props, masks, roles, lies, defences, anxieties, 
projections, and introjections, in short all the carry-overs from the past, 
transference and counter-transference, that we use by habit and collusion, 
wittingly or unwittingly as our currency for relationships. It is this currency, these 
very media that recreate and intensify the conditions of alienation that originally 
occasioned them."108 In terms of Existentialism, the prime object of repression is 
no longer sexual impulse as with Psychoanalysis, but death, giving rise to 
existential "angst", the anxiety provoked by the duality of being versus nullity.
Finally Transpersonal Psychology enlarging the territory still further to include 
the Transpersonal Bands, addresses all levels of the spectrum, egoic, existential 
and transpersonal, including levels of consciousness that are supra individual. It 
is concerned with the primary dualism of self and other, organism and 
environment. Recently David Loy has attempted to re-interpret the Freudian 
Oedipal process yet again, in Buddhist terms, suggesting that the prime object of 
repression is neither sexual drive nor death, but "lack of being", in Buddhist terms 
"annatta". Interpreted thus, the Oedipal project is the attempt of the developing 
self to become one's own father. "To become one's own father is to become what 
Nagarjuna described (and refuted) as self-existing ... In Buddhist terms, the 
Oedipal project is the attempt to attain closure on itself, foreclosing its 
dependence on others by becoming autonomous. To be one's own father is to be 
one's own origin. Rather than just a way to conquer death, this makes even more 
sense as the quest to deny one's own groundlessness by becoming one's own 
ground: the ground (socially sanctioned but nonetheless illusory) of being an 
independent person."109 This is an attempt to heal the division between self and 
other, self and world, the repression of non-duality.110 From the Buddhist point 
of view this sense of self is seen in fact as a mental construct rather than as 
something self-existing. This constructed and constricted sense of self wants to
108 R.D.Laing, The Politics o f  Experience, p. 39.
109 D. Loy, The Nonduality ofL ife & Death. p. 157.
110 A fine discussion of the human situation from this perspective is to be found in R.J.
Martino, "The Human Situation & Zen Buddhism", a paper initially presented at the
conference on Zen Buddhism & Psychoanalysis, in Mexico in 1957, and published in its 
first version in Fromm, Suzuki & deMartino 1960. A revised edition o f this paper 
appears in N. Katz, (ed.), Buddhist & Western Psychology, p. 167.
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make itself real, to ground itself, thus "the ego self is this attempt of awareness to 
objectify itself, by grasping itself -which it can no more do than a hand can grasp 
itself ... The consequence of this is that the sense-of-se lf always has, as its 
inescapable shadow, a sense-of-iack."111 This sense of lack we have met earlier 
in descriptions of various psychotherapies, for as Madan Sarup has written with 
reference to Lacan whose theories, as we have seen, are permeated with this sense 
of lack: "If one allows that philosophy's concern is with being, one must also 
recognise that the concern of psychoanalysis is with lack of being."112 Indeed it is 
perhaps an attempt to evade this sense of lack that is the basis of all our 
identifications, and of the sense of ontological anxiety or guilt that accompanies 
our lack of success in these enterprises. Loy argues that, from the Buddhist 
perspective, the answer to this lack is not another foundation for the self but rather 
its deconstruction, revealing that both the feeling of self, and the feeling of lack 
are unnecessary and illusory, since there neither is nor has ever been a self- 
existing self apart from the world. I would add that from the point of view of the 
Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination lack can be considered as the reverse 
side or necessary concomitant of desire. Desire, whether it is for sensory 
experience, for beliefs or life or self-existence cannot come into existence without 
a perceived lack, desire implies lack and vice versa. In short the way of existing 
of both desire and lack is emptiness. This discussion logically leads us to 
consider these and other Buddhist concepts.
Ibid. p. 158.




"Mind itself is buddha.
Practice is difficult Explanation is not difficult 
Not-mind. Not-buddha.
Explanation is difficult Practice is not difficult
" - a man looking at reality brings his own limitations to the world. I f  he has 
strength and energy o f  mind the tide pool stretches both ways, digs back to 
electrons and leaps space into the universe and fights out o f  the moment into non- 
conceptual time. Then ecology has a synonym which is ALL.2
Just as there are many differences of theory within the broad field of 
psychotherapy, so within Buddhism also there are many schools and differences 
of belief and practice. It is my intention here, as far as possible to present the core 
teachings which remain, with difference of emphasis, at the heart of all Buddhist 
discourse. Where there is substantial divergence I shall name the specific schools 
or approaches concerned. I will concentrate especially on the teachings which I 
consider to be both at the very heart of Buddhism, and also of most importance 
for a psychotherapy able to meet today's needs. Thus I shall begin with an
1 Dogen, "Given to a Zen Person who Requested a Poem." Moon in a Dewdrop. p. 217.
2 J. Steinbeck, The Log from the Sea o f  Cortez, p.99.
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explanation of dependent origination {pratityasamutpada), and its relation to the 
Four Noble Truths, followed by discussion of its relationship to the concept of 
emptiness or transparency (Sunyata). To help explicate this difficult subject I will 
consider the history and development of Western interpretations of 6unyata.3 
Most importantly, I will then consider the idea of £unyata as a "way" rather than 
as a purely intellectual or cognitive concept. Arising from the fact that for 
Buddhist thought ontology and epistemology coincide, I will present a short 
discussion of different models of Buddhist epistemology. Finally I will introduce 
the concept of Buddha Nature (tathagatagarbha) which is an idea of some central 
importance for a Buddhist approach to psychotherapy.
THE FOUR NOBLE, TRUTHS AND DEPENDENT ORIGINATION 
jQERATjT Y AS AMUTP ADA)
The root teachings of Buddhism are encapsulated within the four noble truths; the 
existence of suffering in all life, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, 
and the path.4 Buddha Sakyamuni presented a soteriology based on the individual 
human life; an analysis of ordinary human life, diagnosis of its problem, 
prognosis, and prescription. However, rather than seeing these truths as 
imperatives, in terms of the actions they invoke, there has been a tendency to 
present them as propositions, statements of fact. Yet the emphasis in the Buddha's 
first sermon, the Turning of the Wheel of Dharma is on what is to be done. The 
first truth, of the existence of suffering, is "to be known absolutely." The second, 
the cause of suffering, is "to be abandoned." The third, the possibility of 
cessation, is "to be realised", and the fourth, the path to such cessation, is "to be 
cultivated." These actions may also be said to provide a model for a 
psychotherapy - to become aware, to abandon harmful patterns, to realise the
Exposition o f emptiness, dependent arising and the two truths will ultimately be founded 
on Tibetan presentations o f  Prasangika Madhyamaka based on Nagarjuna’s 
Mulamadhyamakakarika, with particular reference to Tsong Kha pa's commentary upon 
this work, especially chapter 24. (rTsa she tik chen pa'i rgya mtsho. Varanasi.) See also
E.Napper, Dependent Arising and Emptiness for a consideration o f Tsong Kha pa's 
interpretation o f Prasangika Madhyamaka, and a translation o f part o f  his Great 
Exposition on the Stages o f  the Path (lam rim chen mo) concerned with his exposition of 
Madhyamaka philosophy.
Philologist K. Norman in the course of the inaugural lecture of the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai 
visiting Professorship 1994 at SOAS, entitled "Buddhism and Philology," suggested that 
in spite o f common usage, the four noble truths should be read as four truths o f  the noble 
one (i.e. the Buddha), or four truths for the noble ones.
possibility of greater freedom and to cultivate the means to achieve it.5 The first 
truth asks us to clearly know that life itself, from our normal standpoint, is never 
entirely satisfactory. We are drawn to what we like, which causes suffering when 
it is unattainable, or disappears due to inevitable change and decay, and we 
attempt to avoid what we dislike, which causes suffering when our attempts at 
avoidance are unsuccessful. Perhaps the ultimate and inescapable 
unsatisfactoriness or suffering from the point of view of the egocentric individual 
is death. It is also important to note that the first truth presents suffering as 
impersonal. There is suffering - suffering exists. Thus we may negotiate a 
relationship with it. In actuality, what normally happens is that we grasp it or 
identify with it; it becomes my suffering.
The second truth fundamentally relates to causation. Gombrich has pointed out 
that Buddhism’s great innovation was the ethicisation of the pan-Indian doctrine 
of karma, the law of cause and effect, by interpreting it in terms of intention.6 
This at a stroke ethicised and, I would add, psychologised Buddhist teachings 
which become centrally concerned with the analysis of the functioning of mind, 
how willing comes about. Yet underlying this is the doctrine of dependent 
origination (pratityasamutpada). Indeed the Buddha said: "He who sees the 
Dhamma, sees paticcasamuppada" (Pali).7 Later, at the beginning of Mahayana 
Buddhism, Nagarjuna wrote: "One who sees all things as arising in dependence, 
sees unregenerate existence and its origin, its cessation and the path to its 
cessation as they truly are."8 In 1984 in a lecture the Dalai Lama spoke of it as 
"the general philosophy of all Buddhist systems."9 It is this teaching, at the heart 
of the Buddhist view that I contend is of most importance in relation to 
contemporary discourse and to good psychotherapeutic practice. Due to this 
foundation in dependent origination, the outlook of Buddhism is one of dynamic 
interrelationship rather than linearity of cause and effect. It is this that allows it to 
escape dualism and the logic or either/or and take the "middle way" between 
etemalism and nihilism, self and world, inner and outer.10 Dependent origination
5 I am indebted to a discussion with Stephen Batchelor pointing out this shift in focus 
which is discussed by ftanavira, Clearing the Path. p. 258.
6 The Buddha stated: "I say karma is intention; having willed, one acts through thought and 
deed." Ahguttara Nikaya III. 415. Professor Gombrich states: "I do not see how one 
could exaggerate the importance o f the Buddha's ethicisation o f the world, which I regard 
as a turning point in the history of civilisation." R.Gombrich, "How, not what: kamma as 
a reaction to Brahminism." The first o f the Louis H. Jordan Lectures in Comparative 
Religion 1994. SOAS. p. 12.
7 Majjhima Nikaya 28.28. (PTS Vol. 1, p.191.)
8 Nagarjuna Mulamadhyamikakarika (MMK) XXTV. 40. trs M. Sprung.
9 Dalai Lama, The Meaning o f  Life from a Buddhist Perspective, p .5.
10 Carl Jung's presentation o f synchronicity may be considered as a lone Western attempt to 
find an acausal principle.
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explains the nature of causality, and in its twelvefold form relating to human 
existence describes the mechanism underlying the existence of suffering, its 
arising and its cessation. It both describes the arising of samsara, or unregenerate 
existence, and provides for a way of liberation. For if samsara signifies 
conditioned existence, then nirvana or liberation means unconditioned existence, 
the extinguishing of the very conditions which determine our limited and 
restricted existence.
In its simplest form, dependent origination is described thus:
"When there is this, this is,
With arising of this, this arises,
When there is not this, this is not,
With cessation of this, this ceases."11
In the longer form dependent origination in terms of the individual human life is 
presented in the twelve links which are often illustrated as the Wheel of Becoming 
or cyclic existence.
"When there is this this is, with arising of this this arises; that is 
to say, with nescience as condition, determinations; with 
determinations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness 
as condition, name-and-matter; with name-and-matter as 
condition, six bases; with six bases as condition, contact; with 
contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; 
with craving as condition, holding; with holding as condition, 
being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, 
ageing-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain , grief, and despair 
come into being; thus is the arising of this whole mass of
unpleasure (suffering)."12 
These links may be presented either in forward or in reverse order, emphasising 
either arising, or dependence, because each link is both conditioned and 
conditioning, providing a theory of causality that, in contradistinction to most 
Western ways of thought up to present time, is not linear and substantial, but 
circular, and reciprocal. In this model everything is interdependent and 
interconnected, nothing is absolute and independent and the emphasis is shifted 
from individual things to process and relationship. Mind and body, belief and 
action, object and environment are seen in reciprocal relationship, all constituent 
parts of a dynamic and mutually causative whole. In the Theravada commentarial
11 Majjhima Nikaya. VIII. 9. trs. Nanavira Thera, Clearing the Path. p. 16.
12 Ibid. IV. 8. and Nanavira p. 16.
tradition the cycle was interpreted over three successive lifetimes; ignorance and 
determinations of previous life give rise to consciousness etc. in this life which 
rise in time to the next life, but it may also be seen as simultaneous within every 
moment. A Tibetan oral description of samsara is "taking birth again and again 
without autonomy or free will."13 Psychologically interpreted this explains how 
the dispositions of ignorance in every moment infect every subsequent perception 
and understanding of self and world, giving birth to an endless and inescapable 
cycle of misperception. Seen from the point of view of cessation, this same cycle 
points to a way of liberation, starting with the cessation of ignorance or nescience, 
the determinations or mental dispositions will cease; on their cessation, 
consciousness will cease; on the cessation of consciousness, the psychophysical 
person, i.e. name-and-matter will not arise, with no psychophysical person, there 
will be no six senses, giving rise to no contact, no feelings, no craving and 
holding, and thus no being or becoming, no birth and concomitant ageing, death 
and suffering. Since the model presents a distinction between the different stages 
of the process, it also presents the possibility that through training of the mind the 
stages may be delinked and their progression need not become inevitable. 
Psychologically the pivotal links are, from the cognitive standpoint, that of 
ignorance giving rise to the dispositions, and from the emotional perspective, that 
between feelings and craving.
The first node of this cycle is ignorance or nescience; ignorance specifically, that 
is, of the three marks of existence; that all things are impermanent, unsatisfactory 
and without self or fixed essence. In Early Buddhism non-self referred 
specifically to the non-self of persons. I would like to look at the teachings about 
self in detail in the following chapter, merely noting here that in Buddhism there 
is not considered to be an essential self. Self is ascertained primarily in terms of 
five aggregates, which we have already met in different form within the 
twelvefold chain of dependent origination. These are form or matter, feelings, 
perceptions, determinations and consciousness. What we name and identify with 
as our self is actually the interaction of these causal factors which form a system. 
From a Buddhist point of view ignorance arises when this sense of self is grasped 
and identified with as an individual entity rather than as a changing process; when 
words or concepts relating to this process are apprehended as if they referred to 
something ultimately real rather than to a useful concept. The Buddhist 
explanation of self provides a model of process; a non reifying model of human
khor ba /  rang dbang med par yang nas yang du skyes bar len par. I am indebted to 
Stephen Batchelor for passing on to me this oral definition which he received from Geshe 
Rabten.
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being in its dimensions of body, speech and mind; a description of how the self 
works rather than a description of parts.
As well as the provision of an explanation of causality, there may be said to be a 
second level of dependent origination applying to all phenomena, which is an 
explanation of the dependence of wholes upon their parts. A third linguistic level 
of dependent origination, more discussed by Mahayana Buddhism, refers to the 
dependence of phenomena upon their imputation by name and concept.14
EMPTINESS (SCNYATAI
In the Mahayana the concept of selflessness of the person was extended to 
distinguish both the selflessness of persons and that of phenomena In fact the 
root of such teaching exists in the early Buddhist work, the Dhammapada; "All 
dhammas are without self."15 However, in the Mahayana, and in particular, in 
what became known as the Madhyamaka school, this lack of self in all things, 
persons and phenomena, was expanded into the central doctrine of emptiness or 
£unyata, and it is this doctrine that is at the heart of Mahayana Buddhism, and of 
the subsequent Vajrayana or Tantric Buddhism, and schools of East Asian 
Buddhism such as Zen and Hua Yen. Emptiness is grounded in, and indeed is, the 
very interdependence expressed by dependent origination in its simplest form; the 
emptiness of inherent existence or self-sufficient essence of mutually dependent 
processes. As Nagarjuna wrote in the dedicatory verses of the 
Mulamadyamakakarika, the primary text of Madhyamaka Buddhism:
"I pay homage to the Fully Awakened One, 
the supreme Teacher who has taught 
the doctrine of relational origination, 
the blissful cessation of all phenomenal thought constructions 
He then continues to explain that due to dependent origination (relational 





14 See H.H. Dalai Lama, The Meaning o f  Life from a Buddhist Perspective, p.6.
15 Dhammapada v. 279.
16 Nagaijuna.MMK.trs.Inadap.39.
75
non-coming (into being), non-going (out of being)."17
Due to these qualities, Nagaijuna sets out to prove the emptiness of all 
phenomena by a series of arguments that deconstruct every possible opponent's 
position by reducing it to absurdity. Towards the conclusion of the work he 
declares that dependent origination and emptiness are one and the same, and 
constitute the middle way of Buddhism.
Whatever is contingently emergent,
Is said to be emptiness.
It is contingently construed 
It is the central path"18
It may be helpful here to introduce the concept of Two Truths, conventional truth 
(samvrti satya) and absolute truth (paramartha satya). The term for conventional 
or confined truth in Sanskrit, samvrti, comes from a term implying veiled or 
covered and is the ordinary everyday truth of language in which we may 
acceptably say "I", "you", "individual" and "self'. The absolute or liberated truth 
is that there is no indivisible and essential self. From this fundamental ignorance 
of the absolute truth of selflessness, as we have seen, arises the emotional 
grasping, identification and self-cherishing that puts the ego at the centre of the 
world. All else is then related to it. In a similar fashion, Heidegger speaks of the 
world as representation: "Nature and History become the objects of a 
representation that explains.... Only that which becomes object in this way is - is 
considered to be in being.... This objectifying of whatever is, is accomplished in a 
setting-before, a representing, that aims at bringing each particular being before it 
in such a way that man who calculates can be sure, and that means be certain, of 
that being."19 So we get the world as picture which Heidegger calls the essence of 
the modem.
In terms of the two truths, a thing's conventional truth is its appearance and 
apparent existence, its absolute truth is its emptiness of essential existence. 
Ultimately it is necessary to see the two as non-dually indivisible, in order to rest 
in the middle way between the two extreme views of etemalism and nihilism. As 
Tsong Kha pa states:
"So long as the two understandings,
The unfailing (nature) of appearances - the dependent arising,
17 Ib id .
18 Nagaijuna, MMK. XXIV 18. trs. Stephen Batchelor.
19 M.Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture." p.127
And the emptiness - lacking assertion of (independent existence),
Appear as separate, still,
He has not realized the thought of the Muni.
When the (two realizations) exist simultaneously without alteration,
Merely from seeing the dependent arising as unfailing,
Arid, if the ascertained understanding of (non-inherent existence)
Destroys all modes of misapprehension of objects,
At that time the analysis of the view of (emptiness) is complete.
Further, the extreme of existence is avoided by the appearances,
And the extreme of non-existence is avoided by the emptiness."20
Emptiness is a subtle concept, difficult to grasp. As Nagaijuna himself described; 
"A wrongly conceived §unyata can ruin a slow-witted person.
It is like a badly seized snake or a wrongly executed incantation."21 
The supreme fault is the fault of turning emptiness itself into a something, rather 
than a provisional name or thought construction. Ultimately Buddhism teaches the 
emptiness of emptiness itself.
Perhaps the most poetic, positive and easily-accessible contemporary presentation . 
of dependent origination and emptiness comes from Vietnamese Buddhist monk 
and writer Thich Nhat Hanh. He presents the concept in terms of the piece of 
paper you are reading:
"If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in 
this sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without 
rain, the trees cannot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper.
The cloud is essential for the paper to exist....
If we look into this sheet of paper even more deeply, we can see the 
sunshine in it. If the sunshine is not there, the forest cannot grow. In 
fact nothing can grow ... And if we continue to look, we can see the 
logger who cut the tree and brought it to the mill to be transformed 
into paper. And we see the wheat. We know that the logger cannot
Tsong Kha pa, "The Three Principal Aspects o f the Path." trs. Tsepak Rigzin.
Nagarjuna, MMK X X V I11.
77
exist without his daily bread, and therefore the wheat that became his 
bread is also in this sheet of paper. .."22
And so, within the sheet of paper he includes the clouds, the rain, the sunshine, 
the trees, the logger, his food, his parents, and finally you, the reader, for your 
mind and perception are found there too. All these things, in his term "inter-are" 
through their dependent origination, their relative and dependent existence within 
a web of interconnection. Emptiness is merely the description of this from 
another angle; from that of the phenomena themselves, which are empty of being 
autonomous entities, possessors of some essential nature, independent of causes 
and conditions, or a designating mind. Such a presentation as Thich Nhat Hanh's 
leads surely to a participative and enriched rather than an impoverished sense of 
world. It leads to a positive appreciation of emptiness, as source of possibility. 
Perhaps the translations, occasionally found, of openness or transparency for 
iunyata convey this connotation more fully.23
However within Buddhist philosophy there are many different arguments and 
interpretations of iunyata , which very broadly hinge on leaning towards a 
positivistic interpretation leading in the eyes of opponents to the dangers of a 
substantialist understanding, or a more negative interpretation, leading in 
opponents' eyes to the fault of nihilism. Nagaijuna represents what later became 
known as the Prasangika Madhyamaka position, the most extreme anti-substantial 
position which refuses to accept that it represents a logically-defined position or 
view itself, and argues by deconstruction of the propositions of their opponents. 
Another viewpoint presented by Svatantrika Madyamikas asserted that arguments 
propounding the view might better be expressed with the use of syllogisms. The 
other main areas of disputation have to do with interpretations of Sunyata itself in 
Tibetan Buddhism, arguments between adherents of the rang stong or self-empty 
position, and those of the gzhan stong or other-empty position who maintain a
Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart o f  Understanding, p. 3. Ann Klein points to another 
imaginative presentation o f such interdependence in the writings o f the non-Buddhist 
Jorge Luis Borges:" To say the tiger is to say the tigers that begot it, the deer and turtles 
devoured by it, the grass on which the deer fed, the earth that was mother to the grass, the 
heaven that gave birth to the earth.” J.L.Borges, Labyrinths: Selected Stories & Other 
Writings. New York: New Directions. 1964. p. 171 quoted in A.C.Klein, The Great Bliss 
Queen, p .l35.
H.Guenther uses "openness" or "open-dimension" or "dynamic openness" or even 
"nothing" in various works, stating: "Sunya ... is mostly translated by ’void', 'empty', and 
the noun &unyata... by 'insubstantiality'. Such translations are utterly wrong. Sunya and 
Sunyata mean 'nothing' in the sense o f not standing for anything at all. Sunyata has 
nothing to do with the philosophically antiquated concepts of substance and its negation." 
Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective, p.39, n.6. S. Batchelor uses the translation 
"transparency” in his The Awakening o f  the West.
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more positive view of emptiness.24 Yet the message behind the concept of 
emptiness is by no means nihilistic. Later on in the East Asian school of Hua Yen 
(Japanese, Kegon) the eight negations of Nagaijuna are re-interpreted 
cataphatically in the doctrine of the non-obstruction and interpenetration of the six 
characteristics delineated by Fa Tsang. These observe the interdependence of 
three pairs of antitheses; universality and particularity, identity and difference, 
integration and disintegration.25 It is to the Hua Yen school that we are indebted 
for the image of the net of Indra, the image we suggested as a contemporary 
symbol.26
In this view emptiness is seen as possibility, indeed as that without which nothing 
is possible. Nagaijuna himself spoke of this:
"Any factor of experience which does not participate in relational 
origination cannot exist.
Therefore, any factor of experience not in the nature of §unya cannot 
exist."27
I would suggest that it is this quality of emptiness which allows for growth and 
change, and is so important in psychotherapeutic attempts to free ourselves from 
the frames and conditions which we impose on awareness, and with which we 
subsequently identify ourselves.
When emptiness is realised what is seen is suchness, Tathata, the suchness of 
things as they are, freshly presented rather than represented through the 
individualistic veils of conceptuality and emotion. Nagaijuna describes this as: 
"Not dependent on anything other than itself, at peace, not manifested 
as named-thing, beyond thought construction, not of varying form - 
this is tattvam - the way things truly are."28
For discussion of such arguments see D.S. Ruegg. "The Jo nang pas: A School o f  
Buddhist Ontologists according to the Grub mtha' sel gyi me long." JAOS 83, p.73-91. 
1963, and La Theorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra. Paris: Ecole Fran$aise d'Extreme 
Orient 1969. Also S. Hookham, The Buddha Within.
See F. Cook, Hua Yen Buddhism, p. 2. A description of a "cosmology o f wholeness" 
from a recent science book sounds very similar: "Things ...are not separate entities but the 
products o f an interconnected whole. There are no simple causes and isolated effects; all 
things cause and determine each other. Everything that occurs, no matter how minute and 
local, is the outcome o f all that has occurred before and is the ground for all that will 
occur thereafter. Reality is like a system o f interacting waves. Rather than discrete 
things and independent events, there are but ripples upon ripples upon waves in this 
universe, propagating and interpenetrating in a seamless sea." E. Laszlo, The Creative 
Cosmos, p. 37.
See above, p. 19.
Nagaijuna. MMK. XXIV 19. trs. Inada p. 148.
Ibid XVIII 9. trs. M. Sprung, The Question o f  Being, p. 133.
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This is the liberation pointed to by the third truth which is to be realised. As 
noted earlier and to be further discussed later, psychotherapy is less concerned 
with the transcendental and religious aspects of Buddhism, but it is concerned 
with the ideas and practices which lead to liberation, since they may equally well 
lead to a more mundane liberation from the fixed concepts and frames of 
reference which cause us daily and continuing suffering.
When behind the conventional truth of appearance is seen the absolute truth of 
emptiness, then
"Samsara is nothing essentially different from nirvana 
Nirvana is nothing essentially different from samsara.
The limits (i.e. realm) of nirvana are the limits of samsara,
Between the two, also, is not the slightest difference whatsoever."29 
Nirvana is thus not another world, it is perhaps a different understanding of the 
one we inhabit, which, if we believe it to be essentially as it appears, is samsara. 
In effect neither term paramartha nor samvrtti can be utterly separated since what 
is called samvrtti is not pure samvrtti in so far as its true nature is paramartha or 
iunyata, paramartha is not pure paramartha since it is iunyata which always 
appears, to the perception of all but Buddhas, as samvrtti. Ultimately paramartha 
is not to be known by any reifying or dichotomising conceptuality inherent in 
language. It is to be realised by non-dual wisdom, and while discussion and 
discourse may, at least according to Tsong Kha pa, point to this, and lead to 
understanding, it does not subsume and contain that understanding. In fact as 
Nagaijuna states, both absolute and conventional or confining truth is necessary: 
"Without relying on everyday common practices (i.e. relative truths), the absolute 
truth cannot be expressed. Without approaching the absolute truth, nirvana cannot 
be attained."30 As Andrew Tuck perceptively writes in his study of the Western 
interpretation of Nagaijuna: "... sunyata is a provisional heuristic term for the 
nature of the universe as seen without such absolutistic mental constructions. It is 
reality without an 'illusory veil' of conceptional formations that impose a 
conventional view of reality. Paramartha-satya is thus, in this description, a 
psychological state."31
Although, as we have noted, psychotherapy is predominantly concerned with the 
mundane, from the perspective of a Buddhist inspired psychotherapy this
Ibid XXV 19-20. trs. Inada. p. 158.
Ibid XXIV 10. trs. Inada.
A. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy o f  Scholarship; On the Western 
Interpretation o f  Nagaijuna. p.91.
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relationship of the two truths, nirvana and samsara, the unconditioned and the 
conditioned is important. It widens the field and scope of psychotherapy, 
opening, if only in intention, the domain of the possibility of the unconfined and 
unconditioned around, within and among the confined, conditioned and 
conventional. It listens attentively for the silence behind and between speech and 
breath and thought. There is another factor arising from this linkage of the 
worldly and the transcendent, expressed most succinctly in the well-known 
opening of the Heart Sutra: "Form is emptiness, Emptiness is form." From the 
perspective of the unconditioned, and from that of the conditioned as delineated in 
dependent origination, all phenomena and their qualities partake of what they are 
not as well as what they are. Spaciousness speaks also of confinement, clarity of 
ignorance, compassion of separation. This may be helpful to the therapeutic 
approach bringing awareness both to what manifests overtly and to its shadow or 
unspoken aspect. In daily living what occurs is an ever-increasing confinement 
of the open transparent potential of the unconfined. One Buddhist 
psychotherapist describes ordinary psychological development as "a gradual 
thickening of the psyche's arteries as layers of patterned responses deposit 
themselves on the open potential of being."32 This perhaps explains one 
definition of emptiness (Tibetan, Stong nyid) in the Tibetan dictionary as spros 
med, free of conceptual proliferation.33
Other echoes of the value of this idea of seeing things as they are, are found in 
unexpected places. Novelist Italo Calvino quoting from another Italian writer that 
"to know is to insert something into what is real, and hence to distort reality", 
notes of any writer that "from this arises his invariably distorting way of 
representing things, and the tension he always establishes between himself and the 
thing represented, so that the more the world becomes distorted before his eyes, 
the more the author's self becomes involved in this process and is itself distorted 
and confused."34 Surely this is exactly what the doctrine of emptiness is seen as a 
remedy for? Indeed in a statement close to Buddhist thought, Calvino continues 
"Think what it would be to have a work conceived from outside the self, a work
J. Low, "Buddhist Developmental Psychology." p. 120.
Tsong Kha pa in his commentary to Nagaijuna's MMK  ....p.400 states: "de dag spros las 
spros pa ni stong pa nyid kyis 'gag par 'gur" - "endless proliferations will be brought to an 
end by 'emptiness'". Elsewhere in the same work he states that the purpose of teaching 
emptiness is "to pacify proliferations which without exception grasp onto signs." Such 
signs or views may be compared to the patterns or response referred to above, and also to 
Heidegger's concept of gestell or enframing, the thought patterns of technology, in which 
things are always seen as means to other ends, or as functions o f specific purposes. It is 
the contradiction to the receptive thought which responds, allowing Being to appear, or in 
Buddhist terms the meditative realisation that sees tathata.
I. Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium, p. 108.
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that would let us escape the limited perspective of the individual ego, not only to 
enter into selves like our own but to give speech to that which has no language, to 
the bird perching on the edge of the gutter, to the tree in spring and the tree in fall, 
to stone, to cement, to plastic „.."35
Scientists, Varela, Thompson and Rosch also describe a similar state: "As 
mind/world keeps happening in its interdependent continuity, there is nothing 
extra on the side of mind or on the side of world to know or be known further. 
Whatever experience happens is open, perfectly revealed as it is."36 There is no 
additional reality apart from itself, the interdependent whole needs no foundation 
outside itself. It is perhaps similar to the non-dual reality which Heidegger 
described: "Nothing is never nothing; it is just as little a something in the sense of 
an object - it is Being itself, whose truth will be given over to man when he has 
overcome himself as subject, and that means when he no longer represents that 
which is as object."37
The lack of distinction between subject and object is much emphasised in the 
Yogacara school. According to the teaching of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra the 
Buddha's teachings are to be divided into three turnings of the wheel of Dharma 
The first turning refers to teachings based on the Four Truths and the second to 
teachings on emptiness. Teachings of the third turning are broadly those of the 
Yogacara school which chronologically succeeded the Madhyamaka or middle 
way school, whose most outstanding representative was Nagarjuna. The 
Yogacara presentation differs from that of the Madhyamaka. Firmly based in 
meditative practice and reacting to a perceived over-negation tending toward the 
nihilistic in Madhyamaka teachings, Yogacara doctrines are concerned with the 
non duality of subject and object, which for them are impositions upon the non­
dual flow of perceptions, sometimes termed Mind.38 The Yogacara is generally 
considered to be a school of idealism, yet recent studies have questioned this 
view, and designated at least two variant strands of Yogacara thought; the earlier 
and original strand expounded in the works of Maitreya, Asanga, Vasubandhu and 
Sthiramati which is not in conventional terms "idealist", and a later strand
Ibid. p. 124.
F.Varela, E. Rosch, E. Thompson, The Embodied Mind. p. 225.
M.Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 154.
For adherents o f the Yogacara outlook the teachings of the third turning o f the wheel are 
considered the final and definitive teachings o f the Buddha, while for Madhyamikas, and 
these include pre-eminently the Tibetan dGe-lugs-pa, the teachings o f the second turning 
are definitive, while those o f the third turning are considered to be in need o f  
interpretation. Broadly speaking adherents o f the Madhyamaka uphold a rang stong 
interpretation of emptiness, while those following the Yogacara presentation may take a 
gzhan stong view, see above, n.24.
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following Dharmapala and the Chinese translations of Hsuan Tsang, which may 
be so designated.39 Asanga explains emptiness through exposing the false 
dualities of subject and object and designation and base of designation, and bases 
his argument on the theory of three natures and what may be called a nominalist 
approach. Confusion of the two strands of Yogacara teaching arises from 
interpretation of the term "cittamatra" or "mind only" which is often given as 
another name for the school. Willis argues that for Asanga, "mind only" or "only 
mind" describes the nominalist position; the discovery that the object in 
meditation is mind-made is simultaneously the realisation of emptiness. 
Moreover, through meditation, the subject too is found to be also illusory, a 
creation of the mind, thus "merely mind", which is by definition, impermanent 
and empty. Later more idealist interpreters upheld a more positive belief in "mind 
only" as "mind alone", as the true non-dual reality.
For the Yogacara the Madhyamaka presentation of the two truths is expanded into 
a model of three natures or ways of being. This is intended to present a better 
understanding of the conventional existence of phenomena and of absolute 
emptiness, and to act as an antidote to misconceptions of Madhyamaka doctrine 
leading to a misplaced belief that things do not exist at all, even conventionally, 
and are entirely illusory. According to this model parikalpitasvabhava is the 
imagined nature, paratantrasvabhava, the other-dependent or relative nature and 
par in ispannasvabhava, perfected nature. Parikalpita denotes conventional reality 
when apprehended as real, Parinispanna denotes absolute reality, or to avoid 
substantiality, the consummated understanding of a practitioner. Mediating 
between these two, Paratantra denotes the understanding of reality in its 
dependent origination, which is the basis of the other two natures. On this base 
the imagined nature presents itself as false imagination which the worldly person 
takes to be real and becomes attached to. Similarly the consummated nature is to 
be understood on the same basis by the enlightened. This transformation of the 
basis (aSrayaparavrtti)  describes the achievement of enlightenment for the 
Yogacarin. The positive interpretation of emptiness, the gzhan stong 
interpretation, rests on an understanding of emptiness as parinispanna, empty of 
both paratantra and parikalpita. Empty thus, of all "other", it is yet not empty of 
the inseparable Buddha qualities.40 Certainly the Yogacara view of non-dual 
mind, whether ultimately empty or not, was and is of great influence both to 
Vajrayana, and to the development of Far Eastern Buddhism.
See J.Willis, On Knowing Reality. Introduction.
See above, n.24.
WESTERN INTERPRETATIQN...QF EMPTINESS
Both the difficulties and the contemporary relevance of presenting emptiness may 
be seen in considering its changing interpretation in the West.41 The initial 
Western reaction to Madhyamika thought, as also that of earlier Indian opponents, 
was one of repudiation on the grounds of its nihilism. Nineteenth century 
interpreters, principally E. Bumouf called it "nihilisme scholastique". Following 
on this, what we may call the second phase of scholars favoured an absolutist 
interpretation under the influence of German idealism and Vedanta. Here we find 
the works of Scherbatsky and Murti. However, it is more recently both that 
Nagaijuna has seemed to be speaking directly to the contemporary Western 
condition, and that Western discourse has itself led to fresh interpretations of 
Madhyamaka, and a dialogue has ensued.42 This is the third phase of 
Madhyamaka scholarship in the West, which may be termed the "linguistic 
interpretation" after the work of Wittgenstein. Both Nagarjuna and the 
contemporary philosophers mentioned are reacting against the prevailing beliefs 
that meaningful language propositions faithfully reflect existing objects. 
According to the linguistic interpretation the Madhyamaka analysis is to be read 
as a critique of this referential theory of meaning and correspondence theory of 
truth. As philosophical discourse in the West has swept away the grounds of 
legitimation for earlier systems of philosophy or belief, the Madhyamaka analysis 
of just such a condition becomes of greater interest and of greater value. 
Following Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God, Heidegger’s argument 
of the death of metaphysics, and Derrida's of the death of logocentrism, it 
becomes urgent for the West to seek for some view which will both accept basic 
groundlessness and perhaps allow for some value; some future more meaningful 
than either nihilism, or providing more guidance than the "conversation" put 
forward by Rorty.43
For a detailed study, see A.Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy o f  
Scholarship; M.Sprung, The Lucid Exposition o f  the M iddle Way, translator's 
introduction; and C.W.Huntingdon, The Emptiness o f  Emptiness.
"Today, thanks to the crumbling o f some traditional habits o f thought and to the 
pioneering work o f some Western philosophers - Neitszche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein 
to mention the best known - we can attempt once again and in fresh terms to learn what 
we may from Nagaijuna and his school about the puzzlements and conundrums of human 
existence." M.Sprung, Lucid Exposition o f  the Middle Way. p.3. Such interpretations are 
offered by F.Streng, C.Gudmunson, C.W.Huntingdon, RThurman and M.Sprung.
"If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by scientists or 
philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe, then we are well on
Derrida, writing of ''difference", a key term in his discourse, standing for the 
impossibility and continual deferring of self-identity states: "It is because o f ^  
diffdrance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called 
'present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to 
something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past 
element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the 
future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to 
what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this 
very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even as past or a future 
as a modified present."44 That, surely sounds like dependent origination, and like 
Sunyata, differance itself has no absolute existence; "diff6rance is not. It is not a 
present being, however excellent, unique, principal or transcendent. It governs 
nothing, reigns over nothing and nowhere exercises any authority ... not only is 
there no kingdom of differance, but difference instigates the subversion of every 
kingdom, which makes it obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by 
everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of a 
kingdom."45 The deconstruction of the Madhyamika is no less rigorous than that 
of Derrida, but at the end of the deconstruction we are, I suggest, left with 
something more than mere ruins. Ann Klein has suggested that: "... from a 
Buddhist perspective, postmodern emphasis on the constructed, endlessly diffuse 
nature of things, combined with its unwillingness to admit to any category outside 
the process of diffusion, is like talking about dependent arising without 
emptiness."46 The ontological status of any thing may be discussed only in terms ^ 
of its association with other things, and the meaning of any proposition may be 
defined only by being viewed in the full context of its usage, so that both 
existence and meaning are grounded in a contextual matrix. Yet this kind of 
contingent significance does not detract from its value and usefulness, but as we 
saw in the description of Thich Nhat Hanh may even enrich it, opening it upon the 
unconditioned, the ultimate truth of emptiness. Moreover, as Klein carefully 
describes in connected with feminist discourSeHtls emptiness that may be taken 
as a connection between essentialist and constructivist postmodern stances. For 
emptiness is both dependently originated and unconditioned.
the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be 
understood." R.Rorty, Philosophy & the Mirror o f  Nature., p.389.
J.Derrida, Margins o f  Philosophy, p. 13.
Ibid. p. 21.
A.C.Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, p. 137.
EMPTINESS AS A WAY
For above all things, it must not be forgotten that Buddhist philosophy, and 
Madhyamaka is considered the highest pinnacle of Buddhist philosophy, is not 
merely polemic but soteriology. The fourth noble truth which is to be cultivated 
is the truth of the path, whose eight stages are divided into the three divisions of 
wisdom, morality and meditation. Thus Buddhist philosophy is, in Wittgenstein's 
terms, "therapeutic", and in Rorty's, "edifying" rather than "systematic". It is not 
a theory but, for Edward Conze, "a ladder that reaches out into the infinite." and 
for Mervyn Sprung, the termination of philosophy as "the transmutation of 
knowing into something else."47
The Buddhist Mahayana path rests on the twin foundations of wisdom, that 
wisdom of the understanding of dependent origination and emptiness, and of 
compassion. Compassion relates not only to the benevolence which wishes well 
to all beings but also to the way in which one practises such wisdom. It is often 
referred to as "skill in means." Within the circular logic we have noted before, it 
is compassion which gives rise to the Bodhisattva's initial wish to achieve wisdom 
and enlightenment for the sake of all beings, and it is also this compassion which 
as a result of achieving such wisdom, sees the equality and sameness of all beings 
in their dependence and emptiness, and acting under the influence of that 
understanding, ceases to operate from an egocentric perspective.
The contemporary problem has been described as that of nihilism, as the great 
systems of belief and philosophy have lost their sources of legitimation, and we 
have moved into a postmodern universe of signs. When the paradigms of 
knowledge, truth and reality that have dominated modem history have lost their 
ground, we are left groundless, and such loss of meaning is found in the 
psychopathologies of the age.48 Philosopher Hubert Dreyfus suggests that for 
philosophers like Sartre and Derrida the lack of an ultimate ground is an abyss, 
whereas for Heidegger and Wittgenstein the nonground is not an abyss, for what 
we have left is shared practices. "Giving grounds (must) come to an end
47 E. Conze, Selected Sayings from the Perfection o f  Wisdom; M. Sprung, The Question o f  
Being, p. 129.
48 "Nihilism is a cultural epidemic that defines the spirit o f our epoch. Thus, our cases of 
psychopathology cannot be understood outside o f an ontological field o f interpretation in 
which we acknowledge our present historical experience o f Being: our debilitating loss 
of conviction in the meaningfulness of living; our dreadful encounter with the possibility 
of nothingness." D.M. Levin, "Psychopathology in the Epoch o f Nihilism, p. 26.
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sometime. But the end is not in ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded 
way of acting."49 Like Wittgenstein who stated the aim of philosophy was to 
show the fly the way out of the fly bottle,50 and Heidegger,51 the Madhyamaka 
philosopher certainly sees the end of philosophy in action, not only in the shared 
practices of conventional reality, though these are important, but also in the 
transmutation of the conventional into the absolute truth of emptiness and 
suchness. Buddhist critiques of Derrida's philosophy argue that Derrida's own 
critique of Western philosophy fails to go far enough, remaining in the realm of 
pure textuality, while Nagaijuna puts forward a transformed mode of experiencing 
the world; that the middle way goes beyond Derrida in that "it frequents the 
'unheard-of-thought', and also, 'with one and the same stroke' allows the 
reinstatement of the logocentric too."52
For the Madhyamika emptiness is taught with a specific purpose, as a medicine 
prescribed as a remedy for the disease of conceptual proliferation and clinging 
which arises from ignorance about the real nature of existence, its emptiness. 
Realisation of emptiness is the base for an entire way of life grounded in 
compassion, and understanding is achieved through a deconstruction of all present 
conventional beliefs, views, signs and frames through entering into specific mind 
training. A recent Western study discusses how our experience is shaped by our 
conceptual framework, and how that framework and its expression in language 
develops through a process of metaphorically structuring one concept in terms of 
another, layer upon layer.53 For example, we structure our concepts of argument 
through metaphors of war, using such terms as attacking, defending, winning and 
losing. Perhaps if explicated within a different conceptual framework, e.g. that of 
dance, both experience and resultant behaviour would be different, perhaps less 
antagonistic. A Buddhist scholar responded to this work with the comment that 
from a Buddhist point of view the authors have omitted the "most deeply rooted
L.Wittgenstein, On Certainty quoted in H. Dreyfus Being-in-the-world. p. 155. 
L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 309. Cf. also another statement regarding 
the aim of philosophy: "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping 
doing philosophy when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no 
longer tormented by questions that bring itself in question. - Instead we now demonstrate 
a method, by examples; and the series o f examples can be broken off. - Problems are
solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. There is not a philosophical
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies." (ibid 133).
"To understand Heidegger experientially ... is not at all to reduce ontology to psychology, 
it is the only way to do ontology, as he insists." "Heidegger brought forward a line o f  
development... the founding o f our assertions directly on our living, as we experience." 
E.Gendlin, "Befindlichkeit: Heidegger and the Philosophy of Psychology." pp. 55 & 69. 
R. Magliola, Derrida on the Mend. p. 87. See also D. Loy, "The Deconstruction of 
Buddhism."
G.Lakoff & M.Johnson, Metaphors We Live By.
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and pernicious of all metaphors, 'reality as substance.'"54 It is the replacement of 
the metaphor "reality as substance" with that of "reality as emptiness" that 
Buddhism attempts, or indeed the conscious retention of the idea of metaphor 
itself, thus cutting through and deliteralizing all the conceptual layers and 
proliferation, returning us to the suchness of phenomena. "The Madhyamika is 
radically deconstructive, pragmatic philosophy designed to be used for exposing, 
defusing and dismantling the reifying tendencies inherent in language and 
conceptual thought.... All it does is dissolve the old questions which are seen to 
have been misguided from the start, leaving behind nothing other than a dramatic 
awareness of the living present - an epiphany of one’s entire form of life. No form 
of conceptual diffusion remains, and no questions begging for answers that 
reinforce a deep-seated resistance to acceptance that this life, as it is now lived, is 
the only arbiter of truth and reality."55
From the above it will appear that in Madhyamaka thought ontology and 
epistemology become indivisible. As we noted earlier this is clearly stated at the 
beginning of the Dhammapada:
The difference between conventional and absoh
knowing or understanding. Thus it would be helpful here to take a brief look at 
Buddhist epistemology and psychology of perception. Here, again, we find 
models of interdependence, wherein all mind states are seen to arise from the 
interaction of interdependent causes and conditions.
The aim in Buddhist practice is to train the mind in a progression from false views 
to valid perception, first using different logical tools; consequence, syllogism, 
reasoning, and finally on the basis of this to achieve direct perception of reality as 
a result of meditative training.56 From an epistemological perspective, relying
54 C.W.Huntingdon, "The System o f Two Truths in the Prasannapada and the 
Madhyamakavatara."
55 C.W. Huntingdon, The Emptiness o f  Emptiness, p. 136.
56 Tantra and rDzogs-chen offer a shorter path through altered states o f consciousness, 
based on active imagination, physical yoga or direct awareness o f mind's pure state.
BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY
"We are what we think.
All that we are arises with our thoughts. 
With our thoughts we make the world."
- x \ .   ^ yu. 
'rLVL.
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largely on the teachings of Dharmakirti,57 perception is analysed into the six sense 
organs; eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, with their respective objective 
sense fields of form, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles and concepts, and the six 
consciousnesses; visual etc. In a dynamic process in which both self and world, 
knower and known are reciprocally dependent, a visual perception comes into 
being through the contact between a form, an eye, and a visual consciousness. 
Again this presentation reveals the interaction and interdependence of inner and 
outer, subjective and objective, world and person. In its first arising it may be 
considered ideal if it has the characteristics of freshness, infallibility and 
cognition. However, this first perception lasts for only a fraction of a second, and 
serves as the condition for the arising of a moment of mental consciousness, and 
due to the power of secondary mental factors derived from emotions, memories 
etc., (i.e. samskaraSy determinations or dispositions), a memory or mental image 
will arise at the same moment as the arising of the mental consciousness, and the 
subsequent moments of that visual consciousness, will be overlaid by memories, 
images and emotional responses. Thus the problem of conceptual cognition 
according to Buddhism is the inevitable mixing of subsequent mental images with 
initial perceptions. The only ideal cognitions are these ideal perceptions, which 
are defined as fresh, infallible cognitions that are free from conceptuality, and 
ideal conceptions or inferences which are initial states of inferential understanding 
based upon perfect reasoning.58 It is interesting here to note briefly the different 
methods of direct sensory perception and inference. Though both are considered 
valid cognitions, their methods of perception are contrasted. Sense perception is 
said to enter its object in a positive way, and all the qualities of an apprehended 
object appear to a sense consciousness simultaneously and without differentiation. 
In contrast conceptual thought engages with its object in a negative manner. It is 
selective and works through exclusion of all but the specific object or quality 
ascertained. L l l o
The psychological aim of Buddhism is to convert mistaken conceptions first into 
correct beliefs, and eventually into valid cognitions. Cognition of an unrealistic 
j i ature is the source of samsaric states, and conception of a realistic type is the 
source of liberation. J^his modeljhasjpuch resonance for psychotherapy in its 
delineation of how a first fresh moment of valid perception is eroded by
57 In Tibetan this branch o f learning is known as bio rigs. For discussion of this topic see 
Geshe Rabten, The Mind & Its Functions.
58 The presentation o f causes of mistaken sensoiy perception clearly displays the equal 
emphasis given to what the West would call subjective and objective poles o f perception. 
There are four causes o f deception; those within the object, within the sense organ, 
within the situation, and within the immediately preceding condition. An example o f the 
last would be disturbance of the mind due to prior emotion such as fear or anger.
instantaneous cognitive predispositions, accretions of emotion, memory, etc.59 
Also from a Western perspective, philosopher Suzanne Langer has noted the same 
process: "A concept is all that a symbol really conveys. But just as quickly as the 
concept is symbolized to us, our own imagination dresses it up in a private 
personal conception which we can distinguish from the communicable concept 
only by a process of abstraction."60
From a more psychological perspective, mind or primary consciousness is 
analysed in the teachings of the Abhidharma into the secondary mental factors. 
According to the later Mahayana Abhidharma system of Asanga, there are fifty 
one secondary mental factors arranged into six categories in accordance with their 
manner of function.61 Thirty seven of these fall into three categories, wholesome, 
unwholesome or indifferent from the point of view of liberation. The remaining 
fourteen fall into three categories: the five omnipresent factors of intention, 
attention, perception, feeling and contact; the five object-ascertaining factors of 
interest, intensified interest, recollection, concentration and insight which come 
into play whenever the mind is actively engaged in a task; and the four variable 
mental factors of sleep, regret, general examination and precise analysis which 
may be either wholesome, unwholesome or unspecified according to motivation 
or situation.. Thus ethical considerations are fundamental to Buddhist psychology^ 
The aim is to eliminate those factors which are unwholesome, while cultivating 
those that are wholesome. For, as we have seen, the nature of objects as we 
construct them in perception is determined by the characteristics of the concepts 
employed in discerning them. It is by cultivating one’s powers of wisdom, 
concentration and altruism that conceptual cognition can be transformed.
The Yogacara school also presented a model of the structure ofmind. As they 
expanded the model of Two Truths to Three Natures, so the Yogacarins expanded 
the model of six consciousnesses, the five physical sense consciousnesses plus 
mental consciousness, into an eightfold model. They added a foundation or store 
consciousness, the alayavijnana which contains all the dispositions or 
determinations accumulated from all time, lying dormant in the form of seeds 
which create agitation. However these have not solidified and the alaya also 
contains within it the possibility of liberation. Between the alayavijnana and the
59 It will be seen that a model based on these ideas is used by Core Process Psychotherapy, 
see Appendix.
60 S.Langer, Philosophy in a New Key. p.72.
61 see Geshe Rabten, The Mind and its Functions; H. Guenther, M ind in Buddhist 
Psychology; D.R. Komito, Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas, introduction. R. Johannson, 
Dynamic Psychology o f  Early Buddhism; D. Kalupahana, Principles o f  Buddhist 
Psychology.
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mental consciousness lies manas mind, (or klistamanas, afflicted mind, as it is 
often termed) which is responsible for belief in the ego, and from which originates 
an ego-centred approach to the world. The achievement of liberation must be 
accomplished by a turning around (paravrtti) of consciousness from its 
entrapment in manas, which brings about the conversion from the perception of 
the imagined nature to that of the perfected nature, as discussed earlier.
BUDDHA NATURE
Associated primarily with the Yogacara school, indeed in some texts conflated 
with the a layavijnana  is another theory of particular import to the 
psychotherapeutic outlook.62 This is the idea of Tathagatagarbha or Buddha 
Nature; that all beings possess a core nature which is basically pure and luminous 
with qualities of openness, clarity and sensitivity, though veiled by the obstruction 
of thought and desires.63 The attainment of nirvana is the re-attainment of this 
pure state, clarified from its obscurations. This idea that the mind’s fundamental 
nature is that of luminosity and clarity64 is to be found in the canonical works in 
the Anguttara Nikaya; "Luminous is this mind, but sometimes it is defiled by 
chance passions, sometimes it is free of chance passions."65 The Madhyamikas as 
one might expect refuse to hypostatize this luminous mind, seeing it as ultimately 
empty, and as non-thought: "... the Perfection of Wisdom is exempt from thought, 
and the natural luminosity of thought, the natural purity of thought does not 
consist in any thought production."66 Other traditions, primarily the Tibetan 
rDzogs chen speak of the specific qualities of Buddha Nature as those of pure 
Mind; emptiness or spaciousness, clarity or awareness and compassion or 
unimpededness.67
62 See Lahkavatara sutra, chapter 6.
63 This doctrine in its developed form is to be found mainly in a series o f early Mahayana 
sutras and Sastras, the most important being the Ratnagotravibhaga o f Maitraya/Asanga. 
Also see Y.S. Hakeda, The Awakening o f  Faith; D.S. Ruegg, La Theorie du 
Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra.
64 "This is what I described earlier as the mind's fundamental nature, the clear light nature of 
mind." Dalai Lama, Mind Science, p. 21.
65 Anguttara Nikaya 1. 9,10. For discussion o f this idea in the Pali canon see E.Lamotte's 
introduction to his translation o f the Vimalakirtinirdesa.
66 ' Suvikrantavikramin 15 from Vimalakirtinird6sasutra. trs. E. Lamotte, introduction, p.
LXXX
67 The Madhyamaka approach, instantiated particularly by the Tibetan dGe lugs pa, asserts 
that emptiness which is ultimate may be an object of wisdom. The rDzogs Chen pa assert 
the ultimate to be Unconditioned Mind, seen more subjectively as applying to the 
subjective mind rather than the object of wisdom. In either case it affords an opening to
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However, in any form this has important implications for therapy. This basic 
model of an original core and progressive obscuration is found underlying many 
therapies. In the Psychodynamic model the natural drives are perverted by 
defences and repression; in Existential terms Being-in-itself becomes Being-for- 
itself; for Jungians the Self is split into Persona and Shadow. Each model shows 
proliferating dualities and densification. However the Tathagatagarbha model has 
a specific implication for psychotherapy since it contains the notion that the core 
is fundamentally good.68 Buddhist psychotherapy thus starts from a belief in 
what Chogyam Trungpa called "brilliant sanity." The implications in terms of 
therapy are explained in an interview with psychotherapist and writer John 
Welwood:
"The idea would be that the mind or our basic nature is intrinsically 
pure from the very beginning, and wholesome from the beginning, 
because it's not solid, because its open, because its nature is 
undefinable, ungraspable, unpackageable. In it’s very nature, therefore 
it has an intrinsic purity and wholesomeness. There is no sort of sinful 
quality of the mind, broken or unhealthy or confused. Intrinsically this 
is not the nature of the mind, what is intrinsic is the basic healthiness.
The basic healthiness emerges when you actually can relax a little with 
whatever is going on. So instead of trying to change what’s going on, 
then, in that state of relaxation, one can start to just let go a little bit, 
and then one can try and taste some kind of basic goodness, basic 
healthiness, some kind of basic wholesomeness."69 \
Such an underlying attitude may be of immense assistance in therapy, where, as 
research noted above has shown, the attitude and personality of the therapist is 
seen to be the most important factor in the success of therapy. It is a far cry from 
the medical models of sickness which informed the early history of 
psychotherapy. Further therapeutic resonance springs from the presentation of 
Buddha nature as clear light mind, in its separation of pure awareness and the
the unconditioned which to Western discourse seems problematic, if  not impossible. 
Moreover it is not presented, particularly in dGe lug discourse as mystical, but as 
attainable through the processes of mind/body attention. First through calming the mind, 
leading to increasing freedom from personal and cultural dispositions, then through 
insight and analysis o f emptiness leading to special insight which is the combination of 
both the former, and finally through non-dual, non-cognitive awareness o f unconditioned 
emptiness. For a detailed description of this path, see A.C.Klein, "Mental Concentration 
and the Unconditioned: A Buddhist Case for Unmediated Experience."
"Buddhist psychology is based on the notion that human beings are fundamentally good 
... According to the Buddhist perspective there are problems, but they are temporary and 
superficial defilements that cover one's basic goodness." C. Trungpa, "The Meeting of  
Buddhist & Western Psychology", p.4.
J. Welwood in interview with the author.
92
structures of mind. On the religious path to nirvana all structures are to be 
loosened and ultimately disidentified with; on the therapeutic path, only some. 
But the idea is the same; mental structures are not engraved upon stone and 
permanent, but are to be seen through, worked with, and are capable of 
transformation. Both the trainings based on Buddhist principles discussed in the 
Appendices take their inspiration from the more positive approach to 
Tathagatagarbha of the Tibetan rNying ma and bKa' rgyud pa schools.
The Buddhist view, then, is one of an interdependent universe, empty of isolated 
things, a continual process of interconnected events in which world and self 
mutually unfold. It is perhaps fitting that we have considered Buddhist 
epistemology and psychology in the absence of detailed consideration of the view 
of the self. However, I would now like to consider this topic, the "consciousness 
that views", and consider some ideas of the self, both from the Buddhist 
perspective and from contemporary Western discourse, comparing these, and 
contrasting them with the traditional, historical, 'modem' view.
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Chapter Four
THE CONSCIOUSNESS THAT VIEWS: IDEAS OF
THE SELF
"God, whose love and joy  
are present everywhere, 
can't come to visit you 
unless you aren't there. ,rl
f t
calling farewell
to the ears that forget to listen,
to the nerve-ends fraying with use,
to the breathing that retrenches into itself,
to the beautiful skin grown tired o f  dividing the earth
into ours, not ours,
as we tire too, o f  holding separate,
and love o f  se lf that was once so clear
grows suddenly simple, widens,
as a mother's hand smoothing a sheet,
as water that broadens and flattens,
taking the shape o f  the darkened, still-reflecting world. "1
Angelus Silesius, trs. S. Mitchell, The Enlightened Heart, p. 87. 
J. Hirshfield, from "Lullabye", O f Gravity & Angels, p.69.
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Turning from the view to "the consciousness that views", I would like to look at 
concepts of self and human identity. For it is with selves that psychotherapy is 
concerned and it is here that a central contradiction between Buddhist and 
Western psychotherapy is often assumed to occur. Surely Buddhism denies the 
existence of a self (or an ego), and the work of psychotherapy is just to strengthen 
that self (or ego)? This may be a good place at which to start considering ideas 
of self, as it will force us, firstly to consider what we mean by self in western 
terms, and secondly, to define what it is in Buddhism that is to be negated under 
the heading of self.
First, terminology. Not only are we confronted with different conceptions of self, 
but also similar ideas expressed in different terms. One man's ego is another 
man's self.3 The immediate response to the conception of self, I would suggest, 
is usually, or perhaps until very recently has been, that which philosopher Charles 
Taylor has called the "punctual self', the point of self awareness in abstraction, in 
isolation from its constitutive concerns. It is that self which John Locke described 
when he wrote: "We must consider what Person stands for; which, I think, is a 
thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self 
as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places."4 However, if we 
look more closely and follow recent studies we find a sense of self that is above 
all, a construct, and one that appears to be considered as ever more widely 
distributed. As Taylor has pointed out: "much of the most insightful philosophy 
of the twentieth century has gone to refute this picture of the disengaged 
subject."5
William James was one of the first to consider thus. In the early days of the 
century and of academic psychology, he suggested: "In its widest possible sense, 
however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his."6 Working from 
experience James divided the self into the I as knower and doer, and the me, the 
empirical self, the known or experienced; a division which we will find
In a most interesting recent collection of essays on this topic, P.Young-Eisendrath & 
J.A.Hall (eds.), The Book o f  the Self: Person, Pretext & Process, one contribution alone 
is dedicated to the terminology o f Ego and Self, and that merely amongst Freudians and 
Jungians.
J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding. II 27.9.
C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self. p. 514, citing, in a footnote, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, 
Polanyi and the later writings o f Wittgenstein, . Taylor himself defines the self by its 
"orientation to the good", stating that: "My identity is defined by the commitments and 
identification which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine 
from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable o f taking a stand." 
p.27.
W. James, Principles o f  Psychology, p. 279.
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continually, perhaps best labelled self and self concept. He distributed the 
empirical self over a wide ground, designating it as "material s e lf  which 
encompasses body, family and possessions; "social self', the recognition that one 
gets from others; "spiritual se lf, one's inner being and psychic dispositions; and 
the "pure Ego", that core sense of continuity which, he says, when carefully 
examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of peculiar motions in the 
head or between the head and the throat..
the part of the innermost Self which is most vividly felt turns 
out to consist for the most part of a collection of cephalic 
movements of 'adjustments' which, for want of attention and 
reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they 
are; that over and above these there is an obscurer feeling of 
something more; but whether it be of fainter physiological 
processes, or of nothing objective at all, but rather of subjectivity 
as such, of thought become 'its own object,' must at present 
remain an open question, - like the question whether it be an 
indivisible active soul-substance, or the question whether it be a 
personification of the pronoun I, or any other of the guesses as to 
what its nature may be."7
Psychologist Jerome Bruner has criticised the conventional 'punctual' view of self 
on four counts; as being too concerned, firstly with egocentric perspective and 
secondly, with privacy. Thirdly he criticises the idea of immediate 
conceptualism; that a child's knowledge of the world is achieved through her own 
direct encounter with the world, rather than being mediated through various 
encounters in interaction and negotiation with others. Fourthly, Bruner believes 
that cognition, affect and action are far more closely interconnected than allowed 
for in the standard view.8 Changes in contemporary views of the self not only 
move away from the punctual self to a more distributed one, but also display a 
shift away from the separation of epistemology and ontology, in so far as they 
believe the stance we take towards knowledge and reality becomes in time a 
feature of that very reality.9 Expressing both these views Bruner writes:
"I have tried to show how the lives and Selves we construct are the 
outcomes of this process of meaning construction. But I have also 
tried to make it clear that Selves are not isolated nuclei of 
consciousness locked in the head, but are 'distributed' interpersonally.
7 Ibid p. 292.
8 J. Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds., p. 61.
9 This view is particularly expressed by Varela, Thompson & Rosch in The Embodied
Mind, and is designated the enactive approach.
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Nor do Selves arise rootlessly in response only to the present; they 
take meaning as well from the historical circumstances that gave shape 
to the culture of which they are an expression."10
In the light of that can Buddhism, coming from such a different and culturally 
varied background, have anything useful to say to us today? I would first like to 
consider Buddhist views on the self, before considering some contemporary ideas 
relating to the ontogenetic and phylogentic development of self, following which I 
will turn to views of the self in psychotherapy. After this I would like to discuss 
some concepts of self arising in postmodern discourse, before attempting to 
compare and contrast the Buddhist and the contemporary views, suggesting that 
intellectually they are now similar, but Buddhism has much to offer to aid us to 
come to terms emotionally with a realisation of such views.
THEBUDPHIST VIEW OF THE SELF
The third of the three marks of existence relating to all dharmas is anatta, (Pali) 
non-self, and the concept of selflessness is one of the distinguishing marks of 
Buddhism. Yet when we look at the life of the Buddha Sakyamuni, we see a man 
who possessed personal continuity, identity and personality, and who clearly 
referred to himself as "I". What then is the self which is to be rejected, and what 
is a self that Buddhism denies? The Tibetan dGe lugs pa tradition makes a 
distinction between the "mere se lf , the transactional self which functions 
conventionally in the world, and a fictitious self, an absolute or essential self 
which is to be denied. The general definition of self rests on the term "I", imputed 
in dependence upon any or all five of the psychosomatic aggregates; material 
form or appearance (rupa)> and feelings (vedana), perceptions (samjna), 
determinations (samskaras) and consciousness (vijnana). The sense of self which 
we experience is comprised of these five skandhas or aggregates, and it is the 
interplay of these rather than any permanent partless ontological entity. From the 
Buddhist point of view, ignorance or delusion arises when this process of selfing 
is grasped at as an entity and identified with, rather than experienced as an ever- 
changing expression of dynamic interaction. In mindful awareness we can 
become aware of the arising and falling, coming and going of the discontinuous
J. Bruner, Acts o f  Meaning, p. 138.
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thoughts, perceptions, feelings and sensations which make up what we like to 
imagine as a single coherent and continuous self.
"This arising and subsiding, emerging and decay, is just that emptiness 
of self in the aggregate of experience. In other words, the very fact 
that the aggregates are full of experience is the same as the fact that 
they are empty of self. If there were a solid, really existing self hidden 
in or behind the aggregates, its unchangeableness would prevent any 
experience from occurring; its static nature would make the constant 
arising and subsiding of experience come to a screeching halt."11
In the twelvefold description of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) these 
same factors, as we saw earlier, appear in different order. From basic ignorance 
of the three marks of existence; impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and lack of 
essential self, arise the mental tendencies or determinations (samskaras) which 
give rise to consciousness (vijnana) which in turn gives rise to nama/rupa. As we 
have seen nama/rupa comprises the five aggregates since the last four are 
attributed to nama which is often translated as mind, with rupa as body or form.
A more helpful translation of the pair however as name and physical form uses 
them as the basis for a Buddhist theory of identity which would incorporate both 
the conventional self which is acceptable and that which is to be denied.12 It is 
name and form which individualises, identifying us to ourselves and to others, an 
which creates the divisions between inner and outer identity. "Name" also \
introduces the function of language. It is important to point out that these five 
factors are mutually dependent and implicated in each other.
I find Susan Hamilton's exposition of the five skandhas most helpful from a 
psychotherapeutic point of view, as she suggests that the model of the skandhas is 
not presented as a description of what a human being is, but as a description of the 
faculties pertaining to the cognitive process, underlining again Buddhism's 
concern with how rather than w/iaf.13 The result is a picture of the physical and
II Varela, Thompson & Rosch, The Embodied Mind. p. 80.
12 This translation appears to be used by the more recent and more psychologically-oriented 
commentators. See R.Johansson, The Dynamic Psychology o f  Early Buddhism; 
ftanavira Thera, Clearing the Path; Watson, Batchelor & Claxton, (eds.) The Fly & the 
Fly Bottle and S. Hamilton, The Constituents o f  the Human Being in Early Buddhism. 
N.R.Reat in "Some Fundamental Concepts of Buddhist Psychology" suggests that 
nama/rupa denotes the conceptual and apparitional aspects o f a given object, which 
allows for an interpretation of the pratitya samutpada formula which "anticipates some 
modem trends."
13 Reat also emphasises the foundation of nama-rupa in experience, calling it "an analysis 
of consciousness as experienced." It refers to the appearance and conceptualisation of 
objects of consciousness, which is why he translates rupa as "appearance" rather than 
"substance." This is in keeping with the idea o f Buddhist teachings as experientially 
oriented from the perspective of the consciousness o f a human being.
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conceptual identity of the person. According to this, rupa refers to the physical 
attributes of the living body. Vedana, usually translated as feeling, are, I feel 
most helpfully described by Hamilton as experiences, as she considers them as 
part of the cognitive process rather than as merely sensory processes. Moreover 
experience is, in English, a more value-free term than feelings. The locus of 
valuing is rather in the sarhskara skandha. Samjha is the process of apperception 
and conception, the process of recognising what one experiences, the process by 
which one conceives and imagines. Samskara is perhaps the most difficult term 
of translation and ascription, sometimes translated as volition, intention, or 
karmic formations. It is that faculty which influences choice and attention, 
covering all intention from life force to sensual desire. Samskara conveys those 
dispositions or conditions which we impose on our experience. Vijnana is the 
faculty of being conscious of things, and with it resides the sense of continuity.
Hamilton singles out the samskara skandha as the link in the cognitive process 
which gives rise to unhealthiness, suggesting in relation to the oft-repeated sutric 
phrase encouraging the guarding of the doors of the senses: "What has to be 
guarded is in fact one's reaction to what one experiences by means of the 
senses."14 I would consider this to be the very core of psychotherapeutic work; to 
uncover original reactions to experience, seeing how they have become 
incorporated as unchanging parts of the self image, thus influencing all 
subsequent perception and feeling. Seeing this, one may then loosen the hold of 
such predispositions and reactions so that choice, change and transformation may 
occur. Freud in a paper entitled Note on the Mystic Writing Pad used a child’s' 
toy as an image for the workings of the psyche similar to that described in this 
Buddhist model. The Mystic Writing Pad was a device upon which writing was 
displayed according to its impression upon a wax pad. When the paper was lifted 
from the pad the impression was destroyed. However, a permanent trace of what 
was written was retained by the wax slab. Similarly perception, feelings and 
consciousness receive stimuli, but do not retain the traces which are held in a 
different process, that of the dispositions.15 Dispositions such as passions form 
permanent traces in the psychic apparatus which preclude the subsequent 
possibility of immediate, unclouded perception.
Interpreters differ as to the extent they see the individuating factor of the 
dispositional aggregate (samskara skandha) as harmful in itself, but all point to the 
dispositions as the source of individuation, which either in itself, or through
14 S. Hamilton, The Constituents o f  the Human Being According to Early Buddhism, p.55.
15 S.Freud, "A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad." Standard Edition, Vol.XIX.
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solidification and identification of initial interest, leads to samsara. Dr. Hamilton 
suggests in a recent paper that this skandha need not, indeed should not be 
activated in the functioning of the human being.16 Kalupahana points to its 
inevitable presence with consciousness in the initial form of interest or selectivity, 
describing it as "that which processes material form, feeling, perception, 
disposition (itself) and consciousness into their particular forms."17 Certainly it is 
the dispositions which at some stage generate the influxes of desire, becoming, 
views and ignorance which are the causes of suffering and samsara. Without 
these influxes perhaps one can aspire to the purity of perception suggested in the 
Bahiyasutta of the Udana:
In the seen there will just be the seen; in the heard, just the heard; in 
the reflected, just the reflected; in the cognized, just the cognized. 
This is how, Bahiya, you must train yourself. Now Bahiya, when in 
the seen there will be to you just the seen;. . . just the heard;. . . just 
the reflected; . . . just the cognized, then, Bahiya, you will not identify 
with it. When you will not identify yourself with it, you will not locate 
yourself therein. When you do not locate yourself therein, it follows 
that you will have no Tiere1 or 'beyond' or 'midway-between' and this 
would be the end of suffering."18
Again, Nagaijuna writing about the perversions speaks of the destruction of 
ignorance by the cessation of perversion, and of the destruction of samskara 
following on the destruction of ignorance. Inada commenting on this says that 
Nagaijuna "concludes that the perversion itself must cease in order to destroy 
ignorance and that by the destruction of ignorance all devious functions o f  the five 
skandhas, such as samskara and vijnana, will be extinguished, thus arriving at 
ultimate quiescence or nirvana.1'19
From the psychotherapeutic perspective, which is definitely one within samsara, 
the aim is to become conscious of dispositions, to hold them lightly, to have a 
relationship rather than being identified with and ruled by them. For relationship 
implies some space and choice, in identification there is no space and no choice. 
Some form of dispositions or intention or selection, however, would seem to be
S.Hamilton, "Passionlessness in Buddhism," a paper delivered at Wolfson College, 
Oxford, March 1994. See below n.20.
D.Kalupahana, The Principles o f  Buddhist Psychology, p.l 8 on the evidence o f Samyutta 
Nikaya III. 87.
Udana 10.8.
K.Inada, MMK, p .l36 in relation to MMK chapter XXIII, v.23.
both inevitable and desirable, if only through their dependent origination and 
inseparability with consciousness.
In the Majjhima Nikaya the Buddha said that name was comprised of the five 
factors of intention (cetana), attention (manasikara), perception (samjna), 
stimulation or contact (sparia) and feeling (vedana). These same five factors were 
given as the five constant factors of consciousness in the Theravada Abhidharma 
and in the Mahayana by Asafiga in his Abhidharmsammucaya (as we saw in 
chapter two).20 Thus they are the foundation for a working sense of self. The 
illusory self with its concomitant egoic grasping is a superimposition, resultant 
primarily of the naming process of language. Ignorance of the three marks of 
existence conceives of this fluid transactional self as permanent, partless and 
autonomous. The process works in three main ways, both instinctually and 
intellectually: craving occurring in the linguistic form "This is mine", conceit 
manifesting in the linguistic form "This I am", and false views manifesting in the 
linguistic form "This is myself."21 Once one identifies with a permanent, partless 
self concept, pride and craving adhering to this, become the pivot from which an 
egocentric world arises.
One may think here of the seemingly inbuilt commitment to hypostatisation and 
substance ontology that Feyerbend has called "the natural interpretation". Again 
William James has something somewhat similar to say: "This me is an empirical 
aggregate of things objectively known. The I  which knows them cannot itself be 
an aggregate; neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an 
unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, 
viewed as 'out of time.' It is a Thought, at each moment different from that of the 
last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called 
its own."22
The self then, which in Buddhism is to be negated, is an illusion; it is the 
imposition of a self with attributes of independence and permanence upon the 
foundation of the conventional or transactional self, when all that exists is the 
interaction of various factors forming a system. This imposition arises not from 
the lack of an essential self itself, but from the emotional reaction to that lack; 
from the grasping which is the nature of the conditioned mind, which itself arises
The absence o f samskara from this list is taken as evidence for its inessentiality by Dr. 
Hamilton.
Samyuttta Nikaya HI. 1-5.
W. James, Principles o f  Psychology, p. 379.
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from the dispositions or mental tendencies (samskara)  Thus Stephen Batchelor 
suggests that; "The Buddha's sense of self would thus not be different from an 
ordinary person's in terms of structure, but only in the apprehension of that 
structure."23 However I would agreed with Hamilton in seeing this in terms of 
process rather than of structure.
Philosopher Richard Rorty addressing the topic of the contingency of selfhood 
writes of "the unconscious need everyone has: the need to come to terms with the 
blind impress which chance has given him, to make a self for himself by 
redescribing that impress in terms which are, if only marginally, his own."24 
There are three factors here: first description or representation of the "blind 
impress", second redescription in terms of grasping, and third an emotional 
concomitant in terms of identification and value judgement.
Central to this process of expansion and solidification is prapahca We have noted 
prapanca earlier in its Tibetan translation spros pa in relation to a definition of 
emptiness as spros med.25 It is another difficult term to translate, and Bhikkhu 
ftanananda has devoted an entire book length essay to the subject, such is its 
importance. As a translation he suggests that "prapanca may refer to the 
consequent prolificity in ideation" which follows upon initial application of 
thought.26 Nanananda considers the following passage central to his 
interpretation of what occurs in perception, an interpretation somewhat differing 
from the traditional understanding based upon the commentaries of Buddhaghosa 
with whom he disagrees. "Because of eye and material object, O brethren, arises 
visual consciousness; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement, because of 
sensory impingement arises feeling; what one feels, one perceives; what one 
perceives, one reasons about; what one reasons about, one proliferates 
conceptually; what one proliferates conceptually, due to that, concepts 
characterised by the prolific tendency assail him in regard to material shapes 
cognisable by the eye, belonging to the past, the future and the present."27
Most interestingly Nanananada points out that there are three stages. The formula 
is impersonal up to the point at which feeling enters, where it takes up a personal 
verb ending suggestive of deliberate activity and ego grasping. This 
personalisation ceases after the entrance of conceptual proliferation, at which
23 Watson, Batchelor & Claxton, The Fly & the Fly Bottle. p. 13.
24 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony & Solidarity, p. 43.
25 see above p.80, & below, p. 102 & n.31.
26 ftanananda, Concept & Reality, p. 4.
27 Madhupindika sutta o f the Majjhma Nikaya in ftanananda, Concept & Reality. p. 5.
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stage "the concepts are, as it were, invested with an objective character."28 He 
suggests this is brought about due to characteristics inherent in language. This is 
certainly interesting when related to such contemporary ideas as that of Heidegger 
that language is the house of Being, and the works of Derrida and the 
deconstructionists indicating that finally it is language that speaks us.
However, here again I find Susan Hamilton's considerations of prapanca to be 
even more perceptive. She points out that Nanananda and other commentators 
fail to observe the idea of separateness which adheres to the term prapanca. She 
translates the verb papanceti (Pali), which Nanananda gives as "one proliferates 
conceptually", as "one causes to become manifold." Thus after perception comes 
reasoning, which gives rise to making manifold. Hamilton suggests that prapanca 
is associated with perception in this sutta in a way that suggest both that 
manifoldness is a concomitant of identification, and that this manifoldness implies 
the attribution of separate independent existence to the phenomena perceived; 
implies, in fact, an erroneous imposition of separateness upon things which are 
really dependency originated.29
It is this same term prapanca which Nagaijuna used in the dedicatory verses at the 
opening of MMK:
I pay homage to the Fully Awakened One 
the supreme teacher who has taught 
the doctrine of relational origination,
the blissful cessation of all phenomenal thought constructions."30 
This does make more sense when prapanca is understood with its connotations of 
manifoldness and separateness. This connotation was also noted earlier by 
Mervyn Sprung who translated the final line of this verse as: "the serene coming 
to rest of the manifold of named things."31
Ibid  p. 6. Kalupahana disputes the impersonality o f the process prior to the arising o f  
feelings, arguing that consciousness, and thus also the dispositions which are inseparable 
from consciousness, have to some extent at least already come into play at this stage. 
However, with feeling, the dispositions increase in strength and solidify to the extent that 
they not only individuate a person, but lead to identification with such individuation, 
producing metaphysical notions o f self. D.Kalupahana, The Principles o f  Buddhist 
Psychology. p.33.
S. Hamilton, The Constituents o f  the Human Being in Early Buddhism, p.l 10. She backs 
up her argument with complementary examples from the Salayatana sutta, Samyutta 
Nikaya IV.71 and Anguttara Nikaya III. 294, IV. 69, II. 161.
MMK trs. Inada, p.39.
M.Sprung, Lucid Exposition o f  the Middle Way, p.33. In the glossary o f this work 
Sprung translates prapafica as "the world of named things; the visible manifold." The 
coming to rest o f these, he describes as "the preferred formulation o f the 'middle way'; 
usually interchangeable with 'dependent origination', 'absence of being in things' and 
nirvana."
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The most important attribution of separate independent existence is that to the 
self. The pivotal separation is the statement "I am" from which all further 
attributions of separateness spring. It is this that is spoken of in Sutta Nipata 916: 
"The wise man should put a stop to the thought 'I am1, which is the root of all 
naming in terms of manifoldness."
In Mahayana Yogacara philosophy Asanga unites discussion of self, discursive 
reasoning (vikalpa) and consequent conceptual proliferation (prapanca).32 Asanga 
describes how eight kinds of discursive reasoning, being the foundation of 
proliferation, create three bases upon which all the realms of samsara are founded. 
Discursive thought about essential nature, about particularity and about "whole 
shapes" is responsible for producing things or referents, which then become 
named, and the foundation for conceptual proliferation. Discursive thoughts 
about "I" and "mine" produce the basis for the view of self and egocentricity. 
Lastly discursive thought about what is agreeable, disagreeable or neither, gives 
rise to the three primary obstructions of desire, hatred and delusion. Asanga states 
that these three bases are closely interrelated, such that the view of self has 
support only when there is a view of an object in contradistinction to which it is 
defined in self/other, subject/object dualism. Similarly the obstructions of desire, 
hatred and delusion can only arise when there are ideas of self and its possessions. 
The antidote is to understand that discursive thought and the given thing which 
becomes the support for discursive thought are mutually dependent and without 
beginning. If one considers discursive thought in terms of "name" or 
"designation", then thorough investigation of the name, the given thing, the 
designations for essential nature and for particularity, reveals the emptiness or 
transparency of all designations and of given thing. Investigation of name means 
that the wise person sees with regard to a name that it is just a name. Likewise 
with regard to given thing, seeing that is just a given thing is the investigation of 
the given thing. Through such investigation both names, things, essential nature 
and particularity in isolation are found to be groundless, without referent, and 
transparent or empty. Realising the nature of name as it really is, as merely a 
linguistic symbol which facilitates discursive thought and with which discursive 
thought operates and conceptually proliferates, one understands that in its ultimate 
or liberating nature the given thing is inexpressible and separated from discursive 
thought. Such realisation allows a middle-way understanding of reality without 
exaggeration leading to clinging, or underestimation leading to nihilism. For the 
given thing is neither completely present, nor completely absent. "It is not
On Knowing Reality. The Tattvartha Chapter o f  Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi. trs. J.
D.Willis.
104
present, since it is not 'perfected' (parinispannatva), owing to its having an 
expressible 'self. And it is not altogether absent, since in fact is it determined to 
have an inexpressible essence. Thus from the stance of absolute truth 
(paramarthasatya) it is not formed (rupi), yet from the stance of relative 
truth(samvrtisatya) it is not formless, since form is attributed to it."33 Through 
such investigations, one may learn the interdependence and ultimate emptiness of 
both selves and given things, and how they arise together through discursive 
thought and conceptual proliferation.
Thus we see that for Buddhism it is not so much that there is no self as often 
stated, but rather that the imposition of a permanent, separate self onto the 
interaction of self processes is an error. The experiencing of life from the 
perspective of identification with this unchanging centre, this independent 
separate identity is the ignorant premise that underlies life in samsara. If, as we 
are told in the second noble truth, desire is the cause of continual suffering, it is 
fuelled by the erroneous perception which sees and separates one who desires, the 
object of desire, and desires themselves. When one no longer sees in this way 
and things are seen as they really are, such desires and the traces they leave on 
mental processes will cease since they are the result of thinking in terms of the 
separateness or selfhood of oneself and all things. Concomitant with the 
relinquishment of this grasping of separateness arises compassion, a concern for 
that from which one is not separate. In the Mahayana specific attention is drawn 
to compassion as the necessary adjunct to the wisdom which sees the truth of 
emptiness; sees things and selves as dependency originated and devoid of 
separateness.
SOME WESTERN VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Before considering views of self in psychotherapy, I believe it would be helpful to 
look at some Western ideas concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
development of consciousness and self consciousness. Ethologist John Crook 
describes the evolution of mind as adaptation in stages to social necessity.34 First 
there is an intuitive and non-analytical awareness of self as agent, followed by a 
developed apprehension of self in relation to others, then the development of more
33 J.Willis, (trs.) On Knowing Reality, p. 138
34 J. Crook, The Evolution o f  Human Consciousness. Chapter 7, 8 & 9.
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complex social interactions gives rise to more complex social skills with a 
concomitant increase in comprehension and introspection of the self that thus 
interacts. Thus first there is bodily awareness, then representation of one's own 
physical state leading to empathy which is useful in the prediction of the 
behaviour of others on the basis of oneself, giving animals with this facility an 
evolutionary advantage. The next stage is the ability to impute the presence of 
self, in Buddhist terms name as well as form, from self monitoring to self 
awareness. From this imputation of self onto system, and the symbolisation of 
that imputation in language, the construction of social structures and values arises 
in the sphere of culture. The self then acquires values and self esteem, operating 
in a social context which is judgmental. Feeling responses of desire, aversion and 
indifference lead to a strengthening of the sense of self. Thus, as Crook says: 
"The conceptualisation that represents the categorical self (the self as object) 
forms the very root, not only of the self as agent, but of the functional, social self 
in a world of others. It is the basis for evaluation of self esteem."35 In Buddhist 
terms, as discussed above, it is the misapprehension of this conceptualisation and 
separation (prapanca), the misapprehension that what is merely conceptualisation 
is unchanging, essential and to be identified with, that gives rise to our view of 
self and consequent egocentricity. It is this that leads to the Tibetan definition 
which we have viewed earlier, of emptiness as absence of conceptualisation. The 
power of this conceptualisation and identification is reinforced by feelings of 
desire and aversion.
There have been many different psychological models delineating the progressive 
stages of development of the sense of self. Some are described in physiological 
terminology such as Freud's oral, anal and genital stages which delineate the 
development of the ego, or organising principle, through accomplishing the 
challenge of meeting the instinctual demands centred upon different erogenous 
zones. Erikson supplemented these with a sequence of ego qualities which are 
normative for each stage, set out in sets of polarities that must be surmounted for 
the formation and maintenance of identity. For example the task of the primary 
oral stage is to gain basic trust at the expense of mistrust, and the tasks of 
adulthood are concerned with the polarity of generativity versus stagnation.36 
Jean Piaget based his stages in terms of operational ability entitled, "sensorimotor, 
operational thought, concrete operations and formal thought."37
Ibid. p.253.
E. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p.239.
J. Piaget & B.Inhelder, The Psychology o f  the Child.
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Most recently psychologist Margaret Donaldson sees the development of the 
individual in psychological terms somewhat similar to the phylogenetic 
development described by John Crook: "some sense of one's self as an agent is 
probably present very early indeed,... But the construction of a self-concept, or 
self-image, is another matter. The development of the ability to think about, or 
conceptualize one's self seems to have its origin around the age of eighteen 
months."38 She delineates four core stages of development. The first she calls 
Point Mode, that of present awareness. This is followed by Line Mode which 
incorporates narrative ability. This leads speedily on to what she calls Core 
Construct Mode, in which can occur representation, abstraction and modelling. 
This Core Construct Mode occurs in two forms, relating to intellectual constructs, 
and to value-sensing constructs. This latter is concerned with emotional rather 
than rational response, but refers to a responsiveness to what she terms "sources 
of importance"; the values in question must transcend personal concerns. This 
Core Construct mode may be followed by a fourth stage, again divided into two 
parts, Intellectual Transcendent and Value-Sensing Transcendent. From the point 
of view of the self/nonself dilemma which we have spoken of, she notes that: 
"Development beyond the core modes requires, by definition, cultivation of the 
ability to hold concern for the self-image in check, so that it can at least be laid 
aside for certain lengths of time. If these lengths of time are to be more than 
momentary, then some level of personal (not material) security may first have to 
be achieved. For when you are deeply and persistently worried about the "sort of 
person" you are, concern about this will soon intrude; and instead of wanting to 
solve a problem you will be wanting to prove that you are the sort of person who 
can solve the problem."39 As a Western scientist who is not a Buddhist, 
Donaldson shows a great interest in Buddhism as a source of a different kind of 
education in value-sensing modes which she considers as important and 
insufficiently addressed in Western culture.
From the viewpoint of Systems Theory, self is a construction, and as 
conventionally understood, an illusory one. In the words of Gregory Bateson: 
"the 'self as ordinarily understood is only a small part of a much larger trial-and- 
error system which does the thinking, acting and deciding. This system includes 
all the informational pathways which are relevant at any given moment to any 
given decision. The 'self is a "false reification of an improperly delineated part of 
this much larger field of interlocking processes."40 The apparently stable
38 M. Donaldson, Human Minds, p. 83.
39 Ibid. p. 254.
40 G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology o f  Mind. p. 302.
structure of organisms are, in actuality, only maintained through a constant 
process of exchanging matter, energy and information with their environment. An 
evolutionary view of the development of consciousness and self awareness starts 
with the response of simple organisms of irritability, the ability to react to 
fluctuations of energy in the internal and external environment. Progress occurs 
with the development both of biological capability to attune to variations in the 
environment, and more developed and skilful methods of tuning, such as 
attending and experimenting. A significant stage occurs with the development of 
social learning animals. As the tasks become too complex for the mind as a 
whole to deal with them, sub-systems evolve to handle different tasks, bringing 
with them the problem of communication between these sub-systems. The needs 
of dealing with ever greater complexity necessitates representation of self as well 
as world. Accurate perception must involve some level of self representation, 
however this self representation does not exist as a separate understanding in most 
animals up to chimpanzees. Then comes the ability to learn not only from 
observation but also from communication. There is a suggestion that construction 
of self consciousness first occurs within internal communication. Guy Claxton 
suggests that the process of constructing the self may be one of collating the body 
images arising from sub-units of the brain concerned with different purposes, and 
increasing the connections between these modules to the point where the body 
images come together with the linguistic structure.41
Again this is a view with two levels; first self image as process, representing a 
simple and implicit notion of self with inner coherence and position in the world, 
on top of which develops the self concept, which becomes increasingly reified and 
considered autonomous, and to which emotional components adhere, in turn 
affecting the concept. The former is "a kind of rough summary of who I am, 
always open to question, retaining the sense of absolute connectedness with the 
environment as an organism/environment field, whereas the other is a self 
representation which is bounded, causative and persistent through space and 
time."42 Language in turn developing alongside more complex social interactions, 
causes reification of process, which is intensified by identification with the 
illusory structure. It is the development of the capacity for self-awareness and 
description which marks the boundary between human and animal.43
G. Claxton in Watson, Batchelor & Claxton, (eds.), The Fly & the Fly Bottle, p. 25. In 
this section I am indebted to his exposition.
Watson, Batchelor & Claxton, (eds.), The Fly & the Fly Bottle, p. 26.
J.Jaynes in the Origins o f  Consciousness and the Development o f  the Bicameral S e lf  
suggests that the capacity for self-awareness is o f historically recent origin, and that self 
-awareness in the time of Homer was characterised quite differently from today.
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Gerald Edelman who is at the forefront of current research into brains, minds and 
selves writes that in order to acquire the capacity to become "conscious of being 
conscious", "systems of memory must be related to a conceptual representation of 
a true self (or social self) acting on an environment and vice versa. A conceptual 
model of selfhood must be built, as well as a model of the past."44 Edelman 
speaks of the development of primary consciousness which is achieved by the 
reconnection of a value-category memory to current ongoing perceptual 
processes, and of higher consciousness which arises with the evolution of 
semantic capabilities, and the accession of language and symbolic reference. As 
he says: " A conceptual explosion and ontological revolution - a world, not just an 
environment - are made possible by the interaction between conceptual and 
language centers. By these means, concepts of self and of a past and a future 
emerge. Higher-order consciousness depends on building a self through affective 
intersubjective exchanges."45
More controversially, science writer Danah Zohar attempts to describe the self 
and the relationship between man and world in terms of quantum mechanics and 
the complementarity of wave and particle: "Viewed quantum mechanically I am 
my relationships - my relationships to the sub-selves within my own self and my 
relationships to others, my living relationship to my own past through quantum 
memory and to my future through my possibilities. Without relationship I am 
nothing."46
So it would appear that in all descriptions we see this distinction between a 
transactional self and a self concept which tends to become hypostatized; a 
distinction between an ever-changing experiential response to the environment, 
and the concept of a reified continuous self living in an objective world. Perhaps 
one of the simplest ways to underline the difference between the two "selves" as 
Polly Young-Eisendrath and James Hall show in their essay, "Ways of Speaking 
of the Self', is by the common phrase; "I am not myself today."47 The first "I" is 
the immediate changing sense of self as centre of personal subjectivity responding 
to environmental conditions, the second is the more unchanging self concept or 
self image. Both are constructs, Buddhism is concerned with the unreality of the
44 G. Edelman, Blight Air, Brilliant Fire. p. 131. Edelman's work will be further discussed 
in chapter 9 from the perspective o f embodiment.
45 Ibid. p. 150.
46 D. Zohar, The Quantum Self. p. 127. I am unqualified to consider the correctness of her
description which has been much criticised by Edelman and Claxton among others, but
enjoy its resonance with the dependent arising o f Buddhism.
47 P. Young-Eisendrath & J. Hall, The Book o f  the Self  p. 442.
109
second, psychotherapy, as we have seen, with increasing the congruence between 
the two, often achieved by increasing the flexibility and transparency of the latter, 
but rarely challenging its very existence or necessity. I would like now to look at 
some of the ways different psychotherapeutic approaches work with the self.
THE SELF IN PSYCHOTHERAPY
Behaviourist therapies work only with overt behaviour, and the behaviourist self 
is the sum of these behaviours, and is constructed through learning. Such a 
system obviously allows no place for an unchanging, permanent self. We have 
already looked at some ideas of development of self from Cognitive Psychology 
and Cognitive Science referring to ideas of construction. Social psychologists 
have described self as a function of situation, and Cognitive psychology has 
looked for self in terms of narrative, judging its success in terms of coherence, 
adequacy and livability rather than in terms of correspondence to ’reality.’48 In 
terms of Cultural Psychology Bruner has attempted to widen this brief to include 
practices as well as meanings in the definition of self both by the individual and 
the culture in which they participate. I will return later to considerations of 
narrative and metaphor in the construction of self.
Psychoanalysis provided perhaps the first coherent model of the divided self, a 
model which has almost insidiously invaded contemporary discourse. Examples 
from the fields of art and literature abound, perhaps Cubist painting is the most 
obvious example of portraiture equally valuing different perspectives. Freud, as 
we have discussed above, put forward different models over time; divisions into 
conscious, unconscious and preconscious and into ego, id and superego, but the 
emphasis is always on conflict and division. Mark Epstein both a psychoanalyst 
and a Buddhist practitioner has frequently pointed out that the seeming 
contradiction between ego and the Buddhist self which is to be negated are easily 
dissolved if the concepts are analysed clearly. "It is not ego, in the Freudian 
sense, that is the actual target of the Buddhist insight. It is, rather, the self 
concept, the representational component of the ego, the actual internal experience 
of one's self that is targeted."49 As the result of Buddhist practice: "It is not that
48 see K. Gergen, "Social Understanding and the Inscription of S e lf;  J. Bruner, Acts o f  
Meaning, p.99. and D. Spence, Historical Truth and Narrative Truth.
49 M. Epstein, "Freud & Dr. Buddha" in Tricycle 1 (3). 1992 p.52.
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the ego disappears, but that the belief in the ego's solidity, the identification with 
ego's representation, is abandoned in the realization of egolessness.”50 In 
Freudian terms he suggests that realisation of the construction of self concept is 
not to be confused with loss of self or dissolution of ego boundaries. It is the 
"ideal ego" rather than the "ego ideal" that is the target of Buddhist meditation, 
and which is responsible for feelings of solidarity, permanence and inherent 
existence.51 In psychotherapy we work constantly with representations, analysing 
and experiencing their causation, their experience and our identification with 
them, attempting thereby to encourage disidentification or reframing, a widening 
of possibilities or of models that are holding back our clients, helping them to 
open out to new possibilities, new selves, stories and representations. And this is 
where most therapy ends. Perhaps the task of a Buddhist therapy is to be open- 
ended, to see through all models. I would like to return to this idea later.
Kohut's Self Psychology also, developing from the demands of different 
pathologies from those addressed by Freud; pathologies of fragmentation, draws 
attention to the pragmatic needs of developing a coherent and consistent self as 
centre of action. Although it does not advocate a unitary and independent self, it 
may be in danger of reifying the self, by its very emphasis upon it.52 Philip 
Cushman has recently written perceptively about psychotherapy's participation in 
the creation of the essentially empty self of Western culture which is to be filled 
with the goods of a consumer society. Cushman while valuing both Kohut's Self 
Psychology and Object Relations in many ways, also sees them as having 
inadvertently conspired in the development of the isolated interiority of the empty 
self by presenting a model of an inherently empty self constructed from its 
"consumption" or introjection of selfobjects and significant others, and by their 
disregard of wider historical, political and cultural horizons. If, as Ann Klein 
suggests, postmodern discourse is like talking about dependent origination 
without emptiness, perhaps the emptiness of the empty self may be likened in 
Buddhist terms to emptiness without dependent origination, an emptiness, which 
far from being beyond duality, is merely privation.
Ibid. p. 53.
M.Epstein, "Beyond the Oceanic Feeling: Psychoanalytic study of Buddhist meditation."
p. 162.
A critique o f this also reveals a general lack o f sympathy with such a view: " One source 
o f its weakness as a system is that it makes extensive use of the common human 
inclination to reify such abstractions as 'the self and to treat them as tangible structures 
that can be defective, be subject to direct perception, and be repaired or help to resume 
growth." F J. Levine & R. Kravis, "Psychoanalytic Theories o f the Self." p.327.
Paradoxically, both Kohut and Winnicott may be seen both as contributing to the 
interiority of the self in this way and as simultaneously broadening the scope of 
the self by emphasising the interpersonal as well as the intrapsychic. As 
Winnicott wrote: "A description of the emotional development of the individual 
cannot be made entirely in terms of the individual, but that in certain areas ... the 
behaviour of the environment is part of the individual's own personal development 
and must therefore be included."53 Yet, as we said before, perhaps only Lacan 
with his exposition of the mirror stage and the construction of self from others, 
similar though it is to Winnicott's work, emphasises the "meconnaissance", and 
sees the very constructed self as not only constructed, but false.
Humanistic and Existential Psychotherapy is centrally concerned with the 
individual in the world, with Dasein, "being-in-the-world," and Mitsein, "being- 
with." The humanistic conception of the self is concerned with the influence of 
environment, experience, responsibility and choice, and with issues of congruence 
between self and self image. "The self is made up of all the truly objective 
aspects of our being ... It includes images of our bodies, our ideas of what sorts of 
persons we are, our generalizations about how others see us, and our personal 
histories. The self, so conceived, is an abstraction, a perceptual and conceptual 
object."54 Yet it is an abstraction to which we cling instinctively, as Heidegger 
appeared to note: "Dasein ... also interprets itself as having a fixed and self- 
sufficient nature like the occurrent in order to hide 'the inessentiality of the 
self.’"55
Carl Rogers contended that the human infant has an inherent tendency toward 
actualising his organism, part of which is a tendency towards differentiation, due 
to which a portion of experience becomes differentiated and symbolised in an 
awareness of functioning which he describes as self experience. Such 
representation is elaborated through interaction with the environment, particularly 
through interaction with significant others, into a concept of self which is a 
perceptual object in the experiential field. If all experience is available to 
awareness and nothing is shut off due to defensive reactions, then all 
symbolisation will be as accurate as possible, leading to a self concept which is 
congruent with experience.56 Ideally the self concept will be a fluid gestalt 
flexibly changing as it interacts with its experience of world. However in
53 D. W. Winnicott, Playing & Reality, p. 53.
54 J.F.T. Bugental, The Search for Existential Identity, p. 289.
55 H. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world. p. 127, quoting from M. Heidegger, M etaphysical
Foundations o f  Logic. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984. p. 140.
56 See The Carl Rogers Reader, pp. 240 & 252.
actuality various aspects of experience become repressed or defended against 
perceived pain, and the horizon of potential experience becomes limited and the 
self concept rigid. Psychotherapeutic work attempts to expose and loosen the 
defensive structures which prevent experience being available to awareness, thus 
allowing for more flexible self concepts which can be congruent with ever- 
changing experience.
Transpersonal psychotherapies travel beyond Humanistic and Existential therapies 
in their definition of the needs of actualisation, leading them into the territory of 
religion. They, therefore, have perhaps most clearly addressed the self/non-self, 
ego-strengthening/ego-loosening issues. If we take a definition of religion as 
relating to the Latin religere to tie back, reconnect, it connotes the connection to 
that which is greater; to relations between the Many and the One in both 
directions, and is thus at the very heart of the self/no-self debate.
C.G. Jung attempted to counterbalance the emphasis on fragmentation by putting 
forward wholeness as the ultimate, if unreachable, goal of the individuation 
process. In fact there is more than a little confusion within Jung's writings due to 
his use of self both as in common usage in terms of the individual as him or 
herself, and as self standing for wholeness, as a transcendental archetype 
explained in terms of its function in uniting opposites. This latter self, often 
written Self, does come close to that kind of hypostatized self which is to be 
negated in Buddhism, in such statements as; "The self: as the essence of 
individuality it is unitemporal and unique; as an archetypal symbol it is a God- 
image and therefore universal and eternal."57
On the other hand, Jung definitely believed that in the second half of life it was 
necessary to go beyond the frame of the ego, and his Self is certainly not an 
individual self. Several comparisons have been made between Jungian Analytical 
Psychology and Buddhism.58 One of those writers notes that "Neither of the two 
sides advocates complete egolessness, and neither the Buddhists nor Jung have an 
understanding of the negation of the ego that implies the utter eradication or non­
existence of the ego. Each in their own way, shows that it is the exaggeration of
C.G. Jung, Collected Works. Vol. 9, para 116. Possibly such a statement could be 
explicated by reference to the Two Truths, the conventional and the absolute; the absolute 
archetypal God image being compatible to a gzhan stong interpretation o f Buddha Nature. 
However it would probably be quickly refuted according to the dGe lugs pa 
Madhyamaka argument.
N. Katz, "On the phenomena of the "Feminine" according to Tantric Hagiographical 
Texts and Jungian Psychology"; M. Kalff, "The Negation o f ego in Tibetan Buddhism & 
Jungian Psychology"; R. Moacanin, Jung's Psychology & Tibetan Buddhism.
the importance of the ego, a wrong view and a misapprehension of its relative and 
dependent nature that is the cause of pain and suffering."59
Jack Engler, an American psychologist and vip a ^ yana meditation teacher has 
written most clearly and convincingly on this subject, in a way which links back 
to many of the arguments and topics we have been considering above. I shall, 
therefore, quote at length:
"Though they value ego-development differently, both Buddhist 
psychology and psycho-analytic object relations theory define 
the essence o f  the ego in a similar way: as a process of 
synthesis and adaptation between the inner life and outer reality 
which produces a sense of personal continuity and sameness in 
the felt experience of being a 'self,' a feeling of being and 
ongoingness in existence. Object relations theory explains this 
experience of personal continuity and selfhood as the outcome 
of a gradual differentiation of internalized images of a 'self as 
distinct from internalized images of object and the eventual 
consolidation of these images into a composite schema or self­
representation. Theravada Abhidhamma explains the 
emergence of the sense of T in a similar way as the end product 
of a process of identification in which we learn to take one or 
more of the various components (khandhas) which make up our 
experience of objects as 'me' or 'myself. ...
In both psychologies then, the sense of T, of personal unity and 
continuity, ... is conceived as something which is not innate in 
personality, not inherent in our psychological or spiritual 
makeup, but as evolving developmentally out o f  our experience 
o f objects and the kinds o f  interactions we have with them. In 
other words, the 'self is literally constructed  out of our 
experience with the object world.... In fact, the self is viewed in 
both psychologies as a representation which is actually being 
constructed anew from moment to moment.'’60
In this view the issue is a developmental one, first to acquire a coherent and 
cohesive functioning sense of self, then to recognize or acknowledge it as a
59 M. Kalff, op. cit. p. 103.
60 J. Engler, "Therapeutic aims in psychotherapy and meditation; Developmental stages in 
the representation of the self." p. 28.
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construct.61 In fact in Engler's terms: "you have to be somebody before you can 
be nobody1'62 and the issue is not self or no-self, but self and no-self.63 Such an 
understanding fits well with Ken Wilber's hierarchic model. (Fig.l) Wilber 
himself follows a developmental model, and has described in detail what he calls 
the pre/trans fallacy, the danger of mistaking early states of undifferentiated ego 
with later states of transcended or "seen-through" ego. It has been suggested that 
the essential difference between the prepersonal and the transpersonal states is a 
question of awareness.64 It is a view utterly in contradiction to Freud's 
description of all mystical experience as the regression to the former. However 
confusion between these states is a very real danger both in meditation and in 
therapeutic work. There have been many cases of those with borderline 
personality or problems of ego-stability being drawn to meditative experience, 
which is unhelpful to their prior need to strengthen ego boundaries. John 
Welwood has called this the problem of "spiritual bypassing."65
A somewhat different view of this topic is presented by Washburn who presents 
what he calls a "dynamic-dialectical" paradigm in contrast to Wilber's "structural- 
hierarchical" model. Whereas Wilber presents a structural conception wherein 
development proceeds through ascending levels, Washburn presents a bipolar 
conception of the psyche and shows development as a triphasic dialectical 
interplay between the two poles, ego and dynamic ground. In the first stage, the 
pre-egoic, ego emerges out of the ground and is still under the dominating 
influence of the ground. In the second stage, the Egoic stage, ego differentiates 
and disassociates itself from ground, while in the final stage, the transegoic, the 
ego undergoes a return to the ground followed by a higher synthesis with ground 
which is an integration of the two poles of the psyche.66 Though this view is less 
hierarchical, both models show that relationship requires distinction if not 
separation; that there is a necessary movement from union through distinction to
M. Donaldson writes interestingly of the difference between implicit and explicit 
knowledge, between knowledge and 'acknowledge'. See Human Minds. p23.
J. Engler, op cit. p. 51.
However it has been suggested that this view may lead to misunderstanding. It is not a 
question of losing something which existed, but of seeing through the illusion which we
have created by imposing upon a moment to moment working sense o f self, a concept of 
self as a whole, seen as from outside and imbued with characteristics o f solidity, 
permanence and independence.
D.M.Levin, The Body's Recollection o f  Being, p.l 16. A Buddhist perspective on this 
topic concerns different types of mental distortions. Inborn mental distortions are those 
that one is bom with, speculative mental distortions are those that one acquires through 
adopting false views. As the present Dalai Lama writes: "Buddhist practice is aimed not 
at reverting to an infant-like state o f consciousness, but at striving toward an 
unprecedented state o f awakening." H.H. Dalai Lama, Transcendent Wisdom, p.146. n.2. 
J.Welwood, "Principles of Inner Work: Psychological & Spiritual." p.69.
M. Washburn, The Ego & the Dynamic Ground.
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relation. All these tripartite schema may be mapped onto the Bakhtin/Mumford 
model presented in Introduction above.
Thus we see that each school of psychotherapy is attempting according to its own 
model, to heal the divisions in the fragmented self, to describe and clarify the 
relationships between parts whether intra, inter or transpersonally, and to 
encourage a sense of functional coherence and wholeness. The primary division, 
according to Wilber’s Spectrum model, is that of subject from object, self from 
other, and our views of the self, and the goals for the achievement of a suitable 
self concept will be constituted from the ways we view this split, both in terms of 
the divided parts and the relationship between them. In some sense our lives may 
be seen as an attempt to regain some idea of impossible wholeness, whether this is 
seen as lost unity with the mother, or with implacable Desire or with God. The 
therapeutic endeavour is dependent upon the way in which the coming into being 
of egoic consciousness is envisaged, and the particular explanation of the fact that 
the self always already finds itself with the world. Reviewing the different 
definitions of selves and the description of the development of desirable selves 
according to the different therapeutic models, we have seen contradictory trends. 
On the one hand, the increasing dispersal of self over a wide area, from 
intrapersonal to interpersonal to transpersonal dimensions. At the same time there 
has been an increased emphasis on the importance of that self, on actualisation of 
its potential, accompanied by the danger of reconsolidation and reification of the 
construct. The generation of Humanistic psychology has been termed narcissistic 
in the most pejorative sense, the "me" generation. Although the sense of self is no 
longer unitary, yet the operational view of it as an egocentric centre of operations 
has been strengthened. Paradoxically theoretical models of the widely-distributed 
self seem to be accompanied by an ever stronger focus on the interiority and 
individuality of that self. Psycho therapies addressing the problems of the 
contemporary self in practice remain largely fixated on the individual experience, 
narrative and feelings ignoring the wider social horizons.
Working against this trend EcoPsychology, Systems Theory and some 
Structuralists attempt to place the ego firmly in the context of some greater whole. 
This, like Buddhism, may point to a middle way between subjectivity and 
objectivity, one that escapes the extremism of either side, a non-dual view like 
that of Koestler’s Janus-faced "holon" showing both autonomy towards its parts 
and integration within larger systems.67 For in terms of recent prevalent dualities
A. Koestler, ''Beyond atomism & holism - the concept o f the holon." In B eyo n d  
Reductionism. p. 192.
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the obverse of objectivism is renewed subjectivism, which in its turn initiates 
objectivism again. Heidegger pointed out the unsatisfactory nature of this in "The 
Age of the World Picture" describing this age as that in which there has never 
been greater subjectivism and individualism, and at the same time a comparable 
objectivism, an impoverishment of world as representation. According to his 
vision, as man has become the "primary and only real subiectum ... Man becomes 
that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being 
and its truth."68 "To represent (vor-stellen) means to bring what is present at 
hand (das Vor-handene) before oneself as something standing over against, to 
relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into this 
relationship to oneself as the normative realm."69 But in that man puts himself 
into the picture in this way, thereby he becomes himself the "representative (der 
Reprasentant) of that which is, in the sense of that which has the character of 
object."70 Such a state of being might be contrasted with that Dogen describes: 
"To practise and confirm all things by conveying one's self to 
them is illusion, for all things to advance forward and practise 
and confirm the self, is enlightenment... To learn the Buddha 
Way is to learn one's own self. To learn one's self is to forget 
one's self. To forget one's self is to be confirmed by all 
dharmas."71
VIEWS OF THE SELF IN CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE
Current views of self in the West, as we have seen in relation to psychotherapy, 
appear to have taken us quite a way from any unitary, essential and "punctual" 
view. This is reflected in the worlds of theory and art. One of the characteristics 
of the postmodern stance is the idea of the vanishing subject. This may take 
different forms, but in all cases a substantial representation of the self at the 
centre of its world is replaced with a more relational and distributed concept of 
subjectivity. According to a recent study of psychology and postmodernism: 
"What has died is ... the unified, reified and essentialized subject" which is 
replaced "by a provisional, contingent and constructed subject, a subject whose
68 M. Heidegger, "The Age o f the World Picture" in The Question Concerning Technology.
p. 128.
69 Ibid p. 131.
70 Ibid p. 132.
71 Dogen, Genjokoan, trs. M. Abe & N. Waddell, p. 133.
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self-identity is constituted and reconstituted relationally."72 Constantly in 
postmodern discourse the emphasis is on the 'other', on alterity. Whether what is 
privileged are certain types of alterity such as women or minorities, or otherness 
in general, the emphasis has shifted from unity and identity to difference. 
Geoffrey Bennington writing of Derrida speaks of one of the most constant 
themes: "in order to be itself, a subject must already relate to itself as to an other. 
Identity comes only from alterity, called by the other."73 It is only from the point 
of view of the other that I can be perceived as a whole, from outside my own 
happening. This returns us to the difference between self as centre of action and 
self as representation in which language is deeply implicated. Beautifully put by 
Bahktin: "Much as Peter Pan's shadow is sewn to his body, 'I' is the needle that 
stitches the abstraction of language to the particularity of lived experience."74 In 
this stitching there is loss as a result of the addition. Holquist writing of Bakhtin 
comparing the difference between the time of the self which is always open and 
unfinished to the time we assume for others or for a representation of ourselves, 
time which is closed, finalisable, describes that process:
" in order to be known, to be perceived as a figure that can be 'seen', 
a person or thing must be put into the categories of the other, 
categories that reduce, finish, consummate. We see not only 
ourselves, but the world, in the finalizing categories of the other. In 
other words, we see the world by authoring it, by making sense of it 
through the activity of turning it into a text, by translating it into 
finalizing schemes that can order its potential chaos - but only by 
paying the price of reducing the world's variety and endlessness."75
In both agreement and contrast to this the philosopher Emanuel Levinas exhorts 
us to acknowledge, and be open to, the infinite alterity of the other in the face-to- 
face situation, which alone can precede and escape representation, in a project 
which I find strangely complementary to the Buddhist one. Thus, this necessity of 
the other may also be viewed from two sides, from what we might call following 
Dogen, the side of enlightenment or from the egocentric perspective.76 "From 
within the perspective of egology, others seem to have no other status than that of 
stimulus to my own pleasure.... The ego's self-identification and reduction of 
difference (the not me) to the same (the for me) is the totalization process par
72 S. Kvale, Introduction to Psychology & Postmodernism, p. 14
73 G. Bennington & J. Derrida, Jacques Derrida, p. 143.
74 Ibid. p. 28.
75 Ibid. p. 84.
76 This relates to the two ways o f experiencing body, speech and mind which will be 
referred to below in chapter eight.
excellence which Levinas undertakes to criticize in Totality and Infinity."11 In an 
essay Steven Gans convincingly argues that the aim of Levinas' 
phenomenological ethics is the same as that of psychotherapeutic practice since 
"both show the way toward the transformation of egoic need into interpersonal 
desire" 18 Levinas describes the position of egoic interiority of Western man. As 
Gans describes it: " Western man looks out for his enjoyment. From the invisible 
centre of his hidden presence, he represents and constitutes a world which he in 
turn penetrates, manipulates and controls, so that he can accumulate power and 
might in order to deploy resources to satisfy his needs and defend against loss."79 
Levinas' answer to this is to found his philosophy on the priority of the ethical 
over the ontological, on the Platonic Good beyond being, and on the prior claim 
of the face to face encounter with the Other, which calls us to break with "the 
narcissism of the imaginary in order to live in the promised land of the real and 
the good."80 According to Levinas' approach narcissism represents a refusal of 
the extension of self into the world, a failure of nerve, a failure to respond to the 
call of "otherness," a constriction of defensive posture. Perhaps it is not so far 
from Heidegger's call of Being, although Levinas considered Heidegger's 
prioritisation of Being to be still in the realm of theory rather than of the "face-to- 
face." To answer the call of the other is "to move toward an ethics of love, toward 
the celebration of our interrelatedness."81
Such language seems familiar to that of Buddhist discourse. According to Gans, 
also following Lacan, need is deficient desire, "a void in the heart of interiority", 
and it is this which initiates the objectification process as defence against loss, 
limitation and death. In Buddhist terms this loss is illusory, the result of the ill- 
conceived sense of self as ultimately separate from other. In discussion of 
Wilber's Spectrum model in chapter two, I considered David Loy's views on the 
lack of being of the self. Loy speaks of: "the nondualist claim that the ontological 
self is a delusion and that this delusive sense of self is the fundamental duhkha 
(frustration) which distorts our experience and disturbs our lives. Contrary to all 
schools of ego psychology, such a self can never become secure because its very 
nature is to be insecure ... the sense of self is not a thing but a lack, which can
77 S. Gans, "Levinas &  Pontalis." p. 84.
78 Ibid p. 83. It is important to note that, as with Lacan (see above, chapter 2, n.44.) "desire" 
is used to denote a very different concept in the work of Levinas from that current either 
in Buddhist discourse or the works of Freud. Rather than something to be shunned or a 
physical drive it points towards the infinite.
79 Ibid. p. 84.
80 Ibid. p. 85.
81 Ibid. p. 89. Dr. Gans and Dr.LJRedler have recently led a seminar entitled "Towards a
New Paradigm for Psychotherapy" based on the work o f Levinas as the foundation o f a 
psychotherapy grounded in the ethical response of the "face to face."
conceal its own emptiness only by keeping ahead of itself - that is, by projecting 
itself into the next thought, action, and so on - which process is craving..."82 Loy 
suggests that the prime object of repression is awareness of lack of "being", a 
lack of inherent existence, or groundlessness. In terms of Buddhism it is such 
fears themselves, or rather the preceding unsatisfied desire to be an independent 
entity, which is groundless and misguided since the sense of self itself is not an 
existent reality, but merely a mental construction which falsely experiences its 
own perceived groundlessness as a lack. Investigation of the mental 
constructions which give rise to this constructed sense of self, as we saw in 
Asanga's analysis nearly two thousand years ago, reveals its emptiness, loosening 
at one stroke both the conceptual proliferation which supports the sense of self, 
that self itself and the anxiety unconsciously defending its fragility. What is left is 
not nothing, but a greater non-egocentric grounding, as Loy describes: "If each 
link of pratitya-samutpada is conditioned by all the others, then to become 
completely groundless is also to become completely grounded, not in some 
particular, but in the whole network of interdependent relations that constitute the 
world. The supreme irony of my struggle to ground myself is that it cannot 
succeed because I am already grounded in the totality."83
Bakhtin takes particular note of relationship in the composition of self In his 
exposition of existence, language and self as dialogue, he notes that dialogue is 
composed of an utterance, a reply and the relation between; the self is a centre, a 
not-centre and the relationship between them.84 He writes that "the psyche 
enjoys extraterritorial status within the organism. It is a social entity that 
penetrates inside the organism of the individual person." He was influenced by 
the views of psychologist Lev Vygotsky who believed that maturation of the 
infant and the dissemination of culture occurs first in intersubjective space, in 
what he termed the "zone of proximal development." According to this view the 
direction of the development of thinking is from the social to the individual and 
not, as usually perceived, vice versa. Research by Jerome Bruner has explored 
what he calls this "loan of consciousness" from parent or tutor to infant, with , as 
we saw above Bruner’s similar conclusion that conceptualism is not unmediated, 
but acquired in interaction and negotiation with others.85 Sociologist Kenneth 
Gergen has also written widely on the distribution of the self and has pointed 
towards change from an understanding based on an individualistic and dualistic
82 D. Loy, Nonduality, p. 209.
83 Ibid. p. 174.
84 "The most primary o f Bakhtinian a prioris is that nothing is anything in itself." M.
Holquist, Dialogism. p. 38.
85 J.Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, p. 77.
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concept of persons to an understanding as "relational activity" or intersubjectivity. 
He suggest also that in abandoning the assumption that knowledge lies within the 
minds of single individuals, we may be able to move away from the high value 
which we now place on individualism which is problematic for contemporary 
Western culture. 86
In the Madhyamaka view, as we have seen, deconstruction of the solidity of self is 
linked to that of world and of the relation between the two, until only changing 
process remains. However what seems most difficult to dislodge are the last 
traces of reification of the relationship itself, for even process can be hypostatized. 
We need to remember what Bruner calls the "ability to subjunctivize". Ideas of 
metaphor and narrative belong to the project of subjunctification. As we have 
seen, a concern with narrative, by which self creates coherence and consistency, 
and a focus on the meanings, private and cultural by which self is defined, and on 
the practices in which these meanings are achieved, has accompanied the 
deconstruction of the punctual self. As George Lakoff & Mark Johnson explain: 
"A large part of self-understanding is the search for appropriate 
personal metaphors that make sense of our lives. Self-understanding 
requires unending negotiation and renegotiation of the meaning of 
your experience to yourself. In therapy, for example, much of self- 
understanding involves consciously recognizing previously 
unconscious metaphors and how we live by them. It involves the 
constant construction of new coherences in your life, coherences that 
give new meaning to old experiences. The process of self- 
understanding is the continual development of new life stories for 
yourself."87
Indeed it has been suggested that psychotherapy may be seen as "a process of 
challenging and rebuilding models, and metaphor can be a conscious tool toward 
exploring ways for expanding models."88 However only Buddhism suggests that 
all constructs can or should be held lightly and seen through as metaphors, rather 
than being hypostatized and identified with.
This ability and the practices used to facilitate it has been noticed by others. 
Margaret Donaldson advocates switching our modes of mental functioning rather
86 See K. Gergen, "Social understanding and the inscription o f the self."
87 G.Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. p. 233.
88 L.E. Olds, Metaphors o f  Interrelatedness, p.41. A specific theoretical model, George 
Kelly's Construct Theory is founded upon the way our constructs structure our selves and 
our worlds. The goal o f his approach is to create alternative and more effective constructs 
that enable us to predict events more accurately and helpfully. See G.A. Kelly, A  Theory 
o f  Personality.
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than attempting to reconstruct those in which we are suffering. She speaks of 
Buddhism as "a particularly resolute attempt to develop skill in leaving 
undesirable modes at will.1'89 The metaphor often used for such a switch is that of 
looking with a wide focus as opposed to looking with the narrow focus of 
ordinary perception.90 Donaldson also advocated "decentring" on the part of 
educators; the avoidance of being tied to a single point of view and the 
appreciation of differing perspectives. This is in agreement with Richard Rorty's 
delineation of the contemporary scene as one in which "one's aim becomes an 
expanding repertoire of alternative descriptions rather than The One Right 
Description. Such a shift in aim becomes possible only to the extent that both the 
world and the self have been de-divinized."91 The danger, of course, is that of 
utter relativism and nihilism, a danger I contend that Buddhism has both views 
and practices to oppose, which I would like to consider at more length later.
CONCLUSION
In 1987 in the introduction to The Book o f  the Self, subtitled Person, Pretext and 
Process the editors see "person" as subjective coherence or agency, while 
"pretext" "expresses the possibility that presuppositions of a continuous and 
unified self are illusory. The self may be a project of deception, a masking of 
discontinuity and disintegration ... a construction based on language, a cultural 
point of view on human life, expressing a desire for unity in the face of 
dissolution and death."92 This differentiates between self as agency and self as 
concept built up of processes, reified and identified with, as a search for security 
and unity in the face of the primary and secondary dualities of Wilber's Spectrum 
model as described earlier. It presents a view not incompatible with that of 
Buddhism.
However paradoxically, along with the weakening of the certainty of world and of 
the punctual self the West has seen a both rise in nihilistic thought and a 
reactionary emotional clinging to the concept of self and self actualisation, rather 
than attempts to discover ways of keeping our balance within and upon metaphor,
89 M. Donaldson, Human Minds, p. 213.
90 See M. Milner, A Life o f  One's Own and J. Welwood, "Meditation and the Unconscious: 
A New Perspective."
91 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony & Solidarity, p. 39.
92 P. Young-Eisendrath & J. Hall, The Book o f  the Self, p 6.
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movement, fluidity and interconnection. If the sense of self is upheld according 
to the Buddhist view by craving, conceit and false views, perhaps Western 
approaches may be said to have come to terms intellectually with views of self 
rather better than they have emotionally with craving and conceit. Contemporary 
views of self are, as we have seen, most definitely no longer those of a single, 
unitary and permanent self, and everywhere we find a distinction between 
transactional self, and self image or self concept. Yet our conceit, "this is me", 
and our craving, "this is mine," would not appear to have yet caught up with our 
intellectual knowledge.93
There is also an important difference between the historical and cultural \  
preconceptions between traditional Buddhism and contemporary Western 
discourse which must not be overlooked. This concerns the importance given in 
the West to the individual as a locus of experience with the consequent 
importance of personal narrative in the construction of a coherent and self 
sufficient self. No direct tracing of Buddhist concepts of nonself onto Western 
psychotherapy will be helpful if this difference is ignored. Nor, perhaps, will 
Buddhist teachings be easily and helpfully accepted widely in the West without 
acknowledgement of such cultural differences. Yet an understanding of ultimate 
emptiness, impermanence and dependent origination may certainly be helpful in 
enabling us to hold our personal stories more lightly, and to retain awareness of 
their metaphoricity, and their embeddedness in a wider framework. As a 
contemporary Western writer has suggested: "It may be that to understand 
ourselves as fictions, is to understand ourselves as fully as we can."94
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Psychotherapy hardly seems to have followed through with the implications of 
these views of the plurality of the self. In terms of resultant therapy such 
discourse is only just appearing in the work of individuals. James Hillman has 
recently addressed them, as has Philip Cushman with his hermeneutic approach, 
and ecopsychologists are attempting to widen the scope of psychology to embrace
"Because object relations psychoanalysis has not systematically addressed its basic 
contradiction - the lack o f a unitary self in experience versus the ongoing sense of self- 
grasping - the open-ended quality that is possible in analysis, though present in all 
psychoanalysis and particularly in object relations therapy, is limited. Lacanian analysis 
in Europe may be one exception, and it may have gained some o f its power and notoriety 
because o f  this quality. A fuller discussion o f this fascinating bridge between 
psychoanalysis and modern cognitive science - and eventually with the meditative 
traditions - is, however, beyond the scope o f this book." Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
Embodied Mind p. 110.
J. Winterson, Art Objects, p.60.
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environment.95 Psychotherapist Petruska Clarkson in a very recent book points 
out that recent conceptual changes in our psychosocial and cultural environment 
are conspicuous by their absence in the practice of psychotherapy; that despite the 
views which we have explored above, which distribute the self ever more widely, 
the paradigm for psychotherapy is still pre-eminently that of psychotherapist and 
client in a one-to-one individual relationship. At the very least she believes "that 
counselling, psychology and all their associated disciplines need to take on the 
challenges of the new contexts - not to be learnt by rote, but to be held at the 
mind as a constant resource, otherwise they may become a symptom of those 
conditions which called them into being.”96
Buddhism has in its long history not only effected the intellectual deconstruction 
of substantial views of world, self and their relationship but has also instituted 
methods of practice for vitiating the emotional attachment to such views as self 
and the grasping for reified security as illusory defence. It engages both with the 
philosophical and psychological sense of lack and its concurrent desire, for the 
philosophical and the psychological are inextricably interwoven. Buddhism sees 
how belief in self is upheld by desire to be and to have a self, and how from the 
central pivot of identification with a self, the notion of mine and the entire 
egocentric world arises.
For the Western view the perceived loss of self may well lead either to nihilism or 
to a reactive narcissistic grasping of self.97 For Buddhism the realisation that self 
and world are interdependent and ultimately empty allows one not merely to ride 
on the processual wave, but to be it. When world is not viewed from an 
egocentric position, self may be seen not as a solitary unit but as immanent and 
embedded within a larger network of relationship with world, and both self and 
even death take on a different aspect. For, as Gregory Bateson pointed out: "the 
individual nexus of pathways which I call 'me' is no longer so precious because 
that nexus is only part of a larger mind."98 The bridge between self and 
emptiness, which carries one over the abyss of nihilism is interconnection and 
interdependence. Such an understanding is instantiated through the ways of the
J. Hillman, We've Had a Hundred Years o f  Psychotherapy & the World's Getting Worse. 
T. Roszak, The Voice o f  the Earth and P.Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing 
America.
P. Clarkson, On Psychotherapy, p. 229.
"the deep problem ... with the merely theoretical discovery o f mind without self in as 
powerful and technical a context as late twentieth century science is that it is almost 
impossible to avoid embracing some form of nihilism." Varela, Thompson & Rosch, The 
Embodied Mind. p. 127.
G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology o f  Mind. p. 440.
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Path, through morality and meditation, which encourage disidentification with the 







going and coming 
their traces disappear 
but they never 
forget their path. "l
Buddhist texts traditionally divide the Path into Morality, Meditation and 
Wisdom. Within the framework of the eightfold path, two factors, right thought 
and right understanding belong to Wisdom (prajha), three factors, right effort, 
right mindfulness and right concentration belong to Meditation (samadhi) and 
three factors, right speech, right action and right livelihood belong to Morality 
(61 la). Right thought and right understanding rest on the ground or views which 
we have considered in the previous section. Here I would like to discuss Morality 
and Meditation with relation to a contemporary psychotherapy. First, however it 
may be appropriate to say a few words about the stages of the path itself. 
Descriptions of the stages of the path form an important topic in Buddhist 
thought, and a complicated one, since different schools and vehicles delineate the 
stages in different manner. It is outside the intention of this work to go into 
details of the stages of the path in general, yet it is of interest and importance to 
note both that the simple and nearly ubiquitous fivefold map of the path may be 
interpreted in psychological terms, and that this description itself fits well with the 
experience of psychotherapy. The fivefold model presents the path in terms of the 
Path of Accumulation, the Path of Practice, the Path of Vision, the Path of 
Meditation or Cultivation, and the Path of the Arhat who is beyond training. In 
the context of the psychotherapeutic experience this relates happily to the
1 Dogen, Moon in a Dev/drop, p.214.
experience of accumulating information, practising the therapeutic relationship 
and interaction, achieving insight into behavioural or mental patterns, cultivating 
the implications of such insights and finally integrating them into new and 
healthier patterns.2
In finer detail, a recent paper, "The Origins of Insight Meditation", presented by 
L. S.Cousins at the Buddhist Forum at SO AS (9.3.94) delineated a comparison o f stages 
of insight according to the Way of the Seven Purifications from the Visuddimagga and the 
Eleven Knowledges and the Eighteen Mahavipassana from the Patisambhidamagga, 
showing a similar psychological development which again may be fruitfully compared to 
stages in psychotherapeutic work. In brief, it delineated stages o f  definition and 
comprehension, the achievement of right knowledge, and the seeing o f what is true and 
false, followed by a period o f breaking up and dissolving and the destruction of old ways 
accompanied by wretchedness and disorganisation prior to the achievement o f equipoise 
and reorganisation.
Chapter Five
THE VALUE AND PLACE OF ETHICS IN 
PSYCHOTHERAPY
"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the more 
often and the more seriously reflection concentrates upon them: the starry heaven 
above me and the moral law within me. "3
§Ila is usually translated Morality or Discipline and I am aware of how 
unfashionable and unfavoured such a concept currently is. Walpola Rahula gives 
a translation, perhaps more suited to the contemporary scene, that of Ethical 
Conduct.4 Yet under whatever name, this is an area which receives only limited 
consideration in contemporary discussion of psychotherapy.5 Thus in this section 
I wish to look at the Buddhist sense of ethical conduct, and what this entails, and 
how it changed from early Buddhism, through the Mahayana, and Vajrayana. I 
will then consider the subject of ethics in relation to psychotherapy. Here, 
although we find much written about the contract between therapist and client, 
and the ethical behaviour required of the therapist, there is little consideration of 
the wider field of ethics and value. Indeed this reflects the modem scientific 
world view with its distinct attempt to separate facts from values. An attempt 
which psychology in its pursuit of scientific status wholeheartedly embraced. Yet 
psychotherapists are constantly called on to answer moral questions, implicitly if
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason. Conclusion.
4 W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p. 46.
5 Even while writing this, some change may be occurring in this respect. Philip Cushman's
work referred to earlier and published in 1995 discusses at length both the importance and 
the neglect of ethics within psychotherapy.
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not explicitly. Some definition of the good; good health, good life or good 
intention is surely implicit in every facet of therapy. At the same time an 
acceptable moral framework within which to position such questions or to 
legitimate their answers is difficult to find. Most recently both science and 
philosophy tell us that these very attempts to be value-free are themselves "value­
laden", it is merely that the implicit values are unacknowledged. Here Buddhist 
epistemology concurs with the results of research in Cognitive Science in 
rejecting the separation of fact from value, and asserting that perception is from its 
inception value-laden.6 I would, therefore, like to consider both the modem 
separation of fact and value, and some postmodern attempts to ground a sense of 
values in something other than ideology. Finally I will consider whether we can 
usefully find any links between the Buddhist view of ethics and the contemporary 
ones, and thus present an interpretation of ethical conduct in a way that is 
meaningful and valuable for contemporary psychotherapy. I will suggest that 
such an interpretation will be through the idea of responsibility.
BUDDHIST ETHICS
As seen earlier ethics is fundamental to Buddhism. The interpretation of karma as 
intention shifted the emphasis from the natural law of the Vedas to individual 
morality. Following on from this, the human being moves to the centre of 
Buddhist teachings, and an understanding of the working of the mind becomes of 
the highest importance. Walpola Rahula says that Early Buddhism based the 
framework of Buddhist ethics on two factors; the spiritual experience of the 
Buddha and analysis of the human mind.7 The analysis of mind has also been 
considered earlier, and we have seen the importance placed upon the generation of 
healthy mind states. For unethical or unhealthy mind states are per se seen as 
harmful to the mind and inevitably conducive to suffering and entrapment, just as 
physical trauma results in damage to the body. A morally good intention will give 
rise to healthy action and mind states, and likewise for a morally unhealthy 
intention. This may be seen traditionally as occurring across many lifetimes, or 
interpreted more psychologically to describe the tendencies and dispositions
6 "In the conscious process, current value-free perceptual categorization interacts with
value dominant memory. This occurs before perceptual events contribute further to the 
alteration of that memory." G.Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. p. 121.
7 See note 4 above.
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which arise during the current life. How dispositions in turn colour perceptions 
and the interconnectedness of the five skandhas or personality factors has been 
described. Thus an ethics may be discovered by close enquiry into our mind 
states, and the consequences of intentions and actions.
1 0- ^ ’If the path consists of wisdom, ethics and meditation, that wisdom is concerned w 
with experience and conduct, rather than with metaphysical speculation. Since 
the central aim of Buddhism is the attainment of liberation from samsara, 
emphasis is upon the behaviour most likely to achieve this and upon the 
understanding and the training leading to that understanding which will support 
such ethical conduct. Outside this focus lie the metaphysical questions upon 
which the Buddha refused to pronounce. The sutra regarding Malunkyaputta is 
probably the most repeated example of this. Describing the event of a man struck 
by an arrow, the Buddha suggests that it is more helpful to call the doctor to 
attend to the wound, than to pay attention to who shot the arrow, to what family 
he belonged, how he looked, and what the weapon was; such delay undoubtedly 
leading to the death of the wounded man. Similarly Buddha explained that he had 
not explained matters the knowledge of which would not lead to peace.8 
Wisdom and ethics are inextricably linked. In the words of the Buddha; "For 
wisdom is purified by morality and morality is purified by wisdom; where one is, 
the other is."9
Sila is divided into right speech, right action and right livelihood10. Right speech 
includes abstention from telling lies, from slander and speech bringing about 
disunity and disharmony, from rude and abusive language and from idle gossip.
Rules of right action prevent us from taking life or property, from illegitimate 
sexual conduct and from indulging in intoxicating substances. Right Livelihood 
prohibits making one's living from any profession which would bring harm to 
others such as trading in lethal weapons or alcohol or killing animals or cheating.
Such rules obviously aim at promoting a harmonious life for both the individual 
and society. Observation of morality is considered more valuable when it is
Majjhima Nikaya I, 426.
Digha Nikaya I, 124. Sonadanda Sutta trs. M.Walshe. p. 131.
D.J. Kalupahana points out that the Pali term samma prefixed to the eight factors o f the 
path, and usually translated as "right" is not based on the conception o f absolute truth, 
but on that o f completeness or comprehensiveness, as in sam m asam buddha  the 
completely or perfectly enlightened. Therefore, he argues that moral conceptions o f right 
and wrong are corollaries of epistemological notions of the true and the confused, rather 
than absolutist notions o f true and false. D.J.Kalupahana, A History o f  Buddhist 
Philosophy, p. 103.
accompanied by commitments or vows.11 The layman may commit to the Five 
Central Precepts of not taking life, stealing, telling lies, indulging in unlawful 
sexual conduct or taking stimulants, or to any one or more of those. The novice 
will accept ten precepts, up to the full commitment of up to two hundred and fifty 
for a monk and more for a nun. Ethical conduct in Early Buddhism is pre­
eminently that of monastic discipline and training the senses to eliminate sense 
desire and grasping. In general it tends towards the ascetic and prescriptive and in 
spirit it may be said to be world-shunning.
Ethical conduct is considered an indispensable foundation for all higher spiritual 
attainments which are achieved through the path of meditation or mental 
discipline. Research studies show that meditation students without such 
disciplinary preparation for meditation progress far slower, and tend to fill their 
meditation with "therapy." Since they have not prepared themselves to carry out a 
meditative training, they become "stuck" on the contents of mind and personal 
issues.12 The ethical man is he who achieves guardianship of the sense doors - 
who is in control of unskilful mental states and has developed restraint of the 
mind faculty.13 Unhealthy mind states are to be restrained or let go of, healthy 
mind states to be encouraged, through the methods of meditation and mindfulness. 
This outlook does have important implications for psychotherapy in relation to the 
expression of negative mind states such as anger. Western therapy is skilful in its 
understanding of unconscious mind states and their repression, and in its creation 
of techniques for facilitating awareness and expression of these. However charges 
of over-expression, excessive catharsis and reactivation of negative mind states 
may sometimes rightfully be placed against it. From a Buddhist point of view 
continual expression and re-enactment of negative mind states may increase the 
strength and the karmic traces of such harmful emotions, if  there is no 
transformation and integration.14 Interestingly, current research by neuroscientist 
Gerald Edelman would seem to support this idea. Edelman's researches show that 
the neural pathways and connections which are activated during actions which
It is interesting to note that the precepts o f Buddhism are not the exclusionary 
commandments of an external authority as in Christianity, but are commitments freely 
made by the adherent.
D. Brown & J.Engler. "Stages o f Mindfulness Meditation: A Valuation Study. Part I 
Study & Results, Part II Discussion" in K.Wilber, J. Engler & D.Brown Transformation 
o f  Consciousness.
Digha Nikaya, SamaMphala Sutta. see Walshe p. 100.
See H.H. Dalai Lama, Worlds in Harmony, pp. 51-64; D.R. Komito, "Tibetan Buddhism 
& Psychotherapy: A conversation with the Dalai Lama." p.8; Thich Nhat Hanh, "Peace is 
Every Step. pp. 53-63 and Transformation & Healing.
bring about a desired result are strengthened, and will subsequently be activated 
more easily, while those resulting in undesired ends are weakened15.
In the Mahayana the association between the view, a critical insight into 
emptiness, and authentic moral activity is further emphasised.16 As the focus of 
the Mahayana becomes less monastic and more concerned with the lay sangha, 
the emphasis is placed more on intention and relationship, less on retreat from the 
world, and this influences its ethical stance. The essence of Mahayana ethics is 
altruism and compassion. The path of the Bodhisattva, central to Mahayana 
thought, precludes the search for liberation for oneself alone; it is to be undertaken 
for all beings. Skilful means which is identified with compassion becomes the 
equal of wisdom, and the wisdom of early Buddhism becomes the perfection of 
wisdom, Prajnaparamita, the wisdom of emptiness. Such wisdom is expressed in 
compassion, wherein ethical conduct is no longer a matter of comporting to 
external discipline but becomes the spontaneous expression of perfected 
awareness. In the Mahayana, morality is seen not only in terms of the more 
external discipline of speech, action and livelihood, but concerned primarily with 
mind. Thus there is a re-emphasis on the importance of intention which was 
clearly set out earlier, for instance in the Dhammapada.11 In Mahayana literature 
we find expression of the perfected virtues as set out in the six perfections, the 
Paramitas of Generosity, Morality, Patience, Energy, Concentration and Wisdom, 
rather than of the more negative restrictions of Early Buddhism. In the 
Bodhicaryavatara, one of the most important treatises of the Mahayana and central 
to the Tibetan tradition, & anti dev a makes mind the central figure of his chapter 
addressing the Paramita or virtue of $Ila. Stephen Batchelor translates the 
heading of this chapter as "Guarding Alertness." All fear and miseries arise from 
mind, thus taming the "elephant of mind" will achieve the cessation of all fear and 
misery.
"Unruly beings are as (unlimited) as space:
They cannot possibly all be overcome,
But if I overcome thoughts of anger alone
This will be the equivalent to vanishing all foes."18
G. Edelman, Bright Fire, Brilliant Air.
"Insight into selflessness and emptiness informs moral activity, while moral activity 
supports the cultivation of insight." F.E.Reynolds & R.Campany, "Buddhist Ethics" in 
The Encyclopaedia o f  Religion, (ed. in chief) M. Eliade, New York: Macmillan. 1987.
For example: "The fool is careless,
But the master guards his watching 
It is his most precious treasure."
Santideva, Bodhicaryavatara. trs. S. Batchelor. V, 12.
It is impossible to find sufficient leather to cover all the world, but wearing just 
the amount to cover our own feet achieves the same end. Thus morality is 
interpreted at base as a question of mental training, of mindfulness; a question of 
guarding "the wound of my mind."
"The defining characteristic of guarding alertness 
In brief is only this:
To examine again and again
The condition of my body and mind."19
In the Mahayana the identity of samsara and nirvana as demonstrated by 
Nagaijuna emphasises the belief that it is the mind or understanding that is to 
change.20 In Yogacara terms this is the paravrtti, the turning around of 
understanding from its entrapment by manas or egological conceptual thought. 
According to this view egocentrism becomes transcended in understanding of 
relationship, friendliness leads to selflessness in the perfection of non-dual 
understanding. From the point of view of this higher plane of awareness there is a 
more relative view of ethical conduct, more spontaneous, less rule-bound. The 
central virtue is compassion, and in the light of compassion, there are occasions in 
which a Bodhisattva may justifiably transgress moral precepts.21
The Vajrayana propounds the most relative approach towards the rules of external 
morality; they are viewed as a raft, no longer applicable on reaching the farther 
shore, where non-dual understanding transcends such differentiation as absolute 
good and evil. In the words of one of the mahasiddhas or great attainers, 
Tilopada: "I am the void, the world is void, all the three worlds are void; as such 
in pure Sahaja, there is neither sin nor virtue."22 Ethical conduct is no longer a 
matter of external discipline but is instead the spontaneous expression of perfected 
awareness (sahaja). Identified with suchness one's acts are the expression of 
dharma.
"Not only is the reality of identity_and interdependence the basis 
for Bodhisattva activities, but it also acts as a moral imperative, 
leaving the truly moral being with no option but to act in
accordance with this reality. For if my own existence is
19 Ibid. V, 108.
20 Nagaijuna. M M K 25 19-20.
21 "Principally I should consider what will be of the most benefit for others.
When this is well understood,
I should always strive for the welfare of others;
The far-seeing Merciful Ones have allowed (a Bodhisattva)
To do some actions that (for others) were forbidden." Santideva V 83-84.
22 Doha no. 34 as quoted by B. Misra, The Development o f  Buddhist Ethics, p. 153.
unthinkable apart from the existence of this infinite other, and if 
my own actions touch these being in some manner, then I must 
have an obligation to act in such a way that all benefit from the 
acts. I may, of course, choose otherwise, but then I am not acting 
in a fundamentally ethical manner, nor, of course, am I making any 
progress in my own development.”23
The evolution of Buddhist ethics may be seen in terms of the three major periods 
outlined in the Bakhtinian model, although from another perspective aspects of 
each of the three phases may be found within each one of them. Change occurs 
concurrently with change in the conception of the relationship between individual 
and world, mind and world. First in the Vedic period moral law is natural law. 
Later Buddhist ideas of karma with its concepts of intention and choice regarding 
whether or not to follow the eightfold path, introduced ideas of individual moral 
retribution, and raised the status of the individual as, at least partially, mistress of 
her own destiny. Although the present may be caused by the past, yet liberation 
may be worked for, and even achieved through present deeds. This supports a 
belief in the importance of individual mind training, and the classification of mind 
states as healthy or unhealthy. Thirdly the individual is again, to an extent 
subsumed or recontextualised in the doctrine of $unyata expressed in terms of 
prajna and karuna. The relativity, polyphony and non-finality of conventional 
truth are seen as aspects of non-dual absolute truth of emptiness. Morality is seen 
not only in terms of discipline of action, but primarily concerned with mind, 
which is no longer seen as separate from world. Here the perfected expression of 
suchness as an expression of dharma carries an echo of the first phase, though it is 
now seen to be the final outcome of individual efforts.
ETHICS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
Turning to Western views of morality, we find again how the view of the world 
will influence concepts of ethical conduct. Historically religion has been the 
support and foundation for Western morality. With the rise of secular scientific 
culture with a view of man as an isolated individual ’thing' pursuing his destiny in 
a world organised according to impersonal scientific laws of causality, time and
F. Cook, Hua-Yen Buddhism. p. 117.
space, the 'modem' tendency has been to segregate fact from value. In a recent 
work philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch suggests that the purpose of such 
segregation, certainly as used by Kant and Wittgenstein, was to keep moral value 
pure, untainted by, and undehved from empirical facts. Such a well-intentioned 
move, however, has resulted in a diminished account of morality and "a 
marginalisation of the ethical.”24 More recently, the era of value-free science and 
the embrace of the objective point of view has been strongly criticised both by 
contemporary science itself and by philosophy, concurring that such an approach 
is not only impoverished but also impossible.25 Entirely objective, value-free 
cognition is now seen through the eyes of the Cognitive Sciences to be 
impossible. The theory of relativity has also shown the impossibility of 
separating the experimenter from the experiment. What was value-free, has come 
to be seen as merely value-unacknowledged. Similarly, Buddhist epistemology 
clearly shows the arising of values and dispositions within the cycle of dependent 
arising, and in the five aggregates. Yet at the same time as this realisation that 
fact and value cannot be separated, the sources of legitimation for morality, the 
systems of thoughts and religion upon which they were traditionally founded have 
been laid open to criticism and deconstruction as never before.
Psychology, as pre-eminently a child of the modem, has been deeply imbued with 
this spirit of separation of fact and value. Similarly psychotherapy, though 
concerned with the ethics of therapist responsibility, is rarely concerned with an 
explicit moral stance in relation to the client's ethical behaviour, which is 
considered a private matter; the criteria for acceptability being rather whether or 
not it is conducive to the client's health, rather than being seen in a wider social 
involvement. Behaviourist psychology was committed to the segregation of fact 
from value. In Psychoanalytic theory Freud portrayed a sense of morality as 
developing from the external constraints of civilisation, which became in time 
internalised into the superego, a kind of internal detective, monitor or judge. 
Within his writing morality wears a negative and repressive aura. In the Three 
Essays on the Theory o f  Sexuality references to morality are always conjoined 
within a triad of disgust, shame and morality.
Humanistic and Existential theory with its foundation in Existential philosophy, 
and such concepts as Heideggerian authenticity and care has a much greater
I. Murdoch. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p. 25.
Abraham Maslow, who was so instrumental in the foundation o f  both Humanistic and 
Transpersonal Psychology, wrote a paper endorsing this argument entitled "The Fusion o f  
Facts and Values.", American Journal o f  Psychoanalysis. 23 (1963).
potential for exploring the place of moral reflection in self-understanding. 
However, I believe that it is ironic that these situated attributes of Dasein have 
often led via the path of Sartrean freedom to a far more self-centred actualisation 
of the decontextualised and isolated individual in many forms of humanistic and 
existential therapies; have, in fact, led to the terms and goals of the "me
generation" pursuing ever greater individual satisfaction. The potential for
egocentric interpretation of Fritz Peris' Gestalt prayer is obvious:
"I do my thing, and you do your thing.
I am not in this world to live up to your expectation 
And you are not in this world to live up to mine.
You axe you and I am I,
And if by chance we find each other, it is beautiful 
If not, it can't be helped."26
For the view of the world underlying much psychotherapeutic theory is that of the 
"self as an essentially isolated individual in a morally neutral, objectified 
universe."27 This view itself may be seen as itself a source of the emotional and 
behavioural problems which bring clients to seek therapy. Thus psychotherapy 
based on such views, risks perpetrating rather than ameliorating such problems.28 
Different theory, emphasising embeddedness and connection rather than isolation 
- indeed dependent origination - may provide a foundation for a more helpful 
practice. Gregory Bateson again was one of the first to point this out: "But when 
you separate mind from the structure in which it is immanent, such as human 
relationship, the human society or the ecosystem, you thereby embark, I believe 
on fundamental error, which in the end will surely hurt you."29 Contemporary 
transpersonal therapies, ecopsychology and the general drift of the postmodern 
would seem to be attempts at recontextualisation of the individual, and a re­
recognition of ethical and social embeddedness.30 We may find in both Buddhist 
and postmodern discourse various different arguments as to the construction of 
world and self, and the relationship between; arguments which run counter to the 
separation of fact and value and offer different pictures which call upon a new 
ethics.
26 F. Peris, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim, p. 4.
27 C. Guignon, "Authenticity , moral values, psychotherapy." p. 236.
28 Ibid. throughout. Also P.Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America.
29 G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology o f  Mind. p. 461.
30 Such recontextualisation is also occurring within the earlier therapies. As noted earlier,
the idea o f  narrative has recently become important; the idea o f therapy as re- 
narrativizing a person's life story. Aiid as J. Brunner has noted: "Stories must necessarily 
related to what is morally valued, morally appropriate, or morally uncertain ... To tell a 
story is inescapably to take a moral stance." Acts o f  Meaning, p. 50. See also D.Spence 
Narrative Truth & Historical Truth.
SOME CONTEMPORARY WESTERN VIEWS OF ETHICS
The very failure of philosophy to totalize the world, to enclose it within a system 
is its success for Emmanuel Levinas. We have considered above his views of the 
appeal of the other in the construction of the self, and the primacy of the ethical 
relationship, the "call of the face." In his own words: "I am trying to show that 
man's ethical relationship to the other is ultimately prior to his ontological relation 
to himself (egology) or to the totality of things that we call the world. 
(cosmology)."31 Moreover it is through the appeal of the other that the way is 
open to transcendence and escape from totality. "Man's relationship with the 
other is better as difference than as unity, sociality is better than fusion."32 Once 
again we hear the postmodern theme of difference, with once again, I would 
suggest, its echo of Sunyata, the non-totalizable, non-simultaneity of presence, and 
the move away from egology to the acknowledgement of relationship. "My duty 
to respond to the other suspends my natural right to self-survival, le droit vitale. 
My ethical relation of love for the other stems from the fact that the self cannot 
survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the world, 
within the ontology of sameness."33 Alterity opens us up to transcendence, to 
desire, and leads us away from the need of the same, for "the possibility of 
possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is only at first other, 
and other relative to me, is the way of the same.34 Indeed "the identification of 
the same IS ... the concreteness of egoism."35
In some ways this appears against nature; against the Darwinian survival of the 
fittest, and it requires the backing of discipline, emphasised by Buddhism with its 
path of training in morality and mind training to correct or 'see through' the primal 
ignorance. In the words of Levinas: "Ethics is not derived from an ontology of 
nature; it is its opposite, a meontology, which affirms a meaning beyond being, a 
primary mode of non-being (me-on).36 Indeed one commentator has described
E. Levinas & R. Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas." in Face to Face with 
Levinas, ed. R.A.Cohen. p.21.
Ibid. p. 22.
Ibid. p. 24.
E. Levinas, Totality &  Infinity, p. 38. See above, chapter four, n. 78.
Ibid..
"Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas." p. 25.
Levinas' analysis of God as "an impossibility of being or being-present."37 which 
sounds much like an attempt at a description of §unyata. For Levinas too, 
metaphysics is enacted in ethical relations,38 a similar linkage to that of emptiness 
and compassion. That ethical altruism is 'against nature' is also linked with the 
perceived advantages of the single unified and separate self considered in the 
previous chapter. The view of the distributed self and that of the necessity for 
altruism are interconnected. At first both seem contrary to experience and there is 
an emotional pull against accepting them. Perhaps at this stage, one can only note 
how these two ideas are interlinked, and hypothesise that as cultural evolution 
comes into play alongside somatic evolution with the arrival of human beings and 
language, the advantages of participation and communality will become apparent 
in the future.
In a somewhat comparable manner, for Bakhtin too, the foundation of ethics lies 
in the relationship of the individual to the world, most especially the relation to 
the other, in all the concrete actuality of the experienced act. Against the 
background of his belief in the dialogic network of relationship which surrounds 
and constitutes each event, Bakhtin posits the necessity for the individual to 
authenticate and fulfil each act. We have, he believed, "no-alibi in being," but a 
requirement, the "ought" to actualize our own place in "the once occurent event of 
Being."39 Such an obligation is grounded in everyday experience, in concrete 
events rather than in any abstract rules belonging to the "world of cognition", and 
thus is not selfish, since it must be seen against the background of dialogic 
relations, in which every moment of Being is organized around the polyphonic 
value centres of self and others. Thus this "ought to actualize one's unique place 
in once-occurent Being-as-event ... is determined first and foremost as a 
contraposition of I and the other."40 For Bakhtin the monologic view is deaf to 
the response of the other, just as for Levinas the reduction of difference and the 
reduction of the other to the same, is the violence of totalization. Monologue 
attempts both to achieve closure, to say the final word, and to objectivise reality. 
The dialogic position allows the other to remain another consciousness, another 
centre beyond integration or reduction. Speaking in relation to Dostoevsky, 
Bakhtin suggests: "The most important moment of this surplus is love (one cannot 
love oneself, it is a coordinated relation); then, confession, forgiveness ...finally, 
simply an active understanding (that does not reduplicate), watchful listening."41
37 Ibid  p. 32.
38 E . Levinas, Totality & Infinity, p. 79.
39 M. M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy o f  the Act. p. 60 & passim.
40 Ibid. p. 75.
41 M. Bakhtin, Problems o f  Dostoevsky's Poetics, p. 324-5.
Both Systems Theory and the enactive approach from Cognitive Science uphold 
an interconnected view of the relationship of the individual and the world, which 
emphasises the moral nature of knowing itself and a naturalistic and normative 
ethics defining the good as a state of maximum adaptation of natural and 
cognitive systems. In asking where error or sin enters, Ervin Laszlo argues that it 
is on the level of reflective consciousness; conscious representation of basically 
sound attempts at achieving goals become distorted by misrepresentation. One 
principal way in which this occurs, he contends, is in misunderstanding of system 
status resulting in misidentification of goals, interpreted solely in individualistic 
mode, rather than from part status in relation to the larger system, i.e. putting the 
egocentric desires of the individual to the fore at the expense of the needs of the 
higher level system.42 From this way of thinking which gives rise to a relational 
ethics, comes not only the re-unification of fact and value that we have discussed 
above, but also that of means and ends. Ends are no longer considered to be 
something separated, ahead or "out there", but are a function of thoughts and 
actions, interdependent with means. Similarly theory is not seen as an isolated 
supratemporal foundation for praxis, but is emergent, and changing in a mutual 
process or feedback loop, within an open-ended rather than a closed system. 
Means and ends are part of process, similar to that of insight and act as we saw in 
the Digha Nikaya in discussing Buddhist ethics: "From morality comes wisdom 
and from wisdom comes morality."43 The ethical norms for such views do not 
rely on outside legitimation but are grounded in the interdependence that 
conditions all existence. They can perhaps be compared to those revealed by 
Carol Gilligan's research into women's' concepts of morality.44 Gilligan 
distinguishes between what she terms "ethics of principal" and "ethics of 
relatedness", suggesting that women have a different approach to ethical 
problems than men; a morality based on responsibilities rather than on rights, 
grounded in connection rather than separation, within which relationship rather 
than the individual is primary. Within a view that upholds the participation of the 
individual in the world, and that is concerned both with differentiation and 
integration, it is seen that the health of the individual and society are interlinked.
From within the Cognitive Sciences comes another new view of the grounds of 
morality, propounded by Mark Johnson following on his work with George 
Lakoff on the metaphoric and imaginative foundations of language and his own
42 E. Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, p. 257.
43 see above n. 9.
44 C.Gilligan, In a Different Voice.
work grounding this within embodiment which I will discuss in later chapters.45 
Johnson believes that the scope of moral understanding is far broader than 
'institutions of morality' allow for, and pervades all aspects of life. Such a belief 
"confronts us with the task of always trying to see as broadly as possible the 
implications of our attitudes, judgements, and way of life. It simply tries to make 
us more finely attuned to our interconnectedness with other people, animals, and 
organic processes as a whole."46 Johnson finds the grounding of our conceptual 
systems in the structures of bodily experience. Since such concepts are often 
implicated in and extended by conceptual metaphors, he contends that no account 
of morality that fails to examine the use of metaphor and imagination in moral 
understanding can be adequate. His central thesis is that moral understanding is 
situated in narrative understanding, and is fundamentally imaginative in 
character.47 It is derived from the experience of prototypical situations, 
imaginatively extended to wider contexts, rather than from abstract concepts.
His particular researches lead him to the belief, frequently encountered in 
contemporary discourse, that there is no absolute, final or objective, context-free 
truth, and that in freeing ourselves from such a notion, rather than losing 
something valuable and necessary, we are, in fact, merely releasing ourselves 
from the influence of an illusory ideal that is counterproductive to human well­
being and community. In place of this illusion he believes we need a number of 
competing methods, views and practices, a multiplicity of meanings in continuing 
dialogue, tested by experience. In response to charges of relativism he believes 
that the fact of human embodiment, with its shared set of needs and instincts 
guarantees a certain level of commensurability between competing moral themes, 
based on the constraints of human experience, its biological purposes, cognitive 
structures, social relations and ecological concerns. Once again central to this 
theory is the idea of the interrelationship of the individual and the world, as 
Johnson believes: "We are beings whose identities emerge and develop in an 
ongoing process of interactions within our physical, interpersonal and cultural 
environments."48
G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By; M. Johnson, The Body in the Mind.
M. Johnson, Moral Imagination, p.253.
cf. n. 27 above.
MJohnson, Moral Imagination, p. 219.
■CONCLUSIONS
Within these different approaches to morality, we find definite themes which 
recur, and contrast to the earlier 'modem' views which saw man as a thing within a 
world of things, pursuing his individual destiny according either to externally 
given moral authority, or to natural laws. With the deconstruction of the 
legitimation of external authority, and the understanding of both the 
impoverishment and impossibility of a value-free stance, a more pluralistic, 
relative and perspectival view now prevails, with a different concept of the 
individual and their relationship to the world. Recontextualised within society, 
culture and history, the individual is perhaps seen in a middle way between total 
participation and total isolation and egocentricity; as a 'holon', both whole facing 
in one direction, and part of a larger system facing in the other.49 Gilligan's 
research on women's' responses to abortion illustrates this pattern. She found a 
specifically female three-stage sequence of development towards moral problems 
which she termed the development of the "ethic of care." According to this 
sequence an initial emphasis on caring for the survival of the self is followed by a 
phase in which this stance is critically judged as selfish, at which point the good is 
seen as caring for others. The third perspective, focusing on the dynamics of 
relationship, forges a middle way between selfishness and responsibility, through 
a new understanding of the interconnection between self and other. This ethic of 
care, as she acknowledges, "evolves around a central insight that self and other are 
interdependent."50 In place of a privileging of either subjectivity or objectivity 
(which as we have seen earlier are not so different), these new views favour 
transperspectivity rather than mutual contradiction, pluralism and dialogue rather 
than monologue. The guiding image again might well be the net of Indra.
Thus I would contend that the morality implied by these views, and indeed also by 
Mahayana Buddhism is an ethics of responsibility. A responsibility engendered 
by a view of interdependence, our answerability to the other, to the planet, in an 
openness to the claims of interrelationship that decentre the ego and encourage us 
to live in the world with compassion.
This responsibility also includes the aspect of response-ability, an aspect of 
particular relevance to psychotherapy, particularly spoken of in Gestalt therapy. 
For the healthier the human being, the more they are wholly available for free
49 A. Koestler, "Beyond Atomism & Holism - The Concept o f the Holon." In B eyon d  
Reductionism. p. 192.
50 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p.74.
response. In terms of Buddhist epistemology, as we saw earlier, a pramana or 
ideal cognition means ideal and fresh cognition, free from subsequent 
conceptuality. In a somewhat similar way, the more areas of the personality are 
bound by rigid defensive and cognitive structures, the less is available for 
spontaneous and open response. The very work of psychotherapy is to bring 
awareness to these structures and in exploring them, loosening them, freeing the 
energy bound up therein, allowing moment to moment free response to events, in 
contrast to being confined within a pre-determined script written with fear or 
resentment or whatever, often relevant to a time now past. Likewise selfishness is 
a constriction of response and responsibility in ignorance of our embeddedness in 
a greater whole; it is a terrified grasping of a limited part. Understanding of this 
leads to compassion, the foundation of Mahayana and Vajrayana ethics, based on 
the non-duality of self and other.
This link between responsibility and response-ability is also noted by Levinas; "I 
think that the beginning of language is in the face. In a certain way, in its silence, 
it calls you. Your reaction to the face is a response. Not just a response, but a 
responsibility. These two words (r6ponse, responsabilitS) are closely related."51 
Thus, as we have seen, Levinas places the ethical prior to the ontological, the 
Good prior to, and transcendent to, Being. For Levinas this responsibility is 
unique to man, and through it the human breaks with pure being. "The aim of 
Being is being itself. However, with the appearance of the human - and this is my 
entire philosophy - there is something more important than my life, and that is the 
life of the other."52
Perhaps today we can find ground for an inescapable morality in responsibility; 
understanding of the contingency and interrelationship of life giving rise to action 
founded upon responsibility and compassion. And such contingency need not be 
utterly relativistic, if we join such understanding with a return to close attention of 
the things of this world for their own sakes, not as means to further ends. For we 
share embodiment with all humans, we share a planet with nature, these are the 
natural constraints if we view them without egocentricity. Such a view must be 
part of a conception of health. Perhaps this has been most perfectly expressed in 
the lines which we have quoted before by Dogen:
"Studying the Buddha way is studying oneself,
Studying oneself is forgetting oneself.
E. Levinas, "The Paradox o f Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas." In 
R.Bemasconi & D.Wood. The Provocation o f  Levinas, p. 169.
Ibid. p. 172.
Forgetting oneself is being enlightened by all things, 
and in the same essay:
"To practice and confirm all things by conveying oneself to them is 
illusion: for all things to advance toward and practise and confirm the 
self, is enlightenment."53
This attention must be cultivated: both attention to things as ends in themselves 
rather than as means to our egocentric ends, and the attention that through close 
mindfulness of the consequences outwardly of our actions and inwardly of our 
intentions and mind states, experiences the inevitability of suffering arising from 
harmful thoughts and deeds. It is to Buddhism that we may turn to find a long 
tradition of methods of mind training in mindfulness and meditation. These 
methods, as also ethical conduct, are grounded in the view of a changing, 
impermanent and interconnected world of which we are a part, and in which it 
behoves us to participate with responsibility, both to ourselves, to other parts, and 
to the whole, not to manipulate merely from the nescient position of a grasping 
separative egocentrism.
Dogen, Genjokoan. trs. N. Waddel & M. Abe.
Chapter Six
MEDITATIONAL METHODS AS TOOLS IN 
PSYCHOTHERAPY
" . . .  a man becomes his attentions. His observations and curiosity, they make and 
remake him.
Etymology: curious, related to cure, once m eant'carefully observant.' Maybe a 
tonic o f  curiosity would counter m y numbing sense that life inevitably creeps 
toward the absurd. Absurd, by the way, derives from a Latin word meaning 'deaf, 
dulled.' Maybe the road could provide a therapy through observation o f  the 
ordinary and obvious, a means whereby the outer eye opens an inner one. STOP, 
LOOK, LISTEN, the old railroad crossing signs warned. Whitman calls it 'the 
profound lesson o f  reception.4
It is with the practices of awareness and mind training that Buddhism provides the 
greatest specific tools for psychotherapy. Just as &antideva over a thousand years 
ago, encouraged his students to guard their minds, so today we are similarly 
assured that happiness "does not depend on outside events, but, rather, on how we 
interpret them."2 Indeed many people expect discussion about Buddhism and 
psychotherapy to concentrate primarily on meditation. It is the intention of this 
work, however, to try and contextualise such practices within the theoretical 
framework both of Buddhist philosophy and of Western therapy. In this chapter, 
therefore, I would like first to look at Buddhist meditation itself, considering the 
two main approaches and defining their differences. Then I would like to turn to
1 William Least Heat-Moon, Blue Highways, p.l 7.
2 M. Csikzentmihalyi, Flow: The psychology o f  happiness, p.2.
considerations of meditation and mindfulness within the field of psychotherapy; 
firstly from the perspective of the therapist, then from that of the client, and 
thirdly in the context of the therapeutic relationship itself. Thus, I shall consider 
meditative practices first as an aid in the training of therapists, then I shall discuss 
mindfulness practices, both Buddhist and Western, for the client, and finally I 
shall look at meditation as a model for the therapeutic encounter itself.
BUDDHIST MEDITATION,
In the 1890s as we have already noted, William James wrote: "The faculty of 
voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention over and over again is the very 
root of judgement, character and will. No one is compos sui if he have it not. An 
education which should improve this faculty would be the education par 
excellence."3 In 1990s, Margaret Donaldson turns to Buddhism for methods of 
education in developmental modes underdeveloped and undervalued in current 
Western society; modes she terms "value sensing", concerned with affect as 
opposed to intellect.4 It would seem that there is within meditative cultivation a 
resource which has been largely ignored in the West. Buddhist meditation is seen 
as a training in the cultivation of tranquillity and insight, which are the names of 
two distinct types of meditation which ideally and finally are to be yoked together 
to give rise to wisdom. Sometimes they are described as concentrative and 
analytic meditations.
Tranquillity meditation or meditative stabilisation (tematha; Tibetan:shi gnas) is 
that in which the mind is focused upon an object, whether external like a pot, or 
internal like the breath, to the exclusion of all else, devoid of reflection. In the 
Theravadin commentary the Visudhimagga, detailed instructions are given as to 
objects of meditation, situation and methods of meditation for different types of 
person.5 Detailed descriptions are also provided for the path, events and 
achievements of trance-like states. However, such achievements in Buddhist 
meditation are generally considered to be a by-product of attainment of 
concentration, not to be pursued for their own sake, but merely as part of the path
W. James, The Principles o f  Psychology. p. 401.
M.Donaldson, Human M inds, chapter. 13.
These typologies themselves have been suggested as the basis for psychotherapeutic 
work. See R.Mann & R. Youd, Buddhist Character Analysis.
toward controlling the mind and overcoming attachment. Indeed Sakyamuni 
Buddha had achieved the highest of these states in his studies with his teachers 
Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta before his attainment of enlightenment. 
Such states are acquired in the pursuit of a firm concentrative ability which acts as 
a foundation upon which to base the practice of higher vision or insight 
(vipaSyana; lhag mthong) which overcomes ignorance or delusion. Insight 
meditation is the practice of discursive reflection on the nature of the meditative 
object while mental stabilisation is present. The object may be Buddhist 
doctrine, such as selflessness, impermanence or emptiness, or one's present 
ongoing experience. Within this latter mindfulness, there is no narrowly focused 
object of attention, rather, one takes present awareness as the wide focus, paying 
attention to the moment to moment flow of sensations, feelings and thoughts 
arising and ceasing, without being captured by them. Whatever occurs is to be 
received with bare attention, with a mind that is receptive rather than reactive.
Heidegger's Gelassanheit, the "letting-be" that allows for presence would seem, 
perhaps to be somewhat similar. As he says: "The first step ... is the step back 
from the thinking that merely represents - that is, explains - to the thinking that 
responds and recalls."6 This is in contrast to representational and calculative 
thinking, the thinking that is logical, conceptual, grasping and reifying, which 
perpetuates what he terms the "technological" outlook implicit in the activity of 
"framing". Heidegger's concept of Andenken or Besinnung (usually translated as 
meditative thinking or remembrance) for the "thinking that responds" perhaps 
relates most nearly to the non-dualistic, non-conceptual insight or wisdom that is 
the goal of meditative practice. Seeing in such a careful and receptive way breaks 
through stereotyped reactions, and gives rise to a deconstruction of mental 
functioning, fostering first awareness of, then release from, persistent and 
compulsive mental habits. From these observations emerge realisations about the 
nature of the mind, and mindfulness becomes insight. In terms of the twelvefold 
cycle of dependent origination one can become aware of, and finally interrupt, the 
patterns of habituated conditioning.7 Continued practice of Buddhist meditation 
will lead to experience of insight into the reality of existence with its three marks 
of selflessness, impermanence and suffering.
M. Heidegger, "The Thing." p. 18.
"By precise, disciplined mindfulness to every moment, one can interrupt the chain o f  
automatic conditioning - one can not automatically go from craving to grasping and all 
the rest. Interruption o f habitual patterns results in further mindfulness, eventually 
allowing the practitioner to relax into more open possibilities in awareness and to 
develop insight into the arising and subsiding o f experienced phenomena." Varela, 
Rosch, & Thompson, The Embodied Mind, p.l 15.
There are three particularly important sutras in the Tripitaka relating to 
mindfulness; the most famous of them all is the Satipatthana Sutta found in both 
the Pali Majjhima and Digha Nikayas.8 In this sutra the Buddha expounds on the 
Four Foundations of Mindfulness; mindfulness of the body, mindfulness of the 
feelings, mindfulness of the mind and mindfulness of the objects of the mind. 
Mindfulness of the body starts with the breath; with conscious breathing, so mind 
and breath become one. Then, with following the breath and breathing with 
awareness of the whole body, mind and body are brought into harmony, and 
through harmonisation of the breath both mind and body are calmed. Awareness 
of the body is practised in all positions and actions and the parts of the body are 
contemplated and mindfully observed. Through observation of the four elements 
present in the body, the interrelationship of the body with the world is 
contemplated, followed by contemplation of the impermanence of the body. In all 
these contemplations one is advised to notice the process of coming-to-be and 
ceasing-to-be in the constituents which comprise the body.
In the mindfulness of feelings the practitioner is encouraged first to identify 
feelings as to whether they are pleasant or unpleasant, then to consider their roots, 
whether in the body or mind, thus watching the process of becoming and ceasing 
of the feelings. Thirdly, mindfulness is brought to the mind itself; to perceptions 
(samjha), dispositions (samskara), and consciousness (vijnana). Again the 
practice is to observe the arising, presence and disappearance of the mental 
phenomena, illuminated by mindfulness.
Finally mindfulness of the objects of mind looks at the five hindrances (desire, 
anger, dullness, agitation and remorse, and doubt),9 the five aggregates and the six 
sense organs and objects in terms of their arising, ceasing and interdependence. 
Finally attention is drawn to the seven factors of awakening, of which the first is 
mindfulness itself, followed by investigation of phenomena, energy, joy, ease, 
concentration and letting go.
The Anapanasati Sutta, also from the Majjhima Nikaya, which Thich Nhat Hanh 
translates as The Sutra on the Full Awareness of Breathing, unites the four 
foundations of mindfulness with greater emphasis on awareness of the breath. 
One distinct result of mindfulness of the breath is its success in bringing mind and
Majjhima Nikaya 10 & Digha Nikaya 20.
Trs. Thich Nhat Hanh, see Transformation & Healing.
body together in the present moment. The Theranama Sutta emphasises the 
teaching of the Buddha regarding living in the present.10 
"Do not pursue the past 
Do not lose yourself in the future.
The past no longer is 
The future has not yet come.
Looking deeply at life as it is 
in the very here and now, 
the practitioner dwells 
in stability and peace."11
Such mindfulness as taught in these sutras strips experience of all accretions of 
memory, conceptualisation and habituated reactions; it deconstructs it into its 
components so we may better see their coming-into-being, ceasing, 
impermanence and interdependence. Such practice leads to experience of "in the 
seen there shall be just the seen, in the heard there shall be just the heard,"12 as 
recommended by the Buddha; the appreciation expressed by Zen Buddhism as 
"when you are sitting, just sit, when you are eating, just eat."
Furthermore, though it may well be outside the personal experience of all but the 
most committed practitioner, there is another aspect of mindfulness and 
meditation practice of immense importance. Meditation is the path to nondual 
awareness, and it is through such practice that one can realise in the truest sense of 
the word, the unconditioned. Nondual awareness is free from the incompleteness 
of difference inevitably attached to any knowledge of content expressed 
linguistically or conceptually. Nondual awareness is not concerned with 
capturing an object but with experiencing the presence of attention to the clarity 
and non-obstruction of mind itself.13 What is discovered is not a totality of 
knowledge but a presence of attention that holds and illuminates the connection 
between the subjective silence, the spaciousness of consciousness revealed 
through mindfulness and the objective absence that is emptiness. It is beautifully 
described by Ann Klein: "the ocean of one’s focused attention remains a coherent 
dimension amid all its waves of deferred differences."14 What lessons are there 
here for psychotherapy?
10 Samyutta Nikaya XXI, 20. and Bhaddekaratta Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya III, 189.
11 Trs. Thich Nhat Hanh, Our Appointment with Life. p.5.
12 Udana X, 8. & Samyutta Nikaya IX, 73.
13 As we have noted earlier there is a difference of presentation o f this awareness between
dGe lugs pa and rNying ma pa works, see above, p.90. n.67.
14 A.C.Klein, The Great Bliss Queen, p.86.
LESSONS F-QR PSYCHQIHERAPY
The Therapists* Perspective
Firstly let us look from the standpoint of the training of psychotherapists. Rather 
than putting meditation forward as a therapeutic technique for clients, I would 
contend that perhaps its chief value for psychotherapy lies in its use in the training 
of therapists. As the description of the Sutra on the Four Foundations of 
Mindfulness shows, such meditation exposes our habitual thoughts, feelings and 
attitudes. Whatever cognitive theory and practical techniques are necessary in the 
training of psychotherapists, a prime requirement is that the therapist has done her 
own work with her own experience, and has explored and familiarised herself 
with her own mind states to the point where she is comfortable with them. 
Meditation is a supreme method for becoming aware of and understanding the 
number, quality, impermanence and change of mental states, and of building up 
the necessary balance to enable one to ride one's experience without being 
imprisoned in uncontrolled reaction. Having become comfortable and relatively 
unshockable in their own mental world, psychotherapists are enabled to extend 
that same ease to their clients. The basic task of psychotherapy is to enlarge a 
person's living space; to expand their sense of self by integrating the parts that are 
hidden or defended against, or seen as alien. To do this, first these alien areas 
must be brought to awareness, and then made friends with and accepted. Thus the 
charge they carry, of fear or anger or whatever, is defused and the energy 
released. Writer and therapist John Welwood sees the major point of overlap 
between meditation and psychotherapy in the practice of developing this sense of 
maitri or friendliness towards our own experience.15 In mindfulness we can leam 
to be with our experience, to make space for it in a non-reactive way, seeing and 
watching what arises and neither suppressing nor indulging and exaggerating it. It 
is a way of learning to be with whatever comes up, of learning to be with the 
unknown, and to be comfortable with not knowing, which is at first not at all 
comfortable, yet is of inestimable use in the therapeutic encounter. Mindfulness 
meditation is a tremendous resource in training psychotherapists; in developing 
such friendliness to oneself and openness to experience as it arises, rather than as 
one would wish it to be. As John Welwood says: "Meditation is a direct 
experience of how change is more dependent on how we be with ourselves than
15 J. Welwood, "On Psychotherapy and Meditation." p. 43. This idea is also central to the 
Naropa training, see Appendix A.
anything we do to try to improve ourselves."16 The very being of unconditioned 
presence is what allows for healing.17 Indeed the concept of maitri is fundamental 
to the Naropa Institute psychotherapy training (see Appendix A) in conjunction 
with that of Basic Sanity. This mindfulness is in no way an escape from 
phenomenal reality, but a means to engage us more fully in reality as it presents 
itself, without the distortions of emotions and expectations which prevent us from 
responding fully and flexibly to whatever occurs. It is not an escape from the ego 
but a means of using the ego to observe its own workings and experience itself 
without distortion, thus becoming able to respond to and integrate whatever may 
face it, rather than being restricted by defensive structures, and rigid 
identifications. It is, in fact, ego as woiking sense of self rather than self concept, 
as discussed in chapter four.
As research has shown that it is the presence of the therapist rather than their overt 
theoretical stance that is of value in the therapeutic situation, it would seem that 
an important emphasis in the training of therapists would be placed on presence, 
the way therapists are within the therapeutic encounter. Yet this is frequently a 
part of training which is insufficiently addressed. As an experienced supervisor of 
therapists writes: "One of the frustrations I have encountered in supervising over 
the last twenty-five years is that the typical supervisee's focus is on what to do 
with the patient, as contrasted with how to be with the patient."18 He said that in 
all his extensive years of American graduate school, internship and 
psychoanalytic training he never had direct supervision on how to be with a 
patient, and feels that his supervisees, in turn, while speaking of the importance of 
establishing rapport and maintaining a working alliance with clients, have been 
taught little about the subtler qualities of relatedness. He has found meditative 
techniques to be of great use in teaching supervisees how to be in the therapeutic 
encounter, and how to respond to clients rather than to impose upon them their 
own need to do.
Similarly a meditative training may teach therapists how to remain in unknowing, 
being open to what occurs, rather than constraining themselves and their clients 
within the limits of theory and resultant expectation. To be truly comfortable with
16 J. Welwood, Awakening the Heart, p. xiii.
17 Welwood illustrates this with a marvellous quote from the poet Rilke: "Perhaps all the 
dragons in our lives are princesses who are only waiting to see us act just once, with 
beauty and courage. Perhaps everything that frightens us is, in its deepest essence, 
something that feels helpless and needs our love." R.M.Rilke, Letters to a Young Poet. 
trs. S. Mitchell. New York: Random House. 1984 p.92, quoted by J. Welwood, Ordinary 
Magic, p. 170.
18 W.Dubin, "The Use o f Meditative Techniques in Psychotherapy Supervision." p. 65.
unknowing is so far from any state valued within all but a few of the most 
contemporary academic, technical or medical trainings, or even in daily life, that 
it needs much practice, which meditation practice may offer. Both the 
psychotherapy trainings described in the Appendices use Buddhist meditation 
training as this resource, to encourage trainee therapists to experience different 
mind states as they arise, and to learn to be with them, rather than attempting to 
evade them or change them through doing.
Dubin speaks of an important component in the establishment of rapport as being 
a centring in the heart as a centre of experiencing which transcends purely 
intellectual levels. The development of designation and conceptualisation enable 
us to think abstractly, but also remove us from the immediacy of perception. 
Learning to focus attention and still the chatter of conceptualisation allows us to 
contact experience once again in its direct immediacy, and to respond to our 
experience from a more inclusive level of consciousness which can observe 
cognitive operations without being caught up in them. Again, to achieve this level 
of openness and receptivity requires discipline and the ability to transcend one's 
usual egocentric concerns. Such discipline and ability may be acquired through a 
meditation practice.
Meditations like those discussed above have an immense value also in that they 
ground us in our bodies, and through awareness of breath bring body and mind 
into harmony. Simple grounding exercises paying attention to the breathand the 
body may be invaluable in psychotherapy. More complex exercises, such as those 
of yoga or the Tibetan Kum Nye exercises presented to the West by Tarthang 
Tulku take this aspect of therapy further, and may be of value both in training of 
therapists, and for clients themselves.19
There are also specific meditations which may be beneficial for specific purposes, 
helping to generate healthy mind states conducive to healing. The formal Maitri 
meditation is one that promotes the generation of friendliness and compassion 
towards oneself, one's friends, one's enemies and all sentient beings. John 
Welwood describes his frustration in studying Rogerian therapy in graduate 
school since: "I was never taught bow  to develop 'unconditional positive regard' 
for the client. I was told this was essential and it sounded good to me, but it was 
just assumed that I should be able to feel this way toward anyone who walked into 
my office."20 Similarly the practice of exchanging self for other fosters the
19 Tarthang Tulku, Kum Nye Relaxation, Parts I & II.
20 John Welwood, Awakening the Heart, p. xiii.
development of compassion; the fostering of positive attitudes and the combating 
of negative ones.21 Another specific form of meditation is visualisation. Within 
Buddhism this is mostly found in the Tantric practices of the Vajrayana; in the 
visualisation and impersonation of deities whereby the practitioner becomes 
merged with the deity and the world becomes the realm of the god. Similar uses 
of the imagination and guided meditations may be used in a therapeutic setting. 
This is particularly found in Roberto Assagioli’s Psychosynthesis.22
Mfiditation.and the.Client
If a formal sitting practice is primarily for the therapist, a general fostering of 
mindfulness in action is primary for the client. I personally, do not believe that 
psychotherapy should be confused with teaching formal meditation practice. 
Although Buddhism is a rich source for good psychotherapeutic practice as I am 
arguing in this study, there are differences also which I would like to consider 
later. Therefore I consider that psychotherapists would be well advised not to 
give formal meditation practice to clients, thus confusing the roles of therapist and 
teacher.23 I would suggest that clients who wish for this, or those for whom it is 
considered desirable, seek formal meditation instruction elsewhere.24 In some 
cases and in some circumstances, meditation may be definitely counter productive 
to psychological health. As we have noted before, meditation training 
traditionally begins on a firm basis of ethical behaviour and mental health. 
Without these, it is very possible to confuse pre and trans-egoic states as 
discussed in chapter four.25
Having said that, mindfulness and awareness are at the heart of therapeutic work. 
The aim of therapy is to bring awareness, and in its wake space and choice, to the 
conditioned and reactive responses with which we greet new experience. 
Mindfulness encourages us to ground our experience in awareness rather than in 
accustomed forgetfulness through which we lose touch with ourselves and our 
experience and our environment. It brings us into the present moment which, as
For techniques see K.McDonald, How to Meditate, especially pp. 94, 121.
See R, Assagioli, Psychosynthesis, and for techniques, P. Ferrucci, What We May Be. 
Thus giving rise to the possibility o f much confusion concerning transference issues, and 
the therapeutic relationship.
Specific meditation instruction with regard to stress reduction and pain relief has been
found to be o f value, see J.Kabat-Zinn et al., "The Clinical Use o f Mindfulness 
Meditation for the Self-regulation of Chronic Pain."
See above, p.l 14.
Thich Nhat Hanh reminds us is "the only moment we can touch life."26 This can 
help to heal alienation from ourselves, our experience and our world, and can re­
introduce lived meaning. Thich Nhat Hanh is perhaps the finest contemporary 
teacher of the benefits and transformative power of mindfulness. His writings 
constantly describe the healing power of bringing awareness to our mind states, 
particularly negative states such as anger. By staying in mindfulness with the 
state itself, and not allowing our conditioned reaction which is to shift 
immediately from the feeling itself into elaborations of the story surrounding it 
and the people involved in its arising which in turn evoke more negative thoughts 
and feelings, we may observe the initial state with mindfulness and attention 
which brings calm. This first stage is sometimes termed "bare attention"; perhaps, 
more precisely, it is attention to the bare feeling or state, to the very anger or joy 
or disquiet itself, divorced for a while from its story and from other emotions such 
as guilt, justification or judgement which we frequently build onto that first 
feeling, and from our subsequent identification with those added emotions. The 
very fact of acknowledging the core state, paying attention to it without accretions 
of judgement or guilt, and without identifying with it, allows us to observe it, 
calm it and ultimately will transform it. As Thich Nhat Hanh describes it:
"Our mindfulness has the same function as the light of the sun. If we 
shine the light of full awareness steadily on our state of mind, that state 
of mind will transform into something better. The point of meditation 
is to look deeply into things in order to be able to see their nature. The 
nature of things is interdependent origination, the true source of 
everything that is. If we look into our anger, we can see its roots, such 
as misunderstanding (and ignorance), clumsiness (or lack of skill), the 
surrounding society, hidden resentment, habit (or our conditioning). 
These roots can be present both in ourselves and in the person who 
played the principal role in allowing the anger to arise. We observe 
mindfully in order to be able to see and to understand. Seeing and 
understanding are the elements of liberation which allow us to be free 
of the suffering which always accompanies anger. Seeing and 
understanding bring about love and compassion ... our anger is a field 
of energy. Thanks to our mindful observation and insight into its 
roots, we can change this energy into the energy of love and 
compassion - a constructive and healing energy."27
Thich Nhat Hanh, Transformation & Healing, p.40.
Thich Nhat Hanh, Transformation & Healing, p. 86.
A Western approach to mindfulness is found in the Focusing technique of Eugene 
Gendlin which we considered in chapter two. Gendlin maintains that practising 
mindfulness can open us up to the "felt sense", a non cognitive experience that is 
not purely unconscious or beyond awareness, but of which without practice we 
are unaware. He likens this to an animal's ability to respond and act from a sense 
of the whole situation, both the external circumstances and stimuli, and its own 
structured set of physiological and behavioural processes. The aim of his 
technique of focusing is to develop this body-based awareness and openness to 
experience on an intuitive and somatic level that is the body's pre-cognitive 
response to the meaning of the whole situation, its response to both internal and 
external stimuli, of which we are rarely consciously aware. Bringing this into 
consciousness may in itself bring about change and transformation. It is another 
example of enactive embedded experience. In both Buddhist meditation and 
Focusing the division between what is conscious and unconscious is portrayed as 
a matter of breadth of focus rather than structural division.28 For Gendlin emotion 
implies narrowed focus whereas felt sense is received by states of wide, open 
focus giving an unclear response to the total context and relationship. Gendlin 
teaches a step by step programme to help one contact the felt sense, the body's 
response to the whole circumstance beneath our conscious experience29. He 
recommends first clearing a space to focus on present awareness or a specific 
problem, secondly listening to what arises, whether bodily sensation or emotional 
tone. Then one should try to "get a handle" on this experience; some word or 
phrase which reflects the tone of the felt sense, e.g. "sharp", "sticky", "fearful", 
etc. Going back and forth between the statement and the feeling, one changes the 
statement if a more appropriate one arises, attempting to make the match ever 
more resonant. One, then asks what is the relation between this statement and the 
problematic. At this stage one should be wholly receptive to whatever arises. In 
actuality, this very meditative staying with the experience, and not being drawn 
away from the experience itself, by conceptual diffusion and storylines, is often 
enough for a definite shift in feeling, and some insight to arise These messages 
can then be translated into cognitive terms, but in first listening to the meaning 
that the body holds, we may discover a different perspective on the problem.
Gendlin does not mention meditation in his explication of Focusing and the felt 
sense, although I suggest that what he is advocating comes close to techniques of 
meditation, particularly in the following: "We need a new conceptual pattern for
28 For a wider discussion of this issue, see J.Welwood, "Meditation and the Unconscious: A 
new perspective."
29 E.Gendiin, Focusing, p. 10.
our concept of 'felt sense', on which has the more basic unity preceding the 
inner/outer split, the self/other split, the affect/cognition split and the 
acting/speaking split."30 This, surely points towards non-conceptual direct 
knowledge or insight. Gendlin does, however, as mentioned earlier, compare the 
felt sense to Heidegger's concept of Befindlicbkeit, mood or affectedness or 
attunement.31
Another Western attempt to explore meditative states is that of Mihalyi 
Csikzentmihalyi, who since the 1970s has been attempting to reformulate methods 
of controlling consciousness, and mind training according to the contemporary 
Western cultural climate.32. He see his work as an exploration of states of 
"optimal experience" he terms "flow". A state which he claims occurs when the 
information coming into consciousness is congruent with its goals, and rewards 
are intrinsic within the action. One of the chief factors of the flow experience is 
the merging of action and awareness, so that, while there is no loss of self or of 
consciousness, what is lost during this state of optimal experience is any 
consciousness of the concept of self. Such experience is autotelic, or self- 
rewarding, carried out and experienced for its own sake, as an end in itself, never 
as a means to some different end. According to Csikzentmihalyi, the fulfilled and 
self-regulating self is one that can transform potentially chaotic experience into 
flow. He suggests that there are four states necessary to achievement of this; 
setting goals, becoming immersed in the activity, paying attention to what is 
happening and learning to enjoy or letting go. Results of such achieved 
experiences of flow show many of the qualities often connected with meditation. 
For example, his researches into deep flow experiences in rock climbing mention 
terms such as "one-pointedness of mind", "merging of action and awareness", 
"timelessness", "happiness", "integration of mind and body", and "oneness with 
nature".33 Such states occur in an experience of unity with some other - musical 
instrument or tool, person or the natural world. Csikzentmihalyi notes that if 
evolution leads to ever greater complexity, complexity itself is the result of both 
differentiation and integration. He points out that in recent history vast advances 
have been made in the differentiation of consciousness and individual separation, 
and suggests that future complexity may consist in development of the skills of 
integration. This is again the theme of the step beyond egocentricity, much 
repeated in contemporary discourse and central to Buddhism.
E. Gendlin, "Heidegger & the Philosophy of Psychology." p. 54.
See above, p.56.
M.Csikzentmihalyi, Flow. The Psychology o f  Optimal Experience,
M.Csikzentmihalyi, Beyond Boredom and Anxiety.
Meditation in the Therapeutic Encounter
Perhaps the most important aspect of the meditative state in psychotherapy lies in 
its extension to a way of conducting the therapeutic encounter; a way of being for 
the therapist with a client. For as research has shown, it is within the interaction 
between the person of the therapist and the person of the client that change and 
healing occur.34 Medard Boss relates that Freud saw the therapeutic relationship, 
as the "focal point of therapy, - the very core of therapeutic action, its basis and 
arena, whether or not the people taking part in it are aware of its therapeutic 
significance."35 In view of what has been discussed above relating to the 
interdependence of self and other, knower and known, it should make sense that a 
meditative state (or a state of wide-focused unfixed attention as far as possible 
from the normal, close-focused state of reification), is a state best able to penetrate 
into the intermediate state of relationship.36 One of the Buddhist psychotherapy 
trainings refers to this as Joint Practice.(See Appendix B). Its founder, Maura 
Sills has written: "Core Process Psychotherapy is simply a joint enquiry into 
relationship. It seems that if one can abide in the immanent experiential moment, 
no suffering arises. Our reactive relationship to experience is the vehicle for 
confusion and ignorance with its concomitant suffering."37
Freud wrote of the necessity to suspend the critical faculty during psychoanalysis, 
encouraging analysts "to suspend ... judgement and give ... impartial attention to 
everything there is to observe."38 When emotions and mental states are treated 
with such bare attention to whatever arises, stripped of identification and reaction, 
they are transformed. Such attention, of itself, is healing. The acquisition of and 
tolerance for such bare attention is a skill which needs some cultivation.
John Welwood has compared this with meditation, and I consider that his 
description is worth quoting at length:
See above, chapter one, n. 50.
M. Boss, The Foundations o f  Existential Medicine & Psychiatry, p 259.
This state is described by a therapist not from a Buddhist background thus: "In this 
model, there is no such thing as a neutral analyst interpreting drives and defences. There 
is rather an interpersonal field involving both participants. The observer and the observed 
form a relational dyad, an interpenetrating, living organism from which a single psychic 
system can never be clearly extricated," B. S. Sullivan, Psychotherapy Grounded in the 
Feminine Principle, p. 44.
M. Sills, "Veils & Seals: A Reflection on Buddhism & Cognitive Science." Unpublished 
paper.
S.Freud, "Analysis o f a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy." Standard Edition. 10:23 quoted 
by M.Epstein, thoughts without a thinker, p.l 14.
"In the therapy situation, the client's problems or emotions are like the 
thoughts that arise when you are sitting. You, the listener, provide the 
space which coming back to the breath allows in meditation. You 
have to fully respect and bow to the form - the client's real problem - 
listen to it and take it in. If you don't do that, there isn't a connection 
between the two of you that can effect healing. ... The transformation 
that happens between two people in therapy is similar to what may 
take place inside a single person in meditation. In mindfulness 
practice, as painful thoughts and emotions arise, we note them, bow to 
them, acknowledge them, then let them go and come back to the 
breath, which is a concrete manifestation of open space. This process 
of going into and out of form in meditation is what allows 
transformation to take place ... the great challenge of working on 
oneself is in bringing our larger open awareness to bear on our frozen 
karmic structures ... Our large awareness usually gets buried or stuck 
in problems, emotion, reactions, or else it may try to detach and fly 
away into the sky. But a third alternative is to stay with our frozen 
structures and transform them. That is the core of practice, I believe, 
in both psychotherapy and meditation."39
Similarly in an interview, a teacher of meditation speaks of his experience of 
teaching a meditation class for therapists from three perspectives. The first is the 
general human one, "the second was the advantage for the therapist of being in a 
meditative state while they conduct therapy. Such a state creates the attentional 
focus and emotional dispassion that is a good therapeutic milieu ... The third 
thing I taught them was the some clients, but of course not all, could be guided by 
the therapist into a meditative state, talking about their issues and doing their 
therapy within the 'witness state.'"40
Ann Klein's description of the alternation between analytical and stabilising 
orientations of meditation in the context of the cultivation of compassion could 
stand as a presentation of the method of a Buddhist inspired psychotherapy by 
merely replacing compassion as the focus with whatever mind state occurs as the 
client's focus of attention. First she speaks of reflecting cognitively on the nature 
of compassion, then: "If in the course of reflection one taps into a strong feeling 
of compassion, one stabilizes oneself on that feeling. (This is not to deny that
39 J. Welwood, "Principles o f Inner Work." p.71.
40 C.Tart, "Adapting Eastern Spiritual Techniques to Western Culture. A Discussion with 
Shinzen Young." p. 163.
analysis is also a form of experience, but to emphasize that there is a shift from 
reflecting on compassion to experiencing it.) When a feeling of equanimity, love 
or compassion arises, one simply stays with that feeling until it fades away, 
whereupon one can refurbish it by recalling instances of, or supporting reasons 
for, compasionate connectedness."41 Thus we can see how the meditative model 
shows the process whereby the conceptual may connect with the non-conceptual; 
a way of being that moves freely back and forth between conceptual and non- 
conceptual, rational and emotive.
Some recent experiments carried out in Italy with EEG tests has shown that in 
altered states the brain waves of different individuals become remarkably 
synchrononised.42 This research, carried out using a device designed to measure 
levels of synchronisation in EEG patterns between the left and right brain 
hemispheres in one person, as well as synchronisation between different persons, 
indicates that in states of deep meditation there is significant increase in the 
synchronisation of the left and right hemispheres, and that also when two people 
meditate together their respective EEG patterns also become synchronised. Such 
research would support the experiential suppositions that a joint mindful or 
meditative state is one in which deep communication, healing and insight are most 
likely to occur. Different descriptions are to be found from different approaches 
which however seem to describe similar states. Freud speaks of "evenly 
suspended attention" while Krishnamurti describes it as "choiceless awareness." 
In the words of Humanistic psychotherapist John Rowan the essence of it is "a 
kind of deliberate unfocusing ... openness to one’s own experience as well as that 
of the other in a context of action."43 The aim of the therapist, as practised by 
meditators, is to suspend intentional thinking, but to remain aware of experience 
in the present moment.44
A.C.Klein, The Great Bliss Queen, p.l 14.
Reported originally in Cyber, 40 Milan (November 1992), quoted by E.Laszlo, The 
Creative Cosmos, p. 186.
J.Rowan, The Reality Game. p. 48.
For other descriptions, see M.Lefebure O.P., Human Experience & the Art o f  
Counselling.
GQN.aiiS.IQNS,
An enormous amount of research into meditation has been carried out in the last 
few decades. It is beyond the scope of this work to review it here.45 Broadly 
speaking the results have been very varied and inconclusive. Perhaps the 
differences in meditative techniques and in the aims and expectations of the 
meditators themselves, and the emphasis on short-term outcomes and 
inexperienced meditators have militated against successful or conclusive results.46 
Another suggestion is that the approach to research on meditation has been too 
divorced from its theoretical background.47
However experientially, in both psychotherapy trainings described in the 
Appendix, mindfulness meditation has been found to be of great value in the 
training of psychotherapists, allowing them to gain a familiarity with and flexible 
control of their own mind states, so that they can be with them and with their 
clients with their mind states in as open and non-judgmentally receptive a manner 
as possible. In the therapeutic encounter the therapist will first foster mindfulness 
and awareness which allows emotions and thoughts to arise into consciousness, 
helping to bring the client into touch with their inner life, offering therapy as joint 
practice, a meditation shared in which the therapist is guide and protector helping 
the client to explore, in a protected space, issues which might be overwhelming if 
faced alone and unprotected. The gain for both meditator and therapy client is the 
achievement of awareness of the frames and lenses that we place between us and 
the process of experience; to see the structures we have erected in a vain attempt 
to control the flow of process, so that we may be able to loosen or transform them. 
We cannot control the flow, but if we can have some control over our minds, we 
can move flexibly with the waves whatever the wind, and experience flow 
ourselves. As & anti dev a said:
Where would I find enough leather
With which to cover the surface of the earth?
But (wearing) leather just on the soles of my shoes
45 See M.West (ed.), The Psychology o f  Meditation; Wilber, Engler & Brown, 
Transformations o f  Consciousness.
46 A preponderance o f  meditation research has been carried out with students o f  
Transcendental Meditation, which is concerned with stabilising or concentrative 
meditation rather than analytic meditation and mindfulness with which this chapter is 
more concerned.
47 M. West, "Traditional & Psychological Perspectives in Meditation." p.22. West suggests 
that as Buddhist meditation is concerned with self-concept, it is in the field o f self- 
concept and evaluation that further useful research may lie.
is equivalent to covering the earth with it.
Likewise it is not possible for me 
To restrain the external course of things;
But should I restrain this mind of mine 
What would be the need to restrain all else?"48
The amount or extent of mind restraint and reframing however will vary between 
Buddhism and the therapeutic project. For, as discussed in the next chapter, the 
goals for psychotherapy and for Buddhism are in some respects very different.






"Walking in the great monotony 
no music now or harmony
only the naked life-sense 
and the wind o f  silence
eros and logos here conjoined 
long dark-blue sea and quiet sand
a gull's wing makes a lonely sign 
in the night o f  meanings: a dawn.
What are the goals of psychotherapy and of Buddhism? Can they be compared? I 
would suggest that the goals and the results of Buddhism and psychotherapy are, 
in fact, both comparable and similar qualitatively, though different quantitatively. 
The quality in question is that of liberation, liberation from confinement, 
ignorance and grasping through the cultivation of awareness, clear perception and 
experience. For Buddhism the liberation sought is no less than nirvana; ultimate 
truth and ultimate liberation from samsara, the realm of conventional or confining 
truth and all its dependent suffering. In psychotherapy the goal is narrower. It is 
a more or less conditional freedom, ranging from freedom from specific ills,
K.White, "In the great monotony." Handbook for the Diamond Country, p.44.
which cause particular areas of suffering or constriction, to an open-ended attempt 
to push back the constraints to our human potential.
To some, perhaps, it seems unsuitable to compare the two enterprises, one 
concerned with the absolute and transcendent, the other firmly based in the 
relative and confining. The present Dalai Lama has been one of the most 
consistent advocates of the use and possibilities of Buddhist mind training within 
contexts other and lesser than those of the traditional Buddhist path. In his 
address to the Oxford Union in 1991 he stated: "Just as I believe it myself I often 
mention to others that it is possible for people to adopt various Buddhist 
meditative techniques or mental trainings without being a Buddhist... After all, 
adoption of a specific religion is the business of the individual whereas the 
techniques of training the mind can remain universally applicable."2 Elsewhere 
he has also written with regard to Buddhist mind training: "The primary aim ... is 
the attainment of enlightenment, but it is possible to experience even mundane 
benefits, such as good health by practising them."3 He gives two reasons for the 
importance of understanding the nature of mind; firstly for its importance in the 
understanding of karma, and secondly for the crucial part states of mind play in 
the experience of happiness and sadness. We have discussed earlier how, 
according to Buddhist models, accumulated dispositions are fed back into 
perception, thus both conceptually and affectively flavouring our subsequent 
experience.
One may also take a developmental view seeing a distinction between different 
categories of liberation; a worldly or psychological liberation of self achievement, 
and a sacred liberation with a transcendent goal, suggesting that some degree of 
the first is a prerequisite for the latter.
"Liberation in the profane and personal realm has as its goal the 
health and the liberation of the soul or the awareness. This health 
is psychologically oriented . . .  and this constitutes the precondition 
for any further forms of liberation." . . ."The more ignorance can 
be transformed into knowledge, the more wisdom and awareness 
can be actualized. This is the primary goal in Buddhism, prior to 
the asking of any transcendental questions. The more unconscious 
contents can be raised from the unconscious and the more
consciousness can be increased, the more independence from the
dangers of unconscious processes then develops, reducing
2 H.H.Dalai Lama, "Tibet's Contribution to the Future."
3 H.H. Dalai Lama, Mind Science, p. 16.
dependence on drives and libidinous fixations. This is the task of 
Western psychology.1'4 
However the process of liberation, even within Buddhism itself, may be termed 
psychological, based as it is upon exploration of existing mind states, starting 
from contemplation of their unsatisfactoriness in order to facilitate an ever- 
increasing understanding of what may be more healthy. The focus of such 
exploration is ever the experience of the meditator.5 Also, even within a 
psychotherapy confined within personal history, an awareness of interdependence 
and the ultimate emptiness of separated and permanent essence may be helpful 
and liberating.
THE BUDDHIST GOAL
Comparison of the transcendental and relative gives rise to discussion concerning 
two differing approaches within Buddhism itself - whether its goal is liberation 
from the world or liberation within the world. Within the canonical texts support 
for both approaches may be found. In transcendental, otherworldly mode 
salvation is sought away from the natural cyclic world of death and finitude. 
Support for this position can without doubt be found in Buddhism, particularly in 
Early Buddhism, and in Theravada, with exhortation to leave the civilised world, 
and enter the forest to contemplate the horrors of the body and attain liberation or 
nirvana from the samsaric world of suffering.6 The definition of nirvana is 
difficult, and entire books have dealt with this subject alone.7 For this approach, 
nirvana while not a locus like the Christian heaven is definitely utterly 
transcendent. Discussion of this view often rests upon the verses:
D.I.Lauf, The Secret Doctrines o f  the Tibetan Books o f  the Dead. pp. 215, 217.
"This process ... is largely a psychological one: understanding the human condition is 
very much a process o f understanding why we don't understand it now: a subjective 
exploration, so to speak, o f one's ignorance in order to bring insight." S.Hamilton, 
"Passionlessness in Buddhism" p.3.
S.Hamilton points out that the attitude to the body changed during the history of 
Buddhism. In the Pali suttas the body is approached analytically, negative descriptive 
values are introduced later in the commentaries. She also criticises some translations from 
the Pali, suggesting that a sentence reading: "Wherefore, monks, be ye disgusted with the 
body" should more correctly and less emotively, be translated: "So, monks, be indifferent 
towards (or disenchanted with) your body." S.Hamilton, The Constituents o f  the Human 
Being" p. 296.
T. Scherbatsky, The Concept o f  Buddhist Nirvana. London: Mouton & Co., 1965; 
G.Wellbon, Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters. Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1968.
"Monks, there is a not-bom, a not-become, a not-made, a not- 
compounded. Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not- 
compounded were not, there would be apparent no escape from this 
here that is bom, become, made, compounded.
But since, monks, there is an unborn .... therefore the escape from this 
here that is bom, become... is apparent ...8
There is, however, evidence for the alternative view, for an immanent 
transcendence, liberation within the world, even within the early canon. It may be 
pointed to in the Buddha's steadfast refusal to spend time in consideration of 
theoretical and philosophical concerns, as shown in the Malunkyaputta sutta, and 
in the indeterminate questions which the Buddha refused to adjudicate upon, all of 
which have an otherworldly bent. He was, without doubt, concerned with conduct 
in this world, leading to entrapment within the confines of the conventional and 
ill-perceived In the Rohitassa sutta in his response to the seer Rohitassa who had 
unsuccessfully walked continuously for a hundred years in search of the end of 
the world where "one does not get bom, nor grow old, nor die, nor pass away, nor 
get reborn", the Buddha declared: "It is in this very fathom-long physical frame 
with its perceptions and mind, that I declare, lies the world and the arising of the 
world, and the cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the, 
world."9 In a note to his translation of the Rohitassa sutta, Nanananda describes 
the position of the one who has attained enlightenment:
"The emancipated one is 'in the world' but not 'of the world.' For 
him the world is no longer the arena of a life-and-death straggle in 
which he is sorely involved but one vast illustration of the first 
principles of impermanence, suffering and not-self - of the 
separative (nanabhavo), privative (vinabhavo) and transformative 
(annatbabhavo) nature of all existence."10
In the Dhatuvibhanga sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya nirvana is equated with Truth. 
"O bhikkhu, that which is unreality is false; that which is reality, Nibbana, is 
Truth. Therefore, O bhikkhu, a person so endowed is endowed with this Absolute 
Truth, For, the Absolute Noble Truth is Nibbana, which is Reality."11 If nirvana 
is truth, then what is truth? In chapter three we saw that the absolute truth is that
Udana. VIII, 11.
Samyutta Nikaya. II, 3, 6. trs. Nanananda.
Nanananda, An Anthology from the Samyutta Nikaya. p.83. 
Majjihma N ikaya, III, 245, 26.
all phenomena are dependency arisen, and that they are empty of inherent or 
essential reality or absolute substance. The realisation of the absolute truth is to 
see things "as they are", without the ignorance that sees them and ourselves as 
independent and substantial with its concomitant desiring and grasping. The 
extinction of ignorance and desire is thus the extinction of suffering which is 
nirvana. Thus there may be, perhaps, a middle path between liberation from and 
liberation within. Understanding itself is liberation - thus liberation from the 
confines of human nature occurs through understanding that nature.12
This coincides with the Mahayana view which we saw expressed by Nagaijuna, 
that samsara and nirvana are not essentially different, they are different 
perspectives.
"Samsara (i.e. the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially 
different from nirvana. Nirvana is nothing essentially different from 
samsara."13
As Joan Stambaugh has noticed in relation to Dogen: "...spirituality does not have 
to be turned into anything metaphysical beyond this world. Dogen can show that 
there are unimaginable dimensions of this world right there if we will only open 
our minds to them."14 Stambaugh suggests that the approach of Nagaijuna is 
primarily logical, while that of Dogen is experiential and phenomenological. 
Both teach that samsara and nirvana are related, and each in some way depends 
upon the other; within the relative realm of ordinary existence the ultimate can 
only be pointed to with language which is of necessity itself conventional and 
confining.
"Without a foundation in the conventional truth 
The significance of the ultimate cannot be taught.
Without understanding the significance of the ultimate,
Liberation is not achieved."15
In the Mahayana and the Vajrayana there is more support for the view of 
liberation within the world16 . This view sees the problem not as the problem of 
world in itself, but rather with our response to it; not with impermanence and
This point is clearly expressed by Dr. Hamilton in her paper "Passionlessness in 
Buddhism."
Nagarjuna, M M K  XXV 19. trs. Inada.
J.Stambaugh, Impermanence is Buddha Nature, p.ix.
Nagaijuna, MMK. XXIV 18. trs. J.L. Garfield.
Walpola Rahula suggests that this Mahayana view o f the non-difference of nirvana and 
samsara developed from Pali texts relating nirvana to absolute truth, such as the 
Dhatuvibhanga sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya and Samyutta Nikaya. See What the 
Buddha Taught, p.40.
finitude itself, but with our egocentric fear of it. Thus, rather than escape from the 
world, the attempt is to find a balance within impermanence.17
Even the "unborn", quoted above with reference to the transcendent view, can 
carry another interpretation if  compared with the following words quoted by 
Tsong Kha pa in his commentary to Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamikakarika: 
"Whatever arises from conditions is unborn". Here Tsong Kha pa is concerned 
with stating the identity of dependent origination and emptiness, and the non­
identity of emptiness and non-existence: "'Contingently arising' means 'empty of 
inherent existence.' 'Emptiness' does not mean 'the absence of functioning 
reality’."18 The absolute truth is definitely revealed as the perception of the 
emptiness or dependent origination of all phenomena. The view is that of an 
immanent transcendence.19
This interrelationship of transcendence and immanence is emphasised by 
Nishitani Keiji in his great exploration of emptiness as an escape from nihilism in 
Religion and Nothingness. As he states:
"...the field of emptiness is a field of absolute transcendence, a 
transcendence of time and place, of causal necessity, and of the very 
world-nexus itself.20 But this absolute transcendence is at the same 
time an absolute immanence. Samsara-siVe-nirvana, it has been noted, 
is true samsara and true nirvana; but nirvana, the absolute far side, 
only becomes manifest as samsara, which is the absolute near side.
"The nature o f the transformation is a shift in the quality o f consciousness or awareness, 
rather than a change from living in chaos to participation in a supposed eternal principle 
or archetype of existence. ... the shift in awareness is one from a bondage derived from 
assuming that some unchanging essential ultimate reality dominates one's (conditioned) 
existence to a freedom whereby one has the power and insight to avoid self-debilitating 
behaviour." F.Streng, "The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nagarjuna's 
Madhyamika." p. 32. Also, from a Christian, albeit extraordinarily Buddhist-influenced 
perspective, Don Cupitt suggests: "the way to salvation is not by escaping contingency to 
gain absolute knowledge, but by a radical acceptance o f contingency that inwardly 
transforms the believer." The Long Legged Fly. p.84.
Tsong Kha pa, rtsa she tik chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho. p.401. "rten cing 'brel bar byung 
ba'i sgra'i don gang yin pa de nyid rang bzhin gyis stong pa'i sgra'i don yin gyi/  don byed 
nus pa 'i dngos po  med pa'i don ni stong pa nyid gyi sgra'i don min no/"
"Complete enlightenment is not a heaven or a paradise somewhere else. It is fully 
realizing the ultimate nature inherent in oneself." Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche, The Union o f  
Mahamudra & Dzogchen. p.98.
For a most interesting argument concerning the importance of ascertaining the emptiness 
of causation for Nagaijuna's arguments for the relationship of samsara and nirvana, and 
the interconnection of dependent origination, emptiness and conventional designation in 
such a way that: "While it might appear that the Madhyamika argues that nothing really 
exists except a formless, luminous void, in fact the entire phenomenal world, persons and 
all, are recovered within that emptiness", see J.L. Garfield, "Dependent Arising and the 
Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagaijuna start with Causation?" p. 219.
The field of true emptiness becomes manifest only in unison with that 
dynamic nexus of being-doing-becoming in time, or rather as time."21
This more immanent approach to liberation is more compatible with 
contemporary psychotherapy, and is, I would agree with Rita Gross, who has 
given much consideration to these two modes of freedom from and within the 
world: "the dominant emphasis of Western Buddhists, if  not of Buddhism 
throughout the world today."22 It is more in conformity with the contemporary 
postmodern world, with a post-patriarchal Buddhism.23 In terms of the 
Bakhtinian tripartite model, if the first stage is that of immersion in the natural 
cosmos, the second is that of the division into good/bad, life/death, body/spirit of 
the individual life cycle and a transcendent liberation, and the third or dialogic 
approach reinserts the human figure into the cosmological environment, in a non- 
hierarchical, non-egocentric transcendent-sive-immanent discourse. Liberation 
from  the constraints of ordinary human being is only achieved through 
understanding of that human condition.
GOALS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY
Within the wide field of psychotherapy with its many schools there are large 
differences in the quantitative goals of different therapies. They range from 
behavioural or cognitive retraining to overcome specific phobias, to wide-ranging 
'life-changing' therapy seeking increased potential, and to attempts, co-terminous 
with religious quest, to expand the self beyond the personal in awareness of 
belonging to a greater whole. However, here too, the aim is always that of 
freedom from some confinement through the achievement of a larger meaning. 
People seek psychotherapeutic help because they feel behaviourally, cognitively 
or affectively confined by patterns of perception or action that seem beyond their 
conscious control. The goal is to free themselves from a set of automatic 
unconscious or uncontrolled reactions and identifications to a less pre-ordained,
Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, p. 265. This work will be discussed further in 
chapter eight.
R. Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy, p. 150.
Such an approach is supported by another leading Western Buddhist writer Stephen 
Batchelor as "Agnostic Buddhism", the title o f talk delivered by him in Devon in March 
1994.
more flexible openness and responsiveness to ever-changing situations.24 
Psychotherapeutic projects address the tendency of human beings to close down 
with defensive structures in the face of the responsive openness or transparency 
which is the goal to different degrees both of Buddhism and psychotherapy 25
Behavioural therapy has, in general, specific targets and aims, the instigation of 
new and more adaptive behavioural patterns, leading to a greater degree of control 
and choice. As the goals of psychoanalytic work, Freud spoke of exchanging 
neurotic misery for ordinary unhappiness, and the ability to love and work, as well 
as the replacement of the uncontrolled id by the ego and superego. Such goals, or 
perhaps their later interpretation rather than the founder's intention, have been 
criticised as leading to social conformity and adaptation to conventional norms, at 
the expense of individuality. In response to this, the goals of Humanistic 
psychotherapy are, in general to support and expand the sense and potential of the 
self, and to explore the real and genuine self, rather than the false self of 
conformity. In existential terms the aim is freely-chosen authenticity. In terms of 
Wilber's Spectrum model, it is the achievement of the integrated body/mind 
centaur stage. Transpersonal psychotherapy would extend the boundaries of self 
further to include spiritual needs and altered states of consciousness.
In its furthest reaches Existential and Humanistic therapy may be hard to 
distinguish from Transpersonal. James Bugental, an Existential Humanistic 
psychotherapist, speaks of therapeutic goals in terms of different levels ranging 
from deficiency levels with aims of increased coping efficiency to "Being levels
"Well being is possible only to the degree to which one has overcome one’s narcissism; to 
the degree to which one is open, responsive, sensitive, awake, empty (in the Zen sense). 
Well being means to be fully related to man and nature affectively to overcome 
separateness and alienation; to arrive at the experience of oneness with all that exists - 
and yet to experience m yself  at the same time as the separate entity I am, as the 
individual." E.Fromm, Psychoanalysis & Zen Buddhism, p.36. Cf: "The genuine 
individuation o f the individual, determined by the moment does not mean clinging 
obstinately to one's own private wishes but being free for the factical possibilities o f  
current existence." M.Heidegger, Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, p. 288. Medard 
Boss also speaks o f "the great task that is placed before him as a human being in the 
world, the task o f facing up to everything that addresses him from the open realm of his 
being-there, and o f responding to that call appropriately." Existential Foundations o f  
Medicine & Psychiatry, p.279.
"We need to understand, very specifically the inveterate tendency o f our experiencing to 
close and narrow and welcome restriction. We need to understand the tendency to 
conform to normalize, to secure and control. We need to understand the avoidance o f  
impermanence and the 'constancy' which regulates perception." D.M.Levin, The Body's 
Recollection o f  Being, p.74. Similarly Guenther contrasts wisdom and ego-centred 
cognition as highlighting "the conflict between two major opposing forces in each o f us. 
Through making demands we attempt to impose on and to interfere with all and 
everything; above all, we tend to cut ourselves off from the possibility o f seeing ourselves 
as unique and whole human beings and, as a consequence, we merely proceed under the 
aegis o f suitability-for-purpose, o f making everything no more than a means for our 
selfish, if not paranoid ends." Mind in Buddhist Psychology, p.xxvii.
of therapeutic growth goals" which involve facing existential anxieties, freeing 
oneself from identification with a particular self image, and even transcendence. 
He defines transcendence as the "going beyond" of such usually unthinkingly 
accepted dichotomies as good/bad, right/wrong, I/other, life/death, in a manner 
that does not discard the comparisons but sees them in a more inclusive 
perspective. The same may be said of all the levels of therapy; they are not 
discarded but seen in wider perspective. Bugental writes of an ever-enlarging 
sense of identity distinguished into "me" as an object of perception, "the self1 as 
self-concept abstracted out of many perceptions of one's "me" and finally "I": "I- 
process is a term to designate the subject of one's being, the beingness of a human 
life."26 Of this he speaks in terms familiar to Buddhist discourse: "When I begin 
to realize that my truest identity is as process and not as fixed substance, I am on 
the verge of a terrible emptiness and a miraculous freedom." and: "We begin to 
realise that the world which has been the solid foundation of our being is equally a 
construction of our awareness." and again: "we are the process of being aware, not 
the content of the awareing."27 Such aims bring one at the least within the sphere 
of the Buddhist goal.
To explore similarities in the concern of both Buddhism and psychotherapy with 
liberation, I believe it is useful to enter into the sphere of metaphor. Throughout 
the discourse of both Buddhism and psychotherapy certain metaphors recur 
constantly. The central ones, from which almost all others radiate are those of 
space and light. At the centre, the point of origin or of no-origin, and of goal, 
there is unlimited space, mind or awareness. From this progressive distinction, 
rigidification and conceptualisation spread out. Both Buddhism and 
psychotherapy speak constantly in terms of loosening structures of thought, of 
seeing through discrimination, and obstructions, of deconstructing our perception 
which is clouded with conceptuality, emotions or defences. H. Guenther writes of 
the relationship in terminology between Buddhist rDzogs chen and Medard Boss' 
Daseinsanalyse. He compares the concepts of "opening-up" and "illuminating" 
from rDzogs chen to Boss' terms: "world openness", "clearing" and "world 
disclosing." In terms of both systems conceptual mind or, in Tibetan sems, is a 
constriction and narrowing from the viewpoint of Being as a whole. According to 
Boss, such constriction is most conspicuous in mental patients, and Guenther 
points out that from the viewpoint of rDzogs chen we might all be listed as mental 
patients 28
26 J. Bugental, Psychotherapy and Process, p. 133.
27 Ibid. pp. 133, 137.
28 H. Guenther, " Buddhist rDzogs-chen Thought and Western 'Daseinsanalyse.'"
Similarly in a recent book on the psychology of religion, wherein the psychology 
of religious knowing is likened to that of personal exploration in therapy, the 
authors write: "The great quest for both personal and religious insight requires 
openness . ... Once the necessary space has been created, we need to learn 
attentiveness that is broad sustained and penetrating."29 The work of 
psychotherapy is to shed light on the implicit concepts and beliefs that often 
unconsciously lie behind our explicit actions. It is to bring awareness to these 
areas, that we may explore them without fear, in a safe place, releasing the charge 
of the hidden fear or anxiety, liberating the energy confined in their resistance for 
more helpful actions, allowing us more space for choice, and some degree of 
control. A suitable conception of our relationship with the world is also necessary 
to estimate what control is desirable and possible. Perhaps in the words of the 
Serenity prayer: "God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference."30. 
The aim is suppleness and flexibility that can ride with the wave, part way 
between drowning and becoming as a water drop within the wave, that beautiful 
metaphor of the ultimate Buddhist practice. For there is no doubt that the aim of 
Buddhism is quantitatively different from that of psychotherapy.
CONTRASTS
The quantitative difference between Buddhism and the psychotherapies lies in the 
extent of the awareness, meaning and liberation which is sought. Obviously the 
more restricted the goal of the therapy the further it is from comparison with 
Buddhism, and the more open-minded the endeavour, the nearer. Yet however 
open-ended the psychotherapy, Buddhism stretches further to goals of total 
perfection, total awareness, total freedom from all cognitive and emotional 
afflictions, in short to enlightenment. It aims for a thorough transformation from 
the egocentric vision of the ordinary man or woman to an understanding of the
F. Watts & M. Williams, The Psychology o f  Religious Knowing, p. 152.
This prayer has been used in the many Twelve-Step addiction programmes in the United 
States, and also in a recent form o f therapy which calls itself Neo-Cognitive Psychology.
interconnection and emptiness of all life, leading ultimately to the Bodhisattva's 
vow to abstain from personal liberation until all beings are liberated.31
While it is a contention of this work, as stated in chapter four during discussion of 
views of the self, that, in fact, much psychotherapy is held back in its 
contemporary relevance by its confinement to the egocentric individual, and that 
it is the task and challenge of a contemporary psychotherapy in the postmodern 
world to transcend these egocentric limitations, yet there is no denying that there 
is a great difference in the degree to which Buddhism, and even the most aware 
psychotherapy, promotes non-egocentrism. For Buddhism the extinction of ego­
centrism encompasses the extinction of both possessive craving, conceit and the 
false view of self. As psychologically explained by Bhikku Nanananda in a note 
to his translation of the Rohitassa sutta which we mentioned earlier:
"The culmination of the 'not-self attitude is the eradication of the 
conceit, '(I) am': the percipient of 'not-self attains to the
eradication of the conceit 'I am', which is Nibbana here and now,' 
(Anguttara V 358). The removal of the subtle conceit, 'I am’
(asm im ana) is tantamount to a destruction of that delusive 
superimposed frame from which all measurings and reckonings of 
the world were directed through the instrumentality of the sense- 
faculties, and by which the mass of relative concepts in the form of 
sense-data were so organized as to give a picture of'the world' with 
'self mirrored on it. What we call the normal functioning of the 
five external sense, is but the outward manifestation of the notion 'I 
am”’.32
A psychotherapeutic project would agree with the idea of the picture of world 
with self mirrored on it. It would advocate awareness of the imposed self, and if 
it found this dysfunctional, would attempt to facilitate a more appropriate, or even 
a more flexible sense of self, but would rarely, if ever, pursue non-self to the same 
extent as Buddhism.
In part this is the result of a further contrast, a distinction of focus in the different 
approaches to the individual. Buddhism is concerned pre-eminently with the 
structure of mind rather than its contents, tending towards the universal rather 
than the particular. For Westerners problems of identity pertain to matters of
"... man is free insofar as he is, he is unfree in so far as he conceives himself to be this or 
that and finds his limits in and by some other this or that." H.Guenther, Tibetan  
Buddhism in Western Perspective. p,240.
ftanananda, An Anthology from the Samyutta Nikaya. p.72.
choice, style and individual personality, whereas for Buddhists they are concerned 
with mental processes and structures which are built up upon open awareness. 
Thus liberation for Buddhists is from identification with any conception of self 
per se, and from the view of a world constructed and seen from such a self-centred 
perspective. Whereas psychotherapeutically, identification with a specific 
position may be seen as individually limiting, but normally only in terms of 
exchanging such identification for another more healthy or adapted position.
Psychotherapy, though influenced by theoretical overviews, focuses on the 
particularities of the individual story and symptoms.33 And, as mentioned before, 
the cultural background and ideas of the self are very different. Here, perhaps is a 
particular arena, where more than ever, a dialogue rather than a domination of 
either view or a direct mapping of Buddhism onto Western psychotherapy is 
useful, and a balance of universal and individual is helpful. However, in a 
contemplative approach, while the individual elements may be heard and 
attended to, without either being grasped too tightly nor rejected, they may be 
seen in a wider context as well, allowing for an understanding of the ultimate 
metaphoricity or emptiness of all identification.
There are dangers in confusing Buddhism and psychotherapy, and these must not 
be overlooked. In chapter four, during discussion of the self, notice was taken of 
the dangers of the transpersonal approach without adequate concern for the intra 
and interpersonal. This is especially important where one is dealing with systems 
of thought which originate from very different cultural assumptions concerning 
individuality and selfhood from those to which we are accustomed in the West. 
At the first cross cultural meeting between the Dalai Lama and other spiritual 
teachers and western psychotherapists, His Holiness was astonished by the notion 
of lack of self esteem. A positive sense of self (though not, perhaps, the 
individualised one of western standards) is assumed as the starting place for the 
Buddhist path. The alienation, emptiness (in the western sense of privation) and 
longing so familiar to western psychotherapists is not familiar to the Tibetan 
outlook.
These distinctions have been beautifully expressed by A.C.Klein in a discussion o f  
meditation: "Thus, whereas Western psychology takes one to what is most specific and 
idiosyncratic about one's mind and self, the higher Buddhist stages o f practice described 
here take one to what is considered universal in the human mind. Whereas psychotherapy 
honors the project of each person fulfilling her or his own unique and creative vision, here 
the goal is to leave behind the 'personal' for entry into an unconditioned arena where what 
matters is what is most universally available to Bodhisattvas everywhere." Path to the 
Middle, p.221, n.46.
We have noted earlier Wilber’s description of what he terms the pre/trans fallacy, 
Engler's developmental views, and also John Welwood's concern about spiritual 
bypassing.34 Psychiatrists Robin Skinner and Nina Coltart both write of their 
concern about this possible confusion. Skynner speaks of the ways in which 
knowledge gained from spiritual practices may be used as an escape from growth, 
or may, in fact, be used to support and strengthen limited and narrow views. 
Referring both to Skynner and Welwood, Nina Coltart points out the need for a 
healthy sense of personal identity before attempting any kind of self­
transcendence, suggesting: "For a Westerner to proceed healthily on the spiritual 
path which may lead to self-transcendence and loss of 'the fortress of I1, there 
needs must exist already a stable strong sense of personal identity - not 
necessarily a happy one."35 From the opposite pole, Welwood himself points out 
the danger of trying to psychologize spiritual teachings, turning them into mere 
mental health techniques and minimising their profound alternative views of the 
world.
Having considered these similarities and differences between Buddhist and 
psychotherapeutic goals, I should now like to consider some implications of a 
Buddhist inspired psychotherapy within our lived experience.
See above p. 114.
N. Coltart, Slouching Towards Bethlehem, p. 167. For the works by Skinner and 
Welwood cited there, see J.Welwood (ed.) Awakening the Heart.
Chapter Eight
IMPLICATIONS
So far, in relation to the ground of our enquiry, starting from the foundations of 
experience and meaning, we have considered first Western therapies, then 
Buddhist philosophy with an emphasis on those doctrines which I consider to be 
most central for a Buddhist influenced approach to psychotherapy. Next, 
considerations of the self within Buddhism and within various contemporary 
Western discourses, have revealed many similarities in view, yet some Western 
difficulties in affectively coming to terms with this view. In relation to the path, 
the instantiation of views, we have considered the ethical stance and practices of 
Buddhism in relation to a contemporary psychotherapy. The aim and the goals of 
psychotherapy and Buddhism have been compared and contrasted, and seen, I 
hope, to be compatible in terms of aim, yet contrasted in terms of the extent or 
breadth of that aim. I would, therefore, like now to look at the implications of the 
views and path of Buddhism for psychotherapy, considering them in the context 
of contemporary discourse and of human lived experience which is the arena of 
psychotherapy. What exactly can Buddhist discourse provide for psychotherapy?
To facilitate consideration of the implications of a Buddhist contemplative 
approach and its relevance to contemporary Western discourse and to our 
experience, I intend to present this in terms of the three mandalas, or dimensions 
of being of body, speech and mind, a traditional Buddhist tripartite division 
encompassing an overlapping approach, which I hope will reveal the areas of 
interest, and do so in ways which will facilitate an overcoming of the traditional 
dualistic distinctions of mind/body, subject/object and figure/background. These 
three, gates of our action and interaction, form our horizons of experience and
meaning. Guenther has described them as the three gates "through which the 
enworlded individual goes our to meet his enworldedness."1 In Western discourse 
there are distinctions comparable to these, body, speech and mind. Heidegger 
writes of the "existentiales1 of "affectedness", "telling" and "understanding"2. 
Mark Johnson speaks of "embodiment", "imagination" and "understanding". 
Geoffrey Samuel uses the terms "body", "culture" and "mind" to stand for states 
of underlying relatedness, saying: "These states are descriptions of patterns of 
relationships, both relationships among human beings and relationship between 
human beings and their natural environment. In other words they are states of the 
entire human ecosystem."3 In earlier Western discourse the concept of human 
nature was also delineated in a tripartite model of spirit, soul and matter or body. 
The Nicene Council in 787 reduced this to the more familiar dualistic one of spirit 
or mind, and body or matter. As noticed earlier such a dualistic distinction, 
accompanied by a move away from embeddedness in the natural world, has 
simultaneously placed value on spirit at the expense of body.
In Tan trie Buddhism a distinction is made between the words used to describe 
ordinary perception and awakened perception. Thus ordinary body/mind, speech 
and mentation are designated by the terms lus, ngag, yid/sem s, while the gates 
of transformed perception; embodiment as interaction (which Guenther terms 
"gestalt dynamics"), speech as communicative capacity, and mind as spirituality 
or resonance are designated by the honorific terms sku, gsung, thugs. The 
description of mind as spirituality or resonance encompasses the idea of mind as 
interdependence and our participation in being as a whole in a manner reminiscent 
of Heidegger's "openness to Being". Here, in each dimension, we find both an 
everyday pathological relation and the potential for a transformed one. The 
former is closed, encased in reification and distinctions such as body/mind, 
subject/object and individual/world; the latter is open, permeable, dynamic and 
interdependent.
These three, body, speech and mind, are aligned also with the three Buddha 
bodies, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya. These three are 
described somewhat differently by different Buddhist schools and approaches. 
Following Herbert Guenther's interpretation of Tibetan Vajrayana, the kaya or 
body may be taken as a structure of experience, sku the word used for the 
transformed experience of embodiment is the word used to translate the Sanskrit
1 H.Guenther, Creative Vision, p. 56,
2 Translations used by Hubert Dreyfus in Being-in-the-world.
3 G. Samuel, Mind, Body & Culture, p. 152.
kaya. Although experience is a whole, yet three aspects of it can be discerned; 
which he terms immediate-intuitive, factual and mediating-reflective aspects.
The Dharmakaya is the "hidden source of man's being", the body of mystical 
experience, the wisdom of things as they are, accompanied by joy. The 
Sambhogakaya, sometimes translated as the "enjoyment body", encompassing 
concepts which will reoccur in our discussion of speech, is a "structure of 
sensuous elements of imagery which are felt to give knowledge, and in the 
contemplation of which we feel to have come nearer to knowledge." Perhaps the 
most difficult realm to delineate, it is the realm of ideation and imagination; in 
Western terms, I believe it would be home to such concepts as the Platonic Ideas 
and the archetypes of the collective unconscious.
Nirmanakaya is the body of form, which on the level of nescience and division 
from true nature, a sentient being believes to be her real body. Traditionally this 
varies according to the six realms4. Stephen Batchelor describes the doctrine of 
the threefold Buddha body as describing three stages in the process of unfolding 
from formlessness to form; from the silent depths of experience (dharma body) 
through ideas and words (enjoyment body) to embodiment in action (form or 
emanation body). The dharma body, being formless, is never depicted, the 
enjoyment body at the level of ideas and images is depicted in the form of 
idealised Buddha figures, and the emanation body alone is individualised in the 
aspect of ordinary humans.5
It seems necessary to me that if we are to maintain our balance in a world which 
both Buddhist and contemporary Western discourse tells us is compounded, 
impermanent and outsideless, that we ground ourselves first within embodiment.
These are the realms o f the gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts and hell 
beings. These levels have been psychologically interpreted and compared to different 
ways of relating to the world, see Chogyam Trungpa, Transcending Madness. Chapter 
two and M. Epstein, thoughts without a thinker; chapter one.
S. Batchelor, Alone With Others, chapter six.
EMBODIMENT
"My daily affairs are quite ordinary; 
but I'm in total harmony with them.
I  don't hold onto anything, don't reject anything; 
nowhere an obstacle or conflict 
Who cares about wealth and honor?
Even the poorest thing shines.
M y miraculous power and spiritual activity 
drawing water and carrying wood. ,<6
Traditionally Eastern and Western approaches to embodiment are quite distinct. 
In the West that tradition has been for a mind/body dualism, with some bias 
towards the mind as the stronger and more important part. In contrast in the East 
there are many traditions which espouse a view of mind/body oneness. This 
profound initial difference has important consequences. Arising from this first 
distinction in the view of mind and body is a vastly different approach to 
philosophy and science. In the West these disciplines have developed separately, 
with science focusing on the physical world as external nature, and mostly 
ignoring the relationship between mind and world. In the East traditional science 
and philosophy has taken as its starting point the lived human body, and from this 
focus investigated the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm. A further 
difference resulting from the different approaches to the relationship of mind and 
body is shown in attitudes to training. The Western assumption is that training 
proceeds from mind to body. In the East views of mind/body oneness are the 
foundation for methods of self-cultivation which affect, train and transform the 
mind through the body. Another implication of these differing approaches is 
found in the different relationship between theory and praxis. In the East praxis 
has always taken priority over theory. Not so in the West. In Greece, the theiros, 
the spectator was considered to possess the overview of the gods, the position of
Layman P'ang, trs. S. Mitchell, The Enlightened Heart, p.35.
privilege over the mere actors and participants. The original theiros was the 
ambassador who travelled to neighbouring city states to observe their religious 
rites and dramas to bring back home what might be considered of value. 
Professor of Philosophy Mervyn Sprung explores this Greek adherence to the 
sense of life as theory, and the resultant supremacy of the intellect in his most 
recent book. He believes that in the postmodern era: "Philosophy as the pursuit of 
one reasoned truth, is not longer possible", and seeks for what he terms a "vivial" 
understanding based on sensory and behavioural experience in contrast to a purely 
intellectual or theoretical approach.7
In the West today, there is both movement away from theory towards embodied 
experience and praxis, as evinced in the views discussed above, and a 
contradictory movement shown in formalism and in the reading of world as text.8 
As should by now be obvious, this work is interested in and strongly upholds the 
trend towards a view of mind/body oneness, and finds in the Eastern philosophy a 
sense of the value of embodied experience as mediating between self and world, 
subject and object. Arising from, and strengthening this view, methods of self- 
cultivation may be, as we have seen, of immense value to psychotherapy, which 
explains their growing popularity and acceptance in the West. I would thus like to 
consider views of embodiment in Buddhism and in contemporary Western 
discourse which attempt to bridge the division of mind/body, subject/object.
EMBODIMENT IN BUDDHISM.
The dimension of body in Buddhism embraces more than we normally consider as 
body, encompassing the mind/body continuum in its sense-based experience 
including its interaction with the environment. As we have already noted, Tibetan 
Vajrayana distinguishes between body in its exoteric ordinary sense and its 
transformed esoteric sense which Guenther translates as "gestalt". Transformed 
thus, the dimension of embodiment is not our commonly shared world but a 
manifestation of sheer energy through light, colour and sound. A description
M.Sprung, After Truth, p.viii.
Edward Said in a talk entitled "Historical Experience and the Study of Literature" given at 
SOAS on 7.12.93, exemplified this split by, on the one hand the growth o f formalism in 
twentieth century literary studies, and on the other, a return to experience shown in the 
increasing valuation o f feminine and ethnic viewpoints as expanding and enlarging 
horizons o f experience.
from a recent work on Tantric Buddhism which continues Guenther's pattern of 
analysis, beautifully expresses both of these:
"embodiment ... is understood to be not a 'soul' in a 'body' but 
rather a multilayered mind/body continuum of corporeality, 
affectivity, cognitivity, and spirituality whose layers are subtly 
interwoven and mutually interactive. This nonessentialist self is 
seen not as a boundaried or static entity but as the site of a host of 
energies, inner winds and flames, dissolutions, meltings, and 
flowings that can bring about dramatic transformations in embodied 
experience and provide a bridge between humanity and divinity."9
Within Buddhism we can find both a path of renunciation working within the 
normal shared world, and the path of transformation, imaginatively creating 
through visualisation and physical praxis, an alternative reality. Within the first, 
one uses the ordinary body and world to engage in ethically positive actions, 
maintaining the body as a support for meditation. Although there is a strong 
ascetic and world renouncing strain within Buddhism accompanied by meditation 
on the dissolution and disgust of the body, yet there is also much evidence for a 
balanced appreciation of body and world as the very foundation of practice. 
Sakyamuni Buddha himself failed to reach enlightenment after years of ascetic 
practice and bodily neglect. It was only after accepting nourishment from Sujata 
that he reached enlightenment preaching thereafter a "middle way" between 
asceticism and indulgence.
In Tsong Kha pa's commentary to Nagaijuna's Mulamadhyamikakarika, there is a 
discussion of samvpti or relative and conventional truth. There, Tsong Kha pa, 
quoting from Candraklrti's Madhyamakavatara, gives the criterion for acceptance 
as conventional truth, not as we would today, as legitimised by conventions of 
belief or practice, but as legitimised through embodiment.
"For the world whatever is apprehended by six unimpaired senses is 
considered true. Everything else stands as false for the world."10 
Both subject and object of conventional truth are judged in relation to 
"consciousness of one of the six senses which is without the fault of a temporary
M. Shaw, Passionate Enlightenment, p.l 1.
Tsong Kha pa, rTsa she tik  chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho. p.408. quoting from 
Madhyamakavatara: gnod pa med pa'i dbang po drug mams kyis/ bzung ba gang shig 'jig 
rten gyis rtog de/ 'jig rten nyid les bden yin lhag ma ni/ 'jig rten nyid les log par ma par 
bshag//
cause for deception."11 Internal faults which cause deception are given as eye 
diseases, external causes as mirror images, echoes and mirages.
The preliminaries for Tantric practice state repeatedly the necessity for 
appreciation of our human rebirth as being the only foundation for gaining 
enlightenment. "A human form fully endowed with all the liberties and 
opportunities to study and practise the Dharma is extremely rare and precious. It 
is the vehicle through which you will attain Enlightenment or, if you are not 
careful, a lower rebirth."12
The sutras considered in chapter six in connection with meditation reveal a firm 
grounding in embodiment. The first establishment of mindfulness is the body.13 
The first exercise is awareness of breathing, which Thich Nhat Hanh calls 
"conscious breathing". This awareness of breathing acts as a link which unites 
body and mind and brings them into the present. In psychotherapy this is a most 
simple and useful method of bringing clients and indeed also therapists into the 
present moment, alert and awake to their embodied experience which includes 
sensation, expression and thought.14 In the Satipatthana Sutta this awareness of 
breathing is used to establish awareness of body and mind. The object of 
awareness is no longer the breath alone but body itself united with the breath.
"Breathing in, I am aware of my whole body,
Breathing out, I am aware of my whole body.
Breathing in, I calm the activities of my body,
Breathing out, I calm the activities of my body."15
Awareness of breath is followed by mindful observation of the positions of the 
body; walking, standing, sitting, lying and in action. This observation continues 
with closer attention to the individual parts of the body. In his commentary to 
this sutra Thich Nhat Hanh continues the use of breathing to accompany each step 
of observation. "Breathing in, I am aware of the hair on my head, Breathing out, I
Ibid: 'phral gyi ’khrul rgyu'i gnod pa med pa’i dbang po drug gi shes pas....
Wang-Ch'ug Dor-je, the ninth Karmapa, The Mahamudra. p.31.
Satipatthana Sutta in Majjhima Nikaya 1.10, Digha Nikaya II22.
It is important to note the overlap or interconnection of the three dimensions o f body, 
speech and mind, which was also present in the earlier quotation from Miranda Shaw. 
Speaking o f voice or speech, the commentary to rDzogs chen text notes that in its 
transformed or esoteric tantric state "voice is not only speech or the sounds produced by 
our vocal chords, but also all the respiratory energies which supports it, which is itself 
linked to all our bodily energies." K.Lipman & M. Peterson with Namkhai Norbu, 
commentary to You are the Eyes o f  the World, p.68.
Thich Nhat Hanh, Transformation & Healing, p.5.
know that this is the hair on my head", as he says that breathing consciously helps 
us to dwell more easily in awareness and sustain our mindful observation. The 
body is then considered in its interrelationship with the universe in terms of the 
elements, earth, water, fire and air, of which it is composed. Such considerations 
emphasise our participation in the interdependent, non-self, unborn and unending 
nature of all that is. This contemplation is followed by the nine contemplations on 
the impermanence of the body, and here we find evidence of devaluation of the 
body, for the images suggest decay, putrefaction and impermanence. Yet in his 
contemporary commentary Thich Nhat Hanh suggests a different perspective. 
Such contemplations which he feels should only be practised by those in good 
mental and physical health who have conquered desire and aversion, rather than 
teaching hatred of our bodies and the world, should help us to see how precious 
life is; that it should not be wasted nor should we ignore its impermanence, but 
hold it lightly and freshly value it in the present moment.
In each of these observations there is a refrain:
"This is how the practitioner remains established in the observations of 
the body in the body, observation of the body from the inside or from 
the outside, or observation of the body both from the inside and from 
the outside. He remains established in the observation of the process 
of coming-to-be in the body or the process of dissolution in the body 
or both in the process of coming-to-be and the process of dissolution.
Or he is mindful of the fact, 'There is a body here,’ until understanding 
and full awareness come about. He remains established in the 
observation, free, not caught up in any worldly consideration."16 
Thus, as Thich Nhat Hanh points out the teachings of impermanence, selflessness 
and dependent origination may be realised directly through these practices of 
mindfully observing the body.
In her most recent work Ann Klein suggests that Buddhist mindfulness practices 
(citing particularly the Foundation of Mindfulness in the body) may help to 
provide what she terms "visceral coherence" in contrast to the narrative coherence 
of self sought for in the West. Such an embodied coherence is free of dependence 
on language with the attendant difficulties which the following chapter will 
address. It serves to mediate between mind and body and even, Klein suggests, 
between conditioned and unconditioned, providing a different way of being in the 
world. As most clearly stated in her own words: "The unconditioned is most
16 Thich Nhat Hanh, Transformation & Healing, p.58.
ideally accessed by pure nonconceptual mindfulness and concentration, whereby 
one becomes grounded in one's own physical and mental experience. This 
grounded mindfulness collapses the mind/body opposition ... , suggesting the 
possibility of an em bodied  groundedness, one that takes its certainty and 
steadiness as much from a specific way of holding mind and body as from ideas 
or ideals. The difference between embodying an idea and thinking it is subtle, but 
crucial."17 This echoes Sprung's words about the middle way: "It is the practice 
of wisdom, not a means to it. It embodies knowledge, but is not a knowing."18 
Such an embodied stance or posture is of the greatest possible relevance for 
psychotherapy.
It is in the writings of the twelfth-century Japanese monk Dogen that we find the 
most lived and most poetic expression of embodied practice. Dogen writes of the 
transformed world as the Body of the Buddha, relating such stories as that of Su 
Tung p'o who, enlightened by hearing the sounds of streams flowing at night, 
wrote the following verse of enlightenment:
"The sounds of the valley streams are His long, broad tongue;
The forms of the mountains are His pure body.
At night I heard the myriad sutra-verses uttered 
How can I relate to others what they say."19
Although it reaches the limits of poetic expression and points to inexpressible 
mysteries, Dogen's teaching is grounded in the body of the world and the human. 
"What faith has he who does not know the body which is the spring pine, or the 
true reality which is, just as it is, the autumn chrysanthemum? How can he ever 
cut off the roots of birth and death?"20 Furthermore in keeping with this Dogen 
preaches the oneness of practice and realisation. "In the Buddha Dharma, practice 
and realization are identical. Because one's present practice is practice in 
realization, one's initial negotiation of the way in itself is the whole of original 
realization ... As it is already realization in practice, realization is endless, as it is 
practice in realization, practice is beginningless."21 Masao Abe suggests that this 
dynamic oneness of practice and attainment is mediated by the realisation of 
impermanence as Buddha nature; that attainment (Buddha nature) as ground, and 
practice (becoming a Buddha) as condition are nondualistically identical in the 
realisation of impermanence as Buddha nature which arrives at the
17 A.C.Klein, The Great Bliss Queen, p. 154. Italics of the final line are mine.
18 M.Sprung, "Being and the Middle Way." p. 130.
19 F.D.Cook, How to Raise an Ox. p. 102.
20 Ibid. p. 112.
21 Dogen, "Bendowa." trs. N.A.Waddel & Masao Abe, Eastern Buddhist 4, (1). p.130.
nonsubstanitiality of attainment and the emptiness of Buddha Nature.22 The 
implication of the oneness of practice and realisation is the simultaneous 
realisation of the identity of means and ends. In Western life the teleological 
approach has been largely unquestioned. This alternative approach does question 
such purposive living, and indeed reveals it as one of the major causes of the 
separation not only of means and ends, but thereby of experience and meaning. If 
we live always in search of future goals, we are never within our embodied 
experience.23 And it is just this immersion in immediate experience with no 
"self1 outside of this, that Francis Cook suggests is indeed for Dogen authentic 
self; an authentic self which is "self-transcendence, - not world-transcendence."24 
Paradoxically the more tightly the inauthentic self, which sees itself as separate 
from its experience, is grasped, the more there is alienation from everything seen 
as "not-self'. If the authentic self is immediate and relational experience, the felt 
immediacy of things, there is no separation from experience and things, and, as 
we have seen earlier, "to forget the self is to be authenticated by the myriad 
things"; which is enlightenment. Thus authentic selfhood points to a profound 
way of being in the world.
BODY IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN THOUGHT.
Within contemporary Western thought, where attention is paid to the body in new 
ways, what is found is a collapsing of old distinctions and dichotomies, pre­
eminently those of body versus mind, subject versus object, and of the objectivist 
view of the world as some pre-existing reality, about which there can be a correct 
"God's eye" view, of which our knowledge is a more or less correct 
representation. Such a view, as we have discussed, is being challenged by more 
interconnected and enactive accounts of the production of 'reality' as a combined 
effort and result of the very knowledge whereby we grasp it. These views have 
been more prominent in Continental than in Anglo-American philosophy. Over 
the last century there has been the constant theme of a search to bridge the gap 
between body and mind, man and world. We can point to Heidegger's Dasein and 
Merleau-Ponty's "flesh" as attempts to convey the intertwining of the visible and
22 See M. Abe, A Study o f  Dogen, chapter 1.
23 Mention was made in chapter five o f the way in which the enactive approach in Cognitive 
Science and Systems Theory reunite means and ends in a circular interdependent process, 
see above, p. 139.
24 F.Cook, "Dogen's View of Authentic Selfhood", p. 139.
the invisible. Heidegger's presentation of Dasein may be seen as a major signpost 
for such views, with its emphasis on being-in-the-world, and the precedence of 
existence over essence. However such emphasis on existence and experience has 
paradoxically mostly remained a purely intellectual emphasis. Merleau-Ponty 
was the one philosopher to take note of scientific research and psychology and to 
discuss being-in-the-world from the point of view of the interface of the 
physiological and psychic. Such exploration presents the human being in a 
different light to the traditional view. It presents both mind and body, and also 
subject and world as abstractions of "presence", and reinstates the embodied 
subject in process as one that is never finally distinct and cut off, but always 
already intentionally related to world. Such a conception of the human subject 
implies similar revision of world. In this light the dynamic lived relation of 
subject and world is revealed as pre-objective and pre-reflective. For such a view, 
development implies the emergence of subjectivity and personality from the pre­
personal existence of the body, with such development occurring against a 
background of the pre-reflective interaction of being-in-the-world, and in dialogue 
with world and others.
Heidegger suggested, as discussed earlier, that the first step away from the 
metaphysical tradition of reflection and representation and our forgetfulness of 
Being should be "the step back from the thinking which merely re-presents to the 
thinking which responds and recalls."25 In a trilogy of books, David Levin has 
interpreted Heidegger's attempt to delineate the thinking which responds in terms 
of pre-reflective experiential dimensions of embodiment, thus uniting meaning 
and experience as discussed above in the preamble to chapter two.26 The three 
titles themselves explain the different foci of this exploration; The Body's 
Recollection o f  Being explores the lived experience of gesture and motility, while 
The Opening o f Vision continues the discussion in the field of vision, discovering 
a psychopathology in the contemporary approach to the visual dimension which 
Levin connects to nihilism, and against which he advocates a radically different 
vision, one which would structure the figure/ground, subject/object distinction in 
a new way. The third and final book in the trilogy, The Listening Self, addresses 
the potential for hearing in a way which encourages greater self-awareness and a 
different relation to Being. Each of these books addresses what Levin sees as the 
pathologies of the different senses expressed in their contemporary ways of
M.Heidegger, Poetry, Language & Thought. p .l81.
"For without a phenomenology of the lived body, a hermeneutical phenomenology o f  
experiential perception, there can be no 'grounding' of theory and praxis in experiential 
meaning." D.M.Levin, The Listening Self. p. 174.
embodiment, and considers these pathologies as both constituent of and resultant 
from the nihilism of the age. Levin advocates a new embodied responsive way of 
experiencing which could give rise to a different more open, more interactive 
response to Being. His thesis is influenced both by Heidegger's concept of 
Gelassenheit or releasement and by Buddhism, particularly Zen, in its concern 
with non verbal, non-reflexive experience of "direct pointing at reality."
Another philosopher Mark Johnson, as we saw earlier, has upheld the importance 
of embodiment through the work he started in conjunction with linguist George 
Lakoff.27 They first studied the way our life and language is formed by the 
structures of our imagination, the "metaphors we live by."28 They discovered that 
such imaginative structures emerge from our embodied experience; that the 
categories and concepts we use to understand our world, and the forms of 
imagination which create them grow out of our bodily experience. Johnson 
suggests that there can be no meaning without the structures and patterns that 
establish relationship. These organising patterns and structures he calls "image 
schemata." "An image schemata is a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual 
interactions and motor programs."29 They are gestalt structures by means of 
which our experience manifests coherence and order.30 An example of this would 
be the verticality schema. The experience of verticality, an up/down orientation is 
repeated in endless daily perceptions and activities, starting with our felt sense of 
standing upright. The verticality schema is the abstract structure of such 
verticality experiences, images and perceptions, and this experientially based 
structure is then imaginatively extended to an ever-widening field as we project 
patterns of experiences from one domain of experience onto another different 
domain. This is the task of metaphor, and for Lakoff and Johnson metaphor is not 
merely a linguistic term, but a fundamental structure of cognition whereby our 
experience is ordered and understood.31 Thus the verticality schema is extended 
in order to understand quantity; "more" is "up", prices "rise", less is "down", 
prices "fall".
See above, p. 139.
This work was briefly mentioned in relation to Buddhist thought in chapter three, and its 
relation to ethics in chapter five.
M.Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p.xiv.
One might conjecture the similarity between these cognitive structures and basic 
dispositions (samskaras) prior to their solidification with value-laden grasping. See above 
pp.98-9.
"Through metaphor, we make use o f patterns that obtain in our physical experience to 
organize our more abstract understanding." Ibid p.xv.
For Johnson, experience is far richer than the prevailing view of objectivism 
would have us believe. It "is to be understood in a very rich, broad sense as 
including basic perceptual, motor-program, emotional, historical, social and 
linguistic dimensions",32 all those encompassed within the body, speech, mind 
model. Embodiment, our embodied experience (body) provides the physical level 
for the metaphorical projection of imagination aided by language (speech) which 
informs the conceptual, social and historical dimensions of life (mind)33. Thus 
meaning and experience are united: "our understanding is our mode of 'being in 
the world.'" It is the way we are meaningfully situated in our world through our 
bodily interactions, our cultural institutions, our linguistic tradition, and our 
historical context."34 Such a view overturns that of meaning as being a 
conceptual and propositional representation of, and operation on, an external 
ahistorical reality, free of bodily constraints and of value. In its place we have a 
constructivist theory of understanding that emphasises embodiment as the 
foundation of meaning and reason, and the importance of imagination in 
extending and projecting spatio-temporal experience into abstract spheres. 
Understanding is not a reflection on prior experience, it is rather the very way we 
have that experience. It is the result of our body, speech and mind which together 
meld to make our world what it is. Later reflections on experience rest on this 
more basic understanding.
Much contemporary research concerning embodiment is resulting in the 
collapsing of the mind/body duality, challenging both philosophy's neglect of 
body and science’s neglect of mind or consciousness. These works suggest a 
stance that follows neither dualism nor monism according to earlier models.35 
Exemplifying this middle track, Philosopher John Searle recently wrote: "Mental 
phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain, and are 
themselves features of the brain ... Both consciousness and intentionality are 
biological processes caused by lower-level neuronal processes in the brain, and 
neither is reducible to something else."36
Ibid. p. xvi.
Johnson's non-objectivist approach which he terms cognitive "semantics" employs three 
key notions; embodiment, imagination and understanding which, I suggest, align with the 
body, speech and mind model.
Ibid. p. 102.
"It is essential to show that both dualism and monism are false because it is generally 
supposed that these exhaust the field, leaving no other options." J.R.Searle, The 
Rediscovery o f  the Mind. p.2.
Ibid. p.xii.
Neurobiologist Gerald Edelman whose work was considered in chapter four in 
relation to contemporary views of the self, is in agreement with the work of 
Lakoff and Johnson, and is currently searching for a biological theory of brain 
function and evolution which will describe how  symbolic idealised cognitive 
models of language arise as the result of mechanisms of perceptual and conceptual 
categorisation. His theory too is concerned with the embodiment of mind, and is 
founded in principles of evolution applied to neurophysiology, a theory he terms 
the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TGNS).
Edelman distinguishes between what he calls primary consciousness and higher 
consciousness. Primary consciousness arises from developments of the cortical 
system which link it to the limbic system and from the development of a new kind 
of memory based on this linkage, which categorise responses in different brain 
systems according to the demands of value systems in the limbic brain stem. 
Phenomenal experience for a primary consciousness arises from the interaction of 
ongoing value-free perceptual categorisations with value-laden memory, before 
those perceptual events contribute further to the alteration of the memory. 
Primary consciousness is the precondition for the evolution of any higher-order 
consciousness. It is individual, continuous and intentional yet changing in concert 
with both world and internal signals. However, it is limited to a small interval of 
present time, described by Edelman as a "remembered present." Also, says 
Edelman, "it lacks an explicit notion or a concept of a personal self, and it does 
not afford the ability to model the past or the future as part of a correlated 
scene."37 Higher consciousness, which rests upon the base of primary 
consciousness, requires the development of a symbolic memory which allows for 
the construction of a socially based concept of self and the ability to model the 
world in terms of past and future. For its full evolution it requires the emergence 
of language which we will consider in the next chapter, but prior to this Edelman 
considers a model of self-nonself interaction has to evolve and a socially 
constructed selfhood be added to the previous stratum of biological individuality. 
Once the self is developed, initially through social, secondly through linguistic 
interactions, world is developed; a world of both inner and outer events which 
requires naming and intending. The difficulty of understanding the self arises, 
according to Edelman, because of the very limits of embodiment, since the forms 
of embodiment that lead to consciousness are absolutely unique according to the 
body and individual history of each individual. Thus embodiment is the basis of 
our individuality. "The extended TGNS purports to explain how embodiment of
37 Ibid. p.122. cf the ideas of ongoing self and self concept discussed above in chapter four.
mind takes place and thus connects cognition to biology. It provides a consistent 
basis for explaining how meaning arises from embodiment as a result of 
referential interactions."38
Cognitive Scientists Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch in 
their recent groundbreaking book The Embodied Mind bring together recent 
Western approaches to cognitive science, everyday lived experience and Buddhist 
traditions of mindfulness. In their own words: "What we are suggesting is a 
change in the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an 
embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean reflection in 
which body and mind have been brought together. What this formulation intends 
to convey is that reflection is not just on experience, but reflection is a form of 
experience itself - and that reflective form of experience can be performed with 
m indfulness/aw areness."39 So embodiment is not seen as discussion of 
mind/body relation but as the lived foundation of our actual experience, attention 
to which may transform that very experience. Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
suggest that psychoanalysis is the discipline most familiar to Westerners that 
comes closest to this open-ended approach to knowledge in its idea that the "very 
conception of mind and of the subject who is undergoing analysis is understood to 
change as the web of representation in which the self in entangled is slowly 
penetrated through analysis."40 It is the intention of this current work to expand 
this statement and to relate it to other forms of psychotherapy than psychoanalysis 
alone. Indeed Varela, Thompson and Rosch state that what they feel traditional 
psychoanalytic methods lack is the very mindfulness/awareness component which 
has been central to this discussion.41
Varela and the other thinkers discussed above, espouse an enactive approach to 
cognitive science which describes how knowledge of self and world are 
inseparable from our bodies, our language and our social environment. 
Knowledge arises from ongoing interpretation that in turn arises from our 
capacities for understanding which are rooted in the structure of our biological
Ibid. p. 152.
Varela, Thompson & Rosch, The Embodied Mind. p. 27.
Ibid. p.31.
"The possibilities for total personal re-embodiment inherent in the mindful, open-ended 
approach to experience that we have been describing may provide the needed framework 
and tools for implementation o f an existential, embodied psychoanalysis. In fact, the 
relationship between meditation practice, Buddhist teachings and therapy is a topic of  
great interest and great controversy among Western mindfulness/awareness practitioners 
.... An adequate discussion of this ferment would lead us too far afield at this point, but 
we invite the reader to consider what form a reembodying psychoanalysis might take." 
Ibid. p. 180.
embodiment and are lived in the realms of language and culture. Neither world 
nor self exist in isolation, nor are they non-existent Both the enactive approach to 
cognitive science and Buddhism wish to affirm the everyday lived world, 
although they propound views of self and world that are, at least initially, 
unfamiliar. Above all they suggest a different approach to the dualities of 
body/mind and subject/world. All the new Western views point to a pre- 
cognitive, preconscious and hitherto largely ignored, sense of embodiment. In 
twentieth-century studies Michael Polanyi's "tacit dimension", Edelman's 
"primary consciousness", Searle's "background" and Merleau-Ponty's "habitual 
body" and "intentional arc" of vision, comprehension and mobility attempt to 
present the dialogue between body-subject and world. Such a different way of 
experiencing embodiment not as physical object but as a mode of experiencing 
and ordering world may reflect the Tantric distinction between the transformed, 
even deified aspect of body as sku, rather than lus.
CONCLUSION
Thus, we have seen that Buddhist views on embodiment, while somewhat 
different from those prevalent in the West up to the present time, are found to be 
far more compatible with those presently arising from contemporary Western 
research. They also underlie practices instantiating mindfulness of conventional 
embodiment and also an enhanced imaginative view of ideal embodiment, 
supported by tantric visualisation and ritual. These views have further important 
implications for contemporary psychotherapy. Embodiment may play a part of 
particular importance as a grounding against total relativity. If the ahistorical and 
transcendental, or merely intellectually supported, grounds of earlier 
metanarratives have been found lacking, what is left to defend us from incoherent 
relativism? Our common human embodiment and structure of understanding may 
be such a ground as long as it is not seen as an unchanging or transcendent one. 
We have noted Ann Klein's discussion of Buddhist mindfulness practices, citing 
particularly the Satipatthana Sutta, to provide what she terms "visceral coherence" 
grounded in the body, as opposed to the narrative coherence that is dependent 
upon language and convention. We have also noted both Sprung's references to 
embodiment with regard to Madhyamaka and his contemporary essay into a
"vivial" philosophy grounded upon lived experience.42 Whereas both absolutism 
and nihilism lead us away from embodied experience, the middle way reinstates it 
as the locus for realisation. As Johnson describes, between the two extremes of 
foundationalism and relativism lies "an intermediate domain of embodied 
understanding."43 Similarly conscious embodiment may be the foundation of an 
interactive rather than a purely objective or subjective stance towards the world.
Furthermore, awareness and appreciation of embodiment increase a feeling of 
connection with the world. A sense of groundedness on the earth and awareness 
of breathing, the exchange of inspiration and expiration emphasises connection, 
and fosters feelings of belonging. Such feelings grounded in physical sensation 
can become powerful antidotes to alienation and nihilism. An everyday way of 
rootedness may be found based on physical embodiment within the world. In 
terms of psychotherapy, tremendous and healing differences in our experience of 
the world may be fostered through simple bodily practices which may promote a 
sense of groundedness, or expand and loosen breathing. Series of exercises have 
been set out by several of the somatic therapies mentioned in chapter two, and 
also exist within many Eastern spiritual disciplines.44
See above, n.18 & n.7.
M Johnson, The Body in the Mind. p. 196.
e.g. Bioenergetic exercises, Reichian breathing, Hatha Yoga from the Hindu tradition, Chi 
Kung exercises from the Taoist tradition, and the Tibetan Kum Nye exercises as 
presented in the West by Tarthang Tulku.
SPEECH
"For when the traveller returns from the mountain-slopes into the valley, 
he brings, not a handful o f  earth, unsayable to others, but instead 
some word he has gained, some pure word, the yellow and blue 
gentian. Perhaps we are here in order to say: house 
bridge, fountain, gate, pitcher, fruit-tree, window -
Here is the time for the say able, here is its homeland. 
Speak and bear witness.
Earth, isn't this what you want: to arise within us, 
in visible ? Isn't it your dream
to be wholly invisible someday? - Oh Earth: invisible! 
What, i f  not transformation, is your urgent command?'*5
Speech is a specifically human response. The ability to speak is that which 
distinguishes the human being from all other sentient beings. A popular Buddhist 
definition of man is "the being who speaks and understands meanings." For the 
Greeks it was zoion logon echon, "living being having the capacity for 
discourse."46 Suzanne Langer suggests that "it is the power of using symbols - the 
power of speech - that makes him lord of the earth."47
As one of the three gateways of being, speech stands for signification, 
relationship, communication and imagination. Speech is the foremost method of
45 Rainer Maria Rilke, from Ninth Duino Elegy, trs. S. Mitchell in The Enlightened Heart.
46 See S. Batchelor, Alone With Others p. 74. n.4.
47 S.Langer, Philosophy in a N ew Key. p. 26.
communication between people, it is the coin of dialogue, the basis for symbolic 
representation and culture. In its turn it arises from prelinguistic embodiment and 
enaction and it includes the world of imagination. Language structures not only 
our communication but also our categorisation and grasp of our world. It is now 
being considered as fundamental both to our being-in-the-world, and to the 
construction of the world we inhabit. As John Searle points out: "The world 
divides the way we divide it, our main way of dividing things up is in the 
language. Our concept and experience of reality is a matter of our linguistic 
categories."48 However this is not always adequately realised. The traditional 
realistic and objectivistic perspective on speech comes from considering it as 
providing merely a representation of pre-existent reality, a faithful representation 
of an objective world. Both Buddhism and much recent Western discourse, 
philosophic and scientific, oppose this view, and present speech as being 
constitutive of reality as dynamic interaction between embodied subject and 
world.49 From these perspectives two views of speech are frequently presented, 
first as ordinary talk, and second as transformed speech, aware of its imaginative 
and creative role. Not everything to be considered falls neatly into this distinction 
but there is a recurring contrast between the everyday and what might be aspired 
to, beautifully described by Carol Gilligan as "the difference between a voice that 
is an open channel - connected physically with breath and sound, psychologically 
with feelings and thoughts, and culturally with a rich resource of language - and a 
voice that is impeded or blocked."50 One of the main blockages of the open voice 
is the conception of self, which we have discussed at length (chapter five), but 
which we will reiterate here is closely connected to language.
SPEECH IN BUDDHISM
Speech may be distinguished in two parts: ordinary speech which in terms of the 
two truths, is relative or confining, and transformed speech or mantra, a resonance
J. Searle in B.Magee, Men o f  Ideas, p. 184 Perhaps the most extreme views concerning 
the importance of language in the construction of world come in the work o f B. Lee 
Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings.
Terry Eagleton neatly encapsulates both these approaches, while giving his approval to 
the more radical "enactive" stance, stating: "Language always pre-exists the individual 
subject, as the very realm in which he or she unfolds; and it contains 'truth' less in the 
sense that it is an instrument for exchanging accurate information than in the sense that it 
is the place where reality 'un-conceals' itself, gives itself up to our contemplation." 
Literary Theory, p.63.
C.Gilligan, In A  Different Voice, p.xvi. Introduction to 1993 edition.
of reality. The realm of ordinary speech is the realm of the confining, in terms of 
the three natures of Yogacara, the realm of parakalpita. It must be "seen through" 
to its actual transparency. Unfortunately we tend to take it as real in a more 
constricting way, as some unshakeable link between word and object, believing 
that the world must of necessity be divided as our language divides it. For the 
Tibetan Madhyamika commentators ordinaiy language is ming tsam, mere name, 
and much of the most detailed study is engaged in the analysis and deconstruction 
of ordinary speech and its categories. Madhyamaka backed by its exposition of 
emptiness, utterly rejects the conventional views of language as true and essential 
representation of pre-existent reality, advocating that language should be seen 
through, and revealed as a matter of convention. The actual existence of each 
thing is a matter of its dependence upon other things and its imputation by a 
consciousness. Designation is a linguistic act. Nothing is self existent, 
decontextualized. For the Madhyamika:
"Our words are like the reflection of a face in a mirror - there is no 
real connection between the reflected image and the face, but the 
image nevertheless serves a specific purpose for the person using 
the mirror. Similarly, our words bear no intrinsic connection with 
our epistemological and ontological problems and the language 
used to express these problems, but nevertheless these words of 
ours can serve to realize a specific purpose. They can be 
understood to express something that is not susceptible to 
expression in the language of objective facts."51
From the standpoint of the path of renunciation, speech in the formal framework 
of grammar and designation is conventionally to be used in ethically right speech 
- abstention from untruth, abusive language, unkindness and idle talk, and 
ultimately to be seen through. Emptiness is used to see through the conceptual 
diffusion and differentiation (prapanca) of language as discussed earlier. 
Emptiness itself must be actualised and experienced, being, as Huntingdon points 
out: "amenable to interpretation only as the expression of an entire form of life."52 
Thus language is seen as conventionally existent and functional, but ultimately to 
be seen through. It is confining if accepted literally as a representation of reality, 
which is only known through the filter of language and conceptuality. In this 
fashion language involves taking the stance of the observer in relation to our own 
action, and separates us from direct experience. Mindfulness and meditation are
C.W.Huntingdon, The Emptiness o f  Emptiness, p.54. This is his paraphrase o f his own 
translation of Candraklrti, Madhyamakavatara 6. 173-6.
Ibid. p.59.
the practices which enable us to see this perceptual process, and see the 
occurrence of the first split between self and world.
In the path of transformation, speech is not only to be used ethically and seen 
through but also to be transformed. It encompasses not only speech itself but all 
the energy of breath which supports it. Transformed speech is mantra, the 
archetypal expressive energy which gives birth to all individual things. It is 
described by Guenther as "utterance as originary disclosure."53 This compares 
interestingly to the non-Buddhist description of Eagleton noted earlier: "the place 
where reality 'un-conceals' itself."54 The difference between confining and 
liberated speech lies in its degree of closure or openness to world. This in turn is 
regulated according to what extent it is ruled by primary ignorance nescient of the 
three marks of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and non-self. The result of such 
nescience is reification under the domination of a fixed self.
Transformed speech is aligned with the Sambhogakaya or enjoyment body. This 
relates not only to spoken language itself but to the supreme mode of 
communication representing all the processes of the articulation of meaning and 
the unconcealing of reality. It mediates between the inarticulate domain of 
wisdom, the supreme reality, the dharma-body and the everyday world, the 
embodiment in action of the emanation-body. In this sphere of ritual practice, 
Buddhism uses speech in ways rarely found today in the West. Speech is seen not 
only as the carrier of conceptual communication but in the somatic form of 
resonance and the imaginative form of visualisation. At such times, chanting of 
mantra or texts in a certain manner evokes physical and mental effects which may 
be more important than their conceptual message. Here, the sound and resonance 
are valued for themselves. Ritual chanting with its somatic vibration, rhythmic 
breathing and correct posture produces a palpable physiological effect. 
Visualisation practices are concerned with the evocation of ideal worlds and 
deities and accompanied by bodily and spiritual identification with them on the 
part of the practitioner. However, all such practices are always accompanied by 
an understanding of the essential emptiness and endless metaphoricity of all 
processes. They embody the middle position in the unfolding of the formless into 
form, the realm of ideation and archetypes, mediating between the formless realm 
and our realm of samsaric desire.
H.Guenther, Creative Vision. p.xiii.
See above n.49. It is interesting also to compare this with idea o f the openness o f  
utterance as expressed by Bakhtin, and Levinas' distinction between Saying and the Said.
Between the two, much of the writings of the great Tsong kha pa is concerned 
with attempts to reconcile conventional analytical cognition with realisation of 
ultimate emptiness. For the dGe lugs pa school, following Tsong kha pa, ultimate 
nondual realisation may be reached through analytic cognition, there is no 
incommensurability between them. Analytic understanding is seen as a 
necessary, if not sufficient cause for enlightenment, which necessitates the 
internalisation of the understood meanings through the means of meditation. As 
Jose Cabezon describes the process: "Ultimately, words find their fulfilment in 
the set of transformative experiences known as realizations."55 Other schools see 
this somewhat differently, the best-known examples being the gnomic utterances 
of Zen, attempts to shake the mind out of its conceptual frames, and the 
distinction made between the pointing finger and the moon.
CONTEMPORARY IDEAS OF SPEECH IN THE WEST
In the West philosophical and scientific enquiries in this century have led to 
considerations of speech in a far broader sense than that of mere vocal 
representation of a separate and untouchable reality. The search for a different 
approach is again to be found in Heidegger's work, particularly in his later 
writings. Here Heidegger stated that we are within language rather than being its 
controller, saying on several occasions: "Language is the house of Being."56 He 
sought a transformation of speech; the "saying of a turning." Such a 
transformation is again concerned with man's openness to Being, with the hearing 
of silence, the "ringing of stillness" (das Gelaut de Stille), as he described it, 
which is the language of Being.57 Such a transformation is, as one of his 
commentators points out: "more a matter of hearing differently than speaking 
differently."58 Heidegger sees the change as being from a position of mastery to 
one of receptivity, renunciation and commemorative thinking; to placing 
ourselves "within the grant of language." For him it is a transformation from 
speech to Saying, in which to say means to let appear, to show.59 Such showing
J.I. Cabezon, Buddhism & Language. p.51.
In "Letter on Humanism", repeated in On the way to Language, p.135.
Ibid. p.108.
R. Bemasconi, The Question o f  Language in Heidegger's Histoiy o f  Being, p.62.
"The essential being o f  language is Saying as showing. Its showing character is not based 
on signs o f any kind; rather, all signs arise from a showing within whose realm and for 
whose purpose they can be signs." On the Way to Language, p. 123.
is prior to the arising of signs in the showing. As humans we belong within the 
Saying. Such Saying displays the shift from a standpoint of subjectivity and the 
division of subject/object. "Thus our saying - always an answering - remains 
forever relational. Relation is thought of here always in terms of the 
appropriation and no longer conceived in the form of a mere reference."60 Access 
to appropriation or event (Ereignis) is through experience61 and we dwell in 
ereignis only in so far as we are appropriated by language. In our fallen or 
everyday manner of speech, far from dwelling in language, within Saying as the 
House of Being, we use speech which merely designates.
For Levinas also, speech is response. Here, however rather than response to 
Being, it is a question of response to the other. For Levinas the beginning of 
language is in the face, which in its silence calls you.62 Language is the face of 
being addressed and responding. "The relationship between the same and the 
other is language,"63 This relationship, the face to face, which is the beginning of 
language is a relation which can never form part of totality since language does 
not - or true language does not - consist in invoking the other as merely a being 
represented in my thought, a figure of my egoism, but as a revelation of alterity 
irreducible to the subject/object relation. Thus, again, true language is event 
rather than representation. The response is also for Levinas an ethical event, and, 
for him, as he constantly reiterates, ethics rather than ontology is first philosophy. 
The ethical task is to free what gets in the way of open response to the alterity of 
the other.
Levinas uses the model of the Saying and the Said to explain how the ethical 
response signifies within language. The Saying is openness to the other, the event 
of acceptance of the other's alterity and my refusal to attempt to reduce it to the 
Same. It is the act of address. In contrast, the Said is a statement, or proposition, 
the content or meaning of words. There is a noticeable similarity between this, 
Heidegger's distinction between dwelling in the Saying and using speech which 
designates, and Bakhtin's distinction between speech and utterance. For Bakhtin 
too, utterance is always a response - a response to language and to existence 
which is always already there. It is a participative and liminal act, an interface
Ibid. p.135.
"Experience is nothing mystical, not an act o f illumination, but rather the entry into 
dwelling in Appropriation. Thus awakening to Appropriation remains indeed something 
which must be experienced." Time & Being, p.53.
"The face speaks. It speaks. It is in this that it renders possible and begins all discourse." 
E. Levinas. Ethics & Infinity, p.77.
E. Levinas, Totality & Infinity, p.39.
between what is actually said and what is unspoken, the extraverbal horizon of 
speech
The paradox is that the moment the Saying is put into words it enters the domain 
of the Said.64 The logic of this transformed Speech which encompasses Saying 
within speech is not that of either/or. Here we encounter again a logic similar to 
that first encountered in the Prajnaparamita literature, in the Diamond Sutra: 
"Subhuti, what are called wholesome actions are in fact not wholesome actions. 
That is why they are called wholesome actions."65 It is the logic found in the 
eight negations of Nagaijuna, and the six propositions of Fa Tsang. It is a logic of 
non-duality, found more recently in the work of Nishida Kitaro and perhaps, as 
we shall see in the double readings of deconstruction, in intertwining and in 
chiasm.
Thus, in Heidegger, Levinas and Bakhtin there is a twofold approach to speech: 
that of the everyday and that revealing a wider, enriched perspective. In different 
form this also appears in the work of Wittgenstein, the philosopher perhaps most 
closely associated with language in twentieth century Continental philosophy, and 
also the one most commonly considered in contemporary comparison with 
Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka. His work has even been employed as a 
contemporary hermeneutic in revealing their meaning.66 In his early work, the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein showed that the problems of meaning in life transcended 
the limits of language. Claims about self, death and the meaning of life are 
outside what can be meaningfully said: "What we cannot speak about we must 
pass over in silence."67 And it is silence which plays the part of an enriched or 
transformed speech in the Tractatus. In Pro to tractatus, an early version of 
Tractatus Wittgenstein stated: "My work consists of two parts: - the one 
presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part 
that is the important one. ... In short, I believe that where many others today are 
just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by 
being silent about it."68
Simon Critchley in his excellent study o f Levinas and Derrida, The Ethics o f  
Deconstruction, suggests that Levinas' Otherwise Than Being is an attempt to maintain 
the ethical Saying within the ontological Said - "a performative enactment o f  ethical 
writing." p.8. This paradox is also found in Buddhism wherein to speak at all o f ultimate 
truth necessitates the use of conventional language.
The Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra 23.
See C.Gudmunson, Wittgenstein & Buddhism; R. Thurman, Tsong Kha pa's Speech o f  
Gold. Introduction, esp. p. 103; C.W. Huntingdon, The Emptiness o f  Emptiness, pp. 10- 
1 1 .
L.Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 7. p.151.
L.Wittgenstein, Prototractatus. pp 15 & 16.
In his later Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein explored further the way 
language is embedded in forms of life. His project was a therapeutic one; to allow 
the fly to escape from the fly bottle, as we noted earlier69, and to allow us to cease 
doing philosophy having brought ourselves into agreement with the way things 
are.70 One of the chief causes of disharmony according to Wittgenstein, is the 
"bewitchment of language." We become caught in a belief in the reification of 
words, and the objective truth of the world as presented in language. In 
opposition to this Wittgenstein presents us with a realm of language games, 
founded not on absolute privileged transcendental standards, but each dependent 
merely on a context of conventional cultural and historical criteria; meaning as 
usage rather than meaning as representation. Understanding this, that everyday 
language is, in Buddhist terms, merely conventionally true, may release us from 
its iron grip.
We have stated that Wittgenstein's philosophy is therapeutic, or in Rorty's terms 
edifying. One of his commentators has noted that Wittgenstein himself compared 
philosophy and psychoanalysis in that they both undertake to effect change in life 
through change in understanding or perspective that brings one into harmony with 
one's life.71 Wittgenstein considered Freud's project however as philosophical 
rather than scientific, and criticised it for its aspiration to science. Perhaps it is to 
Freud’s initial desire for scientific respectability that we should turn for the origin 
of psychotherapy's lack of engagement with philosophical foundation, upon which 
we commented in chapter one.
On the surface Jacques Derrida appears more concerned with the deconstruction 
of ordinary speech than the positing of a transformed speech. However Simon 
Critchley proffers a persuasive interpretation for a reading of Derridean 
deconstruction as an ethical demand. He describes deconstruction in terms which 
sound somewhat familiar to those conversant with the concept of 6unyata: "All 
ontological statements of the form 'Deconstruction is x1 miss the point a priori for 
it is precisely the ontological presuppositions of the copula that provide one of the 
enduring themes of deconstruction."72 Instead, Critchley presents deconstruction 
as a method of textual practice, a double reading, "that is to say, a reading that
69 Philosophical Investigations .309. See also: "The philosopher’s treatment o f a question is
like the treatment o f an illness." Ibid 255.
70 "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when
I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by 
questions which bring itse lf  in question. Ibid 133.
71 J.F.Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy, p.82.
72 S.Critchley, The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, p.22.
interlaces at least two motifs or layers of reading."73 The first is a commentarial 
interpretation of the text according to its intended meaning. The second is a 
destablization of this; the opening up of alterity within the intended meaning, 
which in some fashion contradicts or destabilizes it, as emptiness destabilizes the 
conventional view of reality.
Derrida shows that in the lack of a direct relation of signifier and signified, the 
sign is a structure of difference, defined as much by what it is not as by what it is. 
Thus meaning is only to be found in the spaces between. Evety sign carries a 
trace of that other which is absent, a certainty forever deferred. This echoes the 
Buddhist description of language-based inference as operating in a negative or 
exclusory manner.74 As we have noted, the method of deconstruction may be 
compared to that of Madhyamaka Prasangika, a reductio ad absurdum in which a 
text or proposition is found to fail in its own terms, as the criteria which it uses are 
reflexively turned against itself. Derrida critiques the belief in self-presence and 
the search for any transcendental signifier which corresponds to any 
transcendental signified, essence or truth in a manner which is reminiscent of 
Nagaijuna's critique of self-inherent being. For a deconstructive reading, both self 
and world can be read as text.75
Such Continental philosophy as that mentioned above is, and has been, much 
exercised with the realm of speech and provides a critique of the objectivist view 
of the world. It has, however, rarely been conjoined to any scientific projects, 
with the exception of the work of Merleau-Ponty and Lacan.
Lacan's writing, as described in chapter two, is centrally concerned with speech. 
As we saw, Lacan believed that the unconscious itself is structured like a 
language. He considered entrance into the symbolic world both as the major 
developmental step, and one which involves a misunderstanding of the nature of
73 Ibid. p.23.
74 See above p. 88, and for more detailed description, J.I.Cabezon, Buddhism & Language. 
p. 124.
75 For discussion of Derrida and Buddhism, see R.Magliola, Derrida on the Mend; 
H.Coward, "Derrida and Indian Philosophy", and D.Loy, N on du ality  and "The 
Deconstruction o f Buddhism." Both Magliola and Loy compare Derrida's critique o f  
Western philosophy with Nagarjuna and Madhyamika, and critique Derrida for his failure 
to go far enough, remaining in a halfway house of textuality, while Nagaijuna points to a 
transformed way of experiencing the world instantiated in meditative practice which is, as 
Loy states: "another praxis beside conceptualization." They point out also that Nagaijuna 
deconstructs emptiness or difference as well as identity or self-being, whereas Derrida, 
deconstructing only identity would merely set in motion another swing o f the pendulum, 
from identity to difference. Magliola (as briefly noted above, p .86.), suggests that 
Nagaijuna's middle path goes beyond Derrida in that it frequents the "unheard-of thought" 
and at the same time by its presentation o f the two truths allows for reinstatement o f the 
logocentric.
self. Lacan's concept of speech encompasses both apparently consciously 
controlled speech and the realms of the unconscious, where, following Freud, the 
subject is not in control of the text. However for Lacan the emphasis is on the 
truth and rightness of the unconscious. Critchley has compared Lacan's 
distinction between emaciation (the act of speaking) and enonce (the formulation 
of this act into a statement) with Levinas' distinction between Saying and Said. 
Thus his work may bring together traces of both Freudian and Buddhist ideas, the 
link being that of language. The opening up of the unconscious may be seen as a 
potential enrichment of speech, but the restriction of enonciation into enonc6 is 
the restriction of the conventional or confined, under the control of a misperceived 
self.
Those approaches within cognitive science which have applied a non-objectivist 
stance to, and as a result of, their researches, are those to which we have 
continually turned. A recurring observation of such works in relation to speech 
concerns its action in the expression and strengthening of self concept. They note 
the way in which languages are implicitly imbued with the view of the human self 
as independent, autonomous actor expressed in personal narrative. Within the 
world of language we can also live at one remove from embodied action as in 
self-consciousness we identify our self as the observer of our actions. In a recent 
work psychologist Guy Claxton has pointed to the privileging of, and 
identification with, consciousness as self to the exclusion of the unconscious.76 
The unconscious here is not the Freudian unconscious as repository for the 
repressed nor the Jungian collective unconscious, but the background network of 
unacknowledged processes from which consciousness emerges as part of a 
continuous spectrum.
Edelman delineates the arising of higher-order consciousness upon which speech 
depends from primary consciousness which in turn arises from non-conscious 
perception. Lakoff and Johnson, as we discussed earlier, show that the idealised 
cognitive models upon which language rests rely on concepts of embodiment 
occurring in bodily activity prior to language. Language is symbolic, based on 
cognitive models and image schemata grounded in bodily functioning which are 
imaginatively extended through metaphor and metonymy. Thus concepts initially 
become meaningful in terms of embodiment and function, and something is said 
to be true when understanding of a statement fits with one's experience. Again, 
we find, that there is no God's eye view of absolute truth in isolation from
76 G.Claxton, Noises From the Darkroom. Parts III & IV.
embodiment and social interaction. Our view of what exists is determined by our 
means of knowing. 77
Jerome Bruner also suggests that linguistic capabilities rest upon pre-linguistic 
support; which he calls protoiinguistic representations of the world which exist 
prior to language in a context of praxis, and reach their full realisation only with 
language.78 These he describes as a set of predispositions to construe the world in 
a certain way, and to act upon these construals. This is comparable to the image 
schemata of Lakoff and Johnson. Bruner argues that it is a drive to create 
narrative that determines the way in which grammatical forms are acquired by a 
young child, as a means of making sense of their own actions and human 
interactions. He mentions four features of narrativity: concern with people and 
their actions, readiness to mark the unusual and ignore the usual, linearalization 
and maintenance of sequence and a narrative voice or perspective. It is this last 
which fosters and strengthens the sense of self. The feature of linearity is 
reminiscent of the linear mode discussed by Margaret Donaldson (see chapter 
four). Donaldson clearly points out how different cultures foster and support the 
development of different modes. As noted earlier she advocates consideration of 
Buddhism for its support in developing the value sensing modes and the means 
for changing modes at will. Western culture has tended to overvalue the 
intellectual, the logical, rational and linear modes.
In the foregoing discussion of both Buddhist and contemporary Western discourse 
in relation to the domain of speech and communication, we have repeatedly found 
a distinction between everyday speech and a potentially transformed speech, and 
a widened appreciation of the unacknowledged and underprivileged prelinguistic 
foundations of speech. I would now like to explore ideas of speech from two 
different perspectives which may show some overlap. The first is speech from the 
point of view of imagination and metaphor, which we have briefly discussed in 
terms of prelinguistic modes. Secondly I would like to speak of speech in terms 
of a feminine voice.
"Language is based on cognition - that is, on cognitive models that can be understood in 
terms o f bodily functioning. This cognitive basis is constrained by the nature of physical 
reality and also depends on imagination and social interactions. " G.Edelman, Bright 
Fire, Brilliant Air. p.250.
J.Bruner, Acts o f  Meaning, p.72.
IMAGINATION AND METAPHOR
There is another kind of speech, or more precisely a condition of speech which 
determines to a large extent what we can say or think, that is analogic, creative, 
participatory and consciously metaphorical. Lakoff and Johnson have shown the 
importance of imagination in extending the symbolic use of language from 
prelinguistic embodied action. Yet imagination is not, or no longer, in general 
considered as part of the Gate of Speech, which is more often considered solely as 
the domain of the logical, sequential and literal. Heidegger criticised ordinary 
speaking as exhausted metaphor: "everyday language is a forgotten and therefore 
used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer."79 Yet he 
pointed to its far richer potential: "Language is the precinct (templum), that is, the 
house of Being. The nature of language does not exhaust itself in signifying, nor 
is it merely something that has the character of sign or cipher."80 This is the 
aspect of transformed conception of speech to which Buddhist tantra and 
contemporary discourse point, and which is ordinarily ignored.
Johnson states definitively:
"there can be no meaningful experience without imagination, whether 
in its productive or reproductive functions. As productive, imagination 
gives us the very structure of objectivity. As reproductive, it supplies 
all of the connections by means of which we achieve coherent, unified, 
and meaningful experience and understanding. We are talking here 
about operations of the imagination so pervasive, automatic, and 
indispensable that we are ordinarily not aware of them. Nevertheless, 
our ordered world, and the possibility of understanding any part of it, 
depends on the existence of this synthesizing activity".81 
As we have seen in the previous discussion, language may perhaps be described 
as the top layer of what may be called "speech", which would then include its 
prelinguistic foundations described in different ways by different authors. 
Together they create meaning. This idea is to be found as early as the eighteenth 
century when John Locke stated: "sensible ideas are transferred to more abstract 
significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of 
the senses.1'82 Imagination as shown by Johnson is the relation between the
79 M.Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p.208.
80 Ibid. p. 132.
81 M Johnson, The Body in the Mind. p. 151.
82 J.Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Vol 2. p.5. New York: Dover 
Books.
prelinguistic and the spoken, and only through recognising the interactional 
character of imagination which partakes both of the somatic and the rational, can 
we hope to understand the nature of meaning.
To see through everyday language and reconnect with its transformative, creative 
and open dimension, not merely with its descriptive properties, we need to be able 
to recognise its metaphorical character, which we are usually only aware of in 
artistic or religious discourse. Writer Jeanette Winterson speaks beautifully of 
this in relation to art:
"Art is large and it enlarges you and me. To a shrunk-up world its 
vistas are shocking. Art is the burning bush that both shelters and 
makes visible our profounder longings. Through it we see 
ourselves in metaphor. Art is metaphor, from the Greek, meta 
(above) and pherein (to carry) it is that which is carried above the 
literalness of life. Art is metaphor. Metaphor is transformation."83
Philosopher Richard Rorty also notices the invitation to transformation: "A 
metaphor is, so to speak, a voice from outside logical space ..." It is a call to 
change one's language and one's life, rather than a proposal about how to 
systematize either."84
In Buddhism a large part of the practices of Tantra are concerned with creative 
imagination and the conscious vision of the metaphorical quality of both everyday 
and transformed reality which is made possible by their foundation in emptiness. 
In the development phase the practitioner imagines herself as a fully enlightened 
Buddha inhabiting a mandala of a luminous Buddha realm. The initial act of all 
such practices is the recitation of a mantra whereby the practitioner acknowledges 
herself to be ultimately of the nature of emptiness.85 Then follows the 
imaginative creation of themselves as an enlightened Buddha. Finally this vision 
is dissolved into emptiness, the practitioner returning to the world empowered 
with remembrance of it as an enlightened realm. The Tibetan term for this 
creation of oneself as a Buddha is bdag bskyed, literally self-creation. Such 
practices empower the practitioner not only by imitation of a transformed state, 
but also by seeing through the solidity of the everyday.
J.Winterson, Art Objects, p.66.
R.Rorty, Essays on Heidegger & Others, p. 13.
The formulas most common are: OM svabhava-guddhah-sarva-dharmah-svabhava- 
suddho 'ham; Pure of essence are all events, pure of essence am I, and OM  Sunyata-jfiana 
vajra-svabhavatmako 'ham: I am the veiy self whose essence is the diamond o f  the 
knowledge o f Emptiness. Translations from S.Beyer, The Cult o f  Tara. p.33.
All of this resonates closely with the work of psychotherapy. In chapter four I 
quoted at length from Lakoff & Johnston: "A large part of self-understanding is 
the search for appropriate personal metaphors that make sense of our lives.... In 
therapy, for example, much of self-understanding involves consciously 
recognizing previously unconscious metaphors and how we live by them."86 It is 
necessary to see the metaphors we live by, both culturally accepted and personal, 
to understand them as metaphors, to re-cognise and reconnect with the creative 
imagination that gave rise to them, and thus to understand that they are not written 
in stone, and may be recreated and reinterpreted in order to construct new 
narratives, new metaphors and new meanings for old experiences, which are more 
in tune with current experience. All of which can only come into being within 
emptiness, the lack of a permanent and unchanging essence. This lack of a 
permanent unchanging self is, as Stephen Batchelor has described it: "not a 
blanket denial of personal identity but the opening to a creative enhancement of 
who one is and how one performs in the world."87
In a most individual work, Owen Barfield described as idolatry the manner in 
which we first experience phenomena as representations, then relate to them non- 
representationally as objects in their own right, existing independently of human 
consciousness. He advocated another use of imagination to enable us to 
consciously see through representations. "To be able to experience the 
representations as idols, and then to be able also to perform the act of figuration 
'consciously' so as to experience them as participated; that is imagination."88
Barfield's work has been commented upon and continued by Archetypal 
Psychology.89 Archetypal Psychology also constantly calls for a deliteralization 
of language and valuation of metaphor, and suggests that this should be achieved 
through personification, and attention to the image. It is another attack on 
representation or objectification from a different perspective.90 Archetypal 
Psychology calls for an imaginative revisioning of speech, a new "angelology of
See page 120. n. 87.
S.Batchelor, "A Democracy o f the Imagination." p.6. A version o f this text, not 
containing the above passage appeared in Tricycle, Vol IV, no. 2.1994.
O.Barfield, Saving the Appearances, p. 147.
See R. Avens, Imagination is Reality.
"For each time you or I treat images as representations of something else - Penis or Great 
Mother or Power Drive, or Instinct, or whatever general, abstract concept we prefer - we 
have smashed the image in favour of the idea behind it. To give to imagination 
interpretative meanings is to think allegorically and to depotentiate the power o f the 
imagination." J.Hillman, "Peaks & Vales" p.50.
words."91 Another Archetypal psychologist suggests that imagination has the 
potential to be the Western model of release from the delusions of ego.92 He 
suggests that imagination is soul or anima, thus linking the themes of 
transformation of speech, the importance of the imagination and the feminine 
voice.
THE FEMININE VOICE
Here I would like to speak of, and perhaps in, the feminine voice, for this has 
been, as yet unacknowledged as an important voice in the dialogue. It has been 
mentioned overtly only in discussion of the French feminist analysts in relation to 
Western psychotherapies. In a wider, less defined, more feminine way this voice 
pervades both this work, postmodernism and the practice of psychotherapy. To 
define feminism I would agree with the definition given by Alice Jardine: 
"Feminism, while infinite in its variations, is finally rooted in the belief that 
women's' truth-in-experience-and-reality is and has always been different from 
men's, and that it as well as all its artefacts and productions have consequently 
been devalued and always already delegitimized in patriarchal culture."93 The 
feminine voice is however, not essentially restricted to gender, and is, I contend, 
as important and necessary for men as for women. It is a voice that until recently 
has been a subtext in Western discourse which has sprung from a milieu 
embodying the masculine and the patriarchal, against the background of which the 
feminine voice can only be seen as 'other'. Hence the feminine has too often been 
heard only in its difference or deviation from the masculine norm. Alice Jardine 
in her fascinating study of the feminine voice in contemporary discourse describes 
this thinking as "the master narratives' own non-knowledge", what has eluded 
them, what has engulfed them. This other than themselves is almost always a 
"space" of some kind over which the narrative has lost control, and it is this space 
which subverts the metanarratives of Truth, Representation, Reason, the Subject. 
To describe the transformation of the feminine at the interior of such narratives, 
she suggests the neologism "g y n e s i s This is the different way of speaking heard 
by Carol Gilligan in the study of a specifically feminine approach to morality, 
which she entitled In a Different Voice.
91 J.Hillman, Revisioning Psychology, p.9.
92 R.Avens, op.cit. p.86.
93 A.Jardine, Gynesis. p. 147.
What is the feminine voice? Perhaps it is easier to define it in terms of what it is 
not - in contradistinction to the voice of patriarchy, a voice that is logical, 
hierarchical and masterly, concerned with identity, separation and independence. 
The feminine is more aware of and concerned with difference than with identity, 
with relationship grounded in a background of interdependence. It is context- 
dependent and dynamic, unhappy with absolutes and closure, with frozen 
hierarchies and fixture.94 It is embodied rather than oriented towards spirit 
and/or mind, and it is, as described in the Yang/Yin symbology of Taoism, 
receptive, more concerned with being than doing. Doing entails goal-directed 
action, technology, progress, individuality and ego, embodied in images of the 
phallus, the blade. Being entails openness, receptivity, responsivity, play, context 
and the transpersonal, embodied in images of the container; Riane Eisler's chalice, 
the womb, the choros. Naturalist Terry Tempest Williams speaks of it poetically: 
"I see the Feminine defined as a reconnection to the Self, a 
commitment to the wildness within - our instincts, our capacity to 
create and destroy; our hunger for connection as well as 
sovereignty, interdependence and independence, at once. We are 
taught not to trust our own experience.
The Feminine teaches us experience is our way back home, the 
psychic bridge that spans rational and intuitive waters. To embrace 
the Feminine is to embrace paradox. Paradox preserves mystery, 
and mystery inspires belief."95
This is absolutely not a suggestion that these attributes of the feminine should 
displace those of the masculine. What is necessary, for both men and women, and 
indeed for the cosmos, is a re-cognition and rehonouring of the feminine, long 
ignored in a patriarchal world. The state of the environment shows the ravages of 
past imbalance, ecology speaks in a feminine voice. So frequently do individual 
clients who present themselves in therapy. Pushed to succeed, unable to care for 
ourselves, how can we show compassion for others?
"One concept which we already have incorporated into feminist thinking has to do with 
the intrinsic interrelationship between the external world and the internal psychological 
world. I could not call a theory woman-based, if it recognized any other relationship than 
one of complicated interaction between reality and the circumstances in which we live." 
H.Lerman, A Mote in Freud's Eye. p. 176.
T. T.Williams, An Unspoken Hunger, p.53.
A middle way, an androgynous way is called for, in which dialogue is engaged 
between the masculine and the feminine, in which space is made for the hitherto 
"alterity" of the feminine. For the feminine has been mistrusted and misvalued 
within patriarchal discourse, seen as ambiguous, uncontrolled, multivalent, 
elusive, illusive, both valuable and fearful. The belief that "Women are to nature, 
as man is to culture"96 has left the feminine as something threatening, and 
uncontrolled. We find this clearly exemplified in Tibetan myth/history, where the 
land of Tibet is seen as a demoness tamed by the placement of Buddhist rites. 
The feminine here is the "pre-existing primordial chaos, the chaos which is a 
female being. Then the chaos is conquered and she becomes the stuff of which 
the world is fashioned.1,97
For Levinas the feminine is also alterity and equivocation.98 The feminine 
displays equivocation in that it occurs as a kind of withdrawal, a speech which 
expresses silence, an interiority and privacy which yet has implications in terms of 
the outer world, a double movement Levinas likens to the relationship of 
voluptuosity to fecundity. Levinas' presentation of woman as alterity is not 
carried out in the light of secondariness, or of difference from the prior masculine, 
but rather in the prioritisation of alterity and exteriority. In her equivocation she 
embodies plurality which escapes the totality of the Same. It is also important to 
note that the division of gender is not rigid for Levinas, but that each individual 
partakes of both masculine and feminine.99
Western psychotherapy was patriarchal in its origins. Freud today stands as the 
epitome, both as individual and symbol, of the patriarch. His standards are those 
of the masculine, against which those of the feminine are measured. If the 
feminine differs from such masculine norms, such difference can only be read in 
terms of privation. Perhaps this is most clearly seen in his consideration of the 
formation of the superego in women, which he believed could only be seen as 
deficient due to women's' difficulty in achieving resolution of the Oedipal 
complex.100 This masculine bias has continued with Lacan and his privileging of
96 Sherry Ortner, quoted by T.Roszak, The Voice o f  the Earth, p.235.
97 J.Gyatso, "Down with the Demoness: Reflection on a Feminine Ground in Tibet." p.40.
98 "Equivocation constitutes the epiphany o f the feminine." E.Levinas, Totality &  Infinity. 
p.264.
99 "Perhaps ..., all these allusions to the ontological differences between the masculine and 
the feminine would appear less archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two species 
(or into two genders), they would signify that the participation in the masculine and in the 
feminine were the attribute o f every human being. Could this be the meaning o f the 
enigmatic verse o f Genesis 1.27: 'male and female created He them?'." EXevinas, Ethics 
and Infinity, p.68.
100 "I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the 
level o f what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is
the phallus as the symbol of entry into the Symbolic world. Despite arguments 
for a distinction between the symbolic phallus and the actual penis, and that 
Lacan's presentation is descriptive rather than prescriptive, it is obvious that such 
terminology, and the thinking behind it, upholds the dominance and priority of the 
masculine.
I would concur with a therapist writing recently that psychotherapeutic work of all 
theoretical styles has been significantly impaired by the dominant imbalance 
between masculine and feminine principles.101 Her suggestions for a 
psychotherapy grounded in the feminine principle echo or travel hand in hand 
with the approach suggested in this work, though the former is uninfluenced by 
Buddhist thought. "The core feminine experience is one of being immersed in the 
living world, one link in an infinite chain."102 Again: "A feminine approach to 
the therapeutic work begins in ... a place of not-knowing, or experiencing focused 
on Being rather than Doing. ... This receptive approach believes everything the 
patient needs is inside his own psyche: the issue is to mobilize and actualize the 
patient's own health rather than to cure him."103 Such is the heart of the approach 
presented here in the framework of the Buddhist doctrines of dependent 
origination as the foundation of interconnection and interdependence, of Buddha 
nature as foundation for intrinsic health, of emptiness to foster unknowing,104 and 
above all in the practices of mindfulness and meditation whereby to instantiate 
such understanding, and to enable therapists to foster and develop receptivity and 
the ability and courage to rest in unknowing. Thus it would appear that the 
feminine voice is implicitly, if not always explicitly, framed within the Buddhist 
doctrine.
To speak overtly of the feminine voice in Buddhism, I can do no better than to 
point to a recent study, and merely here, summarise its arguments and immense 
research on this topic. In Buddhism After Patriarchy Rita Gross has sought for 
the feminine voice in Buddhism in the past, and strongly suggests how it may be 
strengthened to give rise to a truly androgynous Buddhism for the future. She 
finds that the dharma itself is neither male nor female, although there has been, 
and continues to be a serious gap between vision and practice, and practice has
never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins, as we require 
it to be in men." S.Freud, "Some Physical Consequences o f the Anatomical Structure 
between the sexes." p.27.
101 B.S.Sullivan, Psychotherapy Grounded in the Feminine Principle.
102 Ibid. p.20.
103 Ibid. p.81.
104 Here I would echo Levinas' statement: "The not-knowing is not to be understood as a
privation o f knowing." E.Levinas, Ethics & Infinity, p.66.
been largely androcentric. Basing her arguments upon what is expressed 
explicitly in the second turning of the wheel, and implicitly in the first and third 
turnings, she finds that no Buddhist teachings provide the basis for gender 
privilege, and that they are, in fact, more compatible with feminine than 
patriarchal interpretations. Just as I have seen Buddhism and psychotherapy as 
comparable attempts to explore how fixed and conventional patterns of mental 
constructs impede liberation, so Gross has compared Buddhism and feminism; 
seeing the primary patterning which creates the duality of self and other in the 
operations of patriarchy, following Simone de Beauvoir's now classic definition of 
woman as "other". The feminine has not only been defined as other, but also as 
lack according to Lacanian analysis.105 It is perhaps interesting here to speculate 
imaginatively and compare this idea of the feminine as lack with David Loy's 
writings which we have considered on several occasions above, in which he 
compares a sense of lack to iunyata, and to remember that Prajnaparamita, the 
personification of the wisdom of emptiness, is always female. Such imaginative 
comparison sheds light on the distinction between lack as privation, and the lack 
of emptiness which is no lack.
Gross advocates an androgynous reconstruction of Buddhism embodying the 
teaching of the third turning of the wheel speaking of non-dual suchness, and the 
principles of masculinity and femininity. Practically she appeals for a revaluation 
of the sangha or community as the embodiment of feminine values of 
commitment, communication and relationship. Her approach to Buddhism, as 
that of this work, is biased towards the idea of liberation within the world, rather 
than liberation from the world. In this light she, as also I, argue for a 
reconceptualisation of the sacredness of everyday activity, a call for the re­
enchantment of body and speech.106
"The feminine defined as lack, is a cultural construct that is necessary for the self­
perpetuation o f the gender hierarchy because the very illusion o f masculine self- 
sufficiency demands that the devalorized Other be there to serve as a mirror." D.Comell, 
The Philosophy o f  the Limit, p.l 73.
There is an ongoing dialogue now between feminism and Buddhism in the West, which 
may well influence the form a Western Buddhism will take. Recent works in this field 
also include M.Shaw, Passionate Enlightenment; S. Boucher, Turning the Wheel and 
A.C. Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen.
CONCLUSION
A psychotherapy in tune with contemporary thought and inspired by Buddhism 
will need to have a particular relationship with Speech. Strangely despite the 
centrality of language, the fact that psychoanalysis is "the talking cure", careful 
consideration of speech itself rather than the contents of speech within 
psychotherapy has been rare, usually the work of individuals, as we have seen in 
the case of Lacan and Hillman. Buddhist ideas may help us consciously to 
address and thus transform our experience in ways compatible with contemporary 
Western explorations. Both Buddhism and contemporary discourse distinguish 
between an everyday speech, and a potentially transformed one. They point out 
the impoverishment of the former, and its dangers. Everyday language bewitches 
us into believing that it presents a true picture of a reality that exists absolutely in 
isolation from us. This in turn leads to objectification, the perspective of the 
narrator and egocentricity. It is necessary to deliteralize, to see through the 
enchantment of language, realising how it acts as a filter through which we come 
to experience. The point is not to remove this filter, in some attempt to regain 
direct experience, but to become aware of it in its contingency, metaphoricity and 
creativity. Language and expression need not to be withheld but to be liberated, 
seen through and consciously used metaphorically. Buddhism, particularly 
Madhyamaka nominalism brings awareness to speech as convention, essential for 
use, but not essential in nature. 107
Then we may come to understand the possibility of a transformed relationship 
with language. The way towards this will entail a revaluation of language's 
foundation in prelinguistic embodiment and practice and of the importance of the 
imagination and metaphor, and of what I have called the feminine voice. 
Incorporation of these may lead to a speech which will liberate rather than 
confine, a transformed voice expressing relationship, communication and 
resonance with the whole. Instead of a speech which is in thrall to the self 
system, which reinforces the divisions between body and mind and self and 
world, a transformed speech of openness and transparency can release the 
divisions and reinstate the interconnection and interpenetration of self and other, 
expressive of resonance with the whole, that is the dimension of Mind.
107 "Meaning may well be ultimately undecidable if we view language contemplatively, as a 
chain o f signifiers on a page; it becomes 'decidable' and words like 'truth', 'reality', 
'knowledge' and 'certainty have something of their force restored to them when we think 
of language rather as something we do, as indissolubly interwoven with our practical 
forms of life." T.Eagleton, "Literary Theory, An Introduction, p. 146.
MIND
"You never employ the world aright, till the Sea itself floweth in your veins, till 
you aw clothed with the heavens, and crowned with the stars. "108
Mind in Buddhism has a wider connotation than that commonly given it in 
Western discourse.109 Although there are individual differences according to 
different schools, the term refers more to the container of our experience than to 
the contents of our cognition.110 It has been described as "our subjectively lived 
environment"111, the medium through which we know the objective world, and 
which, as we have seen, provides the potential for shaping it. Mind is the 
relationship with world that, in its open form expresses resonance with the whole, 
which is described by Guenther as "spirituality".112 It expresses the inseparability 
of what is more usually in the West divided into mind and body, reason and 
emotion. In its restricted form it is ego-centred mentation, confined within the 
deferral of language and the cognitive sphere. Earlier, I have discussed Buddhist 
psychology and models of mind and identity, here I would like to take the wider 
view of mind as the horizon of our experience and consider the implications of 
Buddhist philosophy and practice relating to this widest dimension of experience, 
in the context both of psychotherapy and recurrent contemporary themes from 
Western discourse which make up the universe of ideas which we currently 
inhabit. Three themes in particular have recurred throughout this exploration and 
are, I suggest, central both to our personal experience and to the changing ideas 
which make up our current horizons. These are the three linked themes of 
Interrelationship, Non-egocentricity and Nihilism.
Thomas Traherne from Centuries o f  Meditation.
An outstanding exception is William James, who distinguishes the often ignored
'transitive' moments o f consciousness from the substantive moments, i.e. thoughts.
This is especially true according to the doctrines of the Yogacara school. 
J.Welwood, "Exploring Mind: Form, Emptiness & Beyond." p.90.
H.Guenther, The Creative Vision, p.xiv.
INTERRELATIONSHIP
In chapter three exploration of the Buddhist teachings concerning the emptiness of 
self-sufficiency or essence in both selves and phenomena revealed that this was 
the corollary of their dependent origination. Thereby everything arises not in 
isolation, but in dynamic dependence upon other phenomena or upon a cognizing 
mind. In contemporary Western discourse too, from very different perspectives, 
we have found this emphasis upon interdependence and interaction both in 
philosophic and scientific fields. Heidegger's Dasein brought enquiry to bear 
upon our "enworldedness" with its "existentiales", and Merleau Ponty's 
phenomenology of perception researched into the interconnection of subjectivity 
and world.113 Merleau Ponty quotes Husserl's assistant, Eugene Fink's 
formulation of the phenomenological reduction, the suspension of those 
presupposed positions which are normally taken for granted, as "wonder" in the 
face of the world.114 He suggests that in order to see the world truly and grasp it 
as paradoxical, we must first break with our familiar acceptance of it; first 
deconstruction, then reconstruction through attention. "True philosophy consists 
in relearning to look at the world."115 This is perhaps the basis of Varela, 
Thompson and Roschs' plea for the uniting of enactive Western cognitive science 
with Buddhist mind training; that such mindfulness and meditation may change 
reality, re-awakening strangeness. As Merleau Ponty stated: "phenomenology's 
task was to reveal the mystery of the world and of reason."116 Surely this echoes 
words from a very different philosopher: "It is not how things are in the world that 
is mystical, but that it exists."117
Both Buddhism and many twentieth century philosophers (and indeed, scientists) 
seek for, and reveal an interdependence of objectivity and subjectivity in our lived 
experience, our incarnate subjectivity, our being-in-the-world. To Merleau Ponty 
the conventional view of experience of the body is discovered to be the 
degeneration of lived experience into representation: "not a phenomenon but a 
fact of the psyche."118 He argues for a return to experience: "to be a
"...we are through and through compounded of relationships with the world." M.Merleau 




L.Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 6.44.
M.Merleau Ponty, op.cit. p.94.
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consciousness or rather to be an experience is to hold inner communication with 
the world, the body and other people, to be with them instead of beside them. To 
concern oneself with psychology is necessarily to encounter, beneath objective 
thought which moves among ready-made things, a first opening upon things 
without which there would be no objective knowledge."119 Being-in-the-world 
for Merleau Ponty is not, as for Sartre, an exile, rather it is interconnection.
Merleau Ponty's tragically terminated later work re-emphasises this 
interconnection, in his concept of the chiasm or intertwining of the visible and the 
invisible, the intersection of "brute being" and "flesh". That last term expresses 
our primordial bond with reality or "what is"; our openness upon "what is". It 
expresses his attempt to encompass both the active and the passive aspects of the 
lived body which is both visible and seeing, and our relationship with the flesh of 
the world of which we participate, of which we are an articulation.
Both Relativity Theory and quantum mechanics have overturned the sequential- 
order reality of Newtonian physics and the mind/body split of Cartesian 
philosophy which for so long formed our conceptual horizons. The resultant 
theories of indeterminacy, relativity, process and mutual implication, let alone 
chaos and superstrings are theories with which the ordinary person has not yet 
come to terms, yet which greatly alter our understanding of 'reality*. Further 
emphasising interrelationship and interdependence, Nobel prize winner Ilya 
Prigogine's work has been concerned with what he calls dissipative structures, 
which he claims are characteristic of living systems, being their ability to be 
continuously replenished and reconstituted through their exchanges with their 
environments. Such exchanges of energy and matter allow them paradoxically to 
remain stable notwithstanding changes in their constituent parts as a result of such 
exchanges and of changes in their environments. James Lovelock's Gaia theory 
sees the earth as such an organism, capable of regenerating itself in exchange with 
its environs.
In the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science the work of Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch, so often mentioned, also displays a comparable paradigm shift from a 
world of cognitive processes reflecting an objective "real world" out there to an 
enactive reality surpassing strict subjective/objective division. The other major 
interdisciplinary field of Systems Theory approaches phenomena in terms of 
hierarchies of wholes interacting with their larger environments. Each whole in
Ibid. p.96.
turn consists of lesser parts, the whole providing the environment. Features of 
such views are the complementarity of differentiation and integration, concepts of 
mutual causality, and thinking in terms of process rather than objects. For such an 
approach, objects or individuals seen in isolation are improperly reified parts of 
systems which are properly constituted of relationship. The great dualities of 
ordinary thinking: "matter and mind, body and consciousness are not ultimate 
realities. Rather they are conceptualizations to bring order ... into experience. 
They have no rigid metaphysical boundaries."120 Again Neuroscientist Gerald 
Edelman believes: "The brain and the nervous system cannot be considered in 
isolation from states of the world and social interaction."121
Anthropologist and systems theorist Gregory Bateson proposed a theory of mind 
as a systems phenomenon characteristic of living things. Any system which 
displays certain criteria is able to process information and display mind. Thus 
mental characteristics are displayed not only by individual organisms, but also by 
social systems and ecosystems. For Bateson mind was immanent not only in the 
body but also in the pathways and relationships outside the body.
In psychotherapy, the developmental history outlined in chapter two displayed a 
widening of territory to include interpersonal relationships and even the 
transpersonal. Yet a really fundamental understanding of interrelationship in its 
wider or communal ramifications is clearly shown only in the work of a few 
individuals and therapies. R.D.Laing's work on schizophrenia as a disease of 
systems reveals such an understanding. It is based on another hypothesis of 
Bateson's, his concept of the double bind This describes the way in which an 
individual receives two mutually exclusive messages from one or more family or 
group members, e.g. loving words accompanied by unloving or threatening 
gestures. A "schizophrenic" response to such a twofold message, Laing 
suggested, was a "sane" response to a "crazy" situation. One area in which such 
work has had important results is the field of family therapy.
Stanislav Grofs work with perinatal or birth states, and altered states of 
consciousness resultant upon holotropic breathing or psychedelic drugs has also 
enlarged the scope of psychotherapy, and our understanding of interrelationship. 
Yet despite these examples, despite the greater emphasis on the wider dimensions 
of therapy e.g. the spiritual perspective, and despite the changes noted above in 
philosophy and science, Petruschka Clarkson's previously quoted belief that
120 E.Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy, p.43.
121 G.Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, p.224.
adequate responses to such change are conspicuous by their absence still holds 
good.122 She believes that the postmodern era displays too great change and 
chaotic complexity to respond to singular solutions, and lays down three 
requirements for all helping professions: "that we be willing to move with our 
times; we move with our art/science; and move with each other."123 Perhaps such 
a willingness will also encompass the hermeneutic approach suggested by 
Cushman; the need to bring awareness to the horizons within which we move, the 
political and social background often ignored by psychotherapy. Also in reaction 
to psychology's closure to interrelationship and its concentration upon the isolated 
individual, Ecopsychologists are beginning to emphasise the embeddedness of 
man within nature and cosmos, of the individual with their environment.
Thus many voices from contemporary discourse now uphold ideas of 
interdependence which are in concert with the concept of dependent origination 
taught by the Buddha, and imaged so splendidly in the net of Indra. Such 
emphasis upon interdependence has a further implication; that of a shift of 
perspective, away from egocentrism.
NON-EGOCENTRISM
In discovering the dependence of all phenomena upon each other, we discover 
also the dependence of the self. As discussed in chapter four, although such 
knowledge is intellectually current in almost all contemporary disciplines, we 
have not yet experientially come to terms with it. Since the time of &akyamuni 
Buddha, Buddhism has presented its doctrines and practices to counter this 
emotional clinging to the self. In that chapter notice was also taken of the 
distinction between self and self concept. Similarly in his Notes on Dhanuna 
Nanavira Thera delineates clearly between individuality and personality, the latter 
being synonymous with "being a somebody", "being a subject" and "selfhood".124 
He explains that phenomena can be significant without being "mine"; that they 
can be teleological without being appropriated.125
122 P.Clarkson, On Therapy, p.229.
123 Ibid. p.230. Her essay ends: "I believe that psychology, counselling, psychotherapy,
supervision and organisational work needs also to acknowledge the final mysteries - the 
end o f our knowledge and the beginning of nothingness ..." p.231. Perhaps emptiness 
(Sunyata) is a doorway to nothingness for the West.
124 Ranavlra Thera, Clearing the Path. p. 105.
125 Ibid. p.487.
Such views may be substantiated from the canonical texts as we quoted earlier:
"In the seen there will just be the seen; in the heard, just the heard; in 
the reflected, just the reflected; in the cognized, just the cognized. 
This is how, Bahiya, you must train yourself. Now Bahiya, when in 
the seen there will be to you just the see; . . . just the heard; . . . just 
the reflected;. . .  just the cognized, then, Bahiya, you will not identify 
with it. When you will not identify yourself with it, you will not locate 
yourself therein. When you do not locate yourself therein, it follows 
that you will have no liere' or 'beyond' or 'midway-between' and this 
would be the end of suffering."126
And in the eighth century &antideva suggested: "In the same way as the hands and 
so forth are regarded as limbs of the body, likewise why are embodied creatures 
not regarded as limbs of life."127 Such views are far from those of the egocentric 
individual.
From the Buddhist point of view egocentricity is the assumption of, and 
identification with, a representation of the unified self from whose perspective the 
world is represented and constituted, while in reality: "The eye (ear, nose, tongue, 
body, mind) is that in the world by which one is a perceived or conceiver of the 
world."128 In ignorance of the dependent origination of everything including 
ourselves, we create a unified and reified self and identify with this fictional self, 
which becomes ever more opaque as we attempt to solidify it, defending it from a 
felt lack or loss. For Buddhism this sense of lack or deficiency arises directly 
from misperception, and is an unreal lack, a lack of something which never 
existed and never will exist, a permanent autonomous self. Once we realise such 
a reification is both unreal and unnecessary, the sorrow of its imperfection and 
impossibility dissolves. As we have discussed earlier, David Loy suggests that 
from the Buddhist perspective, this sense of lack is the prime object of repression. 
Going further I would suggest that for Buddhism both desire and lack are to be 
found to be empty or transparent, and egocentricity, with its positive pole of 
desire and its negative pole of lack, is revealed as a filter superimposed upon an 
interdependent, multi-centred world. Such a realisation of interdependence
Udana 10. 8 and above, p.99.
Santideva, Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way o f  Life. V III114.
Samyutta Nikaya 116.iv.95. Note "conceiver", as both conception mentally, and the 
bringing forth o f Varela, Thompson & Rosch.
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reveals the restriction and impoverishment of egocentricity, and dissolves the 
need for it, allowing us to ’see through’ both desire and lack.
In scientific terms, in a recent study psychologist Guy Claxton describes the 
development of what he terms the “Self System" in three layers.129 The first layer 
is that of sensory patterns grouped according to experience, the second is the 
extrapolation of these from their context according to concepts, function and 
meaning. The third level is that of language with its further disconnection from 
personal experience. Instead of seeing ourselves as distributed over different 
systems, we identify with a verbal label. Claxton describes how, in the absence of 
life-threatening events and survival needs, this Self System may be connected to 
the survival system, such that threats to the labelled or nominal self are perceived 
and reacted as if they were very threats to survival.130
Following the narrative tendency we have already discussed, we also identify with 
the narrator perspective. It is Claxton's contention that the self with which we 
identify, the designated T \  the narrator of our life stories is identified only with 
our consciousness. Similarly, as noted earlier, Ann Klein has noted the fragility 
of the narrative coherence upon which we attempt to found our identity and 
suggested replacing it with a more securely founded "visceral coherence" fostered 
by Buddhist mindfulness practices. From the perspective of the narrator, 
unconsciousness is either relegated, to Freud’s repository of repression or Jung’s 
mythical archive, or ignored. Claxton argues that we should recognise how much 
of ourselves are unconscious, not merely in a special or mystical sense, but merely 
outside, beyond or before the control of the I with which we identify. Neural 
network models, such as those discussed by Edelman and Varela and Systems 
Theory approaches, reconnect conscious with unconscious, mind with world, and 
posit an ecological self, very different from an egocentric one.
Guenther defines transformed mind as spirituality or resonance. Claxton suggests 
that spirituality lies in a correct understanding of "world-body-brain-mind", and 
the illegitimacy of separating them.131 Religious experience is the understanding 
of this, the removal of the Self-System with its illusion of separateness and 
autonomy from the working of brain-mind-world. Thus the accepted division of 
conscious/unconscious is found to be as fundamental and as questionable as that 
of body/mind and subject/object. If the hegemony of the self concept is loosened,
129 G.Claxton, Noises from the Darkroom, p.90.
130 Ibid. chapter 10.
131 Ibid. p. 12.
experience may be received more directly before the assumptions, identifications 
and emotions of the self-system are stirred into i t  Such a view is obviously 
compatible with that of Buddhist epistemology with its model of a first moment of 
clear cognition, prior to subsequent accretions and distortions. As we have seen 
based on the view, morality, meditation and mindfulness are the paths to health; 
firstly by dispelling ignorance and unconsciousness of the processes of the self­
system; secondly by reconnecting with the unconscious experience outside of the 
self-system. A moral outlook intellectually vitiates the hegemony of the self and 
affectively opposes the strength of desire and aversion which support it. 
Mindfulness and meditation enhance this process. This follows the pattern seen 
before; first deconstruction, then reconstruction in attention to experience.
As the perspective widens from egocentrism and even from anthropocentrism, it 
is accompanied by a movement towards difference, plurality and multivocality 
rather than monologue and unity. Within Western discourse this trend is found in 
Bakhtin's concepts of dialogue and heteroglossia,132 in Levinas' privileging of 
alterity, the face to face demand of the Other, even in diffSrance, Derrida's double 
voice of deconstruction.133
One aspect of this is, as noted earlier, an awareness of the silence within the 
spoken - of the preconscious and prelinguistic foundations of language, that which 
evades and avoids the closure of totality, whether called ontology or logocentrism. 
Levinas even suggests that it is not only the said but also the "saying" that is 
equivocal.134 Saying is a response to and responsibility for that which is prior, 
over which speech has no priority. Heidegger speaks of the prior pledge: "the 
realization that the true stance of thinking cannot be to put questions, but must be 
listening to the grant or pledge."135
See: "Dialogism functions ... as a principle of radical otherness or, to use again Bakhtin's 
own terminology, as a principle of exotopy far from aspiring to the telos o f a synthesis or 
a resolution, as could be said to be the case in dialectical systems, the function o f  
dialogism is to sustain and think through the radical exteriority or heterogeneity o f one 
voice with regard to any other, including that o f the novelist himself." P.de Man 
"Dialogue and Dialogism. p. 109. De Man believes that it is by way o f exotopy that larger 
philosophical claims may be made for Bakhtin.
See particularly S.Critchley, The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, in which Crichley argues 
convincingly for a reading o f deconstruction according to a Levinasian hermeneutics 
which reveals the ethical saying o f alterity at work within the said o f a text. "The ethical 
moment that motivates deconstruction is this Yes-saying to the unnameable, a moment of 
unconditional affirmation that is addressed to an alterity than can neither be excluded 
from nor included within logocentric conceptuality." p.41, where the unnameable refers 
to diffemnce.
E.Levinas, Totality & Infinity, p.260 "The "saying" and not only the said, is equivocal. 
The equivocal does not play between two meanings o f speech, but between speech and 
the renouncement of speech..."
M.Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p.72.
A concern with difference, alterity and the traces of the irreducible are the marks 
of the postmodern, rather than unity and totality. This has important implications 
in terms of this project. It is not my intention to weld together Buddhism and 
psychology into a new totality, a new theory, but to initiate a multi-voiced 
discourse, allowing for resonance to arrive which partakes of these voices and of 
the silence and space between. If any external transcendent has been 
deconstructed and found wanting, perhaps there yet remains the trace, an 
immanent transcendent, only hinted at in Western discourse in diffirance, in 
alterity and equivocation, in the feminine which evades the totality and unity of 
the same, but which is far more strongly upheld in Buddhism, in the 
unconditioned, in the emptiness which is indivisible from the conditioned and 
from the network of dependent origination.
Such polyphony and resonance calls for a different logic, different from either/or, 
and from synthesis. The traces of such a logic have recurred throughout this text. 
Most obviously in the eight negations of Nagaijuna, echoed positively in the six 
positive positions expressed by Fa Tsang’s Hua Yen treatises. It is to be found 
today in the world of technology in Fuzzy Logic136, and maybe hinted at in 
Derrida's neologism "seriature",137 in the chiasm, the intertwining of Merleau 
Ponty,138 and in the double structure of deconstructive reading. Crichley terms 
this latter, the logic of interruption,139 the "interdependence of irreconcilable 
orders of discourse,"140 and a relation or logic of supplementarity.141 There is 
some commonalty between the intersection of the Saying and the Said and 
Nagaijuna’s statement concerning the identity of the limits of nirvana and the 
limits of samsara.142 It is the logic of the intersection of incommensurable orders 
of discourse, a logic that is other than either/or.
136 See above, chapter 1, n.26.
137 "An interrupted series, a series o f interlaced interruptions, a series o f  hiatuses (...)."
J.Derrida, "En ce moment meme dans cet ouvrage me voici" in Textes pour Emmanuel 
Levinas. F.Lamette (ed.). Paris: Jean-Michel Place. 1980 p.48, quoted by S.Critchley , 
The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, p. 128., who describes it thus: "The concept o f  seriature 
describes the relations between binding and unbinding, between being bound to 
ontological or logocentric language while at the same moment being unbound to that 
language.”
138 M.Merleau Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible.
139 "The Saying shows itself within the Said by interrupting it." S.Critchley, The Ethics o f  
Deconstruction, p. 164.
140 Ibid. p. 169.
141 Ibid. p. 173.
142 Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika, XXV.20. "The limits (i.e. realm) o f  nirvana are the 
limits o f samsara. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever." 
trs. K.Inada.
Perhaps unsurprisingly the most overt and structured presentations of this logic in 
contemporary discourse come from Eastern sources. Nishida Kitaro propounded 
a paradoxical logic of contradictory identity, the "logic of the place of 
nothingness", a logic which exhibits a dynamic tension of affirmation and 
negation, presence and absence without synthesis.143 For Nishida the existential 
self is to be found in that dimension where the individual negates the universal. 
He believed that Christianity portrays a transcendent transcendence, and 
Buddhism an immanent transcendence. This immanent transcendence has been a 
recurring theme in this work, and is that which upholds the Zen celebration of 
ordinary human experience - when it is released from the filter of egocentricity. 
The release of egocentric, and indeed anthropocentric, perspective reinstates us 
within a supportive network, releasing the anxiety which inevitably accompanies 
our misguided project of autonomous selfhood. Another Japanese philosopher 
Nishitani Keiji, founding his work upon Nishida's study of the "place of 
nothingness" and the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, finds in this an answer to 
nihilism. For the concept of iunyata both founded upon the conditional yet 
partaking of the unconditional, an absolute which is yet immanent would not 
appear to have a direct Western counterpart.
ANSWER TO NIHILISM
The question of nihilism has been that of supreme importance since Nietzsche. It 
would thus perhaps, be appropriate to quote his own definition:
"What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate 
themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why' finds no answer. Radical 
nihilism is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when 
it comes to the highest values one recognizes; plus the realization that 
we lack the least right to posit a beyond or even an in itself of things 
that might be 'divine1 or morality incarnate."144 
For Heidegger, nihilism was negation of Being, and a concern with nihilism in 
some form or other has been a constant theme in twentieth century thought. Such
"The personal self, which is both free and yet determined, subjective and objective exists 
creatively by being the world's expression and yet expressing the world within itself, as 
the contradictory identity of the transcendent and immanent planes o f the conscious act." 
Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings, p.73.
F.Nietzsche, The Will to Power, paras 2 & 3 quoted in J.Stambaugh, The Other 
Nietzsche, p. 123.
a philosophic stance is related to the presenting disorders of psychotherapy. As 
noted earlier, the presenting problems of today's psychotherapy differ from those 
described by Freud. Hysterical paralyses are rare, far more common are cases of 
depression, loss of meaning and self esteem, and those relating to the breakdown 
of relationships unable to carry the unprecedented weight of expectation and value 
as makeweight to a world that otherwise seems empty. As David Levin points out 
in his introductory paper to a volume entitled Pathologies o f  the Modem Self.
"We need to understand the social and cultural significance of these 
disorders. We need to understand them as historical manifestations of 
a nihilism that also takes place in the cultural and spiritual dimensions 
of human existence, where it feeds on a poisonous and debilitating 
crisis within the heart of humanism and consumes our narcissistic 
attention while cutting us off ever more decisively and fatefully from 
the being of the Self; from our humanity, and the very ground of our 
individuality."145
Here, Levin makes two important points: the influence of nihilism upon mental 
health, and the result of such primary nihilism, which is paradoxically a 
narcissistic clinging, first to ourselves, then to nihilism itself, and which becomes 
the very obstacle which cuts us off from health. For, according to the arguments 
of Buddhism and the proponents of every theory which upholds interrelationship, 
it is this clinging to self, and its concomitant separation from other, that provides 
both the initial problem and the fuel that feeds it. Thus we can see the 
connections between interrelationship, non egocentrism and nihilism. The disease 
and insecurity which comes initially from concepts of separation, leads to clinging 
to the self concept and its narrative and metanarratives as separated and 
autonomous realities which, when found lacking, plunge us into nihilism. In turn, 
we then cling to the idea of nothing itself, reifying even that. The Buddhist 
answer is to let go of all clinging, to both being and nothingness, to find that all 
along we have been supported in interrelationship which has both conditioned 
(dependent origination) and unconditioned (emptiness) aspects. As we noted 
earlier, Ann Klein suggests that from a Buddhist perspective, the postmodern 
emphasis on the conditioned and multifarious nature of things, with its 
unwillingness to admit of any category outside the process of diffusion, is 
comparable to talking about dependent origination without emptiness. Certainly 
emptiness adds a dimension to psychotherapy as a source of unconditioned health 
and potential.
D.M.Levin, Pathologies o f  the Modem S elf  p.44.
According to Nishitani Keiji, nihilism, or relative nothingness is a necessary step 
in the process of understanding and accepting emptiness, which is absolute 
nothingness. Nishitani's major work Religion and Nothingness has been 
described as "in a sense a modem hermeneutic of Zen Buddhism."146 To 
Nishitani: "the overcoming of this pessimistic nihilism represents the single 
greatest issue facing philosophy and religion in our times."147 He argues that in 
modem times the essence of human existence has become identified with self- 
consciousness,148 paradigmatically exemplified in the Cartesian cogito, and that 
we see ourselves only according to the horizons of what he terms the "field of 
consciousness." He believes that it is necessary for mankind to move from this 
field of consciousness through the "field of (relative) nihility" to the "field of 
absolute nothingness" beyond all duality, which is iunyata. According to 
Nishitani, Western philosophy since Aristotle has been centred upon a conception 
of substance as a description of being. Although Kant's critique of this reversed 
the poles of the argument, substituting a subject-oriented standpoint, Nishitani 
conceives of both as operating in the field of consciousness, grounded in the 
presupposition of an objective-representational point of view entailing separation 
of subject and object, within and without. The ultimate aim is to attain to the 
position of the "in itself', which is neither subject nor substance, which may be 
realised only on the field of §unyata. From this standpoint of the "in itself, the 
substantiality of things emerges through being one with Sunyata. "The standpoint 
of emptiness is altogether different: it is an absolute openness."149 However to 
reach this position, the way out of the field of consciousness leads through the 
field of nihility before we can attain the field of emptiness.
The field of nihility, - though in fact no field, since there is no place to stand - is 
an existential experience. In Western philosophy, Neitzsche, Heidegger and 
Sartre have engaged with this. However for Nishitani they have not pursued the 
problem far enough. For him, the step into the field of nihility is the moment of 
conversion from the egocentric or anthropocentric mode of being which asks what 
use things have for us, to an attitude which questions the purpose of ourselves. 
On the field of nihility, "existence itself then turns into a single great question 
mark. It becomes something of which we know neither whence it comes nor 
whither it goes, something essentially incomprehensible and unnameable."150 
Nishitani compares Cartesian doubt, which for him is under the sway of ego and
146 Taitetso Unno, "Emptiness & Reality in Mahayana Buddhism." p.315.
147 Nishitani Keiji, Religion & Nothingness. p,47.
148 Cf. G.Claxton's similar argument discussed earlier.
149 Nishitani Keiji, op cit. p.105.
150 Ibid. p . l l l .
within the field of consciousness, with the Great Doubt of Zen which brings us 
into the field of nihility.
The third step for Nishitani leads from this field of nihility, which he considers a 
relative nothingness, which is absence of being and still tainted with 
representation, to the field of iunyata, absolute nothingness which is one with 
absolute being. As Masao Abe describes:
"The conversion from the field of nihility to the field of Sunyata is 
not a conversion from being to nonbeing or relative nothingness, 
but rather a conversion from relative nothingness to absolute 
nothingness which is dynamically identical with absolute being.
The self-presentation of ultimate Reality through our existence is 
only possible when we overcome all possible representation and 
conceptualization, positive or negative, affirmative and 
negative."151
Beyond all relativity and representation, on the field of Sunyata, form is emptiness 
and emptiness is form.152
Thus on the field of emptiness, phenomena are paradoxically reinstated as 
thoroughly ’real', since there is nothing more 'real' behind them. At the same time, 
as normally seen, they are illusory appearance. On the field of gunyata, nirvana is 
no different from samsara, it is the realm of the logic of non duality, wherein 
absolute truth and relative truth co-exist.153 It is the realm of impersonal 
personality, in which: "In its being, we might say, the world worlds."154 It is the 
mode of beings in themselves on the field of iunyata. The foundation of this is 
interdependence.155 Nishitani reaffirms the total positive interdependence of Hua 
Yen, which he terms "circuminsessional." "That beings, one and all are gathered 
into one, while each one remains absolutely unique in its ’being’, points to a 
relationship in which, as we said above, all things are master and servant to one
151 M.Abe, "Nishitani's Challenge to Philosophy and Theology.11 p.26.
152 "Emptiness of tiunyata is not an emptiness represented as some 'thing1 outside of being - 
other than being - it is not simply an 'empty nothing’, but rather an absolute emptiness, 
emptied even of these representations of emptiness. And for that reason, it is at bottom 
one with being, even as being is at bottom one with emptiness.” Nishitani Keiji, op. cit.
p.122.
153 . .  on a field o f emptiness where being is seen as being-s/ve-nothingness, nothingness- 
sive-being, where the reality o f being at the same time bears the stamp o f illusion. On 
this field, a mode o f being is constituted wherein things, just as they are in their real 
suchness are illusory appearances, wherein as things-in-themselves they are phenomena." 
Ibid. p. 147.
154 Ibid. p. 150.
155 "All the things that are in the world are linked together, one way or the other." Ibid. 
p. 149.
another. We may call this relationship, which is only possible on the field of 
tiunyata, 'circuminsessional.'"156
Furthermore, on the field of £unyata, wisdom and praxis coincide. The praxis, 
which originates in the field of iunyata is an "action of non-action" since it 
originates not from the ego, consciousness and intellect, but as a realisation of 
things in themselves. On the field of iunyata knowing is also a non-knowing 
knowing. Robert Thurman likens this non-knowing knowing which transcends 
consciousness, and which Nishitani terms "transconsciousness", with the nondual 
prajnaparamita, the perfection of wisdom displayed in the Mahayana literature.157 
Nishitani himself exemplifies this non-knowing knowing by the poet Basho's 
exhortation:
"From the pine tree 
learn of the pine tree.
And from the bamboo 
of the bamboo."158
suggesting that we learn of each not by observation, but by entering into the very 
mode of being wherein the pine tree is the pine tree, the bamboo the bamboo, and 
from thence to look at pine tree and bamboo.159 Here we are in the same locus as 
Dogen's statement that: "for all things to advance forward and practise and 
confirm the self, is enlightenment."
What this calls for is not just a new way of understanding, but one which is 
instantiated in action, in which, as we have seen, wisdom and praxis are nondual. 
Its foundation is in acceptance of interrelationship and non-egocentrism which 
leads to release of grasping at the conceptualisations and partiality which separate 
us from what is. It is necessary to let go of the different forms of grasping after 
grounds which appear as the usual answers to nihilism, even perhaps to accept 
that the journey into the field of nihilism itself is necessary. Heidegger would 
seem to be suggesting this also: " ..(To) put in question our own being so that it 
becomes questionable in its relatedness to Being, and thereby open to Being."160 
Eventually grasping nihilism itself is to be let go. In acceptance and openness to 
absolute emptiness, beyond divisions of being and non being, we may return to 
things in themselves. The consensus of those who have written of such possibility 
point towards a realisation in praxis. To repeat some of the writers quoted earlier:
156 Ibid. p. 148.
157 R. Thurman, "Nishitani & the Inner Science o f Buddhism." p. 162.
158 See above, p. 143, n.53
159 Nishitani Keiji, op. cit. p.128.
160 M.Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, p.78.
"Giving grounds (must) come to an end sometime. But the end is not 
an ungrounded presupposition - it is an ungrounded way of acting."161
"Finally we saw that these various forms of groundlessness are really 
one: organism and environment enfold into each other and unfold from 
one another in the fundamental circularity that is life itself."162
"If each link of pratitya-samutpada is conditioned by all the others then 
to become completely groundless is also to become completely 
grounded, not in some particular, but in the whole network of 
interdependent relations that constitute the world. The supreme irony 
of my struggle to ground myself is that it cannot succeed because I am 
already grounded in the totality."163
From such realisation may arise "an epiphany of one's entire form of life. No 
form of conceptual diffusion remains, and no questions begging for answers that 
reinforce a deep-seated resistance to acceptance that this life, as it is now lived, is 
the only arbiter of truth and reality ,.."164 We return thus, to embodied 
experience.
Having considered the implications of the views and practices discussed in terms 
of their implications for body, speech and mind, and their compatibility with 
contemporary Western discourse, can we now make some suggestions as to the 
possible form of a Buddhist inspired psychotherapy?
See above p.86. n.49.
Varela, Thompson & Rosch, The Embodied Mind, p.217.
D.Loy, "Avoiding the Void", p.171.




TOWARDS AN EMPTY FULLNESS
"The death o f  the se lf o f which the great writers speak is no violent act It is 
merely the joining o f  the great rock heart o f  the earth in its roll. It is merely the 
slow cessation o f  the will’s spirits and the intellect’s chatter: it is waiting like a 
hollow bell with still tongue. Fuge, tace, quiesce. The waiting itself is the 
thing. ”l
It is perhaps paradoxical to attempt to bring this study to closure or finality; for to 
be true to its presiding orientation its concern has been, and must continue to be, 
to emphasise process, emptiness, interdependence and plurality rather than 
finality, totality or closure. Yet while accepting that any attempt at conclusion 
must be a temporary halt, an impermanent resting place, it would seem helpful to 
review some of the discussions above, and to see if, from them, we can draw any 
constructive suggestions as to the form a contemporary Buddhist-inspired 
psychotherapy might usefully take.
The central attraction of Buddhism for psychotherapy is its long concern with 
mind and with suffering, its analyses of mind states and its practices designed to 
instantiate health. It can offer to Western psychology not merely a description of 
mind but also methods of transformation and a definition of health which can help 
both to liberate the analytical approach from the psychology of sickness, the 
medical model of deficiency from which it arose, and to give theoretical
1 A. Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, p.226.
foundation to the idea of intrinsic health espoused by Humanistic psychology. 
We noted how the four noble truths, the framework of Buddhism, may be 
interpreted as analysis, diagnosis, prognosis and prescription, all centred on the 
experience of human life. The first truth, which is to be known, describes 
suffering, presenting it as existent and impersonal. The second concerns the cause 
of suffering, which is to be abandoned. The law of dependent origination 
describes causality in general. Consistently Buddhist analyses are concerned to 
show how  processes arise, rather than to delineate what exists. The model of the 
five skandhas or aggregates presents a model of the evolution of human identity, 
the process of constructing a self, according to physical, emotional and conceptual 
components. This model demonstrates how this process of constructing identity 
is never free of emotional and cognitive dispositions and biases. The twelvefold 
model of dependent origination in relation to the human life cycle even more 
clearly shows the relationship between misperception and subsequent emotional 
attachment, whereby a rigid and unchanging identification with a self concept 
becomes the inflexible and egocentric centre of gravity from which the world is 
perceived or, even as we have described, "enacted" in every minute. For 
psychotherapy the task is first to understand how concepts become conceived as 
unchanging facts or objects, and then to loosen or delink the stages of that 
process, allowing for disidentification, space, choice and flexibility. 
Psychotherapy encourages awareness of the dispositions in order to see how a life 
statement or belief, chosen or imposed at one stage of life, need not be 
unconsciously or reactively reimposed at all subsequent occasions. It cultivates 
relationship rather than identification, flexible response rather than automatic 
reactivity, believing that the self is a process rather than a solid unchanging 
object. We are enabled to see the metaphoricity of our narratives, to hold our 
lives more lightly and see them as imbued with greater possibility if we do not 
identify unchangingly with one perspective.
The third truth assures us that there is a way of avoiding suffering, embodied in 
the fourth truth of the path of wisdom, morality and meditation. As the Buddha 
reinterpreted the existing doctrine of karma or causation in terms of intention, he 
both ethicised and psychologised it, making ideas of morality and psychology 
central to Buddhism. Unhealthy mind states harm the mind, just as trauma bruises 
the body. Unhealthy mind states unsettle the mind, setting up the reactive patterns 
of grasping desire and aversion, adversely affecting the equanimity that leads to 
the realisation that heals suffering. It is through mindfulness and meditation, both 
that the consequences of unhealthiness are noted, and that the mind is 
subsequently to be controlled. Thus the first necessity is to provide the calm
space in which to witness how the mind works, and then to disidentify from these 
otherwise automatic reactive patterns and identifications which entrap us. 
Through mindfulness we can arrive at a more lived awareness of our embodiment, 
our language and the horizons of belief within which we live. We may further see 
how the grasping and identification of our individual mental processes separate us 
from understanding our interdependence.
The wisdom of the path is especially that of the broader view. We have discussed 
how Buddhism presents a complex causality of interrelation, a multi-level 
processual model which gives rise to an understanding of the mutual 
interdependence of all phenomena, their emptiness of permanent and isolated 
form or essence, which paradoxically leads to their restored meaningfulness 
within the dynamic process of the whole. As the hypostatized "gods" of earlier 
times have been weakened one by one, such an attempt to find meaning and 
coherence in change without reliance upon some reified transcendent outside our 
experience is of the greatest importance. In 1960 Abraham Maslow wrote that 
what our fast-changing world needed was a new type of human being that he 
called "Heraclitian": "people who don't need to staticize the world, who don't need 
to freeze it and to make it stable ... who are able confidently to face tomorrow not 
knowing what is going to com e,... with confidence enough in ourselves that we 
will be able to improvise in that situation which has never existed before."2 
Similarly another writer in the same field speaks of the "clarity and confidence 
within uncertainty that is needed."3 Such views will not provide us with a 
permanent reified foundation dependent upon some fixed ideology but with a 
balance that will allow us to ride the wave. Indeed a current book of essays from 
a psychoanalytic perspective speaks of symptoms as "(failed) attempts at closure, 
at calling a halt to something. Like provisional deaths, they are spurious forms of 
mastery."4 As the same author states elsewhere, such mastery is illusive, for "we 
are all beginners at contingency, because it is the only thing we can be."5 Exactly 
as a recent work on Madhyamaka philosophy concludes: "We must turn the 
conversation from talk of resolution ... to discussion of an insight or attention - a 
refined, purified love of this world - that never ceases to illuminate, destabilize, 
and simultaneously affirm differences which are themselves supported by other, 
suppressed forms of illusory differences."6
A.Maslow, The Farther Reaches o f  Himan Nature, p.61. 
J.Hayward, Shifting Worlds, Changing Minds, p.2.
A.Phillips, On Flirtation, p. 153.
Ibid. p. 21.
C.W.Huntingdon, The Emptiness o f  Emptiness, p. 162.
The Buddhist view of interdependence and emptiness of inherent nature coupled 
with mindfulness of conventional things in awareness of their conventionality 
allows us to go with contingency, beyond a limited version of self, soul, ego and 
even no-self. It underpins an open-ended search, a non-clinging to any ultimately 
deceptive and empty structure or theory. Each new model may be more or less 
meaningful, more or less useful, but in time may be outgrown and transcended. 
Only an attention to phenomena in themselves and a belief in the ultimate 
emptiness of all models allows for continuing growth and a paradoxical kind of 
balance in a world of impermanence, contingency and change.
Considering all the above, what may be the specific features of a Buddhist- 
inspired psychotherapy? Firstly it leads towards an open-ended exploration, 
without specific expectations and goals, attempting and daring to work with 
whatever comes up within a field of unknowing. The role of the therapist is to 
hold open this space of unknowing, the space of this emptiness for the client, and 
to stay with and in it with her. The Buddhist inspired therapist will always hold 
the wider view - that beyond all the identifications and reactivity of the client 
there is the potential of the unconditioned, with qualities of emptiness, clarity and 
resonance. Perhaps paradoxically, this is also united with a mindful attention of 
experience and the things of the world as they are in themselves, an embodied 
grounding or visceral coherence that honours body, feeling and intuition equally 
with rational thought.7
According to the idea of the two truths this bifocal vision will move between both 
perspectives, holding open the potential of the unconfined within the conventional 
and confined. For both are necessary. Very often it would seem that the therapist 
is working only within the relative, and it is easy to restrict the focus to this alone, 
but an intention to hold both truths brings breadth and depth to the therapeutic 
encounter. The relative truth of any situation is its facticity - as it presents in all 
its interconnections; its absolute truth, its core nature, is its transparency, its 
emptiness of fixed and unchanging essence - it can be worked with. These two 
perspectives are present in all situations, but because of identification, reification 
and rigidity we lose sight of the possibility of the unconfined. Perhaps it is the 
specific task of a contemplative psychotherapist to restore mindfulness to the
Such a goal is shared by other approaches to therapy, cf. :"The answer to the question 
after the ultimate meaning o f human existence can never be given intellectually, but only 
existentially; not in words, but by our life, by our whole existence." V.Frankl, 
"Reductionism and Nihilism." p.408. However it is the contention o f this work that a 
Buddhist framework helps both to underpin such aims with its philosophy, and to 
actualise them with its practices.
unconfined aspects, even if in actual practice this may be only in intention. It 
does not call for an altered state of consciousness, rather an altered perspective; an 
embodied intention to bring the qualities of emptiness, clarity and compassion to 
the therapeutic encounter. It is an approach rather than an overt method.
As we have seen while considering the implications of Buddhism for 
psychotherapy in terms of body, speech and mind, such an intention pays 
attention to all the dimensions of our experience both as they are, and as they may 
be if our habitual reactions and restrictions are loosened. Thus, this bifocal vision 
may restore us to awareness of our embodiment, to a purified attention to 
phenomena for their own sake, to speech as metaphor, imagination and creativity 
and to mind as the enriched environment of interconnected potential.
From the view of interdependence arises also a broader, deeper and more 
interactive understanding of causality which results in a profound shift of focus 
from the isolated individual to a receptivity to the importance of relationship and 
context. Recently psychotherapy has been receiving a great deal of criticism from 
many quarters, both internal and external. Most of this is a response to its 
perceived narcissism, and lack of involvement in the wider world. James Hillman 
and Michael Ventura's recent work We’ve had a hundred years o f  psychotherapy 
and the world is getting worse is perhaps the best known example. As Hillman 
points out: "It took the last several decades for therapy to learn that the body is 
psyche, that what the body does, how it moves, what it senses is psyche. More 
recently, therapy is learning that the psyche exists wholly in relational systems. 
It's not a free radical, a monad, self-determined. The next step is to realize that 
the city, where the body lives and moves, and where the relational network is 
woven, is also psyche."8 Similar themes are echoed in the works of Deep 
Ecologist and Ecopsychologists.9 In fact this theme was noted years ago by Jung, 
who wrote as long ago as 1942 that: "Neurosis is ultimately bound up with the 
problems of our time and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of 
the individual to solve the general problem in his own person."10 Yet apart from 
R.D.Laing's attempt to see schizophrenia as a sane response to an insane world, 
the general view has been to isolate the patient or client in a personal world. We 
have also briefly considered Cushman's critique of psychotherapy's collusion in
J.Hillman & M .Ventura, We've had a hundred years o f  psychotherapy and the world is 
getting worse, p.83.
Theodore Roszak likens the industrial city to the body armour o f  our culture, 
pathologically cutting us off from contact with the natural world from which we evolve. 
The Voice o f  the Earth, p. 220.
C.GJung, Collected Works. Vol.7, para 18.
the development of the "empty self', and his call for a hermeneutic approach to 
psychotherapy, grounded in awareness of our political and social horizons. As 
hermeneutics began as a self-conscious discipline in the field of interpretation of 
sacred scripture, particularly that from other cultures, a Buddhist inspiration for a 
Western psychotherapy will both encourage and require a hermeneutic approach. 
A conscious awareness of its contextualisation and the dialogue between the 
different social and cultural backgrounds may lead to ever wider horizons, and 
even to conscious awareness of the perspectivity of all horizons.
The work of the psychotherapist is seen to be vitiated if limited to the sphere only 
of the personal with no acknowledgement of wider relationships. The view of 
dependent relationship may be applied to all the circles or mandalas of existence, 
the personal, the interpersonal, the experiential, the social and the transpersonal. 
As a pebble sends out ripples in a pond, so the life stories of individuals may be 
seen as mandalas , interlocking with other mandalas , each interactive, 
interdependent and reflective as imaged in the net of Indra, thus linking an 
individual within the greater mandalas of family, time and world. This view can 
lead us beyond egocentrism to compassion. This is an understanding of 
compassion interpreted not in terms of charity with its distinction between giver 
and receiver, but of resonance; resonance with others, with what is Other. For an 
understanding of dependent origination emphasises interdependence not 
independence and inter is the space between, not the space inside and leads to the 
middle way, the balance, whereas in standing in contradistinction to out evokes 
dichotomy and duality. Psychotherapy must inevitably focus on the in, but 
ignores the out at its peril. A view which upholds interdependence will help to 
save it from such dangerous ignorance.
Another important feature of the view of a Buddhist-inspired psychotherapy is its 
profound belief in the "basic sanity" or unconditioned core of each person, in their 
Buddha nature, essentially unhindered by the adventitious forms, veils and 
obstructions which personal life, history and experience have imposed on it. This 
discriminates between awareness as such and the structure of mind imposed upon 
it. Such an orientation provides for a different approach to one starting from a 
belief in sin, or a medical model of definitions of pathology. As we have noted 
the therapist will hold a bifocal view of confined and unconfined, of both the 
presenting problems and the suffering of the client and of their potential for 
health, the clear awareness of Buddha nature. Yet this is not conducive to 
egocentrism, for Buddha nature is not ego, or any personalised structure. As 
described by a Buddhist psychotherapy teacher: "It means dropping any particular
fixed reference point, dropping the notion of possessor and possession.”11 The 
quality of Buddha nature is beyond description and words. Perhaps the closest we 
can approach to it is formless awareness, and it is characterised by those schools 
of Buddhism which allow for it to have characteristics at all, by emptiness or 
openness, clarity or knowingness, and compassion or resonance. Even such 
positive descriptions are avoided by the Madhyamika who, believing that such 
description can only lead to hypostatisation, will only speak of Sunyata. This 
orientation for the therapist leads to a different way of being with the client.
This different way of Buddhist-inspired psychotherapy is founded on the 
contemplative practices of mindfulness and meditation. All contemporary 
psychotherapies concur in the importance of the presence of the therapist and see 
the relationship with the client as central to the healing process. A suitable 
relationship is usually recommended to be warm and nurturing, though never 
collusive, and the presence that of attentive openness to the client unobstructed by 
too much contamination of theory and countertransference. However, there are 
few, if any, suggested methods of teaching presence and relationship - except for 
the practice of meditation. The practice of sitting with one’s arising mental 
process, seeing thoughts arise, and witnessing them with welcome, without 
judgement, and letting them pass rather than becoming attached to them and their 
content or identifying with them, teaches the therapist a way of relationship with 
a client. It gives rise to a joint practice in which there is no highly defined power 
structure or rigid parameters of theory, and, if the therapist has done her own work 
successfully, little therapist contamination or aggression. For the client and their 
experience, the basic stance of such therapy is a belief in the healing potential of 
just "being with” difficult states of mind, paying basic attention to them devoid of 
accumulative judgement, story and identification, as we discussed earlier.
The emphasis of mindfulness and meditation in the training of psychotherapists in 
Buddhist-inspired therapy supports the belief that there is no ultimate undivided 
self apart from our experience, and that there is a distinction both between 
awareness itself and the structures normally imposed upon it; between the 
reception of experience and reaction to it. Such a foundation leads on to the 
further belief that healing and value lie in the present, in the ability to be as open 
as possible to our embodied experience, in a manner that is as clear as possible, 
free from defences or hindrances of grasping either in the positive form of 
attachment or the negative form of hatred and fear. Thus we are encouraged to
11 K. Kissel Wegela, "Touch and go in clinical practice." p. 7.
touch and be with our own experience as directly as possible, as it arises in body 
and feelings, unfiltered by dispositions of expectation, conceptualisation and 
theory. We are encouraged just to be with the experience itself, without 
expectation, without judgement and without self-image, paying attention to the 
body, attention to the feelings, attention to mind and the objects of the mind, in 
themselves, in the present moment, noticing that if we do not identify with them, 
they are impermanent, never entirely continuously satisfactory and without an 
unchanging core or essential nature. This is the arena of the Buddhist-inspired 
psychotherapist; what is going on in the present moment of therapeutic encounter. 
For in being entirely present in the present moment, value can unfold and 
meaning be created. They will never be experientially present and alive 
elsewhere.
On this basis I would suggest that a Buddhist-inspired psychotherapy may well be 
less cathartic than others, offering a middle way between repression and continual 
expression; as practised in meditation, where thoughts are not repressed but 
allowed to arise, witnessed, then let go. In the words of Sogyal Rinpoche: " rather 
than repressing emotions or indulging in them, here it is important to view them, 
and your thoughts, and whatever arises, with an acceptance and generosity that are 
as open and spacious as possible."12 A Buddhist inspired psychotherapy may 
have a slightly different intention from others. It does not set out to bring about 
change per se. It sees that what happens is outside personal control but that our 
reaction to events is both our responsibility and response-ability. Thus clients will 
be encouraged to be with their experience, noticing how they tend to identify with 
what they like and repress what they have been taught to dislike, or what they 
fear. They will be encouraged to cultivate ever more tolerance towards 
acknowledging all areas of experience with equanimity, to make friends with 
difficulty, and relax striving towards desires. Acknowledging such mind states 
need not necessitate acting them out, but they must be acknowledged and not 
repressed unheard. Increased awareness and friendliness to our experience, to 
ourselves, in itself will result in a changed relationship to the world we inhabit 
and create. Western psychotherapies often consider change in relation to the 
contents of mind, setting up an ideal of what we wish to change, or to be. From a 
Buddhist perspective such ideals only get in the way. Change occurs in our 
relationship with our arising experience. Bare attention to this, divorced from 
identification and reaction is in itself healing and the source of transformation.
12 Sogyal Rinpoche, The Tibetan book o f  Living and Dying, p.61.
As noted earlier, Thich Nhat Hanh teaches that the constant expression and re- 
expression of negative emotions will water the karmic seeds for a similar negative 
future. Rather than unremitting concern with past suffering he places great 
emphasis, as does the present Dalai Lama, on the cultivation of healthy mind 
states, of appreciation and joy in the daily events of life mindfully engaged in for 
their own sakes. Such an emphasis on positive emotions are more usually found 
in cognitive and behavioural therapies, and are often somewhat ignored 
elsewhere.13
Finally, as Ann Klein has described so well in her recent work on Buddhism and 
Feminism which, with its concern with the contemporary postmodern scene, I find 
most helpful and pertinent to this discussion concerning psychotherapy, it is 
through attention and its cultivation in mindfulness, that we may bridge the 
conceptual and the non-conceptual, mind and body, conditioned and 
unconditioned.14 Perhaps through embodiment, "visceral coherence" or a "vivial 
sense", in the phrases of different writers, we may transcend the endless deferral 
and entrapment of language in an immanent transcendence which returns us to the 
world in a different posture.
Although it is outside the scope of this work, there is also a further possibility to 
consider concerning the relationship between Buddhism and psychotherapy. 
Buddhism changed its form in each new country and climate it came to, and I 
suggest that it is perhaps from the field of psychology that Buddhism will find 
many of its specifically Western clothes.15 Certainly there would seem to have 
been more fruitful meetings between Buddhism and the contemporary sciences of 
mind than directly with philosophy or Western religion. The present Dalai Lama 
has been a firm advocate of such dialogue, well aware of the potential benefits of 
Buddhism to mental health in the West, and seemingly undismayed by such use of 
Buddhism, he wrote recently that:
"There are two general areas for which dialogue or cross­
communication between Buddhism and psychology could be very 
valuable. One is the investigation of the nature of mind itself, of the 
thought processes, conceptualization - simply straight investigation 
into the nature of mind. The second one is investigation of the nature
Psychosynthesis would also be exempt from this stricture.
A.C. Klein, The Great Bliss Queen.
We have noted earlier the possible influence o f feminism also, see chapter eight, n.106. 
Although as outlined in my Introduction the process o f Buddhism's interaction with 
psychology began at the turn o f the century, any specifically Western form o f Buddhism 
is still, I would suggest, merely embryonic.
of mind specifically in relation to therapeutic purposes dealing with 
people who are subject to some mental imbalance or dysfunction - how 
to bring them to better health."16 
He continued to say that as the main objective of Buddhism is to eradicate the 
mental distortions, in particular those of attachment and anger, since these are the 
cause of much mental imbalance and dysfunction, Buddhism will have a 
secondary therapeutic side effect, and may well be of use to psychotherapy.
Similarly, after a recent meeting between His Holiness and a group of twenty two 
Western dharma teachers from all the major Buddhist traditions represented in 
Europe and America, to discuss the transmission of Buddhism to the West, the 
resultant declaration contained the following statement:
"Teachers should also be open to beneficial influences from secular 
and other religious traditions. For example, the insights and 
techniques of contemporary psychotherapy can often be of great value 
in reducing suffering experienced by students. At the same time, 
efforts to develop psychologically oriented practices from within the 
existing Buddhist traditions should be encouraged."17
On the other hand there is the argument that to plunder Buddhism for 
decontextualised practices and psychological interpretations is both to weaken 
Buddhism itself and of little use to psychotherapy. To subsume Buddhism under 
psychotherapy would, I contend, be merely a vitiation. I hope that I have made 
explicit in the foregoing the distinction between Dharma as therapy, and Dharma 
as a strong influence upon an integrated psychotherapy. Again the Dalai Lama 
has spoken of this, suggesting in an interview that as long as such practices are 
presented as interpretations and not as the Buddhist interpretation, such borrowing 
is acceptable.18 As mentioned above in the Introduction, such an interpretation, 
coming from adherence to Buddhism as a path of liberation rather than as an 
institution, would appear to be of relevance to the contemporary scene. For while 
I hope I have shown that the ideas and practices of Buddhism may be of immense 
benefit to a contemporary psychotherapy, its institutional forms as religion may 
be less so. For example the Tibetan language has no words for guilt or alienation, 
or concepts for lack of self esteem, and a psychotherapy without articulation of
Hayward & Varela (eds.), Gentle Bridges, p.l 15.
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"... to pretend it to be the Buddhist interpretation would be a degeneration. However, it's 
all right to make such symbolic interpretations, providing one makes clear that this is 
one's own view, whether correct or not. That’s all right. No problem." D.R.Komito, 
"Tibetan Buddhism & psychotherapy: A conversation with the Dalai Lama" p.4.
these would certainly be at a loss vis & vis a western clientele.19 Freedom from 
cultural restrictions and the rigidifications of time, custom and dogma may even 
prove liberating to Buddhism itself, perhaps one could even say, therapeutic.
The Dalai Lama's words would appear to give an authoritative encouragement to 
the exploration of Buddhist philosophy and praxis as an inspiration for a 
contemporary Western psychotherapy. I hope I have at least suggested some 
reasons why such an inspiration appears relevant and timely. Au fond, perhaps 
there is this particular compatibility between psychology and Buddhism because, 
as we cited earlier: "if one allows that philosophy's concern is with being, one 
must also recognise that the concern of psychoanalysis is with lack of being"20 
which brings us back to gunyata and dependent origination. Psychotherapy 
sometimes appears to forget today, that its inception springs from the discovery of 
the unconscious, and it is the unconscious that subverts all certainty, rationality 
and system. A philosophy that combines close attention to our experience and our 
stories with a belief in their ultimate contingency and lack of firm solidity would 
seem to be a fitting inspiration for a contemporary psychotherapy, an enriching 
source of new ways of description, aware of the non-duality of being and lack of 
being.
Similarly, Japanese therapies, such as Morita and Nakan, although they have been 
introduced to the West by David Reynolds, portray desirable attitudes towards parents 
and elders that are very far from most contemporary western experience.




The training in Contemplative Psychotherapy offered by the Naropa Institute in 
Boulder, Colorado is a three year full time postgraduate programme leading to an 
accredited national Masters level degree within the U.S. university system.2
P.HILQS.QPHY
This training, which has been running since 1976 was started by a Tibetan lama, 
Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche and is founded upon Tibetan tradition, particularly 
Vajrayana Buddhism according to Kagyu and Nyingma lineages, and also upon 
the Shambhala teachings which claim to precede Buddhism. Joined to these are 
the clinical teachings of Western psychotherapies, especially those of the 
Humanistic school. From the Tibetan tradition the training takes the practice of 
mindfulness/awareness meditation and its understanding of mind states and from 
the Western tradition its developmental models, the language for discussing 
psychopathology and the methods of psychotherapy. Personal contemplative
This description of the Naropa Training rests on personal experience o f a course taken in 
1993 for which I acknowledge with gratitude help from the Irwin Fund, University o f  
London. Further information comes from the oral teaching and writings o f K.Kissel 
Wegela; of the latter, in particular "Contemplative Psychotherapy: A Path o f Uncovering 
Brilliant Sanity" and "Touch and Go in Clinical Practice." Further information was 
gained in personal interview with K.Kissel Wegela in the summer o f 1993. See also, M. 
Casper, "Space Therapy and the Maitri Project."
As o f 1995 the course if o f three years duration. At the time o f my research in 1993 it was 
only two and a half years long.
practice is allied to clinical psychotherapeutic practice so that the practice of 
psychotherapy may itself become a contemplative practice.
At the heart of the Naropa training is the idea of "brilliant sanity." This 
unconditional sanity or basic healthiness inherent in each person is referred to as 
Buddha nature in the Buddhist tradition and basic goodness according to the 
Shambhala teachings. Brilliant sanity is presented as displaying three qualities, 
spaciousness or emptiness, clarity or awareness and compassion. These qualities 
are held to be inherent in every client, therapist and all beings, and the path of 
contemplative psychotherapy is that of uncovering this brilliant sanity.
The foundation of the training is in personal experience; experience of one's own 
mind and actions is seen as the path to gain belief in this brilliant sanity. The 
basic method for this is sitting practice of mindfulness/awareness meditation. 
Such meditative practices as following the breath and returning to it each time one 
catches oneself becoming caught up in thought, emotion or perception, provide a 
method of being with experience, a basic attentiveness to the moment to moment 
arising and dissolving of mental phenomena. From this, a wider awareness may 
arise, both of phenomena themselves and of the context of space within which 
they arise. This ability to be with whatever arises in body and mind without 
distortion or judgement is a key notion in Contemplative Psychotherapy and is 
termed maitri. By cultivating maitri, or friendliness to one’s own experience, 
being the ability to be with oneself without judgement, students learn how to be 
with others as well. This meditation practice training students in mindfulness, 
awareness and maitri is at the heart of the Naropa training. It is further enhanced 
by the practice of gtong len, giving and receiving; a specific meditation practice 
wherein the practitioner trains in recognising the space of natural mind and 
developing compassion. This is practised first in relation to oneself, then 
expanded to consideration of others.
A central aspect of the training is the Maitri Space Awareness practice, a 
discipline conceived by Trungpa Rinpoche and Zen Master Suzuki Roshi. This 
practice was originally intended to be used in the context of a healing community 
by people whose minds were too confused to do sitting meditation practice. 
However, it is now used primarily in the training of therapists as an exercise in 
evoking and experiencing particular states of mind. Five major ways of relating 
to the world reflecting the five Buddha families as presented in Vajrayana 
Buddhism are explored in this practice; Discovering Space, Clarifying View and 
Intention, Providing Hospitality, Opening to Exchange and Compassionate
Action.3 Each experience relating to one of the Buddha families with its basic 
energies and attributes is explored in a specially designed room reflecting the 
features associated with the particular family. Each of the five rooms is an empty 
cube of different colour and has its own particular arrangement of windows 
allowing for a light source from outside of similar colour but permitting no 
contact with the outside world. A specific posture is held in each room. The 
rooms, colours and postures all help to intensify the experience. The intention is 
to give the training therapist the opportunity to experience heightened states of 
mind, both in a confused or enlightened mode, and the opportunity to develop 
maitri, the ability to be with such states, and the knowledge that whether they are 
be rich and full or frightening they are also transitory and empty. This Space 
Awareness practice takes place in the context of a residential programme and in 
conjunction with sitting meditation.
The first feature on the path is Discovering Space and relates to the Buddha 
family which is associated with the element of space and the recognition of 
brilliant sanity and its three qualities of spaciousness, clarity and compassion. 
Space is the ground for all other qualities, the container for all phenomena. 
Neurosis and struggle begin when we have and hold preferences within the space, 
colouring our world in the light of these preferences and identifying with these 
partial views of self as separate from space. The colour of the Buddha room is 
white.
The second family is Vajra, its element is water, its colour blue, its quality clarity, 
and its stage of the path that of clarifying the view and the intention. It operates 
on the ground of space. Clarity sees how in order to support ego (which in this 
system is seen as a generic dysfunction at the root of every psychopathology) our 
view of self requires work, rejecting what threatens it, grasping what supports it. 
The Vajra experience in its healthy form is that of mirror-like clarity which 
reflects things as they are in spaciousness. In its neurotic form it is the anger that 
rejects anything that threatens the separate ego, the desire to control, rigidity and 
perfectionism. It is found in the desire to improve things rather than accepting 
them as they are at all levels of body, speech and mind; wanting different bodies, 
using concepts and theories to make us secure, and manipulating states of mind 
for security whether by spiritual practice or intoxicants. Clarity of intention 
relates both to selves and others, whether in the healthy form of bodhicitta, the 
compassion for others based on lack of distinction between self and others, or in
3 See K. Kissel Wegela, "Contemplative Psychotherapy."
the neurotic form of aggression. This last may relate also to therapeutic 
aggression, the holding of an intention for specific change for clients which is 
ultimately in the service of the therapist's ego.
The third, Ratna room is yellow in colour, related to the element of earth and with 
the providing of hospitality. Its wisdom is the wisdom of equanimity. On one 
level it relates to greeting clients with cleanliness and a welcoming environment. 
On another to clearing up the therapist's side of the relationship, working with the 
trainee's own issues, becoming aware of countertransference, maintaining a 
meditative practice in order to recognise what is going on in the therapist's own 
experience This is supported by supervision and possibly, but not necessarily by 
the trainee's own therapy. One of the particular features of the Naropa training is 
a way of being with emotions entitled Touch and Go .4 This is a way of bringing 
maitri and mindfulness to one's own experience and that of the client, neither 
grasping it nor rejecting it, but "being with" it in an atmosphere of friendliness. It 
is a way of extending the way we watch mental and physical process in 
meditation to the therapeutic encounter. What arises is noted, witnessed without 
attachment; one touches what arises and lets it go. It is a way of cultivating 
openness, clarity and compassion to our and others experience.
The healthy expression of Ratna states of mind show richness, generosity, totality. 
Neurotic states display feelings of worthlessness, deprivation, fear of loss, desire 
to grasp, consume, accumulate, the search for security and comfort, self 
importance, taking up lots of room, using lots of words, pumping up with pride to 
cover inner lack.
The Padma family room is red reflecting the element of fire and is connected with 
compassion and the feature of working with others, of opening to exchange with 
others in the non-separateness of space. It is concerned with the opening of the 
heart. Exchange is an important concept within Contemplative Psychotherapy, 
referring to the sense of communication beyond concept, a direct experience 
which cuts through divisions of self and other. It is a concept which is noted in 
other forms of psychotherapy under different names; Rollo May, an existential 
psychotherapist refers to it as resonance. Padma sanity, recognising the 
interconnection and dependent origination of all phenomena, and encouraging the 
therapist to open her heart and be fully present to the client, is central to 
contemplative psychotherapeutic work. The importance of the earlier stage of
4 See K. Kissel Wegela, "Touch & Go in Clinical Practice."
clearing one's own house, being aware of one's own issues helps the therapist 
differentiate between exchange, resonating with the clients' experience, and 
countertransference, their own reaction to the client. In its neurotic form Padma 
energy displays grasping, holding, seducing, manipulating, fear of loneliness and 
strategies to bolster the separated ego. Once the grasping of this separated ego is 
dropped, passion turns into compassion and the heart opens to exchange.
From the concept of exchange comes a way of case presentation that is central to 
the Contemplative Psychotherapy training, the Body, Speech and Mind 
presentation. This is a descriptive practice, the aim of which is to evoke the 
presence of the client and of the relationship between therapist and client. The 
case presentation, usually to a small group of peers and trainers, consists of a 
description of the client in terms of their body, speech and mind. Body describes 
the physical appearance and actual behaviour of the client and the position they 
occupy in the world, living circumstances, work and so forth. Speech describes 
not only their actual manner or talking and use of words, but also their 
relationships, the manner they present themselves and relate to others. Mind 
comprehends their world views, beliefs and thoughts. Participants in the group 
are encouraged to share the responses that come up in the context of the 
presentation. These are addressed not as forms of analysis or judgement but as 
examples of exchange, clues to the situation of the client or the relationship. Thus 
group members become a part of the presentation, and their experience becomes 
part of the supervision process. One facet of this kind of group supervision is that 
it works as an antidote to the tendency to value theory before experience and to 
approach the client's situation in a problem-solving light. The question at the 
forefront of this approach is not "What is wrong with this person?" but "What is 
the obstruction to the health of this person?"
The final family is the Karma family. Its colour is green, its element air or wind 
and its path that of compassionate action. Its neurotic quality displays speediness 
and inappropriate action, perfectionism, fear of failure and inability to be present. 
Its healthy quality displays connection with the ground of space, with the clarity 
of view and intention, with hospitality and the openness of exchange in the form 
of appropriate action which arises only when grounded in present awareness.
Spending time in these rooms, mindfully watching the arising of thoughts and 
emotions both while in the specific postures prescribed for each room and after 
leaving the rooms, allows trainees wide experience of differing mind states, and 
how to be with such states. Such training takes place in terms of the trainees' own
experience in the expectation that only by learning to be with their own 
experience can therapists extend their tolerance to the experience of their future 
clients, modelling for them an ability to tolerate unjudgmentally whatever arises. 
The experience of this unjudgemental presence to different mind states has been 
found to be helpful in and of itself, loosening repression, fear and tension and 
allowing for change.
Contemplative Psychotherapy of itself offers few techniques, but is grounded in 
present awareness and mindfulness. It attempts to transform mindless practice 
into mindful practice on the basis of the four foundations of mindfulness. In 
terms of body, sports, even make up or nail biting may be used as the basis for 
mindful practice. Feelings are also worked with in mindfulness, using the 
technique of touch and go to increase tolerance, and awareness is used to 
encourage the union of mind and body.
OUTLINE OF TRAINING
5In the first year students commence with a class on Introduction to Buddhist 
Psychology which introduces them to basic concepts such as Brilliant Sanity, and 
basic beliefs such as the four noble truths. Alongside this will be classes in 
Western psychotherapy, introducing theories of child development and family 
process, and concepts such as transference and resistance. These will be 
presented with a strong experiential emphasis, working with actual children and 
with their own family backgrounds. These classes will be followed by 
Psychopathology studied from the perspective of sanity and neurosis, so that the 
idea of basic sanity is always present. Participation in these classes happens in a 
group and the emphasis is throughout experiential.
In the second semester the students undertake a ten week Maitri Space Awareness 
training, experiencing the different rooms and mind states as described above. 
This is experienced in a residential community setting and accompanied by 
considerable meditation.
5 This was true as o f Summer 1993, some changes have occurred since.
The second year of training is largely taken up with internship, nine months spent 
in an outside agency with supervision from that agency. Alongside this, students 
return to Naropa for supervision in small groups, comprising three students to two 
faculty members where the focus is on case discussion according to the Body, 
Speech and Mind model described above. There are also continuing classed on 
Psychopathology, Therapeutic Process and Group work and a seminar on 
Contemplative Psychotherapy.
In the third year there is one semester with classes on Ageing and Dying and on 
Research methods. There is also an optional Advanced Contemplative 
Psychotherapy seminar, texts for which have included works such as Santideva’s 
Bodhicaryavatara and the Bar do thos grol (The Tibetan Book o f  the Dead). A 
master's dissertation must be presented. Individual therapy is not a requirement of 
the training, but thirty hours of group psychotherapy outside the programme is a 
requirement in the first year. Sitting meditation practice is required throughout 
the training, and also some form of body/mind discipline, such as Tai Chi, Yoga, 
Aikido or dance in order to foster body/mind integration.
While contemplative practice is an essential component of this training, and 
familiarity with some Buddhist ideas and practices necessary, it is not necessary 
that trainees embrace Buddhist beliefs. In fact, though this training began with 
followers of Trungpa Rinpoche, the percentage of Buddhist students has in fact 
diminished over the years.
APPENDIX B
6THE KARUNA INSTITUTE
The Karuna Institute on Dartmoor in Devon provides a four and one half year 
professional training in Core Process Psychotherapy.7 As with most 
psychotherapy and counselling trainings in the United Kingdom it is private, part- 
time and outside the university system. It is a postgraduate level training, 
requiring either a previous degree or similar levels of experience. Although there 
is as yet no required legal accreditation or registration system within the U.K. for 
psychotherapists, Core Process Psychotherapy is represented on the U.K. 
Standing Council for Psychotherapy, a body concerned with the profession's 
internal rulings, ethics and registration requirements. Successful graduation from 
Karuna Institute accompanied by the requisite hours of professional practice both 
with clients and in supervision, leads towards accreditation according to UKSCP.
PHILOSOPHY
At the heart of Core Process Psychotherapy, as its name suggests, is the belief in 
the core, or in Buddhist terms, Buddha Nature. This core is the pure formless 
awareness available in the present moment. Core process is the process of the 
shaping of this formless awareness which occurs as individual development as we 
meet the world through inner and outer experience. This experience shapes and 
forms our personality in a unique form with which we identify and through which
Information for this Appendix comes from personal experience o f the training and from 
the talks and writings (unpublished) o f Maura & Franklyn Sills.
This is as o f the intake o f September 1995. Up to this time the training has been o f three 
and a half years duration.
we subsequently view and colour our world. Core Process psychotherapy 
attempts to facilitate an awareness of that process by which we hold the shape or 
form of past experience in the present moment, and by bringing awareness to this 
process, hold open the possibility of letting go of this shaped self and opening to 
the spaciousness, clarity and compassion of the core state. The tools for this 
practice are awareness and open heartedness.
A model largely based on Buddhist psychology is used to delineate the process 
from formlessness to form. (Fig. 3) This model of personality formation is based 
on a Buddhist sutra (Samyutta Nikaya 11.73) and demonstrates the process of 
creating and defending a sense of self. In a moment of cognition a sense object, 
an undamaged sense organ and consciousness make contact in a first moment of 
pure awareness. This is followed by secondary perception, a moment of 
recognition based on past experiencing and conditioning. The object is identified 
and known with its past history and conditions. On the emotional level fixed 
positions and reactions to the object arise, and the relationship to the object is 
experienced through the distortion of past conditions. Feelings then arise in 
relationship to this perceptual moment in accordance with the influx of past 
conditions. These concern our attraction or aversion to the object. Such feelings 
intensify; urges, needs, desires arise in relationship to the object. Conflicting 
needs and desires following parental, social and cultural values may add to the 
intensity of the charge. Subtle choices and judgements arise accompanied by ever 
stronger clinging to the views, feelings and positions with which we identify. 
Characterological strategies come into play, defensive strategies and defended 
positions. Following upon this is a process of collecting or incorporation or 
identification. We incorporate the object, our needs, and our responses, becoming 
the things with which we identify. Such self positions and self objects are 
continually collected and incorporated into the sense of self. Introjection, 
projection and ego reinforcement come strongly into play. It is a subtle process of 
self-identification by which we identify with and become the things we have 
collected, and believe that this is who we are. Ongoing present experience seen 
through the lens of past experience and identification reinforces this collected 
sense of self. At this stage, having collected, we solidify the mass of process into 
T, 'Me' and 'Myself It is the birth of "I am' in every moment. We have become 
totally identified with this T and will defend it, protect it and create the world 
from its perspective. From this 'I' arise our personality, life statements, belief 
systems. Attachment to this "I', rigidification of self concept and self image leads 
to suffering as the world shifts and changes in relationship to it. When 
phenomena and experience do not support our chosen I-process we experience
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psychological, emotional or physical suffering. The entire process is a spiral of 
self generating energies and forms in which each layer subtly reinforces and 
interpenetrates the others.
Core Process Psychotherapy evolved from the studies and experiences of its 
founder Maura Sills and her husband Franklyn; from the meeting of Western 
personality theoiy and psychotherapeutic skills mainly from Humanistic school 
and Buddhist awareness practice. Such awareness practice, meditation and 
mindfulness are foundational for Core Process Psychotherapy and all students are 
encouraged and expected to have a meditative or spiritual practice to support their 
work. Silent retreats are held annually and students are encouraged to attend these 
or at least one other external retreat annually. Although students are not, and need 
not become Buddhists, Buddhist models and teachings of dependent origination, 
Buddha nature and mental states are used in the teaching and it is from this 
perspective that other Western theories and therapies are reviewed. Meditation 
practices are concerned with the Brahma Viharas, or core states of friendliness, 
compassion, joy and equanimity, and the mindfulness practices of the four 
foundations of body, feelings, mind and the objects of mind. It is the central 
belief of Core Process Psychotherapy that mindfulness and open heartedness are 
the necessary ground for healing and that true healing can only occur to the extent 
that we are able to be fully present without judgement with our immediate 
experience just as it occurs. Developing the qualities of openness and awareness 
give rise to the practice of presence which is seen as central to the work of the 
psychotherapist.
OUTLINE OF TRAINING
A prerequisite of the Professional Training is a six month Foundation Course 
which presents the basic theory and practice of Core Process Psychotherapy 
(CPP). The main focus of this concerns what are according to CPP the seven 
themes of the psychotherapeutic process. Throughout their presentation the 
emphasis is on noticing and enhancing the quality of awareness. The seven 
themes are those of presence, access, process, resonance, reflection, 
transformation and integration.
Presence is the inherent awareness and knowingness of the human condition 
which allows us to be present in the experience of life. In psychotherapy it is the 
task of the therapist to be present for the client in order to enable them to enhance 
their own awareness. Awareness in relationship is contact.
Process refers to the stream of immediate ongoing experience which we associate 
with our sense of self. In Core Process work the trainee in training and the client 
in therapy are encouraged to bring a continuity of awareness to this experience.
Access refers to the ability of the individual to be aware of their different modes 
of experience, energetic, cognitive, emotional and somatic. Different means of 
access to these modes, through imagery, feelings, or physical actions are 
discussed and explored, and both the most familiar mode of access to experience 
and those less familiar are identified and facilitated.
Resonance is the ability to sense and empathise with the state of another. This 
basic therapeutic skill relates to the quality and depth of contact we have both to 
our own process and to that of another. In connection to this is the distinction 
between resonance and reaction. Resonance is accurate response to another's 
process whereas reaction arises as a projection based on our own individual past 
history; is, in fact countertransference.
Reflection refers to the ability of the therapist to skilfully reflect the client's 
process back to them. Such reflection thus creates a mirror for the client in which 
their own process may more easily be perceived. It is founded upon the therapist's 
open and non-judgmental receptivity to the client's experience.
Transformation relates to the belief in the natural health of the core states and the 
very transformative nature of the awareness itself The central belief of CPP is 
that openness to and awareness of any given experience brings with it a 
knowledge which is both transformative and healing, even within states of 
suffering and ignorance.
Finally integration refers to the process of grounding such transformation in 
everyday life It refers to seeing how actions and reactions arising from past 
experience are not and need not be inevitably loaded onto present experience. It 
also refers to an appreciation of the healthy core state and its availability in every 
moment.
This Foundation course comprises five three day meetings and one five day 
module.
The Professional Training stands on the basis of the Foundation and consists of 
four years, each year of the first three being composed of ten residential weekends 
or three day modules, and one five day residential session. The training is 
undertaken in groups and the collective process of the group is used as the 
vehicle for the deepening of awareness, since the relatedness of all beings and 
phenomena is the matrix through which individual process is viewed.
The first year's work is entitled Inner Dharma and the focus is on immediate 
awareness of present experience, gaining familiarity and working with one's own 
process of embodiment. During this year the emphasis within the therapeutic 
relationship is on work as client rather than therapist. The aim is to increase the 
trainees' awareness, receptivity, depth and toleration of their own experience. A 
deepening ability to access subtle felt sense and feeling tones of experience is 
encouraged, and the quality of presence is fostered. Prenatal and birth experience 
is explored in terms of the ways such experience is still active in present 
experience as part of the shaping of the personality system. Basic Buddhist 
theories of the skandhas, dependent origination, the nature of unconditioned mind 
and contemplative practices are taught, along with the Core model, described 
earlier, showing the process of perception and personality formation from the 
ground of formless awareness and the core nature, as discussed above.
Experiential work is carried out within the whole group and in triads of therapist, 
client and an observer who takes the position of 'fair witness' to the client's 
process. Written requirements for this year are for three short essays, one long 
essay (5000 words), a self evaluation at the end of the year along with two peer 
evaluations and a course evaluation.
In Year Two, the emphasis is on Dharma in Relationship and within the 
therapeutic relationship the focus shifts from the client's perspective to that of the 
therapist. While the emphasis is now upon the therapist, CPP is always seen as a 
journey which both therapist and client undertake together, and the work is often 
referred to as "joint practice". Such a framework also extends to the dynamics of 
the group itself. The nature of mind is considered to be revealed through 
engagement in psychotherapeutic encounter. The theme of resonance met with in 
the Foundation year is deepened and experienced as a bridge between the personal 
and transpersonal. The ability of the therapist to be present and resonate with
states of fear, conflict and not-knowing are encouraged. Such states are seen as 
the ground of potential transformation; the ability to be present openly and 
emptily with such states is seen to allow the inherent health of the core state to 
arise, if only hindrances of defensive reaction are let go. The journey according to 
CPP is to see what gets in the way of this. This is the essence of the 
psychotherapeutic process for this training.
In the second year the exploration of prenatal and birth experience is extended 
into early childhood with the formation of character strategies and modes of 
action in the world, based on the defensive strategies which were necessarily 
developed in response to our early experience. These are then explored in relation 
to the part they may still play in terms of our responses to present experience. 
This exploration of character structures and strategies is approached in an 
experiential manner, from the perspective of the CPP model and Buddhist 
psychology as well as Western psychotherapies8. An awareness of the 
rigidification of the skandhas into a sense of self based on strategies of defence 
and survival is emphasised. The division of this sense of self into acceptable and 
unacceptable parts, persona and shadow is part of this enquiry. Psychological 
processes such as transference, countertransference and projection are seen in the 
light of both character structures and Buddhist psychology.
Small group work in triads continues in the form of Active Supervision. The 
emphasis shifts from the client's experience to that of the therapist, and the 
observer acts now as witness of the therapist's process. This also occurs in large 
groups of five in an adaptation of the Naropa Institute model of case presentation 
according to the Body, Speech and Mind presentation. Here three observers 
observe the interaction of therapist and client from the perspectives of body, 
speech and mind. By the completion of the second year, three more short essays, 
one long essay and a case presentation must be completed alongside evaluations 
of self, two peers and the course.
The current third year which is concerned with professional issues and 
supervision, will from 1997 become the fourth year, and a new third year's 
training will be added. This will be entitled Subtle Dharma and the realm of 
exploration will shift to the realms of transpersonal and symbolic. Existential and 
transpersonal aspects of process will be explored through the means of images,
8 Presentation o f character structures according to models initiated by Wilhelm Reich, the
Hakomi Method of Ron Kurtz and the Enneagram have also been incorporated into the 
training at different times.
symbols and dreams, informed both by western psychology and philosophy and 
eastern spiritual practices, with especial emphasis upon Tibetan practices of 
iconography, mantra and visualisation within the context of a psychotherapeutic 
exploration of the archetypal. The themes of spiritual emergence and emergency 
will be considered in theoretical and practical context, as will also the relationship 
of psychiatry to psychotherapy.
During this year trainees are expected to begin client work under supervision, 
having undertaken a psychiatric placement prior to this if they lack psychiatric 
background. Such placements may take place during the second year. The focus 
of the work continues to be on the therapist's position and the chief vehicle for this 
is active supervision. This is experienced according to a different model in this 
year, again similar to teachings from the Naropa Institute but adapted in a manner 
unique to CPP. The qualities of Buddha or core nature, spaciousness, clarity and 
compassion are applied to the work. The three witnesses to the encounter 
between therapist and client give feedback on the session from each of these 
perspectives, also considering the balance between the three qualities displayed in 
the session. From the perspective of spaciousness, the ability of the therapist to 
'be with' and allow for, whatever arises is seen. Such questions as "Was the 
therapist directive? - uneasy with anger, or grief?" are considered. The viewpoint 
of clarity provides a context which may reveal both lack of clarity or a muddying 
of the client's process with inappropriate or countertransferential matters, or 
paradoxically, and quite commonly, an ultimately unhelpful and overstrong desire 
for clarity, a push for interpretation at any cost, which gets in the way of what 
actually is unfolding, from which alone something transformative and healing can 
arise. In this case it is helpful to consider clarity both as cognitive clarity and 
contemplative clarity. Compassion provides a context in which to see both 
explicitly, the warmth and receptivity of the therapist and implicitly at a deeper 
level, their compassion in terms of resonance with the client and the situation. 
Finally the balance between these three perspectives is discussed. Was clarity 
pursued at the expense of spaciousness, crowding out the confusion that wanted to 
be heard? Was spaciousness allowed at the expense of compassion and contact, 
and the client left feeling unheard? Observation of a therapeutic encounter from 
these perspectives provides an impersonal framework within which both to give 
and receive feedback which is helpful rather than judgmental.
Required written work continues; one book review, two case presentations and 
assessments, and a final thesis of some ten thousand words on a chosen topic is 
required.
A fourth year of training is concerned with the further development of 
psychotherapy skills and the negotiation of the transition between student status 
and the establishment of a professional psychotherapy practice. Issues of 
professional conduct such as ethics, insurance, note taking and case histories are 
addressed. Active supervision and case presentations are the main vehicles of 
training. The final aim is accreditation with the UKCP when course requirements 
and those of client and supervision hours have been met.
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